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ABSTRACT
Basic-Acceptance Teleosemantics
by
Esteban Withrington
Advisor: Michael Devitt
I propose an approach to naturalize semantics that combines the use-theory of meaning with
teleosemantics. More specifically, I combine Horwich’s claim that the meanings of words are
engendered by the acceptance of basic sentences that govern their deployment with the
teleosemantic model, developed by Millikan, Papineau and Neander, according to which the
meanings of symbols are related to functions determined by the history of their use and of the
underlying biological mechanisms responsible for it.
Horwich’s account is general enough to offer plausible explanations of the meanings of
all kinds of words and provides a plausible explanation of how meanings govern the uses of
words in inference. But, as Devitt shows, his claim that meanings are law-like regularities in the
use of words does not make enough room for misuses due to ignorance or error, which may be
regular. I argue that this problem can be overcome by adopting a teleonomic account of the
functions of symbols, which allows for failures in performance. The teleonomic account
characterizes functions as what items are supposed (but may fail) do to, based on their selective
history. While this is a biological notion, Millikan and Papineau have proposed plausible ways to
extend it to acquired representations. Available teleosemantic theories are truth-referential and
are usually regarded as competing with use-theories that are motivated by deflationary views of

v
truth and reference. I argue that we need the basic-acceptance account independently of the fate
of deflationism and that it can be articulated in truth-referentialist terms. Additionally, I argue
that we need to combine it with teleosemantics. The resulting basic-acceptance teleosemantics
claims that some basic sentences containing a word are supposed (but may fail) to govern its
overall use. This account, unlike Horwich’s, makes plenty of room for words being misused due
to ignorance or error.
Basic-acceptance semantics applies to symbols that play roles in inferential processes.
For more basic animal representations that have direct perceptual causes and behavioral effects, I
propose instead an account that combines Millikan’s effect-based teleosemantics with Neander’s
cause-based teleosemantics. Millikan’s theory explains meanings in terms of the conditions in
the world that representations are supposed to covary with in order to have the effects they have
the function of producing. I argue that this theory has the advantage of making enough room for
misrepresentation, due to its output-based character, but can ascribe meanings that are
implausible because it ignores the causes of representations. Neander’s theory explains meanings
in terms of the causes that the perceptual mechanisms are supposed to respond to. I argue that
this theory has the advantage of ascribing meanings that are plausible given the perceptual
capacities of organisms, but it does not make enough room for misrepresentation because it
ignores the effects of representations. According to the hybrid account I propose, the meanings of
basic representations are determined by what is supposed to cause their tokens in order for them
to bring about the effects they have the function of producing. I argue that the hybrid account
makes enough room for misrepresentation while ascribing meanings that are plausible given the
capacities of the perceptual mechanisms that produce them.
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1
Introduction

In this dissertation, I propose a new approach to explain the nature of the meanings of human
symbols. This approach is intended to cover the meanings of words and the meanings or contents
of concepts—i.e., linguistic and mental symbols. The core idea is that a proper explanation of the
nature of such meanings needs to combine insights from Paul Horwich’s “use” theory of
meaning with insights from teleosemantic theories such as those proposed by Ruth Millikan,
David Papineau and Karen Neander.
I borrow from Horwich’s theory the idea that the meanings of words are engendered by
the acceptance of some basic sentences containing them which play the role of governing their
use. Accepting a sentence involves “regarding it as true” and relying on it as a premise in
practical and theoretical inferences. To put it picturesquely, to accept a sentence is to have it
stored in the “belief-box”. I borrow from teleosemantic theories the idea that the meanings of
symbols depend on etiological functions underlying their use or the mechanisms that govern it.
Etiological functions are the functions that reproduced items have been naturally selected for
performing. This may seem to constrain teleosemantics to innate representations. But Millikan
and Papineau have proposed plausible accounts of how the approach can be extended to cover
the meanings of acquired representations.
Horwich’s theory has two main advantages. The first advantage is that the theory is able
to account for the meanings of different kinds of word. For example, Horwich proposes that the
meaning of ‘bachelor’ is engendered by the acceptance of ‘The bachelors are the unmarried
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men’, that the meaning of ‘red’ is constituted by the acceptance of ‘This is red’ in response to the
perception of red surfaces, and that the meaning of ‘and’ stems from the acceptance of the twoway argument schema, “p, q // p and q”. In these examples, we have one meaning constituted by
links to other words, another meaning constituted by direct perceptual links to reality, and yet
another meaning constituted by a rule of inference. It is worth pointing out that most theories of
meaning do not have this generality. The classical “description theory”, for example, explains
meanings in terms of the links of words to other words, which make it plausible only for terms
like ‘bachelor’ and implausible for terms like ‘red’. The contemporary “indicator” theory, for
example, explains meanings in terms of the (reliable) causal links of words to reality, which has
some plausibility for terms like ‘red’, but none for terms like ‘bachelor’.
The second advantage of Horwich’s theory is that it is able to explain how the meanings
of words govern their use, including their sophisticated roles in inference. The idea is that the use
of a word in some basic sentences can account for its use in other sentences that result from
inferential processes where the basic sentences work as premises. For instance, the sentence ‘The
bachelors are the unmarried men’ can serve as an axiom in the inferential system, so that the use
of ‘bachelor’ in other sentences can be derived from it. Similarly, stimulus-dependent tokens of
‘This is red’ can serve as premises for stimulus-independent uses of ‘red’. Many theories—like
the “indicator” theory just mentioned—rely merely on links between isolated words and reality.
A problem that often goes unnoticed is that such links cannot govern by themselves the use of
words in inference or thinking processes. Only sentences can serve as premises in practical and
theoretical inferences. So only properties related to the role of words in sentences can govern
their overall deployment and, consequently, constitute their meanings.
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The two advantages of Horwich’s theory just mentioned are lacking in available
teleosemantic theories, which account for meanings based only on direct links between symbols
and reality and are not articulated in terms of sentence acceptance. But Horwich’s theory has two
problems pointed out by Michael Devitt. First, it is presented as a “use” theory that is compatible
with deflationism: the view that reference and truth cannot play any role in the explanation of
meaning. (Deflationists argue that the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘refers’ do not stand for any
substantial properties that could play explanatory roles in semantics, because their meanings are
fully explained by their roles in trivial statements such as the statement that ‘Snow is white’ is
true if and only if snow is white and the statement that ‘Socrates’ refers to Socrates.) The
problem with Horwich’s theory is that it risks collapsing into a form of truth-referentialism that
is incompatible with deflationism, since it links words to reality in ways that non-deflationary
theories utilize to explain truth and reference: these are precisely the sorts of links that we would
expect if truth and reference did play an explanatory role in semantics. I think that a collapse of
the “use” theory into a form of truth-referentialism is likely, but I am glad to embrace it, since I
am not committed to deflationism.
The second and more serious problem is that Horwich’s theory, as it stands, is unable to
regard misuses of words as misuses, because it makes meaning depend on whatever dispositions
people have to deploy words, but people have dispositions to make mistakes—which the theory
regrettably is forced to treat as correct uses. For example, if a person has a disposition to accept
‘This is a dog’ in response to the perception of dogs, coyotes and wolfs, Horwich’s theory has to
regard all such uses as correct, since they are among the dispositions that fix the meaning of the
word. This problem motivates my proposal to combine Horwich’s basic-sentence acceptance

4
theory with teleosemantics.
Teleosemantic theories have the advantage of overcoming precisely the problem faced by
Horwich’s theory and many other theories that similarly rely on dispositions. This is because
teleosemantic theories deploy a concept of function that allows for characterizations of
malfunctioning or failures in the performance of a function—and with the added benefit of
allowing for such “normative” characterizations within the confines of naturalism. This is a
notion of function that has its home in biology and is anchored on the selective history of items.
The heart, for example, has the function of pumping blood (roughly) because hearts have been
“selected” by Darwinian natural selection to pump blood. A heart that is not pumping blood can
consequently be characterized as malfunctioning: as not doing what it is “supposed” to do.
Teleosemantic theories deploy this notion of function (very roughly) to explain the misuses of
symbols as situations where they are not deployed the way they are “supposed” to in order to
perform their functions.
Teleosemantic theories apply straightforwardly to innately-determined representations.
But Millikan and Papineau have offered reasonable accounts of how the approach can be
extended to acquired symbols. Papineau suggests that the learning processes involved in the
acquisition of novel concepts are selective processes. Millikan suggests that novel concepts have
functions derived from the functions of the innate mechanisms responsible for their acquisition,
which have been naturally selected for coining new concepts. Regarding linguistic words,
Millikan suggests that they have direct functions because they are reproduced items subject to
social selection. While these are very bold hypotheses, it is reasonable to expect acquired mental
and linguistic representations to have etiological functions, since our linguistic and conceptual
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capacities exhibit a complex “design” that is best explained as the result of natural selection
and/or analogous selective processes.
The main drawback of available teleosemantic theories is that they do not account for the
diversity of symbols that Horwich’s theory does, and they do not explain how the meaning of a
symbol is responsible for governing its overall use in inferential processes. Indeed, Millikan and
Papineau offer accounts according to which the meanings of concepts and words depend on their
direct links to reality: they do not provide plausible accounts for the meanings of words like
‘bachelor’ or ‘and’. Also, their accounts do not explain meanings in terms of sentence acceptance
properties, so the meanings they ascribe are not able to govern the uses of words in inference.
Even worse, the links postulated by these theories are not even causal in nature: they merely
involve correlations or co-variations. So they are detached from the causal roles of
representations in cognition.
The situation, then, is the following: basic-acceptance semantics accounts for the
meanings of different kinds of words and for how meanings govern use, but Horwich’s version is
unable to characterize misuses as misuses, while teleosemantics can characterize misuses as
misuses, but Millikan’s and Papineau’s versions are able to account neither for the meanings of
all kinds of words nor for how meanings govern use. To overcome this situation, I propose a
combination of basic-acceptance semantics with teleosemantics. The resulting “basic-acceptance
teleosemantics” promises to combine the main virtues of each of the approaches while
overcoming their main deficiencies.
In a nutshell, my proposal is that the meanings of words are constituted by the basic
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sentences that are “supposed” to govern their use. The meaning of ‘bachelor’, for example, is
likely constituted by the fact that ‘The bachelors are the unmarried men’ is “supposed” to govern
its use. And the meaning of ‘dog’ likely stems from the fact that accepting ‘This is a dog’ in
response to the perception of dogs is “supposed” to govern its use. Like Horwich’s theory and
unlike standard teleosemantics, basic-acceptance teleosemantics can account for words with
different kinds of meaning and for how meanings are causally responsible for word’s uses. But
basic-acceptance teleosemantics, unlike Horwich’s theory and like standard teleosemantics, can
make enough room for misuses. Suppose that a person has a disposition to accept ‘This is a dog’
in response to the perception of dogs, coyotes and wolfs. As long as the word has a function
specifically related to its application only to dogs—e.g., the word proliferated because of uses
governed by accepting ‘This is a dog’ in response to the perception of dogs—then its applications
to wolfs and coyotes can be properly characterized as misuses.
In the course of working on these ideas I encountered fundamental questions regarding
the metaphysical status of meanings and the methodology of semantics. I present my resulting
reflections in the first two chapters of this dissertation. I argue in Chapter 1 for a naturalized
semantics, based on the fact that meanings play causal roles in the physical world, and object to
the view that meanings are abstract entities. The idea that meanings are abstract entities is mainly
motivated by certain view of attitude ascriptions. Consider ‘Mary believes that it will rain’ and
‘John said that it will rain’. According to a standard analysis, such ascriptions relate the person to
an abstract object outside of space and time, which happens to be the same object in the case of
these two examples: the “proposition” that it will rain. Despite being popular, this view is
troubling because abstract objects cannot play causal roles in the physical world, yet the
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meanings postulated in attitude ascriptions do play such roles. The content of the belief ascribed
to Mary, for example, may explain why she picks up an umbrella. I argue in Chapter 1 that we
need a naturalized semantics that explains the nature of meanings in terms of properties or
phenomena that can play causal roles in the physical world. In the process, I defend a view of
attitude ascriptions suggested by Devitt, which serves as an alternative to the “propositionalist”
one: the suggestion is that ‘that’-clauses ascribe semantic properties to concrete representation
tokens by means of synonymy with the sentences embedded in the clauses. For example, the
ascription to Mary above may be paraphrased as ‘Some belief of Mary has the same meaning as
‘It will rain’.’ Under this analysis, attitude ascriptions quantify over concrete utterances and
thoughts and ascribe worldly semantic properties to them. In Appendix 2, I offer another
consideration in favor of this analysis: I argue that it avoids some serious problems faced by the
alternative non-propositionalist analysis offered by Friederike Moltmann.
In Chapter 2, I discuss what is the task of semantics. While it is not unusual to assume
that the task is to explain the truth-conditions of sentences and the referential properties of
words, I argue, following Devitt, that this begs the question against deflationists, who argue that
truth and reference cannot play any substantial role in semantics. I engage in this chapter on a
brief discussion of the correspondence theory of truth and deflationism. I point out that the
canonical view of the correspondence relation as one of structural resemblance is hopeless, but
that a contemporary alternative based on the logico-syntactic structure of sentences and the
referential properties of their words constitutes a promising project. I suggest that the debate
between deflationism and the correspondence view is likely to be settled by whether we find out
that we need or not truth and reference to play explanatory roles in semantics. This shows that
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we cannot settle the debate before engaging in semantics, and that we should not identify
meanings in truth-referential terms before attempting to explain their natures. Following Devitt, I
suggest that we should identify meanings based on the causal roles of linguistic and mental
representations. As “folk semanticists” we identify pre-theoretically meanings in attitude
ascriptions in order to explain the behavior of others and use them as guides to reality. As noted
above, we can explain Mary’s picking up an umbrella based on her belief that it is raining. Also,
we can learn that it will rain by ascribing the right meaning to John’s utterance, assuming he is
reliable. In general, we identify such meanings by the causes and effects of representations. The
same considerations apply to words and concepts, which also have meanings that we identify by
their causal roles, by the way they are used. Pre-theoretically we regard meanings as the
properties that explain the uses of words and concepts. Identifying meanings by the causal roles
of representations has the advantage of being “neutral” between various semantic theories and
not begging the question against deflationists. It sets a common explanatory target for the various
theories to compete against each other. But it also establishes a clear requirement for a proper
semantic theory: it must ascribe meanings that explain the causal roles of representations.
The second part of this dissertation begins in Chapter 3, where I briefly survey available
semantic theories, offer a sketch of the combination of basic-acceptance semantics and
teleosemantics, and elaborate on the virtues and problems faced by Horwich’s version of basicacceptance semantics—along the lines sketched above. In Chapter 4, I briefly present the basic
ideas behind teleosemantics and discuss in some detail the teleological notion of function,
arguing that it has crucial advantages over dispositionalist alternatives. In Chapter 5, I discuss
standard teleosemantic theories in more detail, focusing on the case of simple animal
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representations that have direct perceptual causes and behavioral effects. My original idea was to
briefly survey these theories before moving on to discuss human representations. But while
assessing the views, I came to the conclusion that the main teleosemantic proposals for basic
representations all had serious drawbacks. I ended up proposing a hybrid account that combines
Millikan’s effect-based teleosemantics with Karen Neander’s cause-based teleosemantics.
Millikan’s theory explains meanings in terms of the conditions in the world that representations
are supposed to covary with in order to bring about the effects they have the function of
producing. I argue that this theory has the advantage of making enough room for
misrepresentation, due to its output-based character, but can ascribe meanings that are
implausible because it ignores the causes of representations. Neander’s theory explains meanings
in terms of the causes that the perceptual mechanisms are supposed to respond to. I argue that
this theory has the advantage of ascribing meanings that are plausible given the perceptual
capacities of organisms, but it does not make enough room for misrepresentation because it
ignores the effects of representations. According to the hybrid account I propose, the meanings of
basic representations are determined by what is supposed to cause their tokens in order for them
to bring about the effects they have the function of producing. I argue that the hybrid account
makes enough room for misrepresentation while ascribing meanings that are plausible given the
capacities of the perceptual mechanisms that produce them. It is worth pointing out that my
argument for this hybrid account relies on the methodological considerations discussed in
Chapter 2. Finally, in Chapter 6, I discuss how available teleosemantic theories extend the
approach to human representations, but object that Papineau’s and Millikan’s accounts of the
meanings of human concepts and words have the problems pointed out above. Again, my
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objections rely in part on the methodological considerations from Chapter 2. Finally, I argue that
a combination of basic-acceptance semantics with teleosemantics—along the lines briefly
sketched above—is able to overcome the problems faced by Horwich’s theory, on one hand, and
Papineau’s and Millikan’s theories, on the other.
Millikan has resurrected the view of correspondence as structural resemblance I reject in
Chapter 2. I argue in Appendix 1 that, despite her talk of “picturing” relations and
“isomorphisms”, structural resemblances play no role in her account. This, of course, does not
protect the account from the serious objections raised above and discussed in more detail in
Chapters 5 and 6.
I conclude this introduction with an important terminological warning. I use profusely the
word ‘property’ throughout this work. However, it must be noted that in Chapter 1, while arguing
against Platonism, I express sympathy for a form of nominalism. According to nominalism, there
are no such entities as universals. And talk of “properties” is usually and justifiably understood
as talk of universals. Some people, however, do not want to “give away” the word ‘property’ to
realists about universals. Talk of properties may, for instance, be consistent with particularism
about properties: according to which properties are real but particular, not universal. On the other
hand, ‘property’ can be taken as a convenient manner of speaking that should be paraphrased
away in an ultimate metaphysical analysis. I use profusely the word because I do find it
extremely useful. But I want readers to understand that I expect my use not to commit me to
realism about universals. If pressed, I would say that I am using the word merely as a useful but
figurative manner of speaking.
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Chapter 1:
The Metaphysics of Meaning

1.1 Introduction
There is a commonly held view that threatens any form of a naturalized semantics. Many in the
field of philosophical semantics regard the contents of utterances and thoughts as abstract
entities, rather than natural worldly phenomena. The main motivation for this view comes from
an analysis of attitude ascriptions. Instead of analyzing attitude ascriptions as identifying
phenomena that play causal roles in the physical world, the investigation of attitude ascriptions—
as Michael Devitt points out—is “dominated by philosophers who talk of ‘propositions,’ Platonic
objects that are separate from the concrete spatio-temporal world of meaningful tokens” (Devitt
1996: 83). These are the entities that W.V.O. Quine dismisses as “creatures of darkness” (Quine
1956: 180). The aim of this chapter is to argue against the view that the meanings or contents of
concrete utterances and thoughts involve any relations to such entities. I will argue that there are
compelling metaphysical reasons for regarding contents as natural worldly phenomena—to be
explained by a naturalized semantics—and rejecting any appeal to propositions qua abstract
objects. To defend naturalized semantics from the threat of Platonism, we have to delve into the
metaphysics of meaning.
One of the main motivations for a naturalized semantics comes from Metaphysical
Naturalism, which in its strongest form is the same doctrine as physicalism: the view that “all
entities are physical entities and that the laws they obey are in some way dependent on physical
laws” (Devitt 2010: 254). Metaphysical Naturalism should be distinguished from the doctrine of
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Epistemological Naturalism, according to which philosophical knowledge is continuous with
scientific knowledge and does not have the privileged status it was traditionally thought to have.
Quine defends this doctrine with his rejection of a priori knowledge. Since all knowledge is
empirical, Quine argues, there is no place for a “first philosophy” that investigates reality
independently of science: “it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that
reality is to be identified and described” (Quine 1981a: 21). (See Devitt 2010: 254-255.)
But there is a weaker metaphysical doctrine that is also often regarded as a form of
“Naturalism”: the view that only physical forces can act upon the natural world. Most
contemporary philosophers accept that physical events can only have physical causes—since this
follows from well-established and fundamental scientific principles like the “conservation of
energy”. Accepting the causal closure of the physical world, however, leaves room for admitting
the existence of non-physical entities that do not have any physical effects. (Many contemporary
dualists about the mental, for example, have retreated to an epiphenomenalist version of dualism
according to which mental states do not cause intentional behavior.) Some philosophers seek to
naturalize semantics because they accept this weaker form of naturalism and think that meanings
do have effects in the physical world, but they are not physicalists. This is the case of Paul
Horwich (1998a & 1998b), who offers a naturalistic theory of meaning, but also supports the
view that the propositions expressed by linguistic and mental sentences are abstract objects. I
will address Horwich’s way of combining propositionalism with naturalized semantics and argue
that, while there is one interpretation under which the abstract entities he posits are innocuous,
there is another interpretation under which his view does conflict with the causal closure of the
physical world. While I sympathize with the stronger naturalist doctrine—physicalism—I will
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argue that the weaker and widely accepted doctrine—the causal closure of the physical world—is
enough to rule out abstract objects playing the role of meanings or contents.
I will proceed as follows: I will clarify what propositions are alleged to be (Section 1.2), I
will criticize the main arguments offered in support of the existence of such entities (Sections 1.3
& 1.4), and I will argue that meanings must be worldly phenomena, rather than abstract objects,
in order to play the explanatory roles they ought to play (Section 1.5). Afterwards, I will discuss
whether there are grounds for naturalizing propositions, rather than rejecting them altogether
(Section 1.6). And, finally, I will argue against Horwich’s account of propositions qua abstract
objects—or, more specifically, one interpretation of it—which he combines with a naturalistic
account of meanings (Section 1.7).

1.2 What are Propositions Alleged to Be?
The way talk of propositions is usually introduced does not seem ostensibly controversial or
obscure, but serious complications arise when we consider the ontological commitments such
talk is often interpreted as having and whether the postulated entities can play the explanatory
roles they are supposed to play. In this section, I shall discuss what propositions are often alleged
to be: abstract objects that constitute the contents of utterances and thoughts and that are the
primary bearers of truth. There are alternative views of the nature of propositions. For example,
there is the view that propositions are identical to the facts that make sentences and beliefs true,
the view that they are worldly properties of utterances and thoughts, and the view that they are
merely convenient fictions we talk about figuratively to formulate generalizations about the
meaningful utterances and thoughts. My concern here is with the view that propositions are
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abstract objects. In the following sections, I will critically assess the main arguments for this
view and argue that the meanings or contents of utterances and thoughts should not be regarded
as propositions qua abstract objects, since meanings play causal-explanatory roles that abstract
objects cannot play. In this section I will discuss the main features of the view I am opposing.
Propositions are often said to be “what is common to a set of synonymous declarative
sentences”, so that two sentences “express the same proposition if they have the same meaning”
(Haack 1978: 76-77). For example, ‘Snow is white’ in English, ‘La nieve es blanca’ in Spanish
and ‘Schnee ist weiß’ in German have the same meaning, so they are all alleged to express the
same proposition—namely, that snow is white. A proposition is supposed to be something
different from each of the declarative sentences that expresses it. It is what Alonzo Church calls a
“proposition in the abstract sense”, which he distinguishes from a “proposition in the traditional
sense” (Church 1956a: 3). The word ‘proposition’ was traditionally used to refer to a “declarative
sentence taken together with its meaning” (Church 1956a: 3); but in its contemporary use the
word refers only to the “content of meaning” of a declarative sentence (Church 1956a: 5) which,
according to Church, is an “abstract object” (Church 1956b: 26). According to this view, the
meaning of a declarative sentence is a proposition qua abstract object and what is common to
various synonymous sentences is that they are all related to a single abstract object. A variant of
the view is that the meaning of synonymous declarative sentences is a property they have in
virtue of a relation to a proposition qua abstract object.
The claim that propositions are what synonymous declarative sentences have in common
faces complications in the case of context-sensitive sentences. Presumably when Mary and John
each say ‘I am hungry’, they are expressing different propositions, even though their utterances
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have, in a sense, the same meaning.1 So, as David Kaplan argues, a distinction needs to be drawn
between two kinds of meaning. One kind is the unvarying meaning of an expression—e.g.,
utterances of ‘I am hungry’ always mean that the speaker is hungry—which Kaplan calls its
“character” (Kaplan 1989: 505-507). The other kind is the varying meaning of an expression that
changes from context to context—e.g., ‘I am hungry’ means that Mary is hungry in one context
and that John is hungry in another—which Kaplan calls its “content” (Kaplan 1989: 500-505).
Kaplan convincingly argues that, while the character of an expression depends on linguistic
conventions, the content of a particular utterance of the expression depends on its character
together with the context of the utterance: “The character of an expression is set by linguistic
conventions and, in turn, determines the content of the expression in every context” (Kaplan
1989: 505). For example, the content of Mary’s utterance of ‘I am hungry’ is that Mary is hungry,
because the character or linguistic convention for ‘I’ is that it refers to the speaker and the
speaker in this context of utterance is Mary. Additionally, Kaplan argues that, when uttering a
sentence, the content of the utterance—rather than its character—is what is said and what has a
truth-value (Kaplan 1989: 500). So, what is said and what is true or false when Mary utters ‘I am
hungry’ is that Mary is hungry. Armed with Kaplan’s distinction, proponents of propositions can
handle context-sensitivity by specifying that two utterances express the same proposition when
they have the same content, rather than the same character. Kaplan himself identifies
propositions with the contents of sentence utterances: “The content of a sentence in a given
context is... a proposition.” (Kaplan 1989: 500). To simplify exposition, I will mostly ignore in
what follows the complexities introduced by context-sensitivity. But Kaplan’s distinction is
1

In this case, the utterances are tokens of the same English sentence type. But the same considerations apply to
tokens of synonymous context-sensitive sentences from different languages. When Carlos says ‘Tengo hambre’
in Spanish, he is presumably expressing a different proposition than Mary and John, even though ‘Tengo
hambre’ is synonymous with ‘I am hungry’.
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important regardless of whether the contents of declarative sentences are regarded as abstract
objects or not. I will return to this issue after arguing against the account of propositions qua
abstract objects.
Propositions are said to also be the contents of beliefs, identified in reports of the form ‘S
believes that p’, where the ‘that’-clause contains a sentence expressing the content of the belief.
Bertrand Russell, for example, said: “The content of a belief, when expressed in words, is the
same thing... as what in logic is called a «proposition»… «That all men are mortal», «that
Columbus discovered America»... are propositions.” (Russell 1921: 240-241). Russell
characterized believing as a particular kind of psychological attitude that may be taken towards
different propositions. Someone may believe that p, that q, that r, etc. Conversely, he pointed out
that “there are various different attitudes that may be taken towards the same content.” (Russell
1921: 243). Someone may believe that p, expect that p, remember that p, hope that p, fear that p,
etc. However, he warned: “These attitudes are not equally ultimate.” (Russell 1921: 244). Since
Russell’s work, beliefs, desires and intentions have come to be regarded as the most fundamental
“propositional attitudes”, because intentional behaviors are presumably caused by intentions
formed as a result of practical inferences from beliefs and desires. While desires and intentions
have satisfaction-conditions, only beliefs have truth-conditions. I will focus on beliefs and
discuss other psychological attitudes only when relevant.
It is worth pointing out that Russell rejected the view that propositions are entities that
exist separately from concrete representations when he characterized beliefs as propositional
attitudes: he held instead that a meaningful declarative sentence is a “word-proposition”, while a
contentful mental image is an “image-proposition” (Russell 1921: 241). Notice that what today is
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regarded as the “Russellian” conception of propositions is the view held by the early Russell
(1903)—I briefly discuss it below—which he later rejected. Russell’s view during this later
period was closely related to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s: “the proposition is the propositional sign in
its projective relation to the world” (Wittgenstein 1922: 3.12). Russell and Wittgenstein reverted
to the traditional use of the word ‘proposition’.2
Contemporary accounts of propositional attitudes, however, often adopt the view that
they are relations between agents and abstract objects. According to this view, what the belief
that snow is white, the sentence ‘Snow is white’ and the sentence ‘Schnee ist weiß’ have in
common is that they are all related to a single abstract object: the proposition that snow is white.
Regarding a proposition as an abstract object raises difficult metaphysical questions. Stephen
Schiffer, for example, characterizes the nature of a proposition as follows:
Well: (i) it is abstract, in that it has no spatial location... (ii) It is mind- and
language-independent in that it exists in possible worlds in which there are
neither thinkers nor speakers... [It] is also language-independent in that, while it
may be the content of a sentence of any language, it itself belongs to no language;
it is not a linguistic entity... [Propositions are] abstract, mind- and languageindependent objects... (Schiffer 1992: 506)
Basically, the claim is that propositions are Platonic objects that exist outside of the physical
world of space and time and independently of any concrete utterances and thoughts. The main
source of this view is Gottlob Frege, who argued that the proposition expressed by a sentence has
2

Locke, for example, said: “The signs we chiefly use are either ideas or words; wherewith we make either mental
or verbal propositions.” (Essay: Book II, Ch. XXXII, §19). Similarly, Ockham claimed that the parts of “mental
propositions” are “called concepts” and that “a mental proposition is composed... in the same way as a spoken
proposition is composed of spoken words” (Summa Logicae: Part I C12).
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only the senses of the words as constituents (Frege 1956: 292), which are “neither things of the
outer world nor ideas”, but abstract entities that exist in a Platonic “third realm” (Frege 1956:
302). These Platonic objects are extremely mysterious. Where do they exist, if not in space and
time? What are they made of? How can we know they exist if we cannot access the otherworldly realm they inhabit? And, more importantly, how can they be the content of concrete
utterances and thoughts if—given the causal closure of the physical world—they cannot interact
with them? Since there are no satisfactory answers to these crucial questions—I will focus on the
last one, which is particularly pressing—there is a very strong case for disregarding propositions
qua abstract objects as “creatures of darkness”.
Finally, propositions are claimed to be the primary bearers of truth. This specific claim
has to be distinguished from the claim that propositions are truth-bearers—a broader claim that is
compatible with a number of differing views about the nature of propositions and their relation to
declarative sentences and beliefs. The claim that “propositions” are truth-bearers, without further
qualification, applies equally to “propositions” regarded as meaningful sentences or contentful
beliefs and to propositions regarded exclusively as the meanings or contents that sentences or
beliefs may have. In contrast, the claim that propositions are the primary truth-bearers is clearly
committed to the latter of these views. The idea is that particular sentences and beliefs are only
derivatively true: a belief is true only insofar as it has a true proposition as its content and a
sentence is true only when it expresses a true proposition. Talk of sentences or beliefs being true
is considered at best as parasitic. Frege, for example, claimed: “when we call a sentence true we
really mean its sense is” (Frege 1956: 292). The view is popular among contemporary
philosophers. Some argue even that it is implicit in our ordinary way of talking. Paul Horwich,
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for example, claims: “Ordinary language suggests that propositional truth is fundamental and
that the notion of an utterance ‘expressing a true proposition’ and the notion of a belief ‘being
directed at a true proposition’ are understood in terms of it.” (Horwich 1998b: 133). I will
challenge this view and the underlying assumption that ordinary language considerations can
settle metaphysical controversies.
The particular view on the nature of propositions I oppose—and will argue against in the
remainder of this chapter—is the one that endorses all of the three following claims:
(1) Propositions are the common meanings of synonymous sentences and beliefs.
(2) Propositions are the primary truth-bearers.
(3) Propositions are mind- and language-independent abstract objects.
Whether propositions so conceived really exist depends on whether synonymous declarative
sentences and the beliefs identified by ‘that’-clauses containing them indeed have something in
common, whether what they have in common is a legitimate and primary truth-bearer and
whether what they have in common is a relation to an abstract entity.
The view that combines claims (1), (2) and (3) should be clearly distinguished from
alternative views. I will focus for a moment only on sentences to simplify exposition. Consider
the view according to which propositions are identical to the concrete facts represented by true
sentences (e.g., Russell 1904). This view rejects (3), should also reject (2)—since it cannot draw
a distinction between truth-makers and truth-bearers—and endorses a qualified version of (1):
synonymous true sentences express the same proposition. Another view regards propositions as
worldly semantic properties shared by synonymous sentences and holds that these properties are
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the primary truth-bearers (e.g., Armstrong 2004). This view endorses (1) and (2) but rejects (3).
Finally, there is the view that the primary truth-bearers are meaningful sentence tokens that are
true or false partly in virtue of their meanings (and partly in virtue of how the world is), where
such meanings are worldly phenomena (e.g., Devitt 1996). This view rejects (3), endorses (2)
only if ‘proposition’ is used in its traditional sense and endorses a qualified version of (1):
synonymous sentences have common meanings, but these meanings should not be regarded by
themselves as propositions, since what is true or false are meaningful tokens.
While it is clear that various sentences and beliefs do have common semantic features
that are responsible for their truth or falsity, it is far from clear that these common features
involve abstract entities.3 Consider the various utterances and written inscriptions of ‘Snow is
white’ in English, of ‘La nieve es blanca’ in Spanish, of ‘Schnee ist weiß’ in German, and the
various instances of the belief that snow is white in the minds of different people. Surely all these
concrete sentence and belief tokens have “something” in common: they all mean or have the
content that snow is white. Moreover, these sentence and belief tokens surely are true in virtue of
their meanings or contents (together with snow being white). Unless we are skeptical about the
very notions of meaning or sameness of meaning—i.e., synonymy—there is no reason to
disregard them as “creatures of darkness”.4 But why should we regard meanings as abstract
entities rather than worldly features of sentence and belief tokens?
3

I will focus mainly on sentence and belief tokens. Different but synonymous (non-context-sensitive) sentence
types are said to express the same proposition. In turn, different concrete tokens of the same (non-contextsensitive) sentence type are said to express the same proposition. The major contrast is between concrete
sentence and belief tokens, on one hand, and the alleged abstract objects called “propositions”, on the other.

4

Quine’s rejection of propositions stems, in part, from his skepticism about synonymy: “If there were
propositions, they would induce a certain relation of synonymy or equivalence between sentences themselves:
those sentences would be equivalent that expressed the same proposition. Now my objection is... that the
appropriate equivalence relation makes no objective sense at the level of sentences.” (Quine 1970: 3) I will
ignore this skepticism here and assume that a naturalized semantics can account for different sentence and belief
tokens having the same meaning or content.
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The view that meanings are abstract objects is usually motivated by the metaphysical
conviction that, when various sentence and belief tokens have the same representational content,
what is common to them is not just a property but, rather, a relation to a single object: the same
thing that is said or believed on many occasions and which has the property of being true or
false.5 This postulated object is assumed to be something different both from the concrete
sentence and belief tokens related to it and from the reality that would make it true. A
proposition, on this view, is an intermediary between linguistic and mental entities, on one side,
and the represented world, on the other. For example, it is alleged that a token of ‘Snow is white’
is (derivatively) true because it expresses the proposition that snow is white, which in turn is
(primarily) true because snow is white. This contrasts with the simpler view that a token of
‘Snow is white’ is true because snow is white, with no additional entity mediating between the
sentence and the world. The simpler view has the advantages of being more economical—i.e.,
postulating fewer entities—and relying only on things whose reality is already uncontroversial
(Devitt 1996: 212).
I end this section with a clarification of the notion that propositions are mind- and
language-independent entities. While I am focusing on the version of this view that can be traced
back to Frege, there is another equally popular version that is not (necessarily) committed to
propositions qua abstract objects: the so called “Russellian” account of propositions. The early
Russell held that propositions do not contain symbols: “Words all have meaning... they are
symbols which stand for something other than themselves. But a proposition... does not itself
5

The meaning of a sentence or belief token, on this view, may be regarded as an object or as the property of being
related to an object. However, regarding the meaning as a property is also compatible with it not being a relation
to an object: “[Whereas] if the meaning of a token is an object then the token obviously has the property of
being related to that object; it is not the case that if the meaning is a property then that property is obviously a
relation to some object.” (Devitt 1996: 57).
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contain words: it contains the entities indicated by words” (Russell 1903: 48). On this view, the
sentence ‘Mary loves John’ has the words ‘Mary’, ‘loves’ and ‘John’ as constituents, while the
proposition it expresses is a mind- and language-independent entity that only has the referents of
these words in the world as constituents: Mary, love and John. The early Russell and Frege agree
that only the meanings of words are constituents of the proposition expressed by a sentence.
Their disagreement is about the nature of those meanings. Frege regards senses while the early
Russell regards referents as the constituents of propositions.
The “Russellian” account of the parts of a proposition needs also an account of what
binds them together into a single entity. Russell claimed that “every proposition has a unity
which renders it distinct from the sum of its constituents” (Russell 1903: 53). In the case of the
sentence ‘Mary loves John’ the unity is provided by the syntactic arrangement of its words. But
the proposition that Mary loves John allegedly contains no words. Russell proposed that what
provides the unity of such a proposition is that the loving relation “actually relates” Mary and
John (Russell 1903: 50). As Jeffrey King notices, on this view there is “a collapse of true
propositions into the facts that make them true” (King 2007: 23). Russell for a time embraced the
collapse and suggested that a proposition is true if and only if it is identical to a fact (Russell:
1904). But the collapse creates a serious problem. It entails, as King points out, that “there are no
false propositions” (King 2007: 23). If it is not a fact that Mary loves John, then there is no unity
that we can call the “false proposition” that Mary loves John. This simple point constitutes a
reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine.
The Russellian account of the parts of propositions may be combined with other accounts
of the unity of the proposition. It may be claimed the unity is provided by an abstract structure
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that is not identical to the structure of the fact it represents. This proposal avoids the collapse of
propositions into facts, but propositions are regarded again as abstract structured entities—even
if their parts are concrete. The case against propositions qua abstract entities I make below
applies also to this kind of view. King (2007) proposes a different modification of the Russellian
view, according to which the unity of a proposition is provided by the syntactic structure of the
sentence expressing it. This proposal also avoids the collapse of propositions into facts. But it
clearly departs from the Platonic view I am discussing: King’s “propositions” are not languageindependent.6
Many philosophers, however, still subscribe to propositions qua abstract, mind- and
language-independent objects. In the next two sections I will discuss the main arguments offered
in support of this view. I will argue that none of them succeeds and that the explanation of the
common contents of various declarative sentences and beliefs—in virtue of which they are true
or false—should rely on worldly phenomena rather than relations to alleged abstract objects.

1.3 Propositions and the “One over Many” Argument
One consideration that may be offered in support of regarding the common contents of various
sentence and belief tokens as abstract objects relies on the classical “One over Many” or
“Universals” problem. In this section, I shall present the problem, discuss how it may be applied
6

King’s ingenious proposal, however, adopts a “direct reference” view of meaning along the lines proposed by
Nathan Salmon (1986) and Scott Soames (2002). This view faces well-known problems: it cannot account for
differences in meaning between—or in the “propositions” expressed by—sentences like ‘Lois Lane loves
Superman’ and ‘Lois Lane loves Clark Kent’. Frege’s solution to this problem was to regard “modes of
presentation” or senses as part of the meanings of words (Frege 1948). Frege problematically regarded the
senses of names as associated descriptions: a view that has been debunked by Saul Kripke (1982). He also
regarded the senses of sentences as abstract entities: the target of this chapter. But a broadly Fregean solution
can be articulated without any of these problematic commitments (see Devitt 2001b & 2012).
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to meanings and argue that it fails to provide support for regarding them as abstract objects.
How can many things have one single feature in common? Multiple objects, for example,
are red. This mundane situation may seem, as David Armstrong puts it, “profoundly puzzling”:
The same property can belong to different things... Apparently, there can be
something identical in things which are not identical. Things are one at the same
time as they are many. How is this possible? (Armstrong: 1978: 11)
Plato proposed an uncanny solution to this problem: when many concrete and particular things
share a common feature, there must be one abstract and universal thing—a “form”—that exists
independently of any of them but that they all are related to. In the Republic Plato says: “[Take]
any set of many things you like. For example, there are... many couches and tables... But the
forms connected to these manufactured items are surely just two, one of a couch and one of a
table.” (Rep.: 596a-b) Plato says of “all the forms”: “each of them is itself one thing, but because
they appear all over the place in partnership with actions and bodies, and with one another, each
of them appears to be many things.” (Rep.: 476a) Needless to say, Plato’s solution seems even
more puzzling than the problem. According to Plato, if many things are red, it must be because
they are all related to a single abstract object: redness itself. Similarly, it may be argued, we need
to explain how numerically different sentence and belief tokens can have a single meaning or
content in common that is responsible for their truth or falsity, and the Platonic solution is to
postulate an abstract object that all of these tokens are related to. It is worth addressing this
instance of the “One over Many” argument, even if it is seldom explicitly made nowadays by
those who regard propositions as abstract objects. “One over Many” thinking is common and
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may well have some influence on the view that meanings or propositions are abstract entities.
Consider, for example, the following passage by George Pitcher:
If one person says “It is raining,” another “Il pleut,” and a third “Es regnet,” a
correct answer to the question “What did he say?” would in each case be “He said
that it is raining”—for each would have said the same thing. And it is this element
which all three utterances have in common—this same thing that is said in all
three cases—that is the real bearer of truth, not the different sentences which the
speakers happen to utter. (Pitcher 1964: 5)7
Since different synonymous sentence tokens all say the same thing, the passage suggests, this
common feature must itself be another thing that they all are related to and that is the “real”
truth-bearer. But this argument, as Richard Kirkham points out, is a “non sequitur” (Kirkham
1992: 64). It simply does not follow from different utterances saying the same thing that each
utterance does not say it by itself or that it is not a truth-bearer in its own right: “The [different]
tokens say the same thing, but each one says it independently. Why could not each of the
sentence tokens be true because of what it says?” (Kirkham 1992: 64). The metaphysical
principle that the common features of worldly things must involve a common relation to an
abstract thing that “really” has that feature is, as Kirkham points out, itself problematic:
Consider the property of being my sister: there are two women in the world who
possess this property, and it is not something they have in common that “really”
possesses the property, they each have it. There is not one thing that is my sister,

7

In fairness, Pitcher seems to be merely presenting here what he takes to be a commonly held consideration,
since he eventually rejects the view that meanings are Platonic objects (Pitcher 1964: 9).
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there are two. (Kirkham 1992: 65)8
Similarly, when various utterances say the same thing, there is no reason to suppose that what is
said is another “thing”, in addition to the utterances, that is the “real” truth-bearer. The Platonic
solution faces serious difficulties (which I discuss later in this section) and is incompatible with a
naturalized semantics that expects to explain the meanings of utterances in terms phenomena that
play causal roles in the world.
If we accept that there is a genuine “One over Many” problem, there is an alternative and
more reasonable solution. Instead of endorsing a Platonic transcendent realism about universals
—the view that “universals exist separated from particulars” (Armstrong: 1978: 140)—we may
adopt an Aristotelian immanent realism—which “admits universals but denies that they are
transcendent” (Armstrong: 1978: 137)—. Aristotle rejected the view that the common features of
particular objects are themselves objects with a separate existence and proposed that, while
universal features—or “forms”— are real, they only exist in particular objects. In the
Metaphysics, Aristotle says: “in general nothing that is common is substance” since “that which
is one cannot be in many things at the same time, but that which is common is present in many
things at the same time; so that clearly no universal exists apart from the individuals” (Met.: Z
XVI 1040b). According to an immanent realism, redness is a universal but concrete property that
exists in—rather than separately from—particular red things, while being a sister of Richard
Kirkham is a worldly property possessed by two particular individuals, not a single abstract

8

Kirkham’s reply works well against the kind of Platonism implicit in Pitcher’s passage: one that holds that Fness itself must be F. While Plato apparently held this view, a contemporary Platonist may be better off rejecting
it to avoid the problems associated with it (Armstrong 1978: 71-72). The difficulties I discuss below, however,
apply to any kind of Platonism.
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entity that they both are related to. 9 Similarly, it may be argued, the common semantic properties
of various sentence and belief tokens are universal but worldly properties that exist in these
tokens. Such immanent realism avoids abstract objects altogether and is compatible with a
naturalized semantics, since worldly meanings can play causal roles in mind and language
(Armstrong 2004: 12-14). However, one may reasonably be skeptical about the need to posit
universals to begin with. Is there really any mystery regarding how different tokens have the
same meaning or how different things can be red?
Those who think that the “One over Many” problem is genuine find mundane situations
like various things being red deeply puzzling and in need of explanation. Yet, Quine reasonably
argues that this is a pseudo-problem and no explanation is needed:
One may admit that there are red houses, roses and sunsets, but deny, except as a
popular and misleading manner of speaking, that they have anything in common...
That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate
and irreducible, and it may be held that [the realist about universals] is no better
off, in point of real explanatory power, for all the occult entities which he posits
under such names as ‘redness’. (Quine 1961: 10)
Quine’s suggestion is that particular things being red can be taken as a basic fact that needs no
explanation and, additionally, that positing redness as a universal does not explain anything not
already accounted for by acknowledging the existence of red things (Quine 1961: 10). His point
is that there is nothing puzzling to begin with and the alleged explanations are idle. Now,
suppose that I say ‘My car and my bike have the same property: redness’. Devitt argues that a
9

Armstrong (1978) offers a contemporary defense of immanent realism which I will discuss later in this section.
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claim like this can be paraphrased into a claim that serves the same purpose but is not committed
to a universal: I can say instead ‘My car and my bike are both red’, which trivially follows from
‘My car is red’ and ‘My bike is red’ (Devitt 2010: 14-15). The realist about universals, however,
is puzzled even about how a single thing can have a property: how can my car be red? But one
may wonder whether this is really puzzling. The fact that my car is red can be said to merely
involve the existence of an object, my car, that really is red (Devitt 2010: 16). A further
explanation in terms of universal redness seems to be neither required nor informative.
Devitt argues, however, that there are legitimate explanations we may seek for something
having a property, which are not related to the problem of universals: we may wonder what
caused or what is the purpose of something having certain property, and, in the case of a nonfundamental property, we may wonder what constitutes something having that property (Devitt
2010: 16).10 Suppose that we have a satisfying reductive explanation of what constitutes my car
and my bike being red in terms of the wavelengths of light they reflect and absorb, as well as a
satisfying causal explanation of why they do reflect certain wavelengths of light and absorb
others. The problem of universals concerns even how objects can have these fundamental
physical properties. But, if it is a pseudo-problem, no further explanation is required: “The
explanation must stop somewhere. What better place to stop than with a fundamental physical
fact of our world?” (Devitt 2010: 17).
10 Devitt (2010: 13-30) does not use the word ‘property’ in making this point, since he equates—in this context—
positing properties with positing universals. However, he regards property talk as an acceptable manner of
speaking to the extent that we are prepared to paraphrase it in a way that makes no commitment to “properties”
(i.e., universals). While the transcendent realist regards properties as universal and abstract, the immanent realist
regards properties as universal but concrete. Alternatively, properties can be regarded as both concrete (not
abstract) and particular (not universal). [A detailed discussion of particularism about properties can be found in
Armstrong (1978: 77-87).] To reject universals is not to reject concrete particular properties. I use here and
elsewhere the word ‘property’ in a metaphysically non-committal way that is compatible with properties being
universal or particular and with property talk being just a manner of speaking to be paraphrased away when
addressing ultimate metaphysical questions.
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These considerations can be applied to the question of how different sentence and belief
tokens can have the same meanings. A token of ‘Il pleut’ and a token of ‘Es regnet’ having the
same semantic property, it may be argued, is just a matter of both of them meaning that it rains:
neither transcendent nor immanent universals are required. A naturalized semantics, of course,
does not regard a token meaning that it rains as a basic fact, but rather as a fact in need of
reductive explanation. The legitimate search for such an explanation, however, is not related to
the problem of universals. Explanations must stop somewhere and no further explanation is
required once we have a satisfactory reductive explanation of what fundamental properties
constitute meanings.
I have argued that there are alternatives to the Platonic solution to the “One over Many”
problem for synonymous sentence and belief tokens. One option is an immanent realism
according to which meanings are universal but worldly properties that exist in the tokens.
Another option is to reject the “One over Many” as a pseudo-problem. Neither of these
alternatives posits abstract objects to account for the common meanings of synonymous tokens
and both are compatible with a naturalized semantics. But why should we prefer either of these
alternatives over Platonism? A compelling reason is that abstract objects can play no causal roles
in mind and language (Devitt 1996: 210; Armstrong 2004: 12). This consideration undermines
the Platonic treatment of meanings as abstract objects not only to account for synonymy, but for
any reason.11 There is also a compelling reason to reject abstract objects specifically as what
explains how numerically different things can be identical in nature. As Armstrong convincingly
shows, the appeal to transcendent abstract objects fails because it generates a vicious relation
regress: it attempts to explain how things have a property in terms of their relation to an abstract
11 I will elaborate this point in more detail after addressing other arguments for propositions qua Platonic objects.
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object, but then these things must also have the property of being related to the abstract object,
which either is different from the first relation—in which case it needs to be explained by yet
another relation, leading to an infinite regress—or is the same as the first relation—in which case
the analysis is circular (Armstrong: 1978: 70-71). It follows that positing relations to abstract
meanings fails to explain how various sentence and belief tokens can be synonymous: it
generates a vicious relation regress.
Any attempt to solve the problem of universals that appeals to a relational analysis is
undermined by a relation regress, since “the relations appealed to by such analyses themselves
require the same analysis” (Armstrong: 1978: 139). This applies also to relational versions of
immanent realism: if an object having an immanent property is a relation it has to this property,
then it must also have the immanent property of having this relation, generating a vicious regress
(Armstrong: 1978: 106-107).12 So, a relational immanent realism about meaning properties fails
to account for how various tokens can be synonymous: the required relation between the tokens
and their immanent meaning properties also generates a vicious relation regress.
After convincingly arguing that every other attempt fails, Armstrong proposes a nonrelational form of immanent realism, according to which objects and their properties have a
“more intimate union” than a mere relation: the properties of a thing, he suggests, are not
“separate constituents of the thing” (Armstrong: 1978: 107-108). But how can there be
something identical in things which are not identical? If having a property is not a relation and a
property is not a separate constituent of a thing, how can numerically different things have this
12 Armstrong (1978) also shows how vicious relational regresses undermine various forms of nominalism that
attempt to solve the “One over Many” problem avoiding any appeal to universals. The views of Quine (1961)
and Devitt (2010) just discussed are also versions of nominalism: they reject realism about universals. But there
is a crucial difference. Quine and Devitt do not attempt to solve the problem but to dissolve it, so their proposal
is immune to any relational regress objections: they argue that no explanation, relational or not, is required.
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same property? Armstrong answer is, basically, that this is inexplicable:
Different particulars may be... identical in nature. Such identity in nature is
literally inexplicable, in the sense that it cannot be further explained...
We simply have to accept that different particulars may have the same property or
be related by the same relation. (Armstrong: 1978: 109)
A non-relational immanent realism about meaning properties, consequently, would claim that
various synonymous tokens have a meaning which is universal but inseparable from each of
them and that their synonymy is an inexplicable fact that we simply have to accept.
Armstrong’s analysis shows that every relational solution to the “One over Many”
problem fails. It seems initially reasonable to expect, then, a non-relational solution—if we take
the problem to be genuine. Perhaps a non-relational account of properties can be worked out. But
Armstrong’s own appeal to properties that are inseparable from objects makes inexplicable how
they can be shared. And this problem may be unavoidable for any non-relational account, just
like vicious regresses are unavoidable for relational accounts. If the alleged best solution to the
“profoundly puzzling” fact that different objects can have the same property is itself a mystery, it
does not seem a genuine solution (Devitt 2010: 18). Rather, it seems that the “One over Many” is
a pseudo-problem after all (Devitt 2010: 19) and there is no mystery to begin with.
My concern in this section has been whether the “One over Many” problem provides a
reason for positing propositions qua abstract objects. Does the fact that different sentence and
belief tokens have the same meaning or content require a Platonic account of the metaphysics of
meaning? I have argued that the “One over Many” fails to provide support for the claim that
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meanings are abstract objects. Suppose that the problem is genuine. Then a Platonic solution fails
because it generates a vicious regress. Perhaps some version of immanent realism can solve the
problem. But relational versions of immanent realism are undermined by the same problem as
transcendental realism and Armstrong’s non-relational version does not seem to be a genuine
solution either, since it leaves unexplained how different things can have the same property. It is
likely that the problem is not genuine, and we simply need no explanation of how different
tokens can be synonymous. A token of ‘Snow is white’ and a token of ‘La nieve es blanca’ being
synonymous may merely be a matter of both tokens meaning that snow is white: a fact that
requires a reductive explanation in terms of more basic meaning constituting facts but no further
explanation in terms of universals. Either way, the “One over Many” does not undermine a
naturalized semantics according to which meanings are constituted by worldly properties that
play causal roles in mind and language. In the next section, I discuss other arguments for
propositions qua abstract objects that rely on the alleged ontological commitments implicit in our
ordinary attitude ascriptions.

1.4 Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions
The metaphysical conviction that contents are abstract objects is often defended nowadays on the
basis of ordinary language considerations. People use expressions like ‘what he said is true’,
‘what she believes is true’, or even ‘some things he said are true’, which may be interpreted as
referring to things other than concrete utterances and thoughts or the reality they represent and
which are the primary bearers of truth. Even ascriptions like ‘Mary believes that the Earth is flat’
are said to refer to mind- and language-independent propositions. The way people talk, advocates
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of propositions qua abstract entities claim, is ontologically committed to the reality of such
things. Sure enough, people sometimes talk about the “things” that are said or believed. But
should this way of talking be taken literally? Is such talk actually committed to the existence of
abstract objects that play the role of intermediaries between utterances, thoughts and the reality
they represent? And, if so, should we regard this folkloric opinion as correct? These are all
controversial matters. Perhaps advocates of propositions are misinterpreting ordinary language.13
Maybe talk about the “things” that are said or believed is just a figurative way of talking about
the meanings of concrete utterances and thoughts. Notice that truth is predicated of concrete
utterances in ordinary language. We may “genuinely say ‘His closing words were very true’ or
‘The third sentence on page 5 of his speech is quite false’ ” (Austin 1950: 113). Likewise, truth is
predicated of concrete thoughts. We may say ‘Her belief is true’, which refers to a concrete
psychological state. So why should we regard propositional talk as more fundamental? Maybe
ordinary language is simply non-committal about the ontology of contents and truth-bearers.
More importantly, even if the way people talk were clearly committed to propositions qua
abstract objects, it would remain to be seen whether these objects really exist, since folkloric
opinion is not the ultimate guide to reality.
In what follows, I will present two influential arguments for propositions specifically
based on the alleged commitments of attitude ascriptions in ordinary language: the first one is
based on particular content attributions, while the second is based on general content attributions

13 Wittgenstein (1953) claims that “intermediaries” between sentences and the world are mere chimeras which
philosophers posit because they misunderstand the workings of ordinary language: “‘A proposition is a queer
thing!’ Here we have in germ the subliming of our whole account of logic. The tendency to assume a pure
intermediary between the propositional signs and the facts. Or even to try to purify, to sublime, the signs
themselves.—For our forms of expression prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing out of the
ordinary is involved, by sending us in pursuit of chimeras.” (Wittgenstein 1953: § 94).
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and their inferential relations to particular attributions. I will argue that there are alternative and
more plausible accounts of such attributions and that, even if the propositionalist accounts were
correct about the commitments of attitude ascriptions, it would not follow that propositions exist.

1.4.1 Particular Content Ascriptions
An influential consideration offered for regarding contents as abstract objects relies on the
alleged logical structure of particular content attributions of the form ‘S believes that p’ or ‘S
said that p’. It is claimed that these attributions assert a relation between S and the object that p,
because the ‘that’-clause works as a name or a “referential singular term” (Schiffer 1992: 506).
Basically, particular content attributions are taken to have the same form as ‘A loves B’, which
asserts a relation between A and the object B. The logical form of ‘A loves B’ is ‘Lab’, where ‘a’
and ‘b’ are names and ‘L’ is a two-place predicate. Analogously, the forms of ‘S believes that p’
and ‘S said that p’ are alleged to be ‘Bs<p>’ and ‘Ss<p>’, where the two-place predicates ‘Bxy’
and ‘Sxy’ symbolize the believing and saying relations, ‘s’ is the name of the believing or saying
subject and ‘<p>’ is the name of the proposition: the thing that is believed or said.
However, there are alternative accounts of the logical form of particular content
attributions. A plausible alternative, suggested by Devitt, is that they have the same form as ‘A
loves some B’, which asserts a relation between A and some object that has the property B
(Devitt 1996: 56-57). If the ‘that’-clause functions as an “indefinite singular term” instead of a
referential one, Devitt points out, then what the content attribution asserts is a relation between S
and some object which has the semantic property specified by ‘that p’—where the object is “a
token thought” in the case of ‘S believes that p’ and “a token utterance” in the case of ‘S said

35
that p’ (Devitt 1996: 56). The logical form of ‘A loves some B’ is the existentially quantified
‘∃x(Lax & Bx)’—something that A loves has the property of being a B—, where ‘B’ functions as
a predicate. Similarly, the forms of ‘S believes that p’ and ‘S said that p’ can be said to be
‘∃x(Bxs & Px)’ and ‘∃x(Uxs & Px)’—some belief/utterance of S has the property P—, where the
one-place predicate ‘Px’ symbolizes the semantic property specified by ‘that p’, the existential
quantifier ‘∃x’ ranges over sentence and belief tokens, and the two-place predicates ‘Bxy’ and
‘Uxy’ symbolize the relations “x is a token belief of y” and “x is a token utterance of y”. If we
additionally grant that the sentence embedded in the ‘that’-clause (the ‘p’ in ‘that p’) specifies a
semantic property by means of synonymy or sameness of content, then what the content
attribution asserts is, more precisely, that some belief or utterance of S has the same content as
‘p’. The logical forms of ‘S believes that p’ and ‘S said that p’ would then be ‘∃x(Bxs & Sx‘p’)’
and ‘∃x(Uxs & Sx‘p’)’—there is something such that it is a token belief/utterance of S and it has
the same content as the sentence token ‘p’—where the two-place predicate ‘Sxy’ symbolizes the
sameness of content or synonymy relation and its second place is occupied by a name for the
embedded sentence ‘p’ (not for a proposition) formed by enclosing it within quotation marks.
There are good reasons to believe that synonymy does play a role in content ascriptions. As
Devitt points out:
The expression ‘that p’, used to ascribe a putative meaning, seems to ascribe that
property in virtue of the fact that its content sentence, ‘p’, has the property or one
very like it. So there always seems to be an “intimate link” between the two
properties. However... we can abstract from this link, treating... ‘that p’ like any
arbitrary expression for a property. (Devitt 1996: 82)
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Synonymy seems to play a crucial role in the way a ‘that’-clause specifies a meaning. But the
specified meaning is not itself a relation between some belief or utterance and the sentence
embedded in the ‘that’-clause. Rather, it is a property that both the belief or utterance and the
embedded sentence have independently. It is important to distinguish the specification of a
property from a reductive explanation of its nature. For example, I can specify the color of my
car by pointing out that it has the same color as the Statue of Liberty. The specified color is a
property that both my car and the Statue have. The reductive explanation of what constitutes my
car’s color involves neither its relation to the Statue, nor its relation to an abstract object, but
rather what wavelengths of light are reflected and absorbed by the surface of my car. Similarly,
the content specified by ‘S believes that p’ is a property that both some belief of S and ‘p’ have.
But the reductive explanation of what constitutes the content of the belief involves neither its
relation to ‘p’, nor its relation to an abstract object, but rather the fundamental properties that
explain the causal role of the belief. For example, Nancy’s belief that it will rain plays a causal
role in explaining why she picks up an umbrella, so an explanation of what underlying properties
constitute the content of her belief must account for its causing Nancy’s behavior—just as a
reductive explanation of water as constituted by H 2O molecules explains why it boils at 100
degrees Celsius (at sea level).
Donald Davidson (1968) offers a similar analysis how ‘that’-clauses specify meanings.
He sympathizes with the idea that ‘Galileo said that the earth moves’ can be paraphrased as
“Galileo uttered a sentence that meant in his mouth what ‘The earth moves’ means now in
mine”—which asserts “synonymy between utterances” or “samesaying” (Davidson 1968: 140).
But he prefers not to have the embedded sentence “sealed in quotation marks” because it is then
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“mentioned and not used” (Davidson 1968: 141). So he proposes a modification according to
which ‘that’ functions as a “demonstrative singular term” which refers to the used utterance that
follows it: ‘S said that p.’, he suggests, is equivalent to ‘S said that. P.’ (Davidson 1968: 142).
Are quotation marks really problematic? Consider the following two non-attitudinal meaning
reports: (a) ‘La nieve es blanca’ means that snow is white, and (b) ‘La nieve es blanca’ means the
same as ‘Snow is white’. The mentioned English sentence in (b) serves the same purpose as the
‘that’-clause in (a): they both specify the same meaning. Just as (b) can paraphrase (a), a
mentioned sentence can be part of the correct paraphrase of a ‘that’-clause in an attitude report. 14
I will not press this issue further. The crucial point is that synonymy seems to play a role in the
way ‘that’-clauses specify meanings and that it does not require the postulation of propositions
qua abstract objects. Some philosophers may be tempted to object that an account of different
tokens can have the same meaning requires the postulation of abstract objects, so the proposed
analysis of particular content attributions does not truly avoid them. But this objection assumes
an implausible Platonic account of synonymy, which I have argued against in the previous
section. Additionally, as I argued following Devitt, synonymy only plays the role of specifying a
semantic property, it is not constitutive of the semantic property.
The proposal that ‘that’-clauses function as indefinite singular terms in particular content
ascriptions is not only a plausible alternative to the proposal that they function as names or
referential singular terms. There is reason to believe that it is a more plausible account. If ‘that p’

14 I am ignoring issues that may arise from context-sensitivity. Suppose I report: ‘Mary said that I am rich’.
According to Davidson, I am using the embedded sentence ‘I am reach’. My use of the sentence in this context
would fix its content: I am talking about me. Does the view according to which the embedded sentence is
mentioned have a problem with context-sensitivity? Perhaps. But a slight modification of the analysis may avoid
this problem. What I am reporting may be that some utterance of Mary has the same meaning that ‘I am reach’
would have if I asserted it. I may not be inclined to actually assert it, since I may believe I am not rich.
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functions as a definite singular term referring to the proposition that p, we should be able to
replace it with ‘the proposition that p’, which is a definite singular term referring to the same
alleged abstract object. In some contexts, there seems to be no problem: ‘Nancy believes that it
will rain’ may be paraphrased as ‘Nancy believes the proposition that it will rain’. However, the
substitution fails in other contexts: ‘Nancy fears that it will rain’ cannot be paraphrased as
‘Nancy fears the proposition that it will rain’. Fearing a proposition obviously is not the same as
fearing that it will rain. So the propositionalist account faces what Friederike Moltmann calls the
“Substitution Problem”: “Even though believe allows for a replacement of a that-clause by the
proposition that S, many other attitude verbs don’t” (Moltmann 2003: 82). In contrast, I suggest,
the proposal that ‘that’-clauses function as indefinite singular terms avoids the substitution
problem altogether, since it does not regard them as referring to propositions: ‘Nancy fears that it
will rain’ should be not be paraphrased as ‘Nancy fears the proposition that it will rain’, but
rather as (1) ‘Some fear of Nancy has the same content as ‘It will rain’’ or (2) ‘Some fear of
Nancy has the content specified by ‘that it will rain’’, which are not problematic. The form of (1)
is ‘∃x(Fxn & Sx‘r’)’—where ‘Fxy’ symbolizes ‘x is a fear of y’, ‘n’ names Nancy, ‘Sxy’
symbolizes ‘x has the same content as y’ and ‘r’—enclosed within quotation marks—stands for
the sentence ‘It will rain’ (not a proposition): there is something such that it is a fear of Nancy
and it has the same content as ‘it will rain’. The form of (2) is ‘ ∃x(Fxn & Rx)’—where ‘R’ is a
one-place predicate symbolizing the monadic semantic property specified by ‘that it will rain’:
there is something such that it is a fear of Nancy and it has the content specified by ‘that it will
rain’. Both (1) and (2) have the same logical forms as the accounts I have offered for belief
ascriptions. Neither involve any reference to propositions, so the substitution problem does not
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arise. While the propositionalist analysis is undermined by the substitution problem, the account
of ‘that’-clauses as indefinite singular terms provides a uniform and plausible account of content
attributions involving all attitude verbs that avoids the problem altogether.
A propositionalist, however, may object that regarding particular attributions as
quantifying over token sentences and beliefs is also compatible with the contents of such tokens
being specified as abstract objects (or relations to abstract objects). 15 The correct paraphrase of
‘Nancy fears that it will rain’ may be claimed to be (3) ‘Some fear of Nancy has the proposition
that it will rain as its content’. The form of (3) is ‘ ∃x(Fxn & Cx<r>)’, where ‘Cxy’ stands for “x
has y as its content” and ‘<r>’ is a singular term referring to a proposition qua abstract object:
there is something such that it is a fear of Nancy and its content is the proposition that it will
rain. Notice that the form of (3) differs from the form of the non-propositionalist (1) above only
in its second conjunct. Basically, (3) makes use of an analysis like (1) and flips it into a
propositionalist one. While the standard propositionalist analysis is undermined by the
substitution problem, this variant seems to avoid it: the paraphrase of ‘Nancy fears that it will
rain’ as (3) does not seem problematic. On this regard, (1) and (3) seem equally plausible. So the
substitution problem does not settle the issue of what is ascribed in ordinary attitude ascriptions.
However, the modified propositionalist analyses has a serious problem. If the content of Nancy’s
fear is an abstract object, it cannot play a causal role in the explanation why she is constantly
looking at the sky. I will get back to this issue. But notice that attitude ascriptions are
successfully used by ordinary people to explain each other’s behavior. This provides a strong
reason for preferring a non-propositionalist analysis like the one I am suggesting over any
propositionalist variant.
15 A similar concern is expressed by Devitt (2006: 143-144).
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1.4.2 General Content Attributions
So far I have focused on isolated particular content attributions. But another influential and
seemingly stronger case for regarding contents as abstract objects relies on the logical form of
general content attributions and the validity—and presumed soundness—of certain inferences
linking them to particular attributions. General content attributions contain phrases of the form
‘something S said’ or ‘everything S believes’ which quantify over what is said or believed.
Consider the following inference patterns:
(1) S believes that p and R believes that p. So, there is something that both S and R believe.
(2) S believes everything that R says. R says that p. So, S believes that p.16
As Stephen Schiffer and Paul Horwich argue, at face value the existential quantifier ‘there is
something’ and the universal quantifier ‘everything’ in the general content attributions seem to
range over a domain of objects, which would require—for the inferences to be valid—the ‘that’clauses in the particular content attributions to function as referential singular terms picking out
objects in the same domain (Schiffer 1992: 504-506; Horwich 1998b: 86-90). In other words, the
logical form of (1) seems to be the valid existential generalization ‘Bs<p> & Br<p> // ∃x(Bsx &
Brx)’ and the logical form of (2) seems to be the valid universal instantiation ‘ ∀x(Srx → Bsx) /
Sr<p> // Bs<p>’—where ‘∃x’ and ‘∀x’ are standard objectual quantifiers ranging over
propositions.17 If the face value interpretation is correct, what the ‘that’-clauses purport to name
and what the quantifiers purport to range over are propositions. If we additionally grant that
some instances of these valid patterns are sound, it follows that propositions exist. For example,
16 These are the patterns underlying a couple of the examples offered by Schiffer (1992: 505). Horwich (1998b:
86-87) offers similar examples.
17 I am following here the standard analysis of particular attributions adopted by Schiffer and Horwich.
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the soundness of ‘Copernicus and Galileo believed that the Earth moves, so there is something
they both believed’ would establish that the proposition believed by Copernicus and Galileo is a
real “entity” or object (Horwich 1998b: 90). Nevertheless, there are alternatives to the face value
interpretation and, even if the face value interpretation of the validity of patterns like (1) and (2)
were correct, it would remain to be seen whether they have any literally sound instances.
One alternative to the face value interpretation is the proposal that the quantifiers used in
general content attributions are substitutional rather than objectual (Schiffer 1987). It may be
argued, for example, that quantifiers have two distinct uses or meanings in ordinary language:
one is the standard ontologically committal use, where they function as objectual quantifiers that
range over entities, while the other is a metaphysically innocent use, where they function as
substitutional quantifiers that do not range over a “language-independent domain of entities” but
instead “generalize over the instances” of expressions in the language (Hofweber 2006: 166). An
example of the first kind of use would be ‘There is something that hit the window’, which clearly
asserts that certain object exists. In contrast, ‘There is something that both S and R believe’
would be, on this view, an example of the second kind of use, asserting that there is some true
substitution instance of ‘S and R believe that x’ (in which ‘x’ is replaced by a declarative
sentence). Instead of asserting that an object exists, the quantified sentence is equivalent to an
infinite disjunction of its substitution instances: either S and R believe that p or S and R believe
that q or S and R believe that r, etc. (Hofweber 2006: 167-168). Thus, it may be claimed that
propositions are “shadows of sentences” rather than objects (Hofweber 2006: 194). Notice that if
the quantifiers in (1) and (2) are non-objectual, the ‘that’-clauses need not be referential singular
terms for the inferences to be valid, since non-objectual quantifiers can generalize over the
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instances of non-referential expressions.18 ‘That’-clauses may be, as suggested above, indefinite
singular terms specifying the semantic properties of concrete utterances and thoughts.
Whether there are non-objectual uses of quantifiers in ordinary language is controversial,
but there is another alternative that relies only on standard quantification. The proposal is that,
while the quantifiers in general content attributions do purport to range over objects, there are no
real objects in this domain, because propositions are merely fictional entities. What the
proponent of this view needs to explain is how a person uttering ‘There is something that both
Copernicus and Galileo believed’, quantifying over propositional objects, can convey a truth
even when there are no such objects and the sentence is literally false. Notice that, on this view,
the sentence uttered is as false as ‘There is something that possessed Mary Magdalene’, which
quantifies over demons. Yet quantifying over propositions, unlike quantifying over demons,
seems to be “explanatorily useful, generally successful, and needed” (Devitt 1996: 212-213). Are
people who engage in propositional talk systematically in error or superstitiously committed to
non-existing objects if such talk is indeed literally false?
An explanation of how a literally false sentence can be used to convey a truth comes from
the very proponent of the view that a sentence is ontologically committed to the objects it
quantifies over (Quine 1961: 13-14). Quine suggests that people are not committed to the objects

18 Consider a singular term ‘t’ related to a predicate ‘F’ in the sentence ‘t is F’. Using objectual quantification to
infer ‘something is F’ from ‘t is F’ requires ‘t’ to be referential. But any singular term in ‘t is F’ can be
generalized into ‘something is F’ using substitutional quantification: “In the particular quantifier case: ‘F(t)’
implies ‘Something is F.’... [It] does not matter what ‘t’ is as long as it is grammatically a singular term. In
particular, whether or not ‘t’ is a referring expression and whether or not is succeeds in referring, even if it tries,
is irrelevant...” (Hofweber 2009: 277). So valid inferences like ‘7 is a prime, so something is a prime’, ‘Red is a
color, so something is a color’ and ‘It is true that snow is white, so something is true’, can be regarded as not
committed to numbers, properties and propositions being objects—as long as the expressions ‘7’, ‘red’ and ‘that
snow is white’ in the premises are non-referential and the quantifiers in the conclusions are non-objectual
(Hofweber 2005, 2006 & 2009).
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presupposed by a sentence when they use it as an “avoidable manner of speaking” (Quine 1961:
13)—that is, when they would be prepared to replace it by a paraphrase that serves the same
purpose but is “innocent of such commitments”, so that “the seemingly presupposed objects may
justly be said to have been explained away as convenient fictions” (Quine 1961: 103-104). 19
Basically, a false sentence that quantifies over non-existing objects can convey a truth when it is
used as a manner of speaking which can be paraphrased into a true sentence that does not
quantify over such objects. If propositional talk were an avoidable manner of speaking, people
who engage in it would not be committed to the existence of propositional objects: they would be
quantifying over convenient fictions in literally false sentences that (sometimes) serve the
purpose of conveying truths—a purpose that can also be served by paraphrases that do not
quantify over propositions but express the same truths literally.
Stephen Yablo elaborates further on how fictional talk can be useful. He proposes that
figurative or metaphorical uses of language are make-believe games in which the participants
pretend or imagine that certain fictions are true, not for the game’s own sake, but to “talk about
game-independent reality”: the fictions serve the purpose of describing features of the real world
(Yablo 1998: 246). For example, by pretending or imagining that Italy is a boot, we can
accurately describe the real location of the town of Crotone using the sentence ‘Crotone is on the
arch of the Italian boot’ (Yablo 1998: 252-253). 20 Yablo proposes that one of the hints that a
sentence is used metaphorically is its paraphrasability: metaphors are “oftentimes paraphrasable
19 The original sentence and its paraphrase must “serve the same purpose” but cannot be synonymous: “if they
were synonymous, it is hard to see how they could differ in their ontological commitments” (Devitt 2010: 25).
20 Obviously, figurative uses of language can also fail to accurately describe reality (e.g., ‘Crotone is on the heel of
the Italian boot’). A metaphorical sentence conveys a truth only when the fictions pretended to be true
successfully track features of the real world: “the reason for the pretence [is] to portray the world as holding up
its end of the bargain, by being in a condition to make a pretence like that appropriate” (Yablo 1998: 248).
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away with no felt loss of subject matter” (Yablo 1998: 259n). 21 The metaphorical content of a
sentence, he suggests, coincides with the literal content of its paraphrase: “a paraphrase of S
expresses in literal terms what S says metaphorically” (Yablo 1998: 248n).22 If propositional talk
were figurative rather than literal, people quantifying over propositions would be pretending or
imagining that these fictional objects exist and thereby describing features of the real world.
A very plausible case can be made that propositional talk should be regarded as a
figurative and avoidable manner of speaking. As Devitt points out, paraphrases for general
content attributions that quantify over propositions are readily available (Devitt 1996: 213). For
example, (a) and (b) can be paraphrased as (a') and (b'), respectively:
(a) There is something that both Copernicus and Galileo believed.
(a') Some belief of Copernicus had the same content as some belief of Galileo.23
(b) Nancy believes everything Mary says.
(b') When Mary assertively utters any sentence, Nancy forms a belief with the same content.
The paraphrases quantify over sentence or belief tokens, rather than propositions, but they serve

21 Yablo proposes several other “hints” of metaphoricality and does not take paraphrasability to be a necessary
condition, since he argues that some metaphors are “representationally essential and so not paraphrasable away”
(Yablo 1998: 255). Yablo also argues that there is no sharp demarcation between the literal and the metaphorical
—“the boundaries of the literal are about as blurry as they could be, the clear cases on either side enclosing a
vast interior region of indeterminacy” (Yablo 1998: 233)—and, furthermore, that we may not be able to
completely eliminate metaphors from science—“our best theory may well include metaphorical sentences
(whose literal contents are) not meant to be believed” (Yablo 1998: 255). If correct, these radical theses would
undermine the Quinean program of finding answers to existence questions in the ontological commitments of
our best scientific theories, literally formulated. This is not the place to discuss these radical theses. The
Quinean philosopher, however, can go along with Yablo’s characterization of paraphrasable figurative talk,
which offers an interesting elaboration of the Quinean theme that manners of speaking make use of convenient
fictions.
22 Yablo claims that this explains “rather neatly” how a “paraphrase ‘says the same’ as what it paraphrases”, even
though the literal meanings of the two sentences do not coincide (Yablo 1998: 248n).
23 This paraphrase is based on one suggested by Devitt (1996: 13).

45
the same purposes as the original sentences they paraphrase (Devitt 1996: 213). First, (a') and (b')
serve the same communicative purposes as (a) and (b). Second, they serve the same explanatory
purposes. For example, (b') serves the same purpose as (b) in the explanation of Nancy’s picking
up an umbrella after hearing Mary utter ‘It will rain’. Notice that the suggested paraphrases
assert that pairs of sentence or belief tokens have the same content. This neatly matches the view
that particular content attributions assert that some sentence or belief token has the same content
as the sentence embedded in the ‘that’-clause. 24 Furthermore, the validity of inferences linking
general and particular content ascriptions is preserved by their paraphrases. Consider the
following paraphrased instances of patterns (1) and (2):
(i) Some belief of Copernicus and some belief of Galileo had the same content as ‘The Earth
moves’. So, some belief of Copernicus had the same content as some belief of Galileo.
(ii) When Mary assertively utters any sentence, Nancy forms a belief with the same content.
Some sentence assertively uttered by Mary has the same content as ‘It will rain’. So,
some belief of Nancy has the same content as ‘It will rain’.
These inferences are obviously valid because having the same content is an equivalence relation:
it is symmetric, transitive and reflexive. The valid logical form of these two inferences can be
represented in standard first-order logic by adding meaning postulates defining the two-place
predicate ‘Sxy’ (“x has the same content as y”) as symmetric = ‘∀x∀y(Sxy→Syx)’, transitive =
‘∀x∀y∀z[(Sxy & Syz) → Sxz]’ and reflexive = ‘∀x(Sxx)’. A shorter definition of ‘Sxy’ as an
equivalence relation is that it is Euclidean = ‘∀x∀y∀z[(Sxy & Sxz) → Syz]’ and reflexive. So the
24 I already argued in support of this view. However, if I am wrong and either the standard or the modified
propositionalist analysis of particular content attributions is right, then particular attributions can also be treated
as mere manners of speaking (Devitt 1996: 214). The analysis of particular attributions I proposed would then
offer a literal paraphrase of what is metaphorically conveyed in ordinary language.
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two inferences can be represented, I suggest, as having the following valid forms:
(i)

∀x∀y∀z[(Sxy & Sxz) → Syz] & ∀x(Sxx)
∃x∃y[(Bxc & Sx‘e’) & (Byg & Sy‘e’)]
∴ ∃x ∃y[(Bxc & Byg) & Sxy]

(ii)

∀x∀y∀z[(Sxy & Sxz) → Syz] & ∀x(Sxx)
∀x{Uxm → [∃y(Byn & Sxy)]}
∃x(Uxm & Sx‘r’)
∴ ∃x(Bxn & Sx‘r’)

Where ‘c’ = ‘Copernicus’, ‘g’= ‘Galileo’, ‘m’ = ‘Mary’, ‘n’ = ‘Nancy’, ‘e’ = the sentence ‘The
earth moves’, ‘r’ = the sentence ‘It will rain’, ‘Bxy’ = ‘x is a belief of y’, ‘Uxy’ = ‘x is an
utterance of y’, ‘Sxy’ = ‘x has the same content as y’, and ‘∀x’ and ‘∃x’ range over sentence and
belief tokens. Notice that the first premise in both inferences defines ‘Sxy’ as an equivalence
relation. Both inferences are formally invalid if this premise is omitted.
Alternatively, we can paraphrase the particular content ascriptions in a way that does not
explicitly assert synonymy or sameness of content:
(i') Some belief of Copernicus and some belief of Galileo had the content specified by ‘that
the earth moves’. So, some belief of Copernicus had the same content as some belief of
Galileo.
(ii') When Mary assertively utters any sentence, Nancy forms a belief with the same content.
Some sentence assertively uttered by Mary has the content specified by ‘that it will rain’.
So, some belief of Nancy has the content specified by ‘that it will rain’.
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These inferences are also intuitively valid and may be interpreted as having the same logical
forms as (i) and (ii). If we interpret instead the specified contents as monadic properties, the
inferences are also formally valid as long as we regard them as enthymemes assuming the
obvious premise that two tokens are synonymous (a dyadic relation) if and only if whatever
contents each of them has (their monadic properties) are the same. Symbolizing this unstated
premise requires substitutional quantification (or the ontologically problematic quantification
over properties), since it generalizes over (monadic) content properties. But we can represent in
standard first-order logic instances of the connection between synonymy and particular specified
contents. So (i') and (ii') can be represented, I suggest, by the following valid forms:
(i')

∀x∀y[(Ex & Ey) → Sxy]
∃x∃y[(Bxc & Ex) & (Byg & Ey)]
∴ ∃x∃y[(Bxc & Byg) & Sxy]

(ii')

∀x∀y[(Sxy & Rx) → Ry]
∀x{Uxm → [∃y(Byn & Sxy)]}
∃x(Uxm & Rx)
∴ ∃x(Bxn & Rx)

Where ‘E’ = ‘has the content specified by ‘that the earth moves’’, ‘R’ = ‘has the content specified
by ‘that it will rain’’, and the rest of the symbols are the same as in (i) and (ii) above. The first
premises of (i’) and (ii’) assert intuitively obvious connections between synonymy and particular
specified content properties. Without these added premises, both inferences are formally invalid.
I proposed before a non-propositional analysis of particular content attributions. I have
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suggested now that general attributions can be treated as figures of speech whose metaphorical
content does not quantify over propositions and is literally expressed by suitable paraphrases. I
have also shown that the validity of inference patterns like (1) and (2) can be accounted for by
combining non-propositionalist accounts of particular and general content attributions.25

1.4.3 Folkloric Opinion and Ontology
From a strictly Quinean point of view, the availability of paraphrases for content ascriptions that
quantify over propositions does not, by itself, free a person who engages in propositional talk
from an ontological commitment to abstract objects. According to Quine, this depends on
whether the person agrees to replace the problematic sentences by their paraphrases in order to
“free himself from ontological commitments of his discourse” (Quine 1961: 103). It is an
interesting empirical question whether ordinary people would be prepared in general to accept
the suggested paraphrases. I suspect they would, since the paraphrases clearly serve the same
purposes as what they paraphrase. But establishing that people are genuinely committed to
propositions qua abstract objects perhaps requires more than a rejection of these paraphrases:
what would we conclude if they also reject alternative paraphrases that are more explicitly
Platonic, such as ‘There is an abstract object that exists outside of the world of space and time
and which is a proposition believed by Copernicus and Galileo’? I doubt that ordinary people
would in general be prepared to accept such explicitly Platonic paraphrases. But, of course, this
is an empirical matter. In any case, Quine points out that ordinary people’s ontological
25 I also suggested that the quantifiers in general content ascriptions may generalize over their substitutional
instances without ranging over propositions. This alternative also preserves the validity of the inferences.
However, it is controversial whether substitutional quantifiers are used in ordinary language. The fictionalist
account is simpler, since it relies only on standard first-order logic.
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commitments are often unclear when they talk about “things” beyond well-defined objects: “The
common man’s ontology is vague and untidy... It takes in many purported objects that are
vaguely or inadequately defined... [We] cannot even tell in general which of these vague things...
to count him as assuming.” Quine concludes: “We must recognize... that a fenced ontology is just
not implicit in ordinary language.” (Quine 1981a: 9) Similarly, Yablo points out that people often
talk figuratively without being fully conscious of it (Yablo 1998: 246) and, furthermore, that they
often “fall back” on the metaphorical content of areas of discourse, with “no conscious
equivocation”, when they find out that the objects talked about do not exist or are problematic
(Yablo 1998: 258n). Perhaps people are simply non-committal about the ultimate ontology of
representational contents.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that people were seriously committed to propositions
qua abstract objects: that they preferred explicitly Platonic paraphrases of general attributions
over the non-propositional paraphrases. This interesting anthropological fact would not establish
that propositions qua abstract objects exist, just like the real commitment that many people have
to immaterial souls does not establish that these entities exist. People talk not only about
immaterial souls, but also about witches, ghosts, gods and whatnot. Non-metaphorical and
sincere superstitious talk is ontologically committed to the existence of all sorts of things that
clearly do not exist and this may also be the case for talk that quantifies over propositions (Devitt
1996: 212-213). If propositions are mere fictions—and this cannot be ruled out merely by an
analysis of folkloric opinion—people actually committed to them are in error. In that case,
instead of adopting a hermeneutic fictionalism—according to which propositional discourse is
used figuratively—we should defend a revolutionary fictionalism—according to which
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propositional discourse ought to be used only figuratively—.26 The claim would be that people
ought to accept paraphrases like those suggested above for general content ascriptions. Anyway,
as I pointed out above, I doubt people are genuinely committed to propositions qua abstract
objects, since they may accept the proposed paraphrases or simply be non-committal; so this is
only a “worst case scenario” that I have granted for the sake of argument.
In this section, I have presented arguments for propositions qua abstract objects based on
the alleged ontological commitments of ordinary attitude ascriptions. I have argued that there are
plausible alternative accounts of such ascriptions that avoid any commitment to abstract objects
and that, anyway, the issue of whether meanings are abstract objects cannot be settled merely by
an account of folkloric opinion. In the next section, I will argue that there is a compelling reason
to reject the view that meanings are abstract objects.

1.5 Against Meanings qua Abstract Objects
In this section, I argue that the meanings of utterances and thoughts are not Platonic abstract
objects. The argument is not based on an analysis of the semantic status quo, on what people do
ascribe when they ascribe meanings, but rather on what we ought to ascribe in order to explain
the causal roles of meanings (Devitt 1996: 61-62). I do point out, however, that the general
success of explanations of behavior in folk-psychology suggests that at least part of what people
do ascribe is, indeed, what they ought to ascribe. Once meanings qua abstract objects have been
rejected, I suggest, we can either reject propositions altogether—except as “convenient
fictions”—or, perhaps, attempt to naturalize them. Devitt (1996) proposes the former of these
26 The distinction between hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism comes from Stanley (2001).

51
alternatives, while Armstrong (2004) suggests the latter. I will discuss in the following section
whether there is a need for “naturalized propositions” once propositions qua abstract objects
have been rejected.
There is a compelling metaphysical reason to suppose that semantic properties of
sentence and belief tokens we ought to ascribe are natural worldly properties of each of these
tokens. Abstract objects cannot causally act upon any concrete things in the world, since “we
have fairly good scientific reasons to believe that Nature, the spatio-temporal system, is a
causally self-enclosed system” (Armstrong: 1978: 129). The causal closure of the physical world
undermines, for example, the hypotheses that there is a God that acts upon the world or that we
have non-physical souls that interact with our bodies. According to such hypotheses, some
physical events have non-physical causes. But that violates the causal closure principle.
Cartesian substance dualism has been largely abandoned for this reason. But the same
consideration undermines the hypothesis that abstract objects act upon concrete objects: “If the
case for God and the soul acting upon particulars is weak, it is far weaker in the case of the realm
of numbers, possible words, propositions and so on.” (Armstrong: 1978: 130).
Those who nowadays postulate the existence of abstract objects often accept that they do
not causally interact with the spatio-temporal world. However, this raises the question of why
should we postulate them to begin with:
If any entities outside this realm are postulated, but it is stipulated further that
they have no manner of causal action upon the particulars in this realm, then there
is no compelling reason to postulate them. Occam’s razor then enjoins us not to
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postulate them. (Armstrong: 1978: 130).
Basically, no explanatory gain comes from the postulation of abstract objects and standard
simplicity considerations count against postulating explanatorily idle entities.
The same considerations apply to the postulation of propositions qua abstract objects that
constitute the meanings of sentence and belief tokens and that are the primary truth-bearers.
Abstract objects cannot causally interact with concrete—datable and placeable—utterances and
thoughts, so they cannot determine their semantic properties. As Devitt points out, Platonic
objects “can play no causal role in mind and language”, so “we have the best of reasons for
thinking that they are not part of mental and linguistic reality.” (Devitt 1996: 210). Armstrong
rejects the postulation of propositions qua Platonic objects for the same reason:
There are metaphysicians who are prepared to postulate a realm of propositions
over and above the space-time world. But, presumably, we could not stand in any
causal or nomic relation to such a realm. And if we cannot stand in such relations
to propositions it is unclear that such a postulation is of any explanatory value.
(Armstrong 2004: 12).
That propositions qua abstract objects cannot act upon the world is rarely disputed nowadays.
But the Platonic propositionalist may be willing to accept that propositions do not causally
interact with concrete utterances and thoughts, which amounts to acknowledging that they cannot
play any explanatory role in mind and language. If no explanatory gain comes from postulating
propositions, however, there is no compelling reason to postulate them in the first place.
Accepting that propositions do not causally interact with utterances and thoughts, while
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claiming that they constitute their meanings, amounts to regarding meanings as causally inert
epiphenomena. This is deeply troubling, since we postulate meanings or contents in order to
explain people’s behavior (Devitt 1996: 57-60).27 Ascribing to Mary a belief that it is raining, a
belief that using an umbrella can help her not to get wet, and a desire not to get wet, plays a
crucial role in the explanation of why she picks up an umbrella. Similarly, ascribing to Mary’s
utterance of ‘It is raining’ the meaning that it is raining plays a crucial role in ascribing to her the
belief that it is raining, which in turn plays a crucial role in explaining her behavior: why she
picks up an umbrella. Had the contents of her beliefs, her desire and her utterance been different,
we would reasonably expect her behavior to vary accordingly.
The causal closure of the physical world provides a compelling reason for regarding the
semantic properties we ought to ascribe to explain behavior as natural worldly properties, rather
than relations to abstract objects. Moreover, ordinary people do ascribe contents to explain other
people’s behavior and their explanations are often successful, which provides evidence that the
meanings ascribed in folk-psychology do play a causal role in the physical world. In other words,
there is strong evidence that at least some of what we do ascribe is what we ought to ascribe
(Devitt 1996: 81). While there is plenty of controversy in the field of naturalized semantics about
which is the best reductive explanation of what constitutes meanings, it is clear that meanings
must play a causal role in the psychological explanation of behavior. Consequently, the view that
meanings are abstract, mind and language independent objects, must be rejected. Does this mean
that we should reject propositions or that we should attempt to provide a non-Platonic account of
propositions?
27 As Devitt (1996: 57-60) points out, another crucial purpose for which we ascribe meanings is to learn about the
world. When a person’s thoughts or utterances are reliable, we can learn about the world by ascribing the right
meanings or contents to them. It is unclear how this would be possible if meanings were abstract objects.
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In Quinean fashion, Devitt prefers to avoid talk of propositions altogether, and talks
instead of meaningful sentence and belief tokens:
By talking of meaningful tokens, we can avoid talk of propositions. This is an
advantage not simply because propositions are creatures of darkness but also
because talk of propositions... is explanatorily unhelpful. (Devitt 1996: 13)
Devitt admits that propositional talk may be legitimate to the extent that such talk can be
“paraphrased away, when the ontological chips are down, into talk about the properties of
concrete thoughts and utterances” (Devitt 1996: 210). Although he warns that, even then,
propositional talk is “unnecessary and misleading” (Devitt 1996: 210). Presumably, it is
unnecessary because it is an avoidable manner of speaking and it is potentially misleading
because there is the risk of taking literally what is only useful as a figure of speech.
Armstrong, in contrast, does not want to reject propositions altogether. Instead, he
proclaims: “as a naturalist, I want to look for a this-worldly account of propositions” (Armstrong
2004: 12). His proposal is that propositions are indeed the contents of beliefs and the meanings
of sentences, but that they are properties to be explained by a naturalized semantics, rather than
Platonic objects: “I would be hoping for a naturalistic theory of content and meaning, and so a
naturalistic theory of... propositions.” (Armstrong 2004: 14) The difference between the
approaches of Armstrong and Devitt may seem merely verbal. After all, they both regard
meanings as natural properties. Yet, there is a genuine difference. Armstrong, unlike Devitt,
argues that propositions—not sentence and belief tokens—are the primary truth-bearers.
(Armstrong 2004: 12). Devitt’s view is best characterized as treating meaningful tokens as the
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primary truth-bearers—tokens that are true or false in virtue of their semantic properties.
Armstrong even proposes that propositions are abstractions but, he insists, “not in any otherworldly sense” (Armstrong 2004: 13). He gives the following reason:
That... content or meaning is an abstraction becomes clear when we notice that
contents and meanings are types rather than tokens. Beliefs in different minds
may have the very same content, numerically different statements may have the
very same meaning. (Armstrong 2004: 13)
Basically, Armstrong thinks there is a “One over Many” problem for synonymy, so he suggests
an Aristotelian immanent realism, according to which propositions are worldly but universal
semantic property types that exist in sentence and belief tokens.
The disagreement between Armstrong and Devitt on the nature of meanings/propositions
stems from their disagreement on property realism. If there is a genuine “One over Many”
problem for synonymy, an immanent realism about meaning is preferable to a transcendent
realism. If the “One over Many” is instead a pseudo-problem, there is no reason for regarding
meanings as worldly but universal properties: we can simply regard them as the particular
properties of concrete tokens. In the latter case, there is no need for propositions—except as
“convenient fictions” that we may talk about figuratively to convey semantic facts about
concrete utterances and thoughts. But is there a need for propositions in the former case? Why
not just talk about meanings (qua immanent properties)? Armstrong offers the following reason
for positing propositions: “We can certainly apply the truth predicates very widely, but I am
inclined to think that all other suggested truthbearers besides propositions are called truthbearers
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on account of their relationship to certain propositions.” (Armstrong 2004: 12). In other words,
he agrees with the need for “something” that is not only the common meaning of synonymous
tokens, but also the primary bearer of truth. Such a “thing” is a universal property, rather than an
abstract object, but plays the same roles the alleged abstract object was expected to play.
I have argued that abstract objects cannot play the causal roles meanings ought to play, so
meanings are not abstract objects. I pointed out that we may then reject the existence of
propositions, following Devitt, or attempt to naturalize them, following Armstrong. But do
naturalized meanings play the same roles Platonic propositions where expected to play? Are they
also the primary truth-bearers? I discuss this topic in the next section.
I end this section with a brief clarification regarding the status of abstract entities in
general. There is an influential argument that abstract mathematical objects exist because our
best scientific theories quantify over them. This is known as the “Quine-Putnam indispensability
argument” (Quine 1961; Putnam 1979). It may be objected that my case against propositions qua
abstract objects would equally apply to mathematical objects, yet the indispensability argument
shows that mathematical objects exist—so there must be something wrong with my case. This is
an extremely difficult issue. However, the objection is far from compelling. First, notice that the
indispensability argument, while popular, is not the last word on the issue. There is Hartry Field’s
(1980) ambitious though incomplete project of nominalizing physics. According to Field,
numbers are merely useful fictions, reference to which can in principle be eliminated without
loss from our best scientific theories. But suppose that reference to numbers cannot be
eliminated. This alone does not show that they are not fictions. Stephen Yablo (1998) argues that
abstract entities are fictions even if reference to them cannot be eliminated from science: we may

57
need to learn to live with some in ineliminable metaphors. There is plenty of debate on this issue,
so it is far from established that non-fictional numbers are indispensable. Second, and more
importantly, I have argued that proper paraphrases for propositional talk are readily available. So
the situation of propositional talk is very different from that of mathematical talk. Even if some
abstract entities such as numbers must be accepted, this provides no reason for regarding
propositions as real abstract entities. Finally, numbers in physics do not themselves play causal
roles. No serious contemporary Platonist about numbers claims that they have physical effects.
As Mark Balaguer points out: “there are no causally efficacious mathematical objects... if there
exist any... then they are causally inert... [since] they exist outside of spacetime...” (Balaguer
1998: 132). Whatever role reference to numbers has in scientific explanations, it is very different
from that of reference to electrons and quarks. The fact that numbers are causally inert is what
makes Platonism about them a plausible position. But the situation is very different with
meanings, which clearly have causal roles in the physical world. In contrast with Platonism about
numbers, Platonism about meanings clashes with the causal closure of the physical world.
Consequently, it is simply not a plausible position.

1.6 Naturalized Propositions?
Armstrong attempts to naturalize propositions, regarding them as worldly but universal semantic
properties that also play the role of being the primary bearers of truth. I shall argue in this section
that, even if Armstrong were right about meanings being immanent universals, it would not
follow from this alone that they must also be the primary truth-bearers. I will not argue, however,
that meanings are not the primary truth-bearers. Rather, I will only attempt to clarify what we
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would need to establish in order to determine whether they are the primary truth-bearers.
It is far from clear that meanings should play the role of primary truth-bearers once we
have rejected the account of meanings qua abstract objects and replaced it with an account of
meanings as worldly properties—whether universal or not. The semantic properties of sentence
and belief tokens surely are partly responsible for their truth. A Spanish speaker’s utterance of
‘La nieve es blanca’ and someone’s belief that snow is white are true because they both mean
that snow is white—and because snow indeed is white. But it does not follow from this fact
alone that the real bearers of truth are meanings themselves, rather than meaningful sentence and
belief tokens—that is to say, concrete utterances and thoughts with their semantic (and syntactic)
properties. Meanings or contents, abstracted from utterances and thoughts, may not even be
legitimate—let alone primary—truth-bearers.28 An analogy may help to clarify this point:
A boat has the property of positive buoyancy—of weighting less than the water it
displaces—and, due to this, it has the property of floating in water. But what
floats is the boat, not the property that allows it to float. While other objects also
float because they are positively buoyant, it does not follow that the property they
have in common floats. Positive buoyancy does not float, positively buoyant
objects float.
28 J. L. Austin argues, based on ordinary language considerations, that propositions—regarded as sentence
meanings—cannot be truth-bearers: “In philosophy, indeed, ‘proposition’ is sometimes used... for ‘the meaning
or sense of a sentence or family of sentences’ : but... a proposition in this sense cannot, at any rate, be what we
say is true or false. For we never say ‘The meaning (or sense) of this sentence (or of these words) is true’: what
we do say is... that ‘The words taken in this sense, or if we assign to them such and such a meaning, or so
interpreted or understood, are true.’ ” (Austin 1950: 113). According to Austin, the primary truth-bearers are
neither propositions nor sentence types (which he calls simply “sentences”), but rather the datable and placeable
events he calls “statements”: “A statement is made and its making is a historic event, the utterance by a certain
speaker or writer of certain words (a sentence)...” (Austin 1950: 113-114). I do not think that ordinary language
considerations settle the issue. Yet, Austin’s take is worth mentioning because many authors take ordinary
language to be committed to propositions—qua sentence meanings—being the primary truth-bearers.
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Similarly, it may be reasonably argued:
A token of ‘La nieve es blanca’ in Spanish has the property of being true because
it has the property of meaning that snow is white—and snow indeed is white. But
what is true is the token, not the property that allows it to be true. While there are
other sentence and belief tokens that are true also because they mean or have the
content that snow is white, it does not follow that the semantic property they have
in common is true. Meanings or contents are not true or false, meaningful
sentence and belief tokens are true or false.
My point here is not that meanings cannot have the property of being true or false simply
because they are properties. After all, some properties may themselves have properties. For
example, the property of being red may have the property of being a color.29 What the analogy
with positive buoyancy shows, rather, is that an object O having property X in virtue of having
property Y does not entail that X must be a property of Y itself in order to be a property of O. So,
truth-values being properties of meanings and, consequently, sentence and belief tokens being
only derivatively true or false, does not follow merely from meanings being properties in virtue
of which sentence and belief tokens can be true or false.
To establish that meanings are the primary truth-bearers, we would need to show that the
relation between meaning and truth is more like the relation between being red and being a color
29 This is, of course, controversial. Armstrong argues that the truth of statements like ‘Red is a color’ requires
properties to be real: nominalists who reject properties cannot account for such truths (1978: 58-63). While he
prefers an account in terms of the universal properties, he points out that a particularist account—according to
which “the properties of particulars are themselves particular” (Armstrong 1978: 59)—does not face this
problem. ‘Red is a color’ may be analyzed by the particularist as asserting the following: if any particular thing
has the particular property of being red, then it has the particular property of being colored, and being colored is
a second-order particular property of the first-order particular property of being red (Armstrong 1978: 61).
Devitt regards the issue of accounting for the truth of statements like ‘Red is a color’ as a genuine problem, but
points out that it is different from the “One over Many” problem (2010: 19-20).
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than like the relation between positive buoyancy and floating. While this may be the case,
Armstrong does not provide any explicit reasons to think so. Why should we regard being true as
a second-order property of first-order meaning properties, rather than as a first-order property of
meaningful tokens? Armstrong seems to simply assume that meaning properties are the real
bearers of truth. But this begs the question against the reasonable alternative that the primary
bearers of truth are meaningful sentence and belief tokens.
The only hint of why Armstrong takes meanings qua immanent universals to be the
primary truth-bearers can be found on his brief characterization of particular content ascriptions.
But we are forced to “read between the lines” in lack of an explicit argument. Armstrong says:
Beliefs are essentially beliefs that something is the case. Whatever is believed to
be the case may then be said to be ‘the intentional object of that belief ’, using this
as a technical term only. And that is a proposition. (Armstrong 2004: 13)
What follows the ‘that’ in a particular content ascription, Armstrong points out, has the form
“something is the case”. Surely, then, what follows the ‘that’ can be true or false: it is a bearer of
truth. But Armstrong additionally claims: “note that what follows the ‘that’... is a proposition”
(Armstrong 2004: 14). If this claim were true, it would follow that a proposition is a truth-bearer
in its own right. While Armstrong uses the expression ‘intentional object’ to characterize the
proposition, he insists this is merely a technical term, so he warns: “I do not want to read too
much metaphysics into the phrase ‘intentional objects’.” (Armstrong 2004: 13) This warning is
important, since Armstrong wants to avoid reference to Platonic objects and treat a proposition as
a universal but worldly semantic property that is “what makes the belief the particular belief that
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it is” (Armstrong 2004: 13). An argument for naturalized propositions as primary truth-bearers
we may “extract” from Armstrong’s brief remarks runs roughly as follows: What follows the
‘that’ in a content ascription has the form “something is the case” and is a proposition, so a
proposition is a bearer of truth; additionally, a proposition qua immanent meaning property is
what makes a belief the particular belief it is, so it follows that it is the primary bearer of truth.
The line of reasoning, if sound, would support the view that being true is a second-order
property of first-order meaning properties. But the line of reasoning is not sound. The claim that
the content of a belief makes it the belief it is and the claim that what follows the ‘that’ in a
‘that’-clause has the form “something is the case” are surely correct and uncontroversial. But
why should we regard what follows the ‘that’ as a proposition? Notice that what follows the
‘that’-clause is obviously not a proposition, but an embedded sentence. What Armstrong must
mean is that what follows the ‘that’ somehow “picks out” a proposition. How can it do so? The
Platonic account provides an answer I have argued against: the content ascription asserts a
relation to a proposition because the ‘that’-clause refers to a universal abstract object. But
Armstrong cannot appeal to this answer. Yet, he seems to assume that something similar to the
Platonist account is correct. His characterization of a proposition as an intentional object is
revealing, despite his warning about reading “too much metaphysics” into it. The only account
consistent with Armstrong's own metaphysics is that the ‘that’-clause, instead of referring to a
transcendent object, “picks out” an immanent property. However, the ‘that’-clause surely picks
out a semantic property only because the embedded sentence has that property. But then the
‘that’-clause specifies the property by means of synonymy, which is the account I have defended.
This provides no support for the claim that what follows the ‘that’ has a different status from
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what precedes it. The report ‘Galileo believed that the earth moves’ asserts that Galileo’s belief
has the same content as the embedded sentence: both tokens have the property and both tokens
are true in virtue of having this property—and because the Earth does move. So there is no
support for the claim that what follows the ‘that’ is in any sense primarily true. Granting, for the
sake of argument, that the meaning shared by what precedes and follows the ‘that’ is a universal
does not show that the meaning is a primary truth-bearer either, since this is consistent also with
truth being a first-order property of both meaningful tokens. I conclude that Armstrong’s brief
characterization of content ascriptions fails to provide support for his claim that naturalized
meanings also play the roles of primary truth-bearers and deserve to be regarded as
“propositions”.
In this section, I have argued that Armstrong provides no support for his claim that
naturalized semantic properties also play the role of being the primary bearers of truth and,
consequently, should be regarded as naturalized propositions. I have not argued that meanings
are not the primary truth-bearers. However, I have argued that to establish that they are requires
determining that being true is a second-order property of first-order meaning properties. While
Armstrong does not show that this is the case, it may be the case. Alternatively, it may be the
case that the primary truth-bearers are meaningful sentence and belief tokens.
In the next section, I discuss whether postulating propositions qua abstract objects may
be consistently combined with a naturalized semantics. A view along these lines is proposed by
Horwich. Since this view is at odds with my claim that propositions qua abstract objects are
inconsistent with a naturalized semantics (and I borrow some crucial ideas from Horwich’s
theory of meaning for my own proposal), it is important that I clarify and assess the relationship
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between Horwich’s propositionalism and his semantic naturalism.

1.7 Naturalized Meanings plus Abstract Propositions?
I have argued against the standard account of propositions as abstract objects which constitute
the meaning or contents of thoughts and utterances and the primary bearers of truth. The main
consideration against such objects is that they cannot play any causal role in language and mind.
I have discussed Armstrong’s alternative proposal to naturalize propositions, regarding them as
natural properties which play the same roles abstract objects were alleged to play. But there is yet
another alternative to the standard account: propositions may be regarded as abstract objects that
are the primary truth-bearers, but which do not play the role of determining the meanings of
utterances and thoughts. Horwich’s account is precisely of this sort. He proposes a naturalized
theory of meaning, which he combines with a deflationary theory of truth that applies primarily
to propositions qua abstract objects. In this section, I attempt to clarify his account of the relation
between naturalized meanings and propositions. Horwich’s own remarks on this metaphysical
issue leave room for interpretation. I argue that under one interpretation, Horwich’s account can
avoid the problems of the standard propositionalist account, while under another interpretation
his propositionalism is problematic.
Horwich’s “use” theory of meaning identifies meanings with the properties that account
for the acceptance of sentences, including linguistic utterances and thoughts (i.e., the tokening of
mental sentences in the “belief box”), and explains meanings in terms of some core sentences
that, he suggests, play a basic role in the causal explanation of why other sentences are accepted
(Horwich 2005: 28). This account of meaning has good naturalistic credentials and is a crucial

64
component of the approach I am proposing to naturalize semantics. Furthermore, Horwich fully
accepts the causal closure of the physical world which, he claims, constrains what properties can
constitute meanings:
[A] person’s utterance of a given sentence on some occasion is surely explained,
in part, by the meaning he attaches to that sentence; and this can be so (assuming
the ‘causal autonomy of the physical’) only if [the] meanings of expressions are
somehow engendered by physical phenomena. (Horwich 2010: 103n)
Horwich makes this unapologetic naturalist remark in the context of rejecting accounts according
to which meanings are irreducibly normative. He is not specifically invoking the causal closure
of the physical world to reject accounts of meanings as engendered or constituted by relations to
abstract objects. Yet, the latter accounts are also undermined by this consideration—as I have
argued—and Horwich’s theory of meaning does not appeal anyway to non-natural properties.
Horwich’s deflationary theory of truth is that truth is not a natural property susceptible of
a reductive explanation. He argues that the function of our concept of truth is merely to allow us
to make certain generalizations, that the meaning of the word ‘true’ is engendered by the
acceptance of the trivial equivalence schema “<p> is true ↔ p”, and that no reductive
explanation of the nature of truth is possible or needed (Horwich 1998b: 120-146). The
equivalence schema, Horwich argues, applies primarily to propositions (<p>) and only
derivatively to sentences (‘p’): the truth of the sentence ‘Snow is white’, derives from the truth of
the proposition it expresses, <Snow is white>, which trivially follows from snow being white
(Horwich 1998b: 129-135). His main argument for regarding propositions as objects that are the
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primary truth-bearers is based on ordinary language considerations:
In ordinary language what are said to be true are the things that we believe and
that our utterances express—so-called propositions. Thus, on the face of it,
propositions exist, some of them… are true, and the correlated truth-like attributes
of utterances and of acts of believing, asserting, etc. are the complex, derivative
properties, ‘u expresses a true proposition’ and ‘the object of act x is a true
proposition’. (Horwich, 1998b: 129)
Horwich bases his view that what is said and what is believed are propositional objects on the
face value interpretation of inferences linking particular and general content ascriptions
(Horwich, 1998b: 86-90). I have already argued against the face value interpretation at length. If
I am right, it follows that if deflationism about truth turns out to be correct, a version that takes
sentence tokens as the primary truth-bearers should be favored. 30 My concern here is whether
Horwich’s propositionalism is compatible with his naturalism about meaning and his acceptance
of the causal closure of the physical world.
The first point to notice is that Horwich distinguishes propositions—what is said or
believed—from the meanings of sentence and belief tokens and types identified and explained by
his naturalized semantics: “Certainly, it is vital to distinguish between (1) the meaning (or
meanings) of a sentence type, (2) the meaning of one of its tokens, and (3) the proposition
expressed by that token.” (Horwich 1998a: 82). The same distinction can be made between the
meaning of a belief type or token and the proposition believed, since Horwich treats beliefs as

30 Hartry Field proposes a sententialist version of deflationism which is similar to Horwich’s but does not posit
propositions (Field 2001).
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mental sentences (Horwich 2005: 30). Since his reductive account applies directly only to the
meanings of sentences, this distinction seems to leave room for treating the propositions
expressed by those sentences as abstract objects. Indeed, Horwich claims that this is a “small
and innocuous” step that follows from introducing propositions as follows: if an utterance has the
same meaning as ‘p’, then it expresses the proposition that p (Horwich 2010: 33). The claim
seems to be roughly that the proposition expressed by a sentence token derives from its meaning
and does not determine its meaning. This claim does not overtly violate the causal closure of the
physical world, as far as meanings are concerned. (It is analogous to an epiphenomenalist
account of the mental, which preserves dualism without violating the laws of nature.)
As far as truth is concerned, the order of Horwich’s account is the opposite: the truth of a
sentence token derives from the truth of the proposition it expresses. Is this problematic? Does it
violate the causal closure of the physical world, since propositions are regarded as abstract
objects? Not necessarily. Since truth, according to Horwich, is a trivial property that plays no
causal-explanatory role, it may be argued that his account of abstract propositional objects as the
primary truth-bearers is harmless and does not violate the causal closure principle. For example,
we may explain that Mary succeeded finding a corkscrew because her belief that it was in the
kitchen drawer—which caused her to go to look for it there—turned out to be true. While truth
seems to play a crucial role in the explanation of why Mary’s behavior was successful, Horwich
would insist that the word ‘truth’ is only being used as a “device of generalization” and that we
can explain the situation without appealing to truth: Mary’s behavior was successful because it
was partly caused by a token of ‘There is a corkscrew in the kitchen’s drawer’ in her “belief box”
and there was indeed a corkscrew in the kitchen’s drawer. Horwich would argue that only the
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meaningful token—which can be explained naturalistically—and the location of the corkscrew—
a physical fact—play a substantial role in the explanation of why Mary acted as she did and
succeeded. Horwich’s contention is that truth itself does not play any causal role in the
explanation; while we may use the word ‘true’ in describing the situation—as I did initially—and
even to formulate the generalization that true beliefs (often) contribute to successful behavior, we
only need to apply ‘true’ in accordance with the trivial equivalence schema to do so (Horwich
1998b: 44-46, 139-141).
Le me summarize what I have said so far in this section. I have argued that Horwich’s
propositionalism does not overtly conflict with his naturalistic theory of meaning to the extent
that (1) he distinguishes meanings from propositions, (2) he does not regard the latter as
determining the former, and (3) his deflationary account does not assign any causal role to truth
in the explanation of why behavior based on true belief can be successful. However, I have
argued previously against his motivation for regarding propositions as the primary truth-bearers:
his endorsement of the face value interpretation of attitude ascriptions. I will now discuss in
more detail Horwich’s distinction between meanings and propositions.
As I pointed out, Horwich claims that positing an abstract propositional object is a “small
and innocuous” step: when a sentence token is synonymous with ‘p’, it expresses the proposition
that p (Horwich 2010: 33). This is the way of introducing propositions I discussed above and
found not to conflict with the causal closure principle. However, the devil is in the details. When
we take a closer look into Horwich’s distinction between meanings and propositions, we find that
he makes some remarks that may be interpreted as being far from innocuous. On occasion,
Horwich seems to treat propositions as the contents determined by a token’s meaning together
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with its context of utterance. Consider the context of the passage quoted above, where he
distinguishes the meanings of sentence types and tokens from propositions:
[Speakers] of English know how to use “I am hungry”—they know its unique
meaning. However, on different occasions it expresses different propositions: I
used it yesterday to say that I was hungry; whereas John will use it tomorrow to
say that he is (then) hungry...
Certainly, it is vital to distinguish between (1) the meaning (or meanings) of a
sentence type, (2) the meaning of one of its tokens, and (3) the proposition
expressed by that token. (Horwich 1998a: 82)
Horwich is invoking Kaplan’s distinction between the character of a sentence token—the
unvarying meaning it shares with other tokens of the same sentence type and which is
determined by linguistic conventions—and the content of a sentence token—what is said by the
token, determined by its character and its context of utterance—. This passage suggests that
Horwich may be identifying the meaning of the token with its character and the proposition
expressed by the token—what is said—with its content. Does he take the meaning of a sentence
token to be merely its character? The quoted passage continues as follows:
Moreover, we must acknowledge that the use theory applies primarily to the first
of these notions, and derivatively to the second (in so far as the meaning of a
sentence token is simply one of the meanings of the ambiguous sentence type). As
for the third notion of meaning—the proposition expressed—the use theory does
not purport to give a complete account of it. However... the meaning of an
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utterance token is a major determinant of which proposition is expressed...
(Horwich 1998a: 82)
If the meaning of a sentence token is the meaning of the sentence type to which it belongs, as
Horwich suggests here, then it certainly is merely the token’s character when the sentence is
context-sensitive. Of the three notions he distinguishes between, only the third one—the
proposition expressed—seems able to accommodate Kaplan’s contents. It would be helpful to
know what Horwich thinks about the relation between the meaning of a belief—which he
expects his use theory to explain—and the proposition believed, since there is no
character/content distinction in this case. But Horwich’s remarks on the relation between
meanings and propositions are sparse and, as far as I can tell, he does not address the issue.
However, his endorsement of the face value interpretation of attitude reports suggests that he
identifies the content of a belief with a proposition. What attitude reports ascribe are contents and
Horwich characterizes them as abstract propositional objects: “the things that we believe and that
our utterances express—so-called propositions” (Horwich 1998b: 129). Further support for this
interpretation comes from what Horwich says about the relation between propositions and the
meanings of non-context-sensitive sentences: “[If we] restrict our attention to context-insensitive
sentences (such as ‘dogs bark’ and ‘snow is white’)... it is plausible to identify the proposition
expressed by an utterance with the meaning of the sentence-type to which the utterance
belongs...” (Horwich 1998b: 131). All of this textual evidence seems to support the interpretation
that Horwich does identify propositions and contents. Nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind that
this is a topic that Horwich has not discussed in much detail. So I am not fully confident that this
interpretation fully captures his view on the matter. But let me explain why Horwich’s account
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would be problematic if this interpretation happened to be correct.
Once we combine Horwich’s characterization of propositions as abstract objects with his
seeming identification of propositions with contents, the result is deeply troubling, rather than
“innocuous”. The problem is that contents, not just characters, play a crucial role in the
explanation of behavior. But, given the causal closure of the physical world—which Horwich
accepts (Horwich 2010: 103n)—contents qua abstract objects cannot play such roles. Consider
the following situation: Mary utters ‘I am hungry’ and Nancy responds ‘There is a sandwich in
the fridge’; then Mary replies ‘Great!’, goes to the kitchen, opens the fridge, grabs the sandwich
and proceeds to eat it. The explanation of Mary’s doing what she did relies on ascribing
meanings to the utterances on this exchange, as well as ascribing beliefs and desires to Mary and
Nancy. We ascribe to Mary’s first utterance the content that she is hungry: a content that we
ascribe because we know the linguist convention for the use or the word ‘I’—the character of the
word—and because we know facts about the context of utterance—that Mary is the speaker.
Based on that ascription, we ascribe a mental state to Mary with that same content. The point is
that the content we ascribe to the sentence token and, consequently, to a mental state of Mary,
does play a causal role in the explanation of why she opens the fridge and eats the sandwich. It
follows that contents, as well as characters, must be natural worldly phenomena that can play
such roles. So I conclude that if Horwich identifies contents with propositions, his
characterization of them as abstract objects does conflict with the causal closure of the physical
world and is unable account for the role of contents in the explanation of behavior.
While Horwich identifies meanings as those properties that explain what causes the
acceptance of sentences, Devitt argues that Horwich should extend his identification of meanings
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to include their roles in the explanation of behavior: what sentences cause (Devitt 2011: 197-198
& 2002: 112). Horwich does provide an account of how mental sentences can cause behavior
(Horwich 2005: 37-39), but he continues to identify meanings merely with what causes the
acceptance of sentences (Devitt 2011: 198). The broader identification of meanings is not only
well motivated, but also helps not to overlook the fact the causal closure of the physical world
constrains what properties can constitute both of the kinds of meaning distinguished by Kaplan,
since focusing on explanations of behavior shows that the contents we attribute ought to play
causal roles. The fact that folk psychology is generally successful is evidence that the contents
we do ascribe to tokens—not just the characters—often are the ones that we ought to ascribe.
We need a naturalized semantics that explains the nature of characters and contents identified by
their causal roles.
I have argued that Horwich’s combination of an account of propositions qua abstract
objects with a naturalized semantics may either succeed or fail, depending on what specific
relation between propositions and meanings is intended. In so far as Horwich sharply
distinguishes meanings from propositions, does not regard propositions as determining meanings
and offers a deflationary account of propositional truth, his account faces no problems. However,
if we interpret Horwich as identifying meanings merely with the characters of tokens, the
account is inadequate. The main problem stems from Horwich’s seeming identification of
propositions with Kaplan-style contents which, I have argued, must also be naturalized and
should not be regarded as abstract objects. While I see no motivation to posit propositions qua
abstract objects, there is one way Horwich may avoid the problem. Horwich may regard both the
characters and contents of sentence and belief tokens as natural properties which play causal
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roles in the physical world and posit abstract propositions in a truly “innocuous” way,
introducing them as follows: when a sentence or belief token has the same content (in Kaplan’s
sense) as ‘p’ (a non-context sensitive sentence), it expresses the proposition that p. This may
actually be Horwich’s more recent take on the matter, although he does not specify which aspect
of meaning he intends the “innocuous” introduction of propositions to rely on (see Horwich
2010: 33). Yet, given the availability of sententialist versions of deflationism, I see no benefit in
adopting such a refinement. Finally, Horwich’s main motivation for positing propositions qua
abstract objects stems from ordinary language considerations. But if the face value interpretation
he endorses were right (I have argued it is not), the contents we do ascribe would be abstract
objects and could not play the causal roles they ought to play. In such a case, we should move on
from mere ordinary language considerations to considerations about what properties we ought to
ascribe to explain behavior in a scientifically viable way.

1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed the view that the meanings or contents of utterances and
thoughts are the abstract objects called “propositions” which constitute the primary truth-bearers:
what Church calls a “proposition in the abstract sense”. The main reason for addressing such a
view is that it is inconsistent with a naturalized semantics of the sort I am defending and it is a
view held by many philosophers. I have argued that the argument for propositions qua abstract
objects based on the “One over Many” argument fails, since the Platonic “solution” faces an
insurmountable difficulty: it faces a vicious relation regress. I have argued that the arguments for
propositions qua abstract objects based on the alleged logical form of particular and general
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content attributions also fail, since there are more plausible accounts of such attributions, which
treat ascriptions as specifying semantic properties rather than referring to—or quantifying over—
propositional objects. These non-propositionalist accounts, I showed, can also account for the
validity of inferences containing particular and general content ascriptions. But I also pointed out
that, even if the propositionalist accounts were correct about the ontological commitments of
ordinary ascriptions, this would not prove that propositions exist, since folkloric opinion is not
the ultimate guide to reality. The semantic properties we ought to ascribe—and which very likely
are the ones we often ascribe, given the general success of folk-psychology—are properties that
play causal roles in the explanation of behavior. This excludes Platonic objects as prospective
meanings or contents.
We must either reject propositions altogether or look for a naturalistic account of
propositions. I have, however, casted some doubt on the need for naturalized propositions. But
this issue depends, I argued, on whether being true is a second-order property of first-order
meaning properties. Finally, I have objected to Horwich’s combination of a naturalized semantics
with an account of propositions as abstract objects—or at least one interpretation of it. The
“propositional” contents he claims we ascribe in ordinary attributions must play causal roles in
the physical world, so they cannot be abstract objects.
I conclude that, despite the popularity of propositions qua abstract objects (even among
some philosophers who want to naturalize meanings!), there are no compelling reasons to believe
they exist, but there are compelling metaphysical reasons to reject any abstract entities from a
scientifically viable explanation of the meanings or contents of utterances and thoughts. We need
a reductive explanation of what natural properties constitute the meanings of utterances and

74
thoughts: a naturalized semantics.
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Chapter 2:
Truth, Reference and the Task of Semantics

2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I discussed a metaphysical issue related to the nature of meanings. In this
chapter I will discuss a “methodological” issue. What is the task of semantics? The simple
answer to this question is that the task is “to say what meanings are, to explain their natures”
(Devitt 2012: 62). Presumably, the various semantic theories on offer are rival accounts of such
natures. But it is often not clear whether they are genuine rivals, since they seem to have
different purposes and disagree on what counts as a “meaning”. It is common to assume that the
goal is to explain the truth-conditions of sentences and thoughts and the references of their parts
—where truth is regarded as some form of correspondence with reality. But deflationists argue
that truth and reference cannot play a substantial role in semantics. I will argue that no account of
the nature of truth and reference should be assumed in the definition of the task of semantics,
since it is likely that the dispute between correspondence and deflationary views will be settled
by whether truth and reference are required to play a substantial role in the explanation of
meaning. Following Devitt (1996), I argue that the task of semantics should be to explain the
nature of the meanings pre-theoretically identified by the causal roles of representations. This
definition of the task has the virtue of not assuming any account of the nature of truth or
reference and, consequently, of not begging the question against deflationism.
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2.2 The Nature of Truth and Reference
The status quo in semantics is truth-referentialism: the view that truth and reference play a
central role in the explanation of meanings. The meanings of sentences are regarded as being
exhausted by—or consisting mainly of—their truth-conditions, which in turn are regarded as
being determined by the referential properties of words and the syntactic structure of sentences.
Similarly, the truth-conditions of thoughts are regarded as being determined by the referential
properties of the concepts they contain and their structure. Truth-referentialism requires truth to
be a substantial property. The main substantial account of the nature of truth adopted by truthreferentialists is the correspondence theory. And the main alternative to the correspondence
theory is deflationism, according to which truth is not a substantial property and cannot play an
explanatory role in the theory of meaning. The deflationary conception of truth motivates some
kind of “use” theory of meaning in which truth plays no explanatory role. I will briefly discuss
correspondence and deflationary conceptions and argue that the dispute is likely to be settled by
whether truth and reference must play an explanatory role in semantics.
The most venerable and popular view about the nature of truth is that it consists in some
form of correspondence with reality. Various formulations of the view have been proposed. What
they have in common is a commitment to the claim that truth is a specific kind of relational
property: a property that some truth-bearers have because of a relation they bear to reality. The
various formulations of the view agree on the broad characterization of this relation as one of
correspondence, agreement or conformity. But they disagree on whether it involves a
resemblance or merely a correlation between truth-bearers and reality (Pitcher 1964: 9-11;
Kirkham 1992: Ch. 4.1). The various formulations also agree on the objective—mind- and
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language-independent—character of the reality that true truth-bearers are related to. But they
disagree on whether true truth-bearers correspond to things or to facts (Künne 2003: Ch. 3).

2.2.1 The Canonical Correspondence Theory
What today is regarded as the canonical version of the correspondence view is the claim that a
truth-bearer is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact. This idea was advanced in the early
twentieth century by G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The canonical
view requires an ontology of facts. Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein argued that facts are entities
in their own right, existing over and above the things that compose them. The basic idea is that
facts are structured combinations of objects with properties or relations. For example, the fact
that a certain tree is an oak allegedly consists of an object, the tree, combined with the property
of being an oak (Moore 1953: 311), while the fact that Desdemona loves Cassio allegedly is a
“complex unity” of two objects, Desdemona and Cassio, connected by the loving relation which
“binds [them] together” in a particular “order” (Russell 1912: 128). The canonical view also
needs an account of the correspondence relation. Wittgenstein (1922) and Russell (1918)
proposed that a true sentence “pictures” or “mirrors” a fact in virtue of (1) the referential
relations between its words and the constituents of the fact, and (2) a relation of structural
resemblance or isomorphism between the sentence and the fact (Wittgenstein 1922: 2.131 &
3.21; Russell 1918: 24-25). For example, ‘Socrates is wise’ is true if there is a fact consisting of
the object and property referred to by the name and predicate, respectively, which has the same
monadic structure, Φx, as the sentence. While ‘Napoleon hates Wellington’ is true if there is a
fact that has the same dyadic form as the sentence, Φxy, and which has Napoleon and Wellington
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and the hating relation as constituents.
While very influential in its time, the canonical version of correspondence faces serious
difficulties. As J. L. Austin warned, the idea that portions of reality are isomorphic to the true
sentences that represent them seems to commit “the error of reading back into the world the
features of language” (Austin 1950: 119). Austin proposed that only correlations (not
isomorphisms) between sentences and portions of reality are required for correspondence (Austin
1950: 115-120). Moreover, it turns out that sentences are not isomorphic to what they represent,
as Russell himself noticed:
In the phrase “A is to the left of B,” even if we treat “is-to-the-left-of” as one
word, we have a fact consisting of three terms with a triadic relation, not two
terms with a dyadic relation. The linguistic symbol for a relation is not itself a
relation, but a term as solid as the other words of the sentence. (Russell 1919: 38)
The fact represented by a true sentence ‘Rab’ allegedly is a unity of two objects, a and b, bound
by a dyadic relation R. But the sentence is instead a unity of three words, ‘R’, ‘a’ and ‘b’, bound
by a triadic logico-syntactic relation. If there is such a thing as the fact that Rab, it is not
isomorphic to the sentence ‘Rab’.
Another problem for the canonical view is with the ontology of facts. To begin with, there
seem to be no facts corresponding to negative, disjunctive or conditional statements (Strawson
1950: 154-155). Wittgenstein (1922) and Russell (1918) had a solution for this problem, which
Russell called “logical atomism”: instead of explaining the truth of molecular sentences in terms
of isomorphisms with logically complex facts, they explained it in terms of (1) their logical
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structure and (2) the truth-values of the atomic sentences they contain: ‘p and q’ is true if and
only if ‘p’ is true and ‘q’ is true, ‘p or q’ is true if and only if ‘p’ is true or ‘q’ is true, ‘If p, then q’
is true if and only if ‘p’ is false or ‘q’ is true, etc. (Wittgenstein 1922: 5-5.101; Russell 1918: 3741). However, this still relied on the mistaken view that atomic sentences are true in virtue of
isomorphisms. Furthermore, even “atomic” facts are controversial. The idea that combinations of
objects with properties or relations are sui generis entities assumes realism about universals—a
controversial doctrine that I questioned in Chapter 1. 31 We can accept that Socrates really is wise
without regarding this as a combination of Socrates with a universal wisdom that can be
instantiated elsewhere. Certainly there is plenty of talk of facts in ordinary language. But it looks
like such talk is equivalent to talk of truths. P. F. Strawson, for example, suggests that the
expressions ‘fact’ and ‘true statement’ have overlapping roles and points out:
There is no nuance, except of style, between ‘That’s true’ and ‘That’s a fact’; nor
between ‘Is it true that...?’ and ‘Is it a fact that...?’ (Strawson 1950: 136)
Similarly, Quine remarks:
In ordinary usage ‘fact’ often occurs where we could without loss say ‘true
sentence’ or (if it is our way) ‘true proposition’... Now so far as these uses go
there is no call to posit facts... nor any difficulty in... paraphrasing away the word.
(Quine 1960: 246-247)
Strawson and Quine do not object to the ordinary uses of the word ‘fact’. Their point is rather
that such uses are not seriously committed to the existence of anything other than truths.
31 Armstrong (1997) provides a contemporary defense of the existence of atomic facts, regarded as entities that are
more than the sum of their parts.
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2.2.2 The Contemporary Correspondence Theory
Given the serious problems faced by the canonical version of the correspondence theory,
contemporary theorists have articulated a version of the view that relies neither on facts nor on
resemblance relations. Instead, it relies on (1) an account of truth in terms of the logical
structures of sentences and the referential properties of their parts—based on Alfred Tarski’s
(1956 & 1944) influential work—coupled with (2) a reductive account of reference in terms of
one or another kind of causal relation between words and objects—a combination which, Hartry
Field (1972) argued, is necessary to provide a robust account of truth. While the canonical view
regards correspondence as a resemblance-to-facts relation, the contemporary view treats
correspondence as a correlation-to-objects relation.
Tarski (1956 & 1944) wanted to offer an account of truth that does justice to the classical
conception of truth as consisting in some form of correspondence to reality (Tarski 1956: 153 &
1944: 342-343). Despite his intentions, however, his account turns out to be a form of
deflationism (Horwich 2010: 22-24; Devitt 2010:170-173). Tarski showed how the truth of a
sentence can be explained in terms of its structure and the referential properties of its parts. This
is the aspect of Tarski’s work that is adopted by the contemporary correspondence theory. I will
ignore for now Tarski’s account of reference, which is the deflationary part of his account
discarded by the contemporary correspondence theory.32
Tarski offered his account for fully formalized languages. I will use predicate symbolic
logic as an illustration. Consider a simple sentence ‘Kr’. Following the procedure proposed by
Tarski, we can specify the truth-conditions of ‘Kr’ as follows:
32 I will also ignore that Tarski (1956) did not offer an account of truth, but of truth-in-a-(specific)-language.
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‘Kr’ is true ↔ ∃x(‘r’ designates x & ‘K’ applies to x).
In plain English: ‘Kr’ is true if and only if there is an object that the name ‘r’ designates and the
predicate ‘K’ applies to. Notice that the truth-conditions of the sentence are characterized in
terms of its structure and the referential relations—application and designation—between its
component words and an object in the world. Sentential structure and referential relations were
also components of the canonical view. But here “facts” and “structural resemblances” play no
role. These are correlation-to-objects relations instead of resemblance-to-facts relations. Given
the difficulties faced by the canonical view discussed above, related to “facts” and “structural
resemblance”, this is a clear advantage.
Tarski showed that the truth-conditions of an infinite number of sentences can be derived
from a finite set of rules or axioms that can be recursively applied. For example, the truthconditions of ‘Kr’ stated above can be derived from applying the general rule:
⌜Fa⌝ is true ↔ ∃x(⌜a⌝ designates x & ⌜F⌝ applies to x).
Where ⌜a⌝ can be replaced by any name and ⌜F⌝ can be replaced by any one-place predicate. So
the truth-conditions of any sentence ⌜Fa⌝ can be obtained. Similarly, the truth-conditions of a
compound or molecular sentence ‘Kr & Jz’ can be specified by the biconditional:
‘Kr & Jz’ is true ↔ ∃x(‘r’ designates x & ‘K’ applies to x) & ∃x(‘z’ designates x &
‘J’ applies to x).
Which is derived from applying the truth-rule for ⌜Fa⌝ to each conjunct after applying the
general truth-rule for conjunction:
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⌜A & B⌝ is true ↔ (⌜A⌝ is true & ⌜B⌝ is true).
Where ⌜A⌝ and ⌜B⌝ can be replaced by any simple or compound sentence (so the rule can be
applied recursively to complex sentences that contain indefinitely many simple sentences).
Notice that this characterization coincides with the one offered by Wittgenstein (1922) and
Russell (1918). What sets apart Tarski is his account of “atomic” sentences. His account of
“molecular” sentences is the same.
One of Tarski’s crucial insights is that the “semantic” rules should track and exploit the
recursive syntactic rules. And the “syntactic” formation rules of predicate logic are finite. So,
once we have formulated the corresponding finite set of semantic truth-rules that cover all the
formation rules, we can characterize the truth-conditions of an infinite number of sentences.
What we need is truth-rules for: (1) sentences containing n-place predicates—⌜Fa⌝, ⌜Fab⌝,
⌜Fabc⌝, etc.—, (2) sentences with quantifiers—⌜∀x(Fx)⌝ and ⌜∃x(Fx)⌝—and (3) sentences with
logical operators or connectives —⌜~A⌝, ⌜A & B⌝, ⌜A ∨ B⌝, ⌜A → B⌝ and ⌜A ↔ B⌝—. Tarski
showed how this can be done—roughly along the lines of the examples I gave above.
What is required to turn a recursive account along these lines into a correspondence
theory of truth is to (1) show how it can be extended to natural languages and (2) complement it
with an account of the nature of the referential relations between words and objects—a reductive
account that does not rely on semantic terms, since semantic properties surely are not among the
fundamental properties of the world. Tarski himself offered an account of reference in nonsemantic terms. But Hartry Field (1972) showed that it did not provide a proper reduction (I
discuss this below) and that it had to be replaced with a naturalistic account of reference in terms
of one or another kind of casual relation between words and the world. There has been plenty of
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work on how to naturalize reference in the last decades. The main contenders are theories that
rely on the historical causes, the reliable causes and the etiological functions of representations,
respectively. None of these proposals are without problems. Whether some reductive explanation
of reference in non-semantic terms succeeds or not remains to be seen. Deflationists are skeptical
because they think that a reductive explanation of reference is neither possible nor needed
(Horwich 1998b; Field 1994). But the matter is not settled, and we should keep searching.
The other challenge for the contemporary theory is to extend the recursive account to
natural languages. Tarski himself was skeptical, because formulating the truth-rules for a
language requires that its structure has been already specified exactly.33 But times changed and
eventually philosophers and logicians—and later linguists—started to explore how a Tarskian
account could be applied to natural languages. A crucial inspiration for this optimism was the
increased understanding of the syntax of natural languages provided by Chomskyan generative
grammar. Richard Montague declared: “I reject the contention that an important theoretical
difference exists between formal and natural languages” and proposed a Tarski-inspired theory of
truth for “a formal language that I believe may be reasonably regarded as a fragment of ordinary
English” (Montague 1974: 188). Similarly, Donald Davidson proclaimed: “a semantic theory of a
natural language cannot be considered adequate unless it provides an account of the concept of
truth for that language along the general lines proposed by Tarski for formalized languages”
(Davidson 1984: 55). Consider the philosophical practice of translating natural language
sentences into quantified predicate logic to reveal their logical form. Plenty of sentences can be
33 As he pointed out: “At the present time the only languages with a specified structure are the formalized
languages of various systems of deductive logic, possibly enriched by the introduction of certain non-logical
terms.” (Tarski 1944: 347). Tarski was also concerned about the syntactic rules of natural languages allowing for
the formation of paradoxical sentences like the self-referring ‘This sentence is false’, which would make the
characterizations of truth-conditions inconsistent (Tarski 1956: 157-165 & 1944: 347-349).
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successfully translated. As Davidson points out, this reveals that formal languages already cover
at least some the structure of natural languages—for example, Frege’s work on quantifiers
reveals the logical roles of some uses of words like ‘all’, ‘every’, ‘some’ and ‘none’ in English
(Davidson 1984: 29). The remaining challenge is to show that a Tarski-based approach can be
extended to those sentences of natural languages that seem to resist formalization. Davidson’s
analysis of action sentences and adverbial modifications is a good example of an attempt to
reveal the logical form of some problematic sentences, so that a Tarskian account can cover them
(Davidson 1967 & 1985). Just like with reductive theories of reference, it remains to be seen
whether this can be accomplished.

2.2.3 Deflationism
According to deflationism, a reductive explanation of truth and reference is neither possible nor
necessary, because truth and reference are not substantial properties with an underlying nature
that could be reductively explained. I will first present the unintentional deflationism of Tarski
and then the views of some contemporary deflationists.
Tarski suggested that a proper account or “definition” of truth should capture our pretheoretical intuitions about what is for a sentence to be true by entailing the proper instances of
the equivalence schema:
(T) ‘S’ is true ↔ S.
Where the sentence ‘S’ is mentioned on the left hand of the biconditional and used on the right
hand. The well-known example Tarski (1944) gave of an instance of this schema in English is:

85
‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.
Tarski regarded each instance as a “partial definition” of truth, because he though that it
accounted for the truth of a particular sentence. Indeed, Tarski suggested that a mere list of all the
instances of the schema for a language with a finite number of sentences would provide a proper
account of truth in that language (Tarski 1956: 188). He moved on to offer his recursive account
because interesting languages have an infinite number of sentences. But notice that a list-like
account would not constitute a “correspondence” theory. As Douglas Patterson points out, many
philosophers—notably Tarski (1944: 342-343)—have held the view that instances of the schema
“state correspondences between the sentences they mention and something else” (Patterson
2003: 421). But instances of the schema do not state relations of correspondence, since they do
not state any relations whatsoever: their basic form is A ↔ B, rather than Rab. Indeed,
deflationists argue that there is no need to regard the word ‘truth’ as standing for a relational
property because instances of the equivalence schema are all that is required to account for its
meaning and utility (Horwich 1998b; Field 1994).
Tarski complemented his recursive account of truth with a non-semantic characterization
of what is for a name to designate an object and what is for a predicate to apply to an object.
Notice that reductive explanations of reference in terms of one or another kind of causal link
between symbols and reality (whether reliable, historical or teleological) also are non-semantic.
But the “non-semantic” characterizations of reference offered by Tarski are not of this sort. In the
case of ‘K’ and ‘r’, for example, they would be the following:
∀x(‘K’ applies to x ↔ Kx).
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∀x(‘r’ designates x ↔ x = r).34
Tarski proposed that a complete list of biconditionals like these, covering all the non-logical
symbols of a language, would provide a proper non-semantic characterization of what is for a
symbol to refer in that language. Sure enough, the right-hand sides of these biconditionals
contain no semantic terms. But, as Field pointed out, they do not provide reductive explanations
of the nature of reference (Field 1972). Field made this point vivid using an analogy with the
reductive explanation of chemical valence. In the twentieth century, the valence of elements was
explained in terms of the underlying physical properties of their atoms. But suppose that a
chemist in the late nineteenth century offered the following as a “non-chemical” characterization
of the valence of elements:
An element e has valence n if and only if either e is arsenic and n is 5, or e is
beryllium and n is 2, or …, or e is zinc and n is 2. (See Field 1972: 362-363)
Such a list-like characterization can match all the elements with their correct numerical values.
The right-hand side of the biconditional contains no chemical terms. Yet it is clear that this listlike characterization does not provide a reductive explanation of valence (ibid). Indeed, it says
nothing substantial about the nature of valence. Similarly, Tarski’s list-like definitions say
nothing substantial about the nature of reference. While Field saw this as a serious drawback—
34 Tarski (1956) initially focused on the relation between predicates and the objects they apply to, which he called
“satisfaction”. He offered the following example of how the application of a one-place predicate can be defined:
“for every a, ...a satisfies the sentential function ‘x is white’ if and only if a is white” (Tarski 1956: 190). The
formal languages he originally analyzed did not contain names (Horwich 1998b: 110n). But he did provide an
account of designation (Tarski 1956: 194n; see Field 2001: 17-18), which he later explicitly included among the
semantic features that determine sentential truth (Tarski 1944: 345). Tarski defined designation—just like
predicate-application—in terms of satisfaction: “a given term designates a given object if this object satisfies the
sentential function ‘x is identical with T’ where ‘T’ stands for the given term” (Tarski 1944: 373n). So he
regarded satisfaction as the most fundamental semantic relation that determines sentential truth: “a sentence is
true if it is satisfied by all objects, and false otherwise” (Tarski 1944: 353).
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and proposed that we replace Tarski’s definitions with a causal theory of reference—he
eventually changed his mind and came to think that truth and reference indeed have no
underlying nature, but the words ‘true’ and ‘refers’ nonetheless play useful roles. I will briefly
characterize the views of Horwich and Field, that differ mainly on their takes on truth-bearers.
Deflationists are not always very clear about the metaphysics of truth and reference,
although they have plenty to say about the roles of the words ‘true’ and ‘refers’ (‘applies to’,
‘designates’, etc.). Consider the following schemata:
‘p’ is true if and only if p.
‘a’ designates and object o if and only if a = o.
‘F’ applies to an object o if and only if o is F.
Deflationists like Field and Horwich argue that the roles of ‘true’, ‘designates’ and ‘applies’ in
the instances of these schemata are all that is required to account for their meaning and utility, so
there is no need to regard ‘truth’ and ‘reference’ as standing for relational properties. While Field
(1994) is a sententialist, Horwich (1998b) is a propositionalist, so his version of the first schema
is instead: <p> is true if and only if p.
But what is the utility of these words? Deflationists say that they work as devices of
generalization that allow us to say things that we would not be able (or it would be hard) to say
without them. You can say, for example, ‘What he said is true’, expressing agreement with a
statement that you may not be able to put in words. Given the equivalence schema, this sentence
entails: ‘If he said that grass is green, then grass is green, if he said that Mars is a planet, then
Mars is a planet, if he said that 2 + 2 = 4, then 2 + 2 = 4, etc.’. Conversely, consider this list of
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sentences: ‘If grass is green, then we should believe that grass is green; if Mars is a planet, then
we should believe that Mars is a planet; if 2 + 2 = 4, then we should believe that 2 + 2 = 4; etc.’.
By deploying the equivalence schema, we can turn the list into the following one: ‘If ‘grass is
green’ is true, then we should believe that grass is green; if ‘Mars is a planet’ is true, then we
should believe that Mars is a planet; etcetera’. In turn, this can be generalized into: ‘We should
believe the truth’ (Horwich 1998b: 105-106).35 This generalization would not be possible without
the truth predicate. In virtue of the acceptance of the equivalence schema, we can formulate
generalizations like this one. Moreover, deflationists argue that the equivalence schema is all that
is required to account for other uses of the word ‘true’. In Horwich’s words:
The deflationist’s contention… is that whenever we deploy the concept of truth…
it is playing this role: a device of generalization. Moreover, it doing so requires…
no more and no less than the equivalence schema. Thus the basis for our use of
the truth predicate is indeed our acceptance of the instances of that schema…
(Horwich 1998b: 106)
Horwich indeed claims that the role and meaning of ‘true’ are explained by our acceptance of the
schema. And similar considerations are offered for ‘designates’ and ‘applies to’ (or ‘is true of’).
But what about the metaphysics of truth? What do deflationists say about the nature of
truth itself, rather than about the role of ‘true’? This is a more difficult question than it may
seem, since discussions of deflationism “tend to blur the distinction between the linguistic and
the metaphysical” (Devitt 2010: 157). What is clear is that, based on their account of the role of

35 Horwich uses the propositional version of the equivalence schema in his own examples. Given my objections to
propositions presented in Chapter 1, I prefer Field’s sentential version.
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the truth predicate, they argue for the negative thesis that it does not stand for a substantial
relational property. Horwich is happy to describe truth as a “logical” property—although he
insists that is has no underlying nature. Presumably he should say that there is no truth property
—or no such thing as truth. So there is no such thing as the nature of truth. Anyway, if the truth
predicate does not stand for a relational property, then it does seem that there is no place for a
correspondence theory of truth.
How can we figure out whether we need a correspondence theory or deflationists are
right and we do not need such a theory? On one hand, the correspondence view of truth is very
appealing and seems to provide the proper framework for a truth-referential semantics. On the
other hand, the deflationary view of the role of ‘true’ seems very plausible. But if the equivalence
schema explains everything about the role of ‘true’, then the term does not stand for a relational
property of the sort required to play an explanatory role in semantics—although the truth term
may serve in semantics as a device of generalization. The main argument in favor of the
correspondence theory and against deflationism is that truth and reference play substantive roles
in the explanation of meaning (Devitt 2010: 178-181). Deflationists have attempted to address
this concern by offering so-called “use” theories of meaning where truth and reference do not
play any explanatory roles (e.g., Brandom 1994 & Horwich 1998a). But it remains to be seen
whether these theories can succeed explaining meaning and, moreover, if in case of succeeding
they do not appeal to substantive relations between language and the world that may turn out to
constitute truth and reference. Given this situation, it looks like the debate on the nature of truth
and reference is very likely to be eventually settled after we have figured out what is the best
explanation of meaning and whether truth and reference play substantive roles in it or not.
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Consequently, we cannot settle the debate on the nature of truth and reference before engaging in
the search for a proper theory of meaning—and we cannot assume that the correspondence
theory or deflationism is correct before learning more about the nature of meaning.

2.3 Identifying and Explaining Meanings
The task of explaining the nature of any property should rely on a relatively uncontroversial
identification of the property to be explained. But semantic theories often proceed without such
an identification or rely on controversial identifications which are simply taken for granted but
assume a particular account of the nature of meanings, such as the assumption that a theory of
meaning must explain the truth-conditions of truth-bearers and the referential properties of their
parts. I shall argue that the task of semantics must be specified on the basis of a non-questionbegging identification of meanings.
As Devitt points out, the task of investigating the nature of meanings is analogous to the
tasks of investigating the natures of genes (Devitt 2012: 62). Likewise, Horwich suggests that the
scientific investigation of what constitutes water provides a model for what a semantic theory
should accomplish: it should account for what properties constitute meanings (Horwich 2005:
76-77). The suggestion of Devitt and Horwich is that the task of semantics is to find, for
meanings, an account of the sort exemplified by the discoveries that genes are DNA sequences
and water is H2O. The natures of genes and water—like the nature of meanings—are constituted
by more fundamental properties.36 But notice that the tasks of explaining the nature of genes and
36 And the properties that constitute meanings, genes and water in turn are constituted by even more fundamental
properties. The chemical properties of DNA and H2O are explained by their underlying physical properties.
Similarly, whatever properties constitute meanings surely are not directly fundamental physical properties, but
some properties whose nature needs further explanation.
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water—unlike the task of explaining the nature of meanings—had a clearly defined “subject
matter”, since genes and water were “identified relatively uncontroversially” before undertaking
the investigation of their nature (Devitt 2012: 62). Furthermore, the identification of genes and
water served “clear and familiar theoretical or practical purposes” (Devitt 2012: 62). The
characteristic features by which genes and water were identified—and which made their
identification useful for our theoretical or practical purposes—needed explanation: why do genes
and water have these features? Consequently, investigating their underlying nature was clearly a
worthwhile task: it was clear (1) what to explain and (2) why the explanation was needed. In
sum, there was a clear identification of what needed explanation. Similarly, a theory that expects
to explain the underlying nature of meanings must first provide a clear identification of what
needs explanation: “[The] first step is semantics is to identify meanings. We can then move on to
explain the meanings so identified.” (Devitt 2002: 108).
What are these “meanings” we are trying to explain? How should we identify them? And
why is it worth seeking such explanations? What are the explanations needed for? The
methodological question of how meanings should be identified before attempting to explain their
nature is often overlooked (Devitt 2012: 61-63). But this situation is deeply troubling. On one
hand, “our ordinary talk of “meanings”... is very vague” (Devitt 2011:197). So the claim that the
task of semantics is to explain the nature of “meanings” requires further specification. On the
other hand, theorists often simply take for granted certain views of the tasks of semantics,
without properly motivating them: “It is troubling that much semantic theorizing proceeds with
inexplicit reliance on apparently ad hoc views of the semantic tasks.” (Devitt 2012: 62). The
problem is that competing theories do not only disagree on what is the best explanation of the
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nature of meanings, but also on what needs explanation: “It is far from clear what counts as a
meaning that needs explaining. Indeed, the intractable nature of semantic disputes largely stems
from differing opinions about what counts.” (Devitt 2012: 62).
Many theorists assume that the task of semantics is to explain what underlying properties
determine the truth-referential properties of symbols. In other words, they take for granted an
identification of meanings with truth-referential properties at the semantic level and seek a
reductive explanation of such properties. But this simply begs the question against deflationary
views according to which truth and reference have no underlying natures. While properties that
determine truth and reference may indeed play a role in the explanation of meaning, deflationism
should not be “ruled out by a definition” of the semantic task (Devitt 1996: 63-64). There is a
panoply of theoretical options and none of them should be either ruled out or favored by a
definition of the semantic task. On one extreme, there are theories according to which a reductive
explanation of truth and reference is all that is needed to account of the underlying nature of
meanings (e.g., Fodor 1987). On the other extreme, there are theories that attempt to reductively
explain meanings merely in terms of functional-roles which do not substantially determine truth
and reference (e.g., Harman 1987). Between these extremes, there are theories according to
which a reductive explanation of truth and reference is crucial but does not exhaust an account of
the nature of meanings. One alternative is to regard the very same non-semantic properties that
determine truth and reference also as constituting Fregean “modes of presentation” (e.g.,
Peacocke 1992, Devitt 1996, 2001b & 2012).37 Another alternative is to regard the underlying
37 Horwich points out that the distinction that Frege (1948) draws between sense and reference remains at the
semantic level (Horwich 1998a: 52). But just like there are attempts to explain the underlying nature of
reference, there are attempts to explain the underlying nature of Fregean senses or modes of presentation.
Peacocke (1992) explains the meanings of concepts in terms of “primitively compelling” functional-roles that
constitute modes of presentation substantially determining their reference. Similarly, Devitt (1996) naturalizes
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nature of meanings as composed by two independent factors: a factor that determines truth and
reference plus a functional-role factor that does not determine truth and reference (e.g., Block
1986). All of these proposals are presented as offering accounts of the nature of meanings: they
are allegedly engaged in the same task, asking the same question and offering different
competing answers. For this to be genuinely the case, the specification of the task of semantics
should not beg the question against any of these proposals (Devitt 1996: 64).
How can we decide among all the competing accounts of the nature of meanings? And
how can we determine that they are genuinely competing explanations of the same phenomena,
rather than explanations of different aspects of linguistic and mental representations? Consider,
for example, my thought that snow is white. It is uncontroversial that my thought has the
meaning or content that snow is white, that it is true and that one of the concepts it contains
refers to snow. But let us consider what underlying properties my thought and the concepts it
contains have. As it turns out, a wide range of theorists agree on what these various properties
are, although they disagree on which among them constitute meanings and on whether they
substantially engender truth-referential properties. Most theorists agree that my thought and the
concepts it contains have complex functional-roles in my mind: that they are causally connected
to various other thoughts and concepts, to various inputs from my perception and outputs to my
behavior. Yet, they disagree about whether all, some or none of these roles constitute the
meanings of my thought and my concepts. Additionally, most theorists agree that one of the
concepts in my thought has links to snow in the distal/external world and, furthermore, that such
the meanings of non-primitive words covered by a description theory in terms of some of their functional-roles:
those that constitute the modes of presentation that determine their reference. Interestingly, Devitt (1996, 2001b
& 2012) suggests that the causal links to reality—whether historical-causal, informational and/or teleological—
that determine the reference of primitive words should also be regarded as constituting modes of presentation:
these are causal modes rather than descriptive modes.
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links are—at least part of—what constitutes the meaning of the concept. Yet, they disagree about
whether such links substantially determine the reference of the concept and on whether they
should be regarded as part of its (non-reference-determining) functional-role. Regarding truth
and reference: even deflationists agree that representations do have truth-referential features,
although they regard them as trivial (e.g., Horwich 1998b, Field 1994). Regarding modes of
presentation: “direct reference” theorists agree that there are properties that substantially
determine reference, although they do not include them among the components of meaning (e.g.,
Salmon 1986: 70-71, Soames 2002: 19-20; see Devitt 2001b & 2012 for a criticism of this view);
while deflationists agree that the meanings of words and concepts determine their reference,
although they do not regard such “determination” as substantial (Horwich 1998a: 68-71, 2005:
79-81). Finally, regarding functional-roles: every author who is a realist about mental
representation—and this includes most authors, except a few behaviorists and eliminativists—
agrees that thoughts and concepts have causal roles in cognition, although some authors deny
that these roles constitute the meanings of any concepts (Fodor 1987: 71-95). While different
theorists agree that representations and their parts have all these features—functional-roles,
connections to reality, etc.—they disagree about which among them constitute their meanings.
Why should we regard meanings as truth-referential properties, including or not modes of
presentation, as functional-roles or as some combination of these features? Lacking an explicit
specification of the purposes of semantics, the dispute may seem to be merely about what should
be honored with the label of “meaning”. William Lycan humorously expresses this concern with
his “Double Indexical Theory of Meaning”:
MEANING =def Whatever aspect of linguistic activity happens to interest me now.
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(Lycan 1984: 272)
While Lycan’s concern is mainly with theories of linguistic meaning, we can rephrase it to also
include theories of mental content:
MEANING =def Whatever aspect of linguistic or conceptual activity happens to
interest me now.
To be fair, the competing approaches in semantics often do have theoretically motivated
differences. The disputes (or at least some of them) seem to be substantive rather than merely
verbal. For example, purely functional-role theorists are not simply “more interested” in
functional-roles than on truth and reference. At least some of them are motivated by deflationary
views according to which truth and reference are trivial features that cannot explain meaning or
content (e.g., Field 1994).38 In contrast, truth-referential theorists are motivated by the view that
truth and reference are substantial properties of linguistic and mental representations (e.g., Fodor
1987).
But granting that the debate is not merely verbal does not remove the underlying
problem. As Devitt points out, “to avoid Lycan’s mockery, we must specify a subject matter that
is worthy of investigation, we need an explication that is not ad hoc” (Devitt 1996: 55). We
cannot determine what theory offers the best account of the nature of meaning without a clear
specification of worthwhile explanatory tasks that are not ad hoc. What we need is an
identification of the meanings that need explanation which does not presuppose any specific
38 Others are instead motivated by the idea that content must be “narrow” or “within the head” in order to explain
behavior. This is the case of Ned Block (1986). Block does not adopt a deflationary view that would be
incompatible with a truth-referential semantics. Instead, he combines a truth-referential semantics with a
“narrow” version of functional-role semantics as parts of his two-factor theory of meaning.
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account of their nature. The dispute among various semantic theories will remain hopeless as
long as we do not have a non-question-begging identification of what needs to be explained and,
consequently, a measure of what may count as a satisfactory explanation.
In what follows, I shall argue that the investigation of the nature of meaning-properties
should follow the steps involved in the reductive explanation of any property, starting with an
uncontroversial identification of the property and of the characteristic features by which we
identify it before studying its underlying nature. In the next section, I argue that we should
identify meanings as the properties that are responsible for the causes and the behavioral effects
of linguistic and mental representations. Since we need an explanation of these causal roles,
investigating the nature of the properties responsible for them is a worthy task.

2.3.1 How to Identify Meanings and Investigate their Nature?
In this section, I discuss the methodological issues of how to identify meanings and how such
identification should inform the investigation of their nature. I shall argue, following Devitt, that
we should first identify examples of properties that ordinary people recognize as semantic and
establish what these properties are supposed to do and what are the purposes for which they are
ascribed. This provides a preliminary target for the investigation of the nature of meanings: the
investigation should examine the examples of meanings to find out which underlying properties
constitute meanings and, consequently, are responsible for or explain what meanings do and how
they serve the purposes for which they are ascribed. But it should be kept in mind that the
preliminary identifications are in principle defeasible, and we may need to revise them in light of
the investigation of the nature of meanings. I will proceed as follows: I shall first discuss how the
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investigation of the nature of any property should proceed and then apply the findings to the
methodology of semantics.
Consider the general methodological question of how do we determine the nature of any
property: “How do we tell what is the nature of some property, being an F, that we ascribe?”
(Devitt 2012: 66). The answer to this question, as Devitt points out, “breaks into two stages”:
First, we must identify some apparently uncontroversial examples of F’s and nonF’s. Second, we must examine the examples to determine the nature of being an
F. The second stage is a straightforwardly scientific one. The preliminary first
stage may not be. It involves using “identification experts” who may be scientists
but may be just plain folk. (Devitt 2012: 66-67)
Examining the nature of a property is the second stage of the investigation. The first stage is to
identity clear and apparently uncontroversial instances of the property. The successful scientific
investigations of the nature of various properties clearly illustrate these two different stages and
how they are related. They provide us with a good general model for how to proceed in
semantics. I will focus on the two paradigmatic examples that I mentioned above: the
investigation of the nature of water and genes.
Let us consider the task of explaining the nature of water. The chemical discovery that
being a sample of water is constituted by or reduces to being made of H2O molecules
accomplished this task. In order to accomplish this task, chemists examined samples of water
that were identified pre-theoretically and uncontroversially—without having an account of their
underlying chemical composition. Samples of water were identified by characteristic features,
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like being samples of the colorless liquid that quenches thirst, flows in rivers, freezes at certain
cold temperatures (0 degrees Celsius) and boils at certain high temperatures (100 degrees Celsius
at sea level). The task of explaining the nature of water, consequently, had a clear and worthy
target: what is the nature of the identified samples of water, in virtue of which they have their
characteristic features? Examining the samples, chemists discovered that they are made of H 2O
molecules. Based on this discovery, chemists were able to explain why water has its
characteristic features. For example, the physico-chemical behavior of H 2O molecules at
different temperatures explains why water freezes and boils at the temperatures it does. It is
important to distinguish water’s nature from its causal role. The nature of water is being made of
H2O molecules. The causal role of water includes, among other things, its behavior as a solid, as
a liquid or as a gas at different temperatures. While water was identified by its causal role,
chemists did not identify water with its causal role. Rather, they hypothesized that there must be
some underlying chemical composition that constitutes the nature of water and that explains why
water has its causal role or characteristic behavior.
Let us consider the task of explaining the nature of genes. In this case, the identification
of genes relied entirely on a scientific theory. The Mendelian postulation of genes as entities
playing causal roles in heredity—the transmission of innate traits from organisms to their
offspring—was well-supported by empirical evidence. But there was an explanatory need to
account for the nature of these theoretically identified entities. Again, we should not confuse
what the entities are or their nature with what they do or their causal roles. Mendelian genetics
discovered that there are some things that play certain causal roles in heredity, but it did not
discover the nature of these things. What are genes made of and how can they play their causal
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roles in heredity? Molecular genetics provided the needed explanation. This happened many
decades after the work of Gregor Mendel, as a result of the discovery by James Watson and
Francis Crick of the helix-shaped structure of DNA: Molecular genetics discovered that genes
are made of segments of DNA molecules which are responsible for the transmission of innate
traits from organisms to their offspring. Molecular genetics relied on Mendelian genetics to
identify what needed explanation (Devitt 1996: 73).
The way scientists discovered the natures of genes and water illustrate some basic
features of the methodology involved in the investigation of the nature of a non-fundamental
property—a property that has an underlying nature. Notice that the account of the underlying
nature of a property involves two different levels: the “higher” or “superficial” level where the
property to be explained is identified and a “lower” or “underlying” level where the nature of the
property is explained. Basically, the account of a property’s underlying nature is a reductive
explanation. There are philosophical controversies about the character of such explanations. Do
they ontologically reduce the higher-level phenomenon to the lower-level phenomenon? And
how is the gap between the levels bridged in the inference from the explanans to the
explanandum?39 These are important questions and they do concern the metaphysics and
methodology of theories of the nature of meaning. However, my current goal is to make some
general methodological suggestions leaving room for different answers to these deeper questions.
The task of investigating the nature of meaning can benefit from an elucidation of the
uncontroversial aspects of reductive explanations, since the debate among different reductive
accounts of meaning often proceeds without explicitly attending to even the most basic
methodological matters.
39 See Kim (2005: 93-120) for a detailed discussion of these matters.
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My first methodological suggestion is that the investigation should involve the two stages
distinguished by Devitt: the examination of the nature of the property should rely on a prior
identification of apparently uncontroversial examples of the property. In the case of the property
of being water, both scientists and ordinary people were able to identify samples of the property.
No controversial scientific theory was assumed in such identifications. In the case of the property
of being a gene, in contrast, Mendelian genetics was assumed. However, Mendelian genetics
identified genes without having any theory of their underlying nature: this is the specific sense in
which the prior identification of what needs to be explained should be uncontroversial. 40 Since
the explanation of the nature of the property will take place at a lower-level, the methodological
suggestion is that we need an apparently uncontroversial identification of the property at the
higher level before examining its nature at a lower level.
My second methodological suggestion is that an analysis of how examples of a property
are identified should establish what the property is supposed to do and what are the purposes for
which it is identified. Samples of water are pre-theoretically identified by their superficial
characteristics, including their observable behavior: water does things such as quenching thirst
when drunk, freezing when cooled and boiling when heated. Identifying water serves clear
theoretical purposes, like predicting its behavior at different temperatures, and clear practical
purposes, like quenching thirst by drinking it, making ice cubes by cooling it or brewing tea by
heating it. Similarly, Mendelian genetics identifies examples of genes by what they do, by their
characteristic causal roles in heredity: “the subject matter of investigation is already identified
40 As James Watson reminds us in his personal account of events that led him and Francis Crick to discover the
“double helix” structure of DNA, the leading hypothesis until then was that genes were “special types of protein
molecules” rather than strings of DNA (Watson 1968: 12). Both the DNA theory and the Protein theory were
compatible with the Mendelian identification of genes.
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relatively uncontroversially... because we already have a fairly good idea of what genes... do,
which is a basis for identifying them” (Devitt 2002: 107). Identifying genes serves clear
scientific purposes in explaining and predicting heredity. Diagnosing what a property does or is
supposed to do and the purposes for which we identify it are intimately linked, since identifying
a property presumably serves our purposes because of what the property does. Often, elucidating
the purposes for which we ascribe a property can lead to an elucidation of what the property
does, of its causal role. An elucidation of what a property does is not an explanation of its nature.
But it should inform the investigation of such nature.
My third methodological suggestion is that the examination of the underlying nature of
the identified higher-level property—what Devitt calls the “second stage” of the investigation—
should have as a goal to reveal what lower-level property explains what the identified property
does—its causal role—and how it serves the purposes for which it is identified. The account of
the nature of water as composed of H 2O molecules explains the characteristic features by which
water was identified. Similarly, the account of the nature of genes as composed of strings of
DNA explains the causal roles by which they were identified. These accounts also explain how
the higher-level identifications serve our purposes: how it comes about that identifying certain
genes we can predict the transmission of certain innate traits or that identifying samples of water
we can predict at what temperature they will freeze. That the reductive explanation of a higherlevel property must explain what lower-level property is responsible for its causal role is a basic
and uncontroversial requirement. Suppose that we discovered a lower-level property of samples
of water that did not explain why those samples freeze at 0 degrees Celsius, or a lower-level
property of samples of genes that did not contribute to an explanation of their causal role in
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heredity. Surely we would have no reason to regard such lower-level properties as constituting
the natures of water and genes. That a lower-level property explains the causal role of a higherlevel property is crucial evidence in support of the claim that the former constitutes the latter.
It is time to apply these methodological suggestions to the investigation of the nature of
meanings. The first step is to identify uncontroversial samples of properties identified as
meanings. The second step is to find out what these identified meanings do—or are supposed to
do—and what are the purposes for which they are identified. The last step is to look for what
underlying non-semantic properties constitute meanings. A basic requirement to determine
whether a non-semantic property indeed constitutes a meaning is that it must explain the causal
role by which and for which the meaning is identified.
My methodological suggestions are far from original. They correspond to similar
suggestions made by Devitt and Horwich. Devitt argues that we need to first identify
uncontroversial samples of meanings and then investigate their nature (Devitt 1996: 72-81). But
he also pays attention to the intermediate step I suggested, arguing that we should find out what
are the purposes for which we ascribe meanings and that those purposes should inform our
investigation of the nature of meanings (Devitt 1996: 57-62). Horwich shares this view. His
following passage serves well as a summary of what I have said about how semantics should
proceed:
An underlying property U constitutes a relatively superficial property S if and
only if the co-extensiveness of U and S explains why S is manifested in the
characteristic ways that it is. For example, we judge that ‘being made of H 2O
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molecules’ constitutes ‘being a sample of water’ because, on the basis of the
assumption that water is made of H2O, we can explain why water is a colorless,
tasteless liquid that boils at 100º C. In the same way, in order to identify how
meaning-properties are constituted, we should look for underlying non-semantic
properties that can explain the symptoms of those meaning-properties. (Horwich
2005: 76-77)
It is crucial to identify correctly meaning-properties and their characteristic features or
“symptoms”, since the task of investigating the nature of meanings will largely consist of finding
out what non-semantic properties can explain such “symptoms”.
How do we identify meanings in the first step of the investigation? Since the competing
philosophical theories of meaning—including semantic-level analyses—are not neutral in the
required sense, we cannot simply rely on them in the way that molecular genetics relied on
Mendelian genetics. What we need instead is some apparently uncontroversial examples of
properties that “identification experts” recognize pre-theoretically as semantic, and we need to
establish what features of these properties the experts rely on in their identification. In this case,
like in the case of the identification of water, the relevant identification experts are ordinary
people. As Devitt points out, ordinary people have the competence “to produce token thoughts
and utterances to which the [meaning] properties are ascribed” (Devitt 1996: 78). More
importantly, ordinary people are competent to ascribe meanings to the utterances and thoughts of
others. These ascriptions provide the uncontroversial examples we need: “To identify examples
in the preliminary first stage, we look to ordinary attitude ascriptions” (Devitt 1996: 78). This
does not mean that philosophers of language must engage in an anthropological or sociological
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study of folk ascriptions, as interesting as that may be. As Devitt points out, “theorists can count
themselves among the expert folk” (Devitt 1996: 78). Of course, the theorist must set aside
philosophical assumptions about the nature of meaning. The goal is to (1) find samples of
meanings and (2) analyze what are they supposed to do—what do we ascribe them for qua folk
semanticists—before (3) proceeding to study their underlying nature.

2.3.2 Identifying Meanings by their Causal Roles
Devitt and Horwich propose a way of identifying meanings that is neutral, in the sense that it
does not assume any particular account of the nature of meaning. Basically, they suggest that we
should identify meanings by the causal roles of representations. While Horwich (1998a, 2005,
2010) focuses on the causes of linguistic and mental representations, Devitt (1996) originally
focused on their effects.41 But Devitt (2002 & 2011) later suggests that we should focus on both
aspects of their causal roles. In the previous sections I argued that we need a non-questionbegging identification of meanings. I shall argue in this section that we should identify meanings
as the properties that we ordinarily ascribe based on the causes and behavioral effects of
linguistic and mental representations. These properties can be recognized pre-theoretically as
semantic—without assuming any theory of meaning—and we need an explanation of their
nature, so investigating them is a worthy task. Notice that identifying meanings by their causal
roles is a very different proposal than that of identifying meanings with their causal roles.
The topic of how folk semanticists identify meanings is one I already covered in Chapter
1, where I analyzed ordinary attitude ascriptions. I argued, following Devitt, that we ascribe
41 Devitt (1997) expanded his identification of meanings to also include the causes of representations.
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contents to the utterances and thoughts by means of ‘that’-clauses that function as indefinite
singular terms that specify the meanings of such utterances and thoughts. These ascriptions
provide us with identified samples of what needs to be explained—and such identifications are
pre-theoretical in the required sense: they do not assume anything about the underlying nature of
the identified properties. I also talked in Chapter 1 about one of the main purposes for which we
ascribe meanings: namely, to explain other people’s behavior. Indeed, Devitt suggests that we
should focus on the purposes for which the folk make attitude ascriptions using ‘that’-clauses:
one of them is to explain behavior, but another one is to use other’s thoughts and utterances as
guides to reality (Devitt 1996: Ch. 2 & 2012: 1.1).
Consider the ascription ‘Nancy fears that it will rain’. Such ascription may play a causal
role, for example, in the explanation why Nancy is constantly looking at the sky. Or consider the
ascription ‘Mary believes that it is raining’. It may help us to explain why Mary picks up an
umbrella before leaving her house. Alternatively, consider the ascription ‘The weather guy said
that it will rain’. This ascription serves as a guide to reality. When a person’s thoughts or
utterances are reliable, we can learn about the world by ascribing the right meanings or contents
to them. Notice that we typically ascribe meanings to thoughts and utterances based on what we
take to be the causes of such tokens, which in turn helps to explain their effects. For example, if
we witness that John runs away after seeing a dog, we may ascribe to him the thought that the
dog is dangerous. The content we ascribe is identified both by its presumed causes and effects.

It is important to recall two points I made in Chapter 1. One is that our ordinary
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ascriptions of content to explain other people’s behavior are often successful. Now we can add
that our ascriptions of content to other’s utterances and thoughts to learn about reality are also
often successful. This success provides very good evidence that the meanings ascribed in folkpsychology are real phenomena that play causal roles in the physical world. This means that we
are overall correct in our pre-theoretical identifications of meanings and that investigating the
underlying nature of such meanings is a worthwhile task. Also, it is worth insisting here that the
meanings thereby identified must be natural phenomena, since otherwise they could not play the
causal roles they do play. As I argued before, what is required is a naturalized semantics.
It is worth considering for a moment the case of attributions of content to non-human
languages. Cognitive ethologists attribute “referential” languages to bees, prairie dogs, monkeys,
chickens, etc., because of their causal role of conveying information about the world from one
organism to another. The attributions also play a causal role in the ethologists’ explanation of
animal behavior. Let us consider a couple of examples. Cognitive ethologists have discovered
that vervet monkeys use three distinct vocalizations to warn their peers of the presence of
leopards, eagles and snakes, respectively (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). They have learned this
because each of these alarm calls is paradigmatically caused by the presence of the relevant
predator and the calls trigger three different kinds of avoidance behavior that are appropriate to
avoid being hunted by that particular kind of predator. Similarly, chickens use two distinct
vocalizations to warn of the presence of aerial predators and land predators (Evans and Marler
1995). Again, each vocalization is paradigmatically caused by the presence of one or the other
kind of predator and triggers an avoidance behavior in the audience that is appropriate to the
particular kind of predator being announced. In these cases of non-human languages we clearly
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see what sorts of causes and effects are relevant to the identification of meanings. Both the
“typical” causes and effects of utterances are very directly connected in these simple languages
to the purposes for which meanings are ascribed to them. The utterances serve the purpose of
guiding conspecifics away from predators and the meanings ascribed by scientists serve the
purpose of explaining the animals’ behavior.
I end with a short note on the meanings of words and concepts. By focusing on ‘that’clauses in the case of ascriptions to humans, I have played attention to the meanings of complete
utterances and thoughts. But as folk semanticists we also ascribe meanings to the words and
concepts that compose them. The meanings of words and concepts are usually identified within
‘that’-clauses. If I ascribe to Mary the belief that it will rain, I am ascribing to her a concept with
the same meaning as the word ‘rain’ in the embedded sentence in the ‘that’-clause. Similarly, if I
report ‘John said that it will rain’, I am likely ascribing to one of the words uttered by John the
same meaning as the word ‘rain’—even if John spoke in German and my report serves as a
translation. The meanings of words have to be abstracted away from the meanings of sentences
where they appear. But in the end the meanings of words are also pretheoretically identified by
their causal roles. As Horwich points out: “[We] recognize pretheoretically… that what people
say is due, in part, to what they mean. I assent to ‘That’s red’, when I do, partly because of what I
mean by the word ‘red’.” (Horwich 1998a: 47). Also: “[The] symptom of a word’s meaning is its
overall use, principally, the collection of sentences containing it that are accepted and the
circumstances under which this is done.” (Horwich 2005: 77). Horwich’s very reasonable point
here is that we identify the meanings of words by the way they are used and, more specifically,
as what is causally responsible for such use. So a crucial explanatory target for a theory of
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meaning is to explain in non-semantic terms what properties are indeed causally responsible for
the use of words.42
Notice that the identifications here proposed regarding what meanings it is the task of
semantics to explain are theoretically neutral. They do not beg the question for or against truthreferential approaches, whether directly referential or “Fregean”, functional-role approaches, etc.
Any existing or new approach is free to attempt to explain the underlying nature of the identified
meanings. The virtue of these identifications is that they provide a non-question-begging
definition of what is it the task of semantics to explain.

2.4 Conclusion
I have argued that neither a correspondence nor a deflationary view of the nature of truth should
be assumed in the definition of the task of semantics, largely because it is an open question
which of these views will end up succeeding. Moreover, the dispute is likely to be resolved based
on whether substantial truth and referential relations turn out to be required to explain the nature
of meaning. In general, I argued that we need a pre-theoretical identification of meanings. I
suggested that we should identify meanings by the causal roles of utterances and thoughts, and
that such identification specifies the task of semantics. Finally, I argued that the ‘that’-clauses
deployed in ordinary attitude ascriptions in order to explain the behavior of others and in order to
learn about reality provide the needed identifications.

42 As I argued before, following Devitt (2011: 197-198 & 2002: 112), Horwich should expand his identification of
meanings to include also behavioral effects (see Chapter 1, Section 1.7).
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Chapter 3:
Basic-Acceptance Semantics

3.1 Introduction
In the first part of this dissertation, Chapters 1 and 2, I focused on fundamental metaphysical and
methodological issues related to the nature of meanings and the task of semantics. I argued that
meanings are phenomena that play causal roles in the physical world and that we need a
naturalistic explanation of their underlying natures. I also argued that the task of semantics is to
explain specifically the meanings pre-theoretically identified by the causal roles of linguistic and
mental representations. A proper theory of the meanings of words should account for what nonsemantic properties are responsible for their overall uses.
The main aim of the second part of this dissertation, from Chapter 3 to Chapter 6, is to
explore what sort of naturalistic theory promises to explain what non-semantic properties
constitute meanings. My main focus is on the meanings of human words and their mental
counterparts. I will propose a combination of (1) a “use” theory along the lines of Horwich’s
theory of meaning with (2) a teleological account of the functions of symbols. In this chapter I
briefly review the range of available theories of meaning, briefly sketch the combination that I
will propose and focus on motivating a “use” theory along the lines of Horwich’s theory. But I
also point out the problems faced by the theory. In a nutshell, the main advantages are that it
promises to explain properly the overall uses of human words/concepts, including their complex
roles in inferential processes, and also that it can account for the variety of meanings that human
words like ‘red’, ‘bachelor’ and ‘or’ exhibit. One problem with the theory is that it risks
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collapsing into a form of truth-referentialism in spite of being presented as a match for a
deflationary view of reference and truth. But this problem does not concern me in particular,
since I am happy to embrace such a collapse. I argue that in such a case we would anyway need a
truth-referential version of the theory. A more serious problem is that Horwich’s theory is unable
to account for misuses of words due to ignorance or error. It is this problem that motivates the
search for a teleological component that I undertake in the following chapters.

3.2 The Place of Meaning in the World
What is the place of meaning in the world? In virtue of what do our linguistic utterances and
thoughts have the meanings they have? The nature of meaning is one of the most fundamental
issues at the core of both the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. As Jerry Fodor
puts it: “It appears increasingly that the main joint business of the philosophy of language and
the philosophy of mind is the problem of representation itself: the metaphysical question of the
place of meaning in the world order.” (1987, p. xi)
The debate on the nature of meaning involves multiple dimensions. One of the many
questions that a theory of meaning has to answer is what is the relation between the meanings of
linguistic utterances and thoughts. Some theories of meaning have been originally proposed in
the philosophy of language and their primary targets are the meanings of words and sentences in
natural languages (e.g., Frege 1948 and Kripke 1980). Others have been proposed in the
philosophy of mind and their primary targets are the meanings or contents of thoughts and
concepts (e.g., Fodor 1987 and Block 1986). Others simply treat language and thought as a
seamless whole, assuming that we use the same words to think and to communicate and that their
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meanings do not depend primarily on one of these uses (e.g., Sellars 1954 and Brandom 1994).
It is clear that the meanings of linguistic utterances and the meanings of at least some
thoughts are intimately related. After all, one of the primary uses of language—likely the primary
use—is to express thought. As Fodor, Bever and Garrett point out: “there is much to be said for
the old-fashioned view that speech expresses thought, and very little to be said against it” (Fodor,
Bever, and Garrett 1974: 375). Someone can express the belief that the weather in New York is
horrible by uttering ‘the weather in New York is horrible’ or a number of sentences in other
languages with the same meaning. All these sentences and the belief they express have the same
meaning or representational content. Additionally, the meanings or contents of many of our
concepts—probably most of them—come from the meanings of words. Most of us can think
about genes because we have heard of them: the content of our concept comes from the meaning
of the word. However, this does not entail that linguistic meaning has the ultimate explanatory
priority over mental content. After all, some people must have originally thought about genes to
coin the word ‘gene’, which was then passed along from speaker to speaker until we acquired
our concept from it (Devitt & Sterelny 1999: 152; Devitt 1996: 157-158).
How are linguistic and mental meanings related? Many authors think that the meanings
of linguistic utterances depend on conventions (Lewis 2002) that ultimately link them to the
meanings of thoughts (Grice 1989). Given the obvious conventional character of the words of
natural language, together with the consideration in favor of the ultimate priority of thought just
mentioned, I think that this account must be heading in the right direction—although there is
room for filling in more details about the nature of the conventions involved in language. I also
support the promising though controversial hypothesis that thoughts take place in an internal
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language of thought (Harman 1973; Fodor 1975). A very plausible explanation of the
productivity and systematicity of mental states like beliefs and desires is that they have sentencelike structure (Fodor 1987: 147-154). More importantly, the language of thought hypothesis
offers the best available account of the mental processes involved in thinking, which it explains
as computational operations performed over syntactically structured inner representations (Fodor
1987: 143-147). Devitt reasonably argues that the later consideration is more decisive, since
other kinds of structures—e.g, map-like structures—may also be productive and systematic
(Devitt 1996: 154-156).
If these views are correct, as many theorists of meaning expect today, part of what we
need to do in order to find the place of meaning in the world is to explain the nature of the
relevant conventions linking the words used in natural languages to their mental counterparts, but
the most fundamental task is to explain the sources and nature of the meanings of words in the
language of thought. I will later elaborate an account of how the meanings of linguistic words
depend on the meanings of mental words. While I endorse the Gricean view about the priority of
thought, I will not adopt the particular mechanism he proposes to account for the literal meanings
of words. Following Millikan (2005), my account of linguist conventions will depart from
Lewis’ in being historical and teleological—involving the historical purposes of linguistic
conventions. For the moment, however, I will simply talk about “words”, including their uses in
thought and communication. We need an account of the meanings of words independently of
what account of the relation between the semantic properties of mental and linguistic
representations turns out to be true. Treating language and thought initially as a “seamless
whole” will simplify the discussion of other dimensions of the debate.43
43 Millikan (2005: 84) complains that some authors treat language and thought as a “seamless whole”. I will
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In virtue of what do words mean what they do? While a number of theories have been
proposed to answer this fundamental question, there is no agreement in sight. The purpose of the
second part of this dissertation is to propose a new answer to the question. My proposal borrows
components from already existing theories. Mainly, I combine the core component of Horwich’s
(1998a) use-theory of meaning—namely, that the meanings of words depend on their roles in
some sentences—with the core component of teleosemantics (Millikan 1984; Papineau 1984)—
namely, that the meanings of words depend on their historical functions or purposes. The novelty
of my approach comes from this particular combination of components, which has not been
proposed before but, I shall argue, promises to overcome some of the most serious shortcomings
of available theories of meaning, including those I borrow components from. In a nutshell, my
proposal is that words mean what they do in virtue of their roles in some sentences that have the
historical function of governing their use.
Before articulating and defending my own proposal, I shall briefly mention the main
competing theories in the debate on the nature of meaning. My focus in the reminder of this
chapter will be on the virtues and problems faced by Horwich’s “use” theory.

3.3 The Range of Available Theories
There is a panoply of theories attempting to explain why words mean what they do. According to
the description theory (Frege 1948; Russell 1905), the meanings of words depend on links to
other words in descriptions that determine their reference. 44 This theory has plausibility for
words like ‘bachelor’, but is essentially incomplete: the reference of ‘bachelor’ may depend on
instead treat thought as ultimately more fundamental, as stated above.
44 Searle (1958) modified the theory to rely instead on clusters of descriptions.
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that of ‘unmarried men’, but what determines the reference on ‘unmarried’ and ‘men’?
According to another family of theories, the meanings of words depend instead on links to the
external world that determine their reference: indicator theories (Dretske 1981; Fodor 1987)
claim that the relevant links involve the reliable causes of words, other theories (Kripke 1980;
Devitt 1981) rely on their causal-history, while teleosemantic theories (Millikan 1984; Papineau
1984) rely on their historical functions—which they explain in terms of natural selection or an
analogous evolutionary process. The three kinds of theories in this family are typically atomistic,
including only links to reality and excluding any links to other words among the links that
determine meaning.45 The description theory can be characterized instead as molecularist, since it
includes some links to other words.
According to yet another family of theories (Block 1986; Harman 1982: Brandom 1994;
Horwich 1998a), the meanings of words depend on connections to inputs from perception,
outputs to behavior and roles in inference that determine their uses or functional-roles.46 (What I
am calling “functional” roles are often called “conceptual” or “inferential” roles. As Devitt
(1996) points out, talk of “functional” roles is preferable because the latter two encourage the
overlooking of links to inputs and outputs.) Functional-role or “use” theories are typically
holistic, including all the inferential, perceptual and behavioral connections of words among the
links that determine their meanings (Block 1986; Harman 1982; Brandom 1994). In contrast,
Horwich (1998a) claims that the meanings of words depend only on their functional-roles in
some sentences, which may link a word either to the world, to some other words or to rules of

45 An exception is Papineau (1984; 1987), who includes all the functional links of words in their meanings.
46 The view has its origins in the work of Wittgenstein (1953) and Sellars (1954).
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inference. This functional-role theory is molecularist rather than holistic.47
The mainstream approach in semantics is truth-referentialist: the view is that meanings
depend on properties that determine the references of words which, together with syntactic
structure, determine the truth-conditions of sentences containing them. Frege (1948) proposed
that the meanings of words include their references and their senses or “modes of presentation”:
the associated descriptions that determine their references. Based on this distinction, Frege
offered a neat account of how co-referring words can differ in meaning: different senses can
determine the same reference. Most theories relying on causal links to the external world regard
meanings instead as exhausted by their referential properties, so co-referential words cannot
differ in meaning. Devitt (2001b), however, expands the Fregean notion of senses to include
causal modes or reference constituted by links to the world. This allows him to offer a neat
Fregean account of how co-referring words can differ in meaning, even when their meanings
depend on links to the world rather than on associated descriptions.
In contrast with this truth-referential tradition, most functional-role or “use” theories
claim that the functional-roles involved in meaning do not determine reference. Some theorists
(e.g., Block 1986) propose that meanings are composed of two factors: a purely internal and nonreference-determining functional-role factor and a separate referential factor involving links to
the external world. Other theorists reject altogether the referential factor, since they endorse
deflationary views (Field 1994; Horwich 1998b) according to which truth and reference are not
substantive properties and, consequently, cannot play an explanatory role in the theory of
meaning. Use-theories that endorse deflationism (Harman 1987; Horwich 1998a; Brandom 1994)
47 Peacocke (1992) proposes a similar theory based on the primitively compelling functional-roles of concepts.
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include links to the world in their accounts: their functional-roles are not purely internal.
However, they claim that these external links do not determine reference. A less common—but
promising—proposal is that some of the functional-roles of words do determine their reference:
Devitt (1996) argues that the meanings of some words—those covered by a description theory—
include some functional-roles that determine their reference, while Peacocke (1992) argues that
the referential properties of all concepts are determined by their primitively compelling
functional-roles.
Whether the meanings of words depend on functional-roles and whether these roles
determine reference are two different questions. The expressions “functional-role semantics” and
“use-theory” are often used to characterize non-referential theories or at least theories that
include a non-reference-determining factor. But this common usage obscures the fact that
functional-roles may substantially determine reference. 48 In what follows, I will depart from this
common usage and I will not assume that functional-roles do not determine reference.
I end this brief survey presenting another fundamental dimension on which theories of
meaning diverge. Most of the theories mentioned above are in the business of naturalizing
semantics: explaining meaning in terms of properties that words have in the natural world, such
as the reliable causes (e.g., Fodor 1987), the historical causes (e.g., Devitt 1981), the
evolutionary functions (e.g., Millikan 1984) or the causal/functional-roles (e.g., Harman 1982) of
their physical tokens. However, other theories abandon naturalism, claiming that the meanings of
words depend on norms prescribing how they ought to be used that cannot be reduced to any

48 The common usage is also inconsistent. Most authors that adopt it consider, for example, Peacocke (1992) as a
functional-role theory of the content of concepts, despite its substantial account of reference determination.
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aggregate of natural facts (Kripke 1982).49 Brandom’s (1994) inferentialism—a use theory based
on irreducible normativity—is the most developed version of this non-naturalist approach.
The panoply of theories offered to explain meaning shows that this is a very difficult
enterprise. I shall argue that many of the current proposals contain at least a kernel of truth,
providing some important insight into the nature of meaning, but that every single one of them is
undermined by one or another serious problem. Each proposal combines a set of claims. While
some claims of a proposal may contain important insights, other claims of the same proposal
may be problematic. To make progress, we need a new approach that combines the insightful
claims of different theories while discarding the problematic ones. I will soon discuss some of
the main insights and problems.
I have presented in this section a brief map of the territory: the vast range of available
accounts of why words mean what they do. In the next section, I will clarify what are the two
main components that my own proposal combines to answer this question. Afterwards, I will
argue for each of the components and articulate how I propose to combine them.

3.4 A New Approach to Explain Meaning
The new approach I propose to explain why words mean what they do combines elements from
functional-role semantics and teleosemantics. This combination, I shall argue, provides a
framework to incorporate the insights of further theories. The basic idea is that words mean what
they do in virtue of the core functional-roles they are “supposed” to have in order to perform
their historical functions: the functions that account for why the words exist and have been kept
49 Kripke’s (1982) influential work does not endorse this view. He presents it as a reading of Wittgenstein’s (1953)
discussion about rule-following.
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in circulation. These core functional-roles have the historical function of governing word usage.
The functional-role component of my approach comes specifically from Horwich’s
(1998a; 2005) use-theory of meaning, according to which the meanings of words depend on their
core functional-roles: their roles in some basic sentences that users (speakers / thinkers) accept
or regard as true. Horwich argues that these basic sentences govern the uses of words (2005: 3742) and vary in kind for different words, connecting them either to the external world, to other
words or to rules of inference (2005: 48-49). I borrow this set of central claims from Horwich’s
use-theory. I shall call this set of claims “basic-acceptance semantics”.
Horwich’s use-theory, however, includes other commitments—beyond basic-acceptance
semantics—that I do not borrow or endorse. Horwich (1998b) is one of the leading advocates of
deflationism, so his use-theory is committed to the claim that meanings do not substantially
determine reference. But Devitt (2002) points out that his use-theory risks collapsing into truthreferentialism, since it includes causal connections between words and the world that are among
the candidates to naturalize reference. I shall remain agnostic about deflationism, since basicacceptance—given its links to the world—may indeed determine reference. Devitt (2002; 2011)
also shows that Horwich’s use-theory cannot tell apart misuses—due to ignorance and error—
from the correct uses of words. This problem, I shall argue, stems from Horwich’s commitment
to semantic dispositionalism: the view that meanings depend on causal dispositions or
regularities underlying word usage. I shall reject any form of dispositionalism, since it cannot
account for the difference between the correct and incorrect uses of words (Kripke 1982). My
approach basically replaces Horwich’s dispositionalism with the historical account of the
functions of symbols proposed by teleosemantics.
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The teleosemantic component of my approach is the core claim shared by all available50
and possible teleosemantic theories; namely, that the meanings of symbols depend on their
historical functions, which are determined by the selective history underlying their use and/or the
mechanisms responsible for it. These are functions that explain why symbols exist. The selective
processes may take place at the genetic level or at the level of learning and cultural inheritance.
A combination of these levels is needed to account for the meanings of all words and concepts.
Teleosemanticists argue that symbols need not perform their functions reliably or regularly. They
need only perform them often enough to be kept in circulation (Millikan 1984).
Teleosemanticists also argue that a theory of meaning based on historical functions can explain
why some uses are correct, while others incorrect: the correct ones are those where symbols
perform their historical functions (Millikan 1984; Papineau 1984; Neander 1995). Any theory of
meaning committed to these central claims is a version of teleo-semantics, since it adopts a
teleological or teleonomic account of functions—based on selective history—to explain the
semantic properties (i.e., the meanings) of symbols. My approach is committed to these central
claims, so it is a version of teleosemantics—even though it combines them with basic acceptance
semantics.
Available teleosemantic theories, however, typically share further commitments that I
will not endorse. The currently available versions of teleosemantics claim that the historical
functions of all symbols involve links to the external world. But this is plausible neither for
words whose meanings are likely to involve only links to other words (Devitt & Sterelny 1999:
156-157) nor for the terms of logic and mathematics (Horwich 1998a: 53). I shall argue that the
50 Millikan (1984), Papineau (1984), Neander (1991), Jacob (1997) and Price (2001). Godfrey-Smith (1991) offers
a similar account restricted to the most primitive kinds of representation.
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historical functions of words involve instead their roles in basic sentences that link them either to
the external world, to other words or to rules of inference. Also, available teleosemantic theories
are committed to the historical functions of words substantially determining their reference. I
accept this is very likely to be true. But I shall remain agnostic about deflationism and,
consequently, open to the possibility that the historical functions of words may not substantially
determine their reference.51 The goal is to explain the underlying nature of the meanings pretheoretically identified by the causal roles of words. If the non-semantic properties that end up
explaining meanings turn out to provide a proper reductive explanation of truth and reference, as
I think it is likely, truth-referentialism will be vindicated. But I think plenty of progress can be
made before fully settling that issue.
A combination of basic-acceptance semantics and teleosemantics, I shall argue, can
simultaneously overcome some of the most serious problems of available theories while
incorporating their valuable insights. In particular, the combination can overcome the
shortcomings that Horwich’s theory and available teleosemantic theories have on their own.
Horwich’s theory, I shall argue, cannot tell apart the misuses from the correct uses of words; but
the combination I propose can do so, since its teleosemantic component is tailored to explain
why some uses are correct. Standard teleosemantic theories, I shall argue, cannot account for
words whose meanings depend on links to other words or to rules of inference and cannot
explain how the meanings of words govern their complex inferential uses in cognition; but the

51 Millikan (1993: 231-235) argues that a teleosemantic theory must involve substantive (i.e., correspondence)
reference and truth, since the historical functions of symbols relate them to real distal events in the external
world. While her argument rules out a verificationist notion of truth as warranted assertability, which threatens
realism about the external world, it does not rule out a deflationary notion. As Devitt (2010: 34-35) shows,
deflationism is fully compatible with realism. If what teleosemantics needs to work is realism, nothing more
than deflationary truth is required.
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combination I propose can do so, since its basic-acceptance component is tailored to explain how
the meanings of all kinds of words govern their various uses. I will not argue that my approach
answers all the questions a theory of meaning must answer. Some questions will remain open—
notably, whether the features that explain meaning substantially determine reference. But I shall
argue that they can be answered within the framework provided by my approach.
In this section, I have presented the two components I propose to combine into a new
approach to explain the nature of meaning: the core claims of Horwich’s use-theory—i.e., basic
acceptance semantics—and the core claims of teleosemantics. I have also mentioned which
aspects of Horwich’s theory and standard teleosemantics I either propose to reject or remain
neutral about. In what follows, I will argue that a theory of meaning does need to include each of
the two components I am combining and reject the problematic aspects of the theories these
components come from. I will also argue that the fate of deflationism is still undecided, so we
should remain initially neutral about it. Finally, I will elaborate on how to combine basicacceptance semantics and teleosemantics. I shall start by motivating basic-acceptance semantics.

3.5 Why Basic-Acceptance Semantics?
The claim that the meanings of words depend on their roles in some sentences that govern their
use is the central claim of Horwich’s use-theory. I will first elaborate on his theory and the main
arguments for it. Then I will discuss the main problems faced by the theory. Based on this
assessment, I shall argue that an account of meaning should adopt basic-acceptance semantics,
reject semantic dispositionalism and remain initially neutral about deflationism.
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3.5.1 Horwich’s Use-Theory of Meaning
As I discussed in Chapter 2, the prevailing view is that truth and reference play a substantial role
in the explanation of meaning. A challenge to this truth-referentialism comes from deflationary
views according to which truth and reference are not properties with an underlying nature and,
accordingly, cannot play a metaphysically substantial or significant role in explanations of any
kind, including explanations of why words mean what they do. I pointed out that deflationists
(Field 1994; Horwich 1998b) base their view on a plausible account of the role of the truth term.
Whether their account of the nature of truth is equally plausible is controversial (Devitt 2001a).
Nevertheless, if deflationism is true, we need an alternative approach to explain the nature of
meaning. And the best—perhaps only—alternative seems to be the “use theory” or functionalrole semantics, since the uses or roles of words in language and thought—which depend on their
connections to other words, inputs from perception and outputs to behavior—presumably do not
substantially determine their reference.52 Horwich (1998b) provides one of the most elaborate
and influential defenses of the deflationary theory of truth and reference. His use-theory of
meaning (Horwich 1998a & 2005) is intended to be compatible with—and largely motivated by
—deflationism.53
Horwich’s use-theory of meaning (UTM) sides with naturalist versions of functional-role
semantics (FRS), which understand functional-roles in terms of causal connections of words
(e.g., Block 1986 & 1987; Harman 1968 & 1982), and against non-naturalist versions that offer
52 As I pointed out in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3, and in this chapter, Section 3.3, this may turn out to be a wrong
assumption. But notice that two-factor versions of functional-role semantics endorse this assumption but reject
deflationism. Their case relies on the need of a functional-role factor in psychological explanation (Block 1986
& 1987). Deflationary versions of functional-role semantics (Harman 1987; Horwich 1998a) typically make a
similar case about psychological explanation: their theories are not exclusively motivated by deflationism.
53 Other theorists that combine a “use theory” with deflationism include Brandom (1994), Field (1994) and
Harman (1974, 1982 & 1987).
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irreducibly normative accounts of meaning (e.g., Brandom 1994 & 2000).54 The aim of UTM is
to offer a reductive account of meaning constitution in terms of non-semantic and non-normative
facts. Unlike other versions of FRS, however, UTM does not identify the meaning of a symbol
with its overall use or functional-role. Rather, UTM identifies the meaning of a word with what
explains its overall use. So UTM regards merely as the explanandum what most versions of FRS
conceive as the explanans. What makes UTM a version of FRS is that its explanans is a subset of
“explanatory fundamental” uses or functional-roles: UTM claims that the meaning of a word is
constituted by the basic sentence acceptance property that explains its overall deployment.
Horwich (2005: 28) offers the following “short crude statement” of UTM:
The meaning of a word, w, is engendered by the non-semantic feature of w that
explains w’s overall deployment. And this will be an acceptance-property of the
following form:—‘that such-and-such w-sentences are regularly accepted in suchand-such circumstances’ is the idealized law governing w’s use (by the relevant
‘experts’, given certain meanings attached to various other words).55
UTM characterizes the use of a word in terms of its presence in sentences that are regarded as
true or accepted, including not only uttered sentences, but also sentences deployed in thought—
i.e., sentences in the speaker’s “belief-box”.56 According to UTM, the totality of accepted wsentences (sentences containing the word w) can be explained by a small subset of accepted wsentences. This hypothesis appeals to “a familiar inferential model” to explain the overall use of
54 As Brandom (1994, p. 625) characterizes his own view: “the story is one in which it is norms all the way down”.
55 A minor typographical mistake has been corrected in this quotation.
56 Indeed, UTM treats uniformly the use of expressions in speech and in the language of thought (Horwich 2005:
31). Basically UTM treats language and thought as a “seamless whole”. Devitt (2002) suggests that UTM
should give instead priority to the mental. I will follow Devitt’s suggestion when I combine basic-acceptance
semantics with teleosemantics.
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words (Horwich 2005: 43). The idea is that the acceptance of most w-sentences deployed in
speech and in theoretical and practical reasoning can be explained as the result of inferences
from other w-sentences; but there must be some w-sentences that (1) serve as the inferential
basis for other w-sentences but (2) cannot themselves be inferentially derived from previous wsentences. According to UTM, the acceptance of these core w-sentences is explanatorily basic
and constitutes the meaning of w because it accounts for the acceptance of all other wsentences.57
One of the main advantages of UTM over other versions of FRS comes precisely from
not identifying meanings with overall uses. A serious problem with FRS is that it seems to lead to
semantic holism, since the functional roles of a symbol include the totality of its
causal/inferential connections. Although proponents of FRS usually endorse this result (Block
1995; Harman 1993), semantic holism is extremely implausible (Fodor and Lepore 1992; Devitt
1993 & 1996). As Fodor puts it, “Meaning Holism really is a crazy doctrine” (Fodor 1987: 60).
Semantic holism entails that the meaning of a word in a user’s idiolect changes whenever the
user accepts new sentences or rejects old sentences containing the word. This leads to the
radically absurd consequence that a word in a user’s idiolect cannot mean the same over time and
that no two users can ever mean the same, given the obvious discrepancies between people’s
webs of beliefs. UTM, however, is a non-holistic version of FRS, since it only regards some core
uses as meaning constitutive. If the meaning of ‘bachelor’ stems from the user’s acceptance of
‘Bachelors are unmarried men’, it will not change when user comes to accept a new sentence,
such as ‘Bachelors are unhappy’.
57 The various w-sentences contain other words, not just w, so their acceptance is not explained merely in terms of
the core w-sentences, but rather by the core sentences governing each of these words.
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Another virtue of UTM is that it is a non-solipsistic version of FRS. A persistent worry
about FRS is that it seems to be a purely internalist doctrine, since it relies on the roles of words
within the cognitive system. But compelling arguments for physical externalism show that
meanings must involve relations between words the external world (Putnam 1975; Kripke 1980).
Two-factor theories attempt to avoid this problem by adding a referential factor that connects
words to the world to the solipsistic—purely internal—functional-role factor that plays a role in
the user’s psychology (Block 1986). However, they face serious problems that stem from their
postulation of two separate factors. One problem is that they do not offer an account of what
coordinates the separate factors (Fodor 1987: 82-83). To put it bluntly, nothing in the theory
prevents a word from having, for example, the functional role of ‘cat’ and referential connections
dogs. Another problem is that the external factor plays no role in the psychological explanation
of behavior. This is deeply troubling, since the explanation of behavior must account for how we
deal with the world (Harman 1988 & 1999: 235-243). In contrast with two-factor theories, UTM
makes room for externalism by including connections to the external world among the core
functional-roles of words. These are wide functional roles that reach out into the world instead of
narrow ones encapsulated in the head. The basic acceptance-property governing the use of ‘cat’,
for example, may involve accepting ‘This is a cat’ in the presence of cats. Accordingly, this wide
functional role explains the various uses of ‘cat’, in theoretical and practical reasoning leading to
intentional behavior, in terms of the links to cats—in the world—of sentences that govern these
inferential processes. The connections to the world and the psychological roles of the word are
fully coordinated into a single factor, so the external link plays a substantial role in the
explanation of behavior. Harman (1987) also proposes a wide or non-solipsistic version of FRS.
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But his theory is hopelessly holistic.
By being non-solipsistic and non-holistic, UTM has clear advantages over other versions
of FRS. If we need a functional-role or use-theory, UTM is the best candidate. 58 But why should
we favor UTM over non-use-theoretical alternatives? One reason may be deflationism about
reference and truth. If deflationism is right, we need a use-theory and the arguments above
suggest that we should favor a basic-acceptance account—e.g., UTM—over other use-theories.
However, Horwich does not base his case for a use-theory exclusively on deflationism—which is
good because the argument based on deflationism is not too strong, given the risk of UTM
collapsing into a form of truth-referentialism (see Section 3.6.1). He also argues that UTM has
two crucial advantages over non-use-theoretical alternatives: its generality and its explanatory
power (1998a: 53). In what follows, I will present these two arguments and argue that together
they show that we need an acceptance-based account of meaning independently of the fate of
deflationism. In other words, that we need an acceptance-based account even if the meanings of
words turn out to substantially determine their references. I start with Horwich’s generality
consideration.

3.5.2 The Generality of a Basic-Acceptance Account
The meanings of different words vary considerably, so theories that are plausible for some terms
usually are not plausible for others. UTM, in contrast, can account for all classes of terms.
Horwich (2005: 26-27) gives the following examples of the meaning constitutive properties we
may expect to find according to his use-theory:
58 In fairness, Peacocke’s (1992) theory of concepts is also non-solipsistic and non-holistic. Indeed, it is very
similar to UTM in crucial respects.

127
“bachelor” ’s meaning is engendered by the fact that its basic regularity of use is
our acceptance of the sentence, “The bachelors are the unmarried men.”
“red” ‘s meaning stems from the fact that its law of use is a propensity to accept
“That is red” in response to the sort of visual experience normally provoked by
observing a clearly red surface.
The meaning of “water” is constituted by the fact that the law explaining its
overall use is that we accept, “x is water ↔ x has the underlying nature of the
stuff in our seas, rivers, lakes and rain.”
“neutrino” means what it does in virtue of our unsupported acceptance of the
conditional, “∃øT(ø) ⇒ T(neutrino)”, where “T(neutrino)” is a formulation of
neutrino theory.
“and” means what it does because the fundamental regularity in its use is our
acceptance of the two-way argument schema, “p, q // p and q”.
Notice the variety of meaning constituting properties allowed for by UTM. The meaning of
‘bachelor’ is accounted for by its association with other words. The meaning of ‘red’ is causally
related to red surfaces. The meaning of ‘neutrino’ is determined by its role within a theory. And
the meaning of ‘and’ is determined by an argument schema or rule of inference. The shape taken
by these different basic acceptance properties accommodates insights from description theories
(‘bachelor’), indicator or causal theories (‘red’), traditional FRS (‘neutrino’) and even solipsistic
FRS (‘and’). The generality of UTM cannot be matched by any of these other theories. The
description theory is plausible for terms like ‘bachelor’, but cannot account for terms like ‘red’,
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‘horse’ and ‘water’. Causal theories are plausible for terms such as ‘red’, ‘horse’ and ‘water’, but
implausible for terms like ‘bachelor’ and ‘neutrino’. And purely internalist versions of FRS give
plausible accounts only of logical terms like ‘and’. None of these theories provide a unified
reductive account of the meaning constituting properties of all words (Horwich 1998a: 53).
Due to its generality, a basic-acceptance semantics—such as UTM—has a crucial
advantage over almost every other theory offered to explain why words mean what they do.
There is, however, an alternative to UTM that can accommodate different kinds of meaning. As
Michael Devitt (2002: 113-114) points out:
The alternative is a “moderate” truth referentialism along the following lines.
“Primitives” get their meanings from referential relations explained by some sort
of direct causal link to reality, an informational, teleological, or historical-causal
link, or some combination of these; proper names and natural kind words are
likely primitives. Other words get their meanings from referential relations
explained by their “definitional” links; the words are inferentially associated with
others that determine their reference; they are covered by “description” theories of
reference; ‘bachelor’ is a likely example.
Devitt’s moderate truth-referentialism incorporates the insights of different theories that regard
meanings as constituted by reference-determining properties. 59 So the approach is diametrically
opposed to Horwich’s UTM, which is committed to deflationism and does not regard meaning
constituting properties as reference-determining. Notice that by making room for description
theories, informational theories, teleological theories and historical-causal theories, moderate
59 Devitt (1996) and Devitt & Sterelny (1999) argue for this moderate view.

129
truth-referentialism offers a plausible account of the meanings of different kinds word, unlike
any of these particular theories taken by itself.
Moderate truth-referentialism explains the meanings of primitive words in terms of direct
links to reality and the meanings of non-primitive words in terms of indirect links to reality
provided by connections to other words. However, even this moderate approach does not seem
particularly well-suited to explain the meanings of the terms of logic and mathematics (e.g.,
‘and’ or ‘plus’), which appear to be related to their roles in inference rather than to any direct or
indirect link to the external world (Field 1977; Harman 1987). 60 An acceptance-based theory, like
UTM, is even more general than moderate truth-referentialism, allowing the meanings of
different words to depend on basic sentences that link them either to the world, to other words or
to rules of inference. The links to rules of inference are crucial to account for the meanings of the
terms of logic and mathematics. But moderate truth-referentialism only includes links to the
world and to other words. So UTM has an advantage even over moderate truth-referentialism. As
Devitt (2002: 117) acknowledges: “I do think that the use theory has an advantage over its rivals
in the handling of the terms of logic and mathematics”. Fodor (1994: 110) makes a similar point:
I'm inclined to think that maybe there is no objection to the idea that “+”, “and”,
“all” and the like have the meanings they do because they play a certain causal
role in the mental lives of their users. This would, of course, be to accept a
distinction in kind between the logical and the nonlogical vocabularies. (The
semantics for the former would be a kind of ‘use’ theory, whereas the semantics
60 Field (1977) gives an inferential account of the meanings of logical terms. Similarly, Harman (1987) argues that
the meanings of logical and mathematical words depends mostly on their roles in inference: given his semantic
holism, he claims that links to perception also play some role.
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for the latter would depend on nomic, specifically mind-world, relations.)
It may seem surprising that Fodor accepts a use-theory for logical vocabulary, since he is one of
the fiercest opponents of use-theories in general—at least for non-logical words (Fodor 1987: 7184). However, Fodor’s account of meaning—for non-logical words—is far from moderate. On
the contrary, he proposes a radical atomism, according to which the meanings of all—nonlogical—words depend exclusively on their links to the world (Fodor 1987 & 1994). Both a
basic-acceptance semantics (like UTM) and Devitt’s moderate truth-referentialism have a clear
advantage on this regard.
A general theory of meaning has to account for all words, presumably explaining what is
the common property in virtue of which they all have meanings. While a basic-acceptance theory
has a clear advantage over all of its rivals on this regard, I suggest that a modification of
moderate truth-referentialism can also achieve the required generality: it can treat logical words
as auxiliaries whose meanings also depend on properties that contribute to the truth-conditions
of sentences, explained in terms of the links of logical words to rules of inference. Moderate
truth-referentialism can hold the following:
The meanings of all words depend on properties that determine the truthconditions of sentences: primitive words get their meanings from links to the
world that determine their references, non-primitive words get their meanings
from links to other words that determine their references, and logical words get
their meanings from links to rules of inference that determine their contributions
to the truth-conditions of sentences.
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I conclude that the generality consideration favors a basic-acceptance theory like UTM over the
vast majority of rival theories of meaning, but a moderate truth-referentialism—expanded to
include links to rules of inference—matches the basic-acceptance theory in generality. While
generality alone does not favor a basic-acceptance theory over a moderate truth-referentialism,
generality is a crucial desideratum. A plausible unified reductive account of meaning will have
to be along the lines of theories like basic-acceptance semantics (e.g., UTM) or an expanded
moderate truth-referentialism, which can accommodate all kinds of words.
In the next section, I present the second consideration offered by Horwich in favor of
UTM. I shall argue that this consideration does favor a basic-acceptance approach over all of its
rivals. Still, I shall argue that a moderate truth-referentialism can again match a deflationary
basic-acceptance approach if expanded further to include basic-acceptance. The resulting version
of moderate truth-referentialism is, of course, not a rival to basic-acceptance semantics, because
it includes basic acceptance, but it is a rival to UTM. After arguing for the core claims of UTM—
i.e., basic-acceptance semantics—, I shall discuss the main problems faced by UTM. These
problems do not stem form basic-acceptance semantics per se, but from UTM’s commitments to
deflationism and dispositionalism.

3.5.3 The Explanatory Power of a Basic-Acceptance Account
The feature of a basic-acceptance semantics—like UTM—that truly favors it over nonacceptance-based rivals is its explanatory power. Basic-acceptance semantics offers a plausible
explanation of how meanings can govern use, since it can appeal to the inferential model to
explain how the total use of a word is derived from a fundamental acceptance property. In
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contrast, Horwich (1998a: 47) argues, theories according to which the meanings of words do not
depend on the acceptance of some sentences containing them cannot explain how these meanings
govern the use of words in theoretical and practical inference:
One of the properties of meaning that we recognize pretheoretically is that what
people say is due, in part, to what they mean. [...] And this explanatory feature of
meaning is immediately accounted for by the use theory. For the central
component of that theory is that the property which constitutes a word’s having
the meaning it does is that its use is governed by a certain explanatorily
fundamental acceptance property. And it is indeed quite clear [...] how the total
use of a word might be derived, in light of circumstantial factors, from a basic
‘law’ of use—whereas it is relatively unclear how any other sort of property of a
word [...] would constrain its overall use.
Let me unfold the points Horwich makes in this passage step by step.
Pretheoretically, the meaning of a word seems to be what governs its use, since people
use words according to what meanings they attach to them. (Notice that this crucial point is in
tune with the identification of meanings and the definition of the task of semantics I defended in
Chapter 2.) If someone utters ‘Bachelors are unhappy’ or has a token of this sentence in his
“belief box”, this is surely due in part to what the word ‘bachelor’ means (1998a: 47).
Additionally, a central theoretical motivation for attributing meanings and, consequently, for
articulating semantic theories is precisely our need to explain people’s behavior, which includes
their linguistic behavior (Devitt 1996 & 2002). So a fundamental desideratum for a theory of
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meaning is that it must explain how people use words. (This again follows for the methodological
considerations discussed in Chapter 2.)
Before I elaborate on how a basic-acceptance account (e.g., UTM) can explain word
deployment, let me point out that standard use theories face a serious circularity problem if they
attempt to explain word usage in terms of meaning, since they claim that meaning is use. Use
theories that identify meanings with the overall use of words seem to have things upside down:
they attempt to explain meaning in terms of use, when what we need instead is to explain use in
terms of meaning. Basic-acceptance semantics (e.g., UTM), however, only claims that some core
uses determine meaning: it does not identify the meaning of a word with its overall use.
Furthermore, UTM claims that the core use of a word—i.e., its basic acceptance property—
explains its overall use. So UTM is different from other use theories in not having things upside
down. The explanatory power of this use theory is precisely given by the fact that it offers a
plausible explanation of how meanings can govern use.
Horwich claims that the total use of a word derives from a fundamental acceptance
property (Horwich 1998a: 47). How does it derive? The explanation appeals to the inferential
model, which is the only working model of thinking we have: “no other model has been
suggested for how we might explain what needs to be explained.” (Horwich 2005: 44). Given the
deployment of rules of inference, the acceptance of some w-sentences—sentences containing a
word w—can bring about the acceptance of other w-sentences, so some uses of a word can be
derived from—and consequently explained by—others. While most uses of a word are surely the
result of inferences from other w-sentences, these causal/inferential chain must start somewhere.
There must be a core set of accepted w-sentences that serve as the inferential basis for other w-
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sentences61 but are not themselves inferentially derived from other w-sentences. These core
sentences govern the overall use of the word because they function as fundamental premises or
“axioms” in the system of inferences containing the word. But if this is the case, these core
sentences must be—at least part of—what the meaning of the words depends on, since they play
a substantial causal role in the explanation the word’s overall use. As long as our theoretical
motivations to attribute meanings are related to the need to explain the overall deployment of
words, basic-acceptance semantics offers indeed a plausible account of the nature of meaning.
Notice that basic-acceptance semantics can also explain how mental content governs nonlinguistic behavior, since the fundamental acceptance properties of a word can as well govern
behavior through practical inference. Basic-acceptance semantics—e.g., UTM—exploits the
inferential model without identifying meaning with overall inferential roles, so it preserves the
pre-theoretical intuition that meaning determines use. Also, it relies on the inferential model
without restricting meanings to inferential roles, since fundamental acceptance properties can
link the meanings of words to the external world. The various uses of ‘cat’ in inferences leading
to intentional behavior, for example, may be explained by the acceptance of ‘This is a cat’ in the
presence of cats. Links to the world play a crucial role in the explanation of the use of many
words and the intentional behavior resulting from practical inferences containing them.
Horwich claims that “it is relatively unclear how any other sort of property of a word [...]
would constrain its overall use” (Horwich 1998a: 47). In other words, he claims that a basicacceptance approach offers the best explanation. I take it that non-use-theoretical approaches
must anyway incorporate a use theory to explain the use of logical and mathematical words (see
61 Together with other factors, such as the meanings of other words in those derived w-sentences, inputs from
perception, etc.
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Section 3.5.2). So I will focus on words whose meaning plausibly depends on links to some other
words or to the world. The description theory plausibly claims that the meaning of ‘bachelor’
depends on its association with ‘unmarried man’. Indicator, causal-historical and (standard)
teleosemantic theories plausibly claim that the meaning of ‘cat’ depends on its links to cats.
Basic-acceptance semantics (e.g., UTM) includes these very same links to explain the meanings
of ‘bachelor’ and ‘cat’, respectively. The crucial difference is that the above mentioned theories
—or a moderate truth-referentialism that combines them—do not articulate these links as part of
basic-acceptance properties. Can the links explain by themselves the overall use of these words,
independently of the words having the links while embedded in some basic sentences? Arguably
not. Most uses of these words in theoretical and practical inferences—in thinking—must result
from previous sentences containing them, since only sentences can function as premises in
inferences. I take this to be rather uncontroversial. 62 Those who endorse non-acceptance-based
theories can go along with this and claim that the word simply preserves its meaning in these
inferential processes. But the widely accepted inferential model of thinking does impose a
constraint in what properties can conceivably govern the use of words—and, consequently,
explain their meanings—, since when we get to the original uses of the words in the
causal/inferential chain, they must also be uses in sentences for the very same reason: isolated
words cannot function as premises. The acceptance of ‘Bachelors are unmarried men’ associates
‘bachelor’ with ‘unmarried men’, as the description theory plausibly suggests, but it also
explains how the association can govern the use of the word in other sentences containing it. The
acceptance of ‘This is a cat’ in the presence of cats links ‘cat’ specifically to cats in the external
world, as indicator, causal-historical and teleosemantic theories plausibly suggest, but it also can
62 At least for anyone who accepts the language of thought hypothesis and a “computational” theory of the mind.
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serve as a premise in inferences containing ‘cat’, thereby governing other stimulus-independent
uses of the word. So links to other words and to the world can indeed govern a word’s overall
use, provided they are links the word has when embedded in some sentences containing it.
While UTM incorporates causal connections to the world in its account of the meaning of
some words, Horwich denies that they thereby determine the reference of such words.
Interestingly, however, Horwich (2005: 44) points out that a non-deflationary version of the
basic-acceptance approach can be articulated, by postulating basic-acceptance properties that
substantially determine the referential properties of words. Given the generality consideration, a
plausible non-deflationary version of basic-acceptance semantics should be combined with a
moderate truth-referentialism. Such a version of a basic-acceptance semantics would have the
following shape:
i. Primitive words get their meanings from the acceptance of basic sentences with links to
the world that determine their references and govern their use (e.g., the acceptance of
‘This is a cat’ in the presence of cats determines the reference of ‘cat’ and governs its
use).
i. Non-primitive words get their meanings from the acceptance of basic sentences that link
them to other words that determine their references and govern their use (e.g., the
acceptance of ‘Bachelors are unmarried men’ determines the reference of ‘bachelor’ and
governs its use).
ii. Logical words get their meanings from the acceptance of basic sentences that link them to
truth-preserving inference rules and govern their use (i.e., the acceptance of the schema
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‘p, q // p and q’ determines the truth-conditional meaning of ‘and’ and governs its use).63
This version of moderate truth-referentialism clearly matches Horwich’s deflationary UTM in
explanatory power. But arguably it does so thanks to incorporating basic-acceptance semantics.
The moral we should draw is that the “explanatory power” consideration strongly favors
a basic-acceptance account of meaning over all of its non-acceptance-based rivals. If
deflationism turns out to be right, we need a deflationary basis-acceptance account. 64 If
deflationism turns out to be wrong, we need a moderately truth-referentialist basic-acceptance
semantics. Basic-acceptance semantics is strongly motivated independently of the fate of
deflationism.
In Section 3.5.1, I presented Horwich’s UTM and argued that it has crucial advantages
over other versions of FRS. In Section 3.5.2, I argued that basic-acceptance semantics—the core
set of claims of UTM—has a crucial advantage over almost every other theory of meaning in
terms of generality, except an expanded moderate truth-referentialism that includes links to rules
of inference for logical words. Basic-acceptance semantics and moderate truth-referentialism are
the only plausible candidates for a general theory that accounts for the meanings of all words. In
this section, 3.5.3, I argued that basic-acceptance semantics has a crucial advantage over every
other theory of meaning in terms of explanatory power: the meanings of words must depend on
basic-sentences containing them in order to govern their use. I also argued that this argument is
independent of deflationism, so that it does not favor a deflationary basic-acceptance semantics
—like Horwich’s UTM—over a moderately truth-referentialist basic-acceptance semantics.
63 This sketch is inspired on one offered by Horwich (2005: 44-45).
64 At least if we do not want to “abandon meaning altogether” (Devitt 2002: 106).
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I have so far abstracted away from the problems faced by Horwich’s UTM and focused
on the virtues and insights of a basic-acceptance semantics. However, Horwich’s UTM does face
some serious challenges. I shall discuss these challenges in the following sections. Based on my
assessment, I shall argue that basic-acceptance semantics must be combined with teleosemantics
and that the result may turn out to be deflationary or moderately truth-referentialist.

3.6 Problems with Horwich’s Use-Theory
While basic-acceptance semantics is strongly motivated by its generality and explanatory power,
Horwich’s UTM faces two main problems pointed out by Devitt (2002 & 2011): (1) UTM risks
collapsing into truth-referentialism, and (2) UTM is undermined by problems of ignorance and
error. I shall argue that neither of these problems stems from basic-acceptance semantics. The
first problem arises from UTM’s commitment to deflationism. Given the risk of a collapse, I
shall argue that basic-acceptance semantics should remain agnostic or neutral about deflationism
until we determine whether it effectively collapses or not into a form of truth-referentialism. The
second problem arises from UTM’s commitment to a dispositionalist account of the functions of
words. I shall argue that UTM is indeed undermined by this problem and that basic-acceptance
semantics must be combined with a different account of the functions of words in order to offer a
plausible explanation of why words mean what they do.
Before discussing the main problems faced by UTM, let me make a brief point about
Horwich’s take on the relation between the meanings of linguistic and mental representations.
Horwich treats language and thought as a “seamless whole”. As far as he is concerned, his theory
is about the words used by people both to think and to communicate with each other. As he puts
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it: “I favour a uniform account, which will deal in the same way with both overt and mental
terms” (Horwich 2005: 31). In a critical assessment of UTM, however, Devitt reasonably argues
that UTM should give instead priority to the mental. Devitt’s main point is that UTM’s
“linguistic theory which seeks to identify and then explain the meanings of linguistic words
depends on the prior identification and explanation of the meanings of mental words”, and that
this is a consequence of UTM’s “reliance on accepting a sentence” (Devitt 2002: 109). Recall
that, for Horwich, accepting a sentence involves regarding it as true and relying on it as a
premise in inferences, which includes not only asserted sentences, but also sentences deployed in
thought—i.e., sentences in the speaker’s “belief-box”. The point is that “accepting a sentence” is
fundamentally a psychological notion. Inferences take place in the mind. In order to rely on a
sentence as a premise in theoretical and practical inferences, the sentence must be tokened in
though—i.e., stored in the “belief-box”. This alone should suffice to show that UTM should give
priority to the mental.
Suppose that Mary believes that bachelors are unhappy and utters ‘Bachelors are
unhappy’. What explains Mary’s linguistic behavior? The best explanation we have—I am not
sure there even is another plausible one—is the standard one based on Mary’s thoughts: she
believes that bachelors are unhappy, she wants to communicate her belief, therefore she utters a
sentence that has the same meaning as her belief according to the linguistic conventions of her
community (Devitt 2002: 110). This sort of explanation is based on our old and very successful
folk-psychology. The idea behind it is reflected in the saying that language expresses thought
(Devitt 2002: 111). It should be obvious that there is a lot to say in favor of this view and almost
nothing to say against it. But the view in effect assigns explanatory priority to the mental. Let us
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consider now Horwich’s explanation of the overall use of a word in terms of basic-acceptance.
To follow the same example, UTM would explain Mary’s uses of ‘bachelor’ in her utterance and
belief by her acceptance of ‘The bachelors are the unmarried men’. Should a proper version of
UTM deal “in the same way with both overt and mental terms”? The first point to notice is that
the basic sentence will have to be tokened in the “belief-box” in order to govern inferences with
the word by serving as a premise. The second point to notice is that, given the explanation of
Mary’s utterance, the basic sentence will only cause the utterance by first causing the belief.
UTM can indeed explain both overt and mental uses, but the explanations are not symmetrical: it
can explain the overt use by explaining the mental one. So I conclude that UTM indeed should
give priority to the mental. Of course, for many explanatory purposes it is convenient to ignore
the complex relations between language and thought treating them simply as a “seamless whole”.
But the point remains that in an ultimate analysis thought takes priority.

3.6.1 Risk of Collapse
Devitt points out that both UTM and a moderate truth-referentialism account for the meanings of
non-primitives such as ‘bachelor’ in terms of their associations with other words. For these
terms, Devitt argues, the only difference between the two competing theories is in their accounts
of the nature of reference: “truth referentialism is committed to a substantial reference relation,
the use theory, to deflationary reference” (Devitt 2002: 114). Therefore, relevant evidence in
favor of one theory of meaning over the other has to be found elsewhere: in their accounts of the
meanings of primitives.
Moderate truth referentialism explains the meanings of primitives in terms of their
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reference determining causal relations to reality. The use theory has to choose between also
explaining the meanings of these words in terms of their causal relations to reality or explaining
them instead in purely intra-linguistic terms. As Devitt points out, well-known arguments for
externalism count against the second alternative (Devitt 2002: 115). A use theory that follows
this path is an extremely implausible theory of meaning. To be plausible, the use theory must
explain the meanings of primitives in terms of their causal relations to reality. But then, Devitt
argues, the theory faces the following challenge:
[It] needs to distinguish itself from truth referentialism. Truth referentialism holds
that these meaning-constituting causal links explain reference. The use theory
needs to say why they don’t (because the use theory holds that reference is
deflationary and not open to this sort of explanation). (Devitt 2002: 114-115)
It is important to notice that this challenge is faced specifically by Horwich’s deflationary UTM,
rather than by basic-acceptance semantics in general. As I argued above (Section 3.5.3), basicacceptance semantics is motivated independently of deflationism—and may even take a truthreferntialist form—so its fate does not go hand in hand with the fate of deflationism.
How can UTM explain why all of these causal links are not reference determining ones?
Horwich may claim that the causal links only determine meaning and that ascriptions of referents
to these words are derived trivially from the application of the deflationary reference schema
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3). But the problem is that deflationism entails that reference cannot
play any explanatory role in meaning. Why should we expect the meanings of primitives to be
constituted exactly by the same causal links that truth referentialism regards as reference
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determining if reference does not play any explanatory role in the account? Truth referentialism
has good reasons to hold that we need these causal links: we need them to explain reference.
In his reply to Devitt, Horwich makes two points. I already presented the first point above
(Section 3.5.3): Horwich suggests that a non-deflationary version of the basic-acceptance
approach can be articulated, by postulating basic-acceptance properties that substantially
determine the referential properties of words (Horwich 2005: 44). This of course does not
prevent UTM from collapsing into truth-referentialism. Horwich’s point is merely that if there
were a collapse, it would not undermine basic-acceptance semantics per se. Horwich’s second
point is intended to defend specifically his deflationary UTM. He argues that we should not
expect basic-acceptance semantics to take the shape required by moderate truth referentialism,
since the plausibility of deflationism shows that there is no reason to assume that meaning
properties must constitute the “is true of” relation (Horwich 2005: 45). While Horwich agrees
that some words may turn out to have relational acceptance properties, he insists that the use
theory does not require it:
[The use theory] leaves room for ‘physical’ externalism, insofar as it does not
preclude the possibility that the conditions of acceptance involved in certain
meaning-constituting properties will include aspects of the environment. But it is
not committed to externalism, insofar as it allows that the best explanations of
overall use may turn out never to call for that kind of basic acceptance property.
(Horwich 2005: 49n.)
Devitt warned that if UTM treats the meanings of primitives as determined by causal relations to
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reality, it risks collapsing into truth referentialism. Horwich replies that UTM is not committed to
externalism and UTM’s explanations may turn out to never involve causal links to reality. If this
happened to be the case, UTM would certainly not collapse. However, a purely internalist UTM
would not only avoid a collapse: it would also be undermined by the powerful arguments for
externalism, as Devitt originally warned (Devitt 2002: 115). So the sensible conclusion to draw
is that UTM indeed risks collapsing into a form of truth-referentialism.
Given similar worries, Field suggests that we should merely adopt a methodological
deflationism in the theory of meaning: “a methodological policy, which if pursued could lead to
the discovery that deflationism in the original sense (‘metaphysical deflationism’) is workable or
could lead to the discovery that inflationism is inevitable” (Field 2001: 119). We should leave
open the possibility that a fully satisfactory version of basic-acceptance semantics may turn out
to be one that complies with the requirements of a moderate truth-referentialism—along the lines
I sketched above (Section 3.5.3). I have to confess that, unlike Horwich, I am inclined to believe
that this is a likely outcome.

3.6.2 Problems of Ignorance and Error
Another issue pointed out by Devitt (2002 & 2011) is that UTM faces serious problems of
ignorance and error. These problems, I will argue, stem from UTM’s commitment to
dispositionalism, not from basic-acceptance semantics itself.
Horwich relies on a dispositionalist model of inference to explain the overall use of
words, on one hand, and the nature of basic acceptance properties, on the other. Accordingly,
Horwich regards the overall use of words as a certain kind of regularity, and the core uses that
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constitute their meanings as an “explanatory basic regularity”. The meaning constituting
properties of words are, according to Horwich, the laws that govern their use. These laws are
articulated as basic acceptance properties which, in turn, are dispositions or tendencies to accept
certain sentences in certain conditions. Certain sentences have to be regularly accepted in certain
conditions in order to constitute an explanatory basic use. Even Horwich’s account of the
division of linguistic labor is purely dispositionalist. A speaker qualifies as sharing the public
meaning of a word, even when he is too ignorant or makes too many mistakes, as long as he is
disposed to defer to the experts in the use of that word in his linguistic community.
Horwich’s dispositionalist accounts of fundamental acceptance properties and of the
division of linguistic labor face serious problems of ignorance and error. As Kripke (1982) has
shown, any dispositionalist theory of meaning will fail to properly characterize incorrect uses as
incorrect, because speakers/thinkers often have dispositions to make mistakes and often lack the
right dispositions. A purely dispositionalist theory does not have the resources to exclude the
dispositions to make mistakes from being meaning constitutive. So it is no surprise that
Horwich’s use theory, as it stands, fails to offer a plausible account of meaning. I will argue that
Horwich’s dispositionalist account of fundamental acceptance properties indeed leads to a
serious disjunction problem when applied to relational meanings. On one hand, Horwich claims
that the problem of error is a pseudo-problem. But I will reply that this position leads to
implausible attributions of meaning. On the other hand, Horwich offers an account of the
division of linguistic labor that anyway may help to overcome the problem. But I will argue that
the problem persists for mental words that are not part of a public language and that the proposed
solution even fails for words that are indeed words of a public language since, as Devitt (2002)
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shows, Horwich’s theory of linguistic deference is itself undermined by serious problems of
ignorance and error.
Let us suppose that UTM’s hypothesis for the meaning of ‘horse’ is that it constituted by
our basic tendency to accept ‘This is a horse’ in the presence of horses. However, surely we have
a tendency to accept ‘This is a horse’ in the presence of not only horses, but also muddy zebras,
the odd cow, etc. But then this is the actual law of use of ‘horse’, with the result that applying
‘horse’ to muddy zebras, the odd cow, etc., does not constitute a misuse of the word. Horwich,
however, claims that the meaning constituting laws of use are idealized laws. So his theory does
make some room for error. If a speaker has a tendency to only occasionally accept ‘This is a
horse’ in the presence of muddy zebras and odd cows, but a regular tendency to accept it in the
presence of horses, then the use theory can characterize his misuses as misuses: simplicity
considerations will determine that the relevant idealized law is only the one that involves horses.
However, idealized laws of use will successfully abstract away from errors only when
most actual uses of the word are correct. The dispositionalist use theory still requires meaning
constituting sentences to be regularly accepted. But this makes too little room for error. The
problem is that errors may often be more frequent than the use theory allows. In these cases,
UTM will attribute the wrong meaning to the word. In the ‘horse’ example, it will attribute a
disjunctive meaning-constituting relational property to speakers that fail more often than they
succeed in identifying real horses. Or consider Putnam’s (1975) ‘beech’ and ‘elm’ example. In
this case, plain ignorance of how to apply the terms (rather than error committed during their
application) may lead to consistent misapplication of the words by many speakers who share
Putnam’s inability to distinguish beeches from elms.
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Horwich argues that the problem of error is a pseudo-problem. I will get back to this
below. But he also offers an account of the division of linguistic labor that is intended to make
room for people misusing words without changing their meanings:
In order for an individual member of the community to mean a certain thing by a
given word, it is not necessary that he himself uses it precisely in accordance with
the regularity that fixes the meaning of the word type. What is needed is, first, that
there are acknowledged experts in the deployment of the term—experts whose
usage is determined by some such regularity; second, that the individual is
disposed to defer to the experts—i.e. to accept correction by them; and
consequently, third, that his use of the term conforms to that regularity at least to
some extent. In these circumstances, even when the speaker’s use of a word is
fundamentally abnormal, we none the less attribute the normal meaning to him;
and that normal meaning is constituted by the regularity that explains the overall
use of the word by those ‘specialists’ to whom the rest of us are prepared to defer.
(Horwich 1998a: 86)
There are two things to be said against this. In the first place, the proposed solution only is
available for abnormal uses of words with a public usage. So the problem of error persists for
words that are not part of a public language—e.g., mental words coined by an individual thinker
or written words coined for someone’s private use. In the second place, even for words with a
public usage, the solution relies on the disposition of users to defer to experts. The original
problem of error was related to the theory’s dispositionalist account of basic acceptance
properties. But, as Devitt (2002) demonstrates, a dispositionalist account of the division of
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linguistic labor is doomed to face analogous problems.
I will elaborate the first problem with a simple thought experiment. Suppose that
Robinson Crusoe, alone on his island, coins a new word to name a small long-eared species of
rodent he has encountered. When speaking to himself and writing in his diary he calls these
creatures ‘gavagais’. One day he manages to construct a precarious boat to escape from his
solitary confinement. In sailing out to sea, however, he finds himself in a storm that
unfortunately brings him to another uninhabited island. On this new island, Robinson Crusoe
finds a small mammal that looks exactly like a gavagai, so he thinks these creatures are gavagais
and the new entries on his diary also allude to these creatures as gavagais. However, unknown to
him, the creatures on the new island are not really gavagais. They are not even rodents, but
marsupials that have evolved into a very similar shape to that of gavagais because of their similar
ecological niches.
In a case like this, how can the use theory explain error and misrepresentation? It cannot
appeal to semantic deference, since this is a word coined by a solitary speaker. Robinson Crusoe
is the only “expert” in the use of the term. The use theory cannot avoid the conclusion that the
meaning of Robinson Crusoe’s ‘gavagai’ is constituted by his tendency to accept ‘This is a
gavagai’ in the presence of either gavagais or their marsupial lookalikes. But surely Robinson
Crusoe is misrepresenting the small marsupials as being gavagais. Since the misrepresentation is
systematic, the use theory cannot abstract away from it appealing to the ideal law of use for the
word. Since the word is not a word of a public language, the use theory cannot appeal to
semantic deference to account for the proper meaning of the word. The conclusion is that a
dispositional characterization of basic acceptance properties fails to provide a plausible account
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of meaning.
The second problem with Horwich’s proposed solution is that his dispositionalist account
of semantic deference faces itself serious problems of error. Recall that Horwich’s theory of
deference imposes three requirements for a speaker who uses a word abnormally to qualify as
using the word with its public meaning: first, there must be experts on the use of the word;
second, the speaker must be disposed to defer to the experts; third, the speaker use must conform
to the public use to some extent. As Devitt (2002) points out, these requirements can hardly be
met:
Consider proper names. To meet Horwich’s second requirement, the user of a
name has to acknowledge her ignorance and hence be prepared to defer. But
surely many ignorant users of a name do not acknowledge their ignorance. On
Horwich’s theory these users will not be using the name with the same meaning as
the deferrers and the experts. My guess is that most users of most names will be in
that category. Next, the requirement demands that each deferrer identify experts to
defer to. How? They cannot be identified simply as experts on the meaning of the
name, on pain of circularity. It is surely unlikely that most deferrers will be able to
manage the required identification [...]. Finally, Horwich’s first requirement is that
there be acknowledged experts. But surely the ignorant will often defer to
someone that they think is an expert who in fact is not. In sum, people will often
not defer where they should; they will often try to defer but fail; they will often
refer to a nonexpert. (Devitt 2002: 118-119)
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The account of deference fails for exactly the same reasons as the account of basic acceptance
properties. People often have dispositions to make mistakes (error) and often lack the required
dispositions (ignorance). In the case of deference, as Devitt points out, people may have
dispositions to make mistakes in whom to defer to, in when to defer, and people may lack the
disposition to defer to anyone whatsoever. Again, these failures may often be regular, so
appealing to regularities or laws of usage does not solve the problem.
Horwich has developed an ingenious reply to the objection that UTM cannot overcome
the problem of error. In a nutshell, he argues that the “problem of error” is a pseudo-problem that
results from an unwarranted inflationism about truth and reference. Given inflationary
assumptions, he claims, we wrongly expect to be able to “read off” the referent of a word from
its meaning constitutive property. But deflationism frees us from the requirement that a meaning
constitutive property should substantially determine the reference of a word. According to
deflationism, the reference of a word is instead trivially determined. So, Horwich concludes,
there is no need to impose on the theory of meaning any substantial requirements related to how
the correct reference of a word is determined by its meaning. (See Horwich 1998a: 65-71 &
2005: 63-84.)
I have two points to make against Horwich’s attempt to disregard the problem as a
pseudo-problem. First, it seems to me that Horwich’s “dissolution” fails because it would
undermine his own reasonable hypotheses about words’ meanings. Consider the hypothesis that
the meaning of horse is engendered by the acceptance of ‘This is a horse’ in the presence of
horses. This is similar to many of the reasonable hypotheses offered by Horwich himself. But in
order to really embrace the view that there is no problem of error, rather than just flirt with the
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idea, Horwich must be willing to bite the bullet and say that the meaning of ‘horse’ is engendered
by the acceptance of ‘This is a horse’ in the presence of horse-looking things; so that the word
would be correctly used when applied to muddy zebras or odd cows.
The second problem I find with Horwich’s alleged dissolution of the problem of error is
that I do not think that the problem is merely a truth-referentialist one. While the problem has
often been articulated in truth-referentialist terms, the underlying problem with dispositionalism
is deeper and occurs even outside of the theory of meaning. As teleological theorists have
pointed out, a dispositionalist theory of biological function is in quite an analogous situation to a
dispositionalist theory of meaning (I elaborate more on this on Chapter 4). The function of
sperm, for instance, seems to be to fertilize eggs. However, most sperm never performs this
function. And similar problems arise for the functions of biological organs, innate behaviors,
acquired behaviors, etc. Biological devices often have dispositions to malfunction and even
malfunction regularly. So a purely dispositionalist/regularist account of functions is unable to
characterize malfunctioning as malfunctioning.
The problems of malfunctioning with dispositionalist theories of biological function are
clearly not based on any inflationary assumptions. But they will also arise for a functionalism
about content that adopts a similar dispositionalist account of the functions of symbols.
Consequently, I think that deflationism does not truly remove the underlying problem. Even a
deflationary UTM should give a proper account of malfunctioning in the deployment of words
and concepts. But as long as UTM is committed to pure dispositionalism, it is not clear how it
can offer such an account.
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There is a use-theorist that does take seriously the problem of dispositionalism being
unable to underscore a proper distinction between correct and incorrect uses. Robert Brandom
(1994 & 2000) argues for a form of use theory that he calls “inferentialism” and that, notably, is
based on norms rather than dispositions or regularities of use. Brandom’s elaborate theory is
non-naturalist, since it relies on irreducible normativity. This alone makes it unattractive, given
the arguments for a naturalized semantics I have given in Chapter 1. But notice that someone
with different views on that issue may suggest that Horwich should similarly adopt a norm-based
account of use. Meanings would be engendered according to such a theory by basic norms of
acceptance, instead of basic acceptance regularities. The meaning of ‘horse’, it could be said, is
engendered by a norm like: You ought to accept ‘This is a horse’ in the presence of horses.
The alternative solution, which I suggested earlier, is to combine basic-acceptance with a
teleological account of the functions of symbols. This combination allows the basic-acceptance
approach to make plenty of room for ignorance and error while remaining within the sane
confines of naturalism. The meaning of ‘horse’, for example, may be said to be engendered by
the fact that the acceptance of ‘This is s horse’ in response to the perception of horses is
supposed to govern its use, while the meaning of ‘cardiologist’ may be said to be constituted by
the fact that its use is supposed to be governed by the acceptance of ‘Cardiologists are doctors
specialized heart diseases’—where the relevant “supposed” is not a prescriptive one, but the kind
of “supposed” involved in the natural fact that kidneys are supposed to filter blood. This requires
the notion of “function” that applies to biological organs to be “normative” in this nonprescriptive sense and representations (including acquired ones) to have these same sorts of
functions. I will discuss these issues in the following chapters.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have briefly surveyed the range of available theories of meaning, suggested an
approach that combines Horwich’s basic-acceptance semantics with teleosemantics, and
elaborated on the virtues and problems of UTM: Horwich’s version of basic-acceptance
semantics. I argued that the generality and mainly the explanatory power of basic-acceptance
semantics favors it over other alternatives, although I pointed out that a basic-acceptance
semantics with these advantageous features can take a truth-referentialist form. I also argued,
following Devitt, that UTM risks collapsing into truth-referentialism and fails to give a proper
account of relational meanings, because it is undermined by serious problems of ignorance and
error. I have suggested that the risk of collapse into truth-referentialism does not undermine
basic-acceptance semantics. If basic-acceptance semantics fails to give a plausible account of
meaning given the problems of ignorance and error of UTM, then we either have to reevaluate
the inference to the best explanation based on the explanatory power consideration or somehow
fix the theory to avoid the problems of ignorance and error. Since I think that the explanatory
power consideration favors the use theory over any theory not based on basic sentence
acceptance properties, I will explore the second alternative: to fix the use theory to avoid the
problems of ignorance and error. Overcoming the problems of ignorance and error is the main
virtue of the combination of basic-acceptance and teleosemantics. In the next chapter, I will
introduce the idea of teleosemantics and analyze in detail the teleological notion of function.
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Chapter 4:
Teleonomic Functions

4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, I argued in favor of a basic-acceptance account of meaning, but objected that
Horwich’s articulation of such an account is undermined by serious problems of ignorance and
error. My aim is to propose a teleological or teleonomic version of basic-acceptance semantics
which promises to overcome such problems. There are various already existing “teleosemantic”
theories that rely on teleology to offer accounts of meaning that avoid falling prey of problems of
ignorance and error. The approach I will be proposing departs in crucial ways from existing
theories, but also borrows elements from them. Some available teleosemantic theories are quite
complex and the model of functions they rely on requires some inspection before delving into
how it can illuminate the nature of meaning. In this chapter, I will briefly discuss the nature of
teleosemantic theories and discuss in some detail the etiological account of functions that such
theories rely on. I will argue that the main advantage of the etiological account is that it accounts
for the “normative” character of functions within a fully naturalistic framework. This is the
feature that makes etiological functions particularly attractive to semantics.

4.2 What is Teleosemantics?
The core feature of teleosemantic theories is the following: they rely on a teleological account of
functions to explain the nature of meanings. But most of the available versions of teleosemantics
share another feature: they rely on direct links to reality to explain the references and/or truth-
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conditions of representations. In this section, I briefly present these points, which I discuss in
more detail afterwards. I suggest that the only defining feature of teleosemantics is the first one.
A theory of meaning can be teleosemantic even if it does not have the second feature.
The first common feature of available versions of teleosemantics is that they all attempt
to explain the nature of meanings in terms of what symbols or representations are supposed to do
or what is their purpose given the history of their use and/or the history of the underlying
mechanisms responsible for their use. What they propose, first and foremost, is that the meaning
or content of a symbol or representation depends on its etiological functions: the functions that
explain why the symbol or representation exists. Since the historical functions of an item explain
why the item exists in terms of its purposes, of what the item is for, the etiological account is
often called “teleological”. This account of functions has its roots in biology and the philosophy
of biology. A kidney, for example, has the function of filtering blood. A teleological account
proposes that filtering blood is a purpose of kidneys (among others, such a producing certain
hormones) because they have been naturally selected for doing this. One of the main virtues of
this account is that it makes room for malfunctioning. A failing kidney can be said to have the
function of filtering blood even if it is not currently performing it properly or at all, because the
explanation of why it exists relies on how having kidneys benefited ancestor creatures—by
filtering waste and excess fluids out of their blood—aiding their survival and reproduction,
which resulted in the inheritance of the trait by their descendants. Notice that while
“malfunctioning” or “failing” to perform a function are, in a qualified sense, “normative”
notions, the etiological explanation is fully naturalistic. I discuss etiological functions in more
detail in the following sections of this chapter.
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A teleosemantic theory basically makes use of the etiological explanation of functions to
account for the meanings of symbols or representations. If symbols or representations are
supposed to be used in certain ways because they have etiological functions, then their misuses
can be accounted for in fully naturalistic terms. If we strictly follow the biological account which
relies on Darwinian natural selection operating over hereditary traits, a teleosemantic account
may seem to be available only for innate symbols or representations. Some teleosemanticists do
limit the scope of teleosemantics to a subset of symbols or representations that are innate or the
result of purely innate mechanisms (Sterelny 1990 & Neander 1999). But other teleosemanticists
have argued that the account can be extended to cover also symbols or representations that are
the result of learning (Millikan 1984, Papineau 1984 & Dretske 1988) and even to the words of
natural languages which are transmitted culturally rather than by biological reproduction
(Millikan 1984). Whether the scope of a teleosemantic theory is limited or not to innately
determined symbols or representations, what makes it a version of “teleosemantics” is that it
relies on an etiological account of the functions of symbols to explain the nature of their
meanings. This is the defining feature of teleosemantics.
The second common feature of most available versions of teleosemantics is that they
resort to teleology specifically in order to explain the contents of representations in terms of
direct links to reality that determine their references and/or truth-conditions.65 Like indicator or
informational theories, causal-historical theories and description theories of reference—but
unlike many “use” or functional-role theories of meaning—all available versions of
65 In the case of words and concepts, the direct links are alleged to determine their references—which in turn
contribute to the truth-conditions (or satisfaction-conditions) of sentences and thoughts containing them. In the
case of simple and non-compositional representations—such as those generated by frog’s bug-detectors
(discussed in Chapter 5)—a teleosemantic theory is best characterized as providing direct links that determine
truth-conditions.
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teleosemantics are truth-referential. Indeed, teleosemantic theorists tend to simply identify the
contents of representations with their references and/or truth-conditions. Like indicator and
causal-historical theories, most available versions of teleosemantics rely on direct links to reality
to explain representational content. The links are direct in contrast to the indirect links of
description theories of reference—according to which the link between a symbol and reality is
mediated by its links to other symbols (e.g., ‘bachelor’ is indirectly linked to bachelors through
its direct links to ‘unmarried’ and ‘man’). In sum, available teleosemantic theories belong to the
large set of truth-referential theories of meaning and, within this set, to the sub-set of theories
that rely on direct links to the world. The crucial motivation for resorting to teleology in order to
explain the nature of these direct links can be appreciated by comparing teleosemantic theories
with indicator or informational theories—since the former are tailored to avoid one of the most
serious problems faced by the latter.
According to indicator or informational theories (Stampe 1977, Dretske 1981 & Fodor
1987), the references and/or truth-conditions of symbols or representations are determined by
their reliable causal links to reality. A mental token of ‘horse’, for example, is said to indicate or
carry information about the presence of a horse because tokens of that type are reliably caused by
the presence of horses. Indicator theories have the virtue of being fully naturalistic. But they are
undermined by serious problems of misrepresentation. Due to ignorance or error, tokens of
‘horse’ are sometimes caused by zebras or distant cows, for example. The problem is that
indicator theories do not have the resources to characterize these instances as genuine
misrepresentations. Since ‘horse’ is reliably caused by horses, zebras and other horse-looking
things, the pure indicator theory unfortunately entails that ‘horse’ refers to horses, zebras and
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other horse-looking things.
Available teleosemantic theories attempt to overcome the problem of misrepresentation
by relying on a teleological characterization of the direct links between representations and
reality. A simple option combines indication with teleology, claiming that a representation R
stands for X if and only if it has the etiological function of indicating X (Dretske 1988). A related
informational alternative holds that R stands for X if and only if the mechanism that produces it
has the etiological function of responding to X (Neander 2013). These versions of teleosemantics
may be regarded as teleological variants of indicator or informational theories. They rely on
etiological functions to isolate the proper causes of representations—what conditions in the
world they are supposed to be caused by—and are able to characterize tokens that are not
properly caused as misrepresentations. A representation may have the function of indicating or
being tokened in response to exclusively X even if it fails to be reliably caused only by X. Other
versions of teleosemantics depart further from indicator or informational theories, focusing on
the effects rather than the causes of representations. They claim that a representation R stands for
X if and only if it is supposed to be tokened in the presence of X—or when X obtains—in order to
bring about the beneficial effects it has the function of producing (Millikan 1984 & Papineau
1984). Notice that what matters here is that R is tokened in the right circumstances, regardless of
what causes such tokens. The circumstances may be the right ones even when R is not caused by
what it represents. These versions of teleosemantics rely on etiological functions to isolate under
what conditions in the world representations are supposed to be tokened—and are able to
characterize tokens that are not tokened in the proper conditions as misrepresentations. I will
propose a hybrid between these two approaches. The hybrid account claims that a representation
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R stands for X if and only if it is supposed to be caused by X in order to bring about the
beneficial effects it has the etiological function of producing. I will argue that this combination
overcomes some problems faced by teleosemantic theories exclusively based on either the causes
or the effects of representations. I discuss these various teleosemantic approaches in Chapter 5.
All of these teleosemantic theories attempt to explain truth-referential content in terms of
direct links between representations and reality. However, this common feature is not a defining
characteristic of the teleosemantic approach itself. In principle, the etiological account of
functions can be exploited to articulate teleosemantic variants of other kinds of theories of
meaning. Consider a moderate truth-referentialism, according to which the meanings of primitive
words/concepts depend on their reference-determining links to reality and the meanings of nonprimitive words/concepts depend on their reference-determining links to other words/concepts
(Devitt 1996). The place for teleosemantics within such an approach, it may be assumed, is
among the candidate theories for the meanings only of primitives, while a description theory is
expected to account for the meanings of non-primitives. However, a description theory can also
be articulated in teleological terms—basically, characterizing the reference-determining links to
other words/concepts of a non-primitive as those it is supposed to have in order to be used
properly.66 Furthermore, I will suggest that teleology can be used to articulate a teleosemantic
version of a “use”, functional-role or conceptual-role theory. More specifically, I will argue that a
basic-acceptance semantics that relies on an etiological account of functions promises to
overcome the serious problems of misrepresentation faced by Horwich’s basic-acceptance
66 Papineau (1987: 78-80 & 93) indeed offers a teleosemantic description theory for non-observational concepts,
which supplements his (direct-links based) teleosemantic theory for observational concepts. The version of the
description theory he adopts, however, is not the most plausible one (see Devitt 1991: 431-432). But the
problems do not specifically stem from its teleosemantic character. I will get back to this in Chapter 6.
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theory. I discuss these matters and propose a combination of basic-acceptance semantics with
teleosemantics in Chapter 6.
Before delving into the functions of symbols or representations, discussing different
teleosemantic approaches and articulating a teleosemantic version of basic-acceptance semantics,
I will discuss in more detail the etiological account of biological functions that serves as the basis
for teleosemantics. While the etiological account of functions discussed below can and has been
applied beyond the realm of the strictly biological—for example, to the realm of “cultural
evolution”—its application to strictly biological phenomena is largely responsible for its
naturalistic credentials which, in turn, are responsible for much of the philosophical interest in
applying it beyond the strictly biological. The focus of the remainder of this chapter is on
biological functions.

4.3 The Etiological Account of Biological Functions
The etiological account of biological functions is usually called “teleological” because it ascribes
“purposes” to biological items. But this must be qualified, since it departs in crucial ways from
traditional forms of teleological thinking. In the Aristotelian tradition, purposes or goals were
understood as “final causes”—roughly, the counterpart of X being the efficient cause of Y would
be Y being the final cause of X—which were postulated not only to explain why seeds grow into
plants, but also why stones fall to the ground. The etiological account of functions does not rely
on this rightly discredited notion of “final causes”. Another traditional form of teleological
thinking—which is still alive in folkloric opinion—relates the purposes of biological items to
their alleged “design” by an intelligent, supernatural, creator. This view is at odds with a
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naturalistic view of the world. In contrast, the contemporary form of teleological explanation
offers a naturalistic account of the “purposes” of biological items that relies on the brute, blind,
and ultimately physical forces governing biological evolution.
While the etiological account is the mainstream view about the nature of functions in the
philosophy of biology, it is not the only naturalist account available. Its main alternative is the
account of functions in terms of the causal roles played by items within the larger systems to
which they belong. The etiological and the causal-role accounts of functions are often regarded
as rivals. But they both may be appropriate as accounts of different phenomena. However, in the
case of specifically biological functions the etiological account has a clear advantage over the
causal-role account: it explains how things can have a function even when they fail to perform it.
I contrast the etiological and the causal-role accounts of functions in Section 4.7 of this chapter.
Eyes are for seeing, hands are for grabbing, wings are for flying, ears are for hearing, and
so forth. The purpose of hearts is to pump blood, the purpose of kidneys is to filter blood, the
purpose of calluses is to protect skin from friction, and so forth. In some sense of the words ‘for’
and ‘purpose’ these are all uncontroversial claims. But the characterization of biological
functions in these teleological terms has to be taken with a grain of salt. Ordinary people often
describe functions teleologically, but they also often think of such functions as intended or
deliberate purposes: the kinds of purposes conferred to artifacts by their intelligent designers and
users, which biological items would also have if they were the products of intelligent design. The
question is how can a naturalistically respectable “teleological” account of functions be offered
for biological items, since scientific biology has shown that they are the result of non-intelligent
forces. As Peter Godfrey-Smith points out:
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Teleology has been a huge topic in the philosophy of biology; here I mean the
status of our tendency to treat biological activities in terms of purposes, goals, and
proper functions. It is usually assumed that the intentions of an intelligent
designer or user of an object can be the basis for teleological description in a
straightforward way. The problem is whether and how these terms can be used in
the absence of this overt role for intelligence. (Godfrey-Smith 2009: 12)
Let us consider for a moment the functions of artifacts. Pens, for example, are for writing. That is
their purpose because they have been intentionally designed for it. Now consider a stone used as
a paperweight. If it was polished to be comfortable to handle and painted over to be aesthetically
appealing, it has been intentionally designed to be a paperweight and a piece of decoration.
Alternatively, the stone may have been chosen or “selected” by someone because it was already
smooth and simply used as a paperweight without modifying it. It anyway has the function of a
paperweight—i.e., preventing paper from being blown away by wind—because of the use it has
been deliberately selected for and is being put to. However, stones qua stones have no purposes.
It would be a serious mistake to ascribe purposes to them, “projecting” into the world the kinds
of purposes that humans deliberately confer to artifacts. Unlike stones, however, wings, eyes,
hearts and kidneys do have “purposes”—in some sense of the word—independently of the
“intentions of an intelligent designer or user” (to use Godfrey-Smith’s phrase). How can this be?
The contemporary account of teleology in the philosophy of biology regards evolution by
natural selection as the ultimate source of “purposiveness”. Charles Darwin discovered in the
19th century that the complex phenotypical traits of organisms are the result of a process
involving inheritance, modification and differential survival and reproduction. Organisms inherit
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characteristics from their ancestors, but they are not perfect copies or reproductions, since there
are occasional random mutations. These modifications sometimes increase or decrease a
creature’s chances of surviving before it reproduces. Consequently, favorable modifications tend
to be maintained in—and unfavorable modifications tend to be filtered out from—populations of
reproducing organisms over time. As Darwin pointed out, the process is analogous to that of the
artificial selection of traits made by human breeders of domesticated animals and plants. The
difference is that the natural history of organisms involves no deliberate selection whatsoever.
Nonetheless, some variations are favored and others are filtered out as a matter of brute fact. This
is what Darwin called “natural selection”. Intelligence plays no role in the process, but the results
of the process often look as if they had been deliberately designed. We may say that biological
traits are “designed” by natural selection, as long as we keep in mind that this manner of
speaking, while useful in some contexts, is either merely figurative or has a technical meaning
that departs from the ordinary usage of ‘design’.
The process of evolution by natural selection explains how organisms and their traits
descend from common single-celled ancestors which did not have most of those traits. It explains
why creatures have eyes, hearts, kidneys, wings, hands, and so forth. The standard evolutionary
explanation is gradualist. Eyes are complex structures which are the result of cumulative small
changes—each of which was favorable—starting with simple mutations that made some skin
cells light-sensitive. There may also be non-gradual changes or “saltations”. But notice that the
selective process does not stop working once an organ has “fully” evolved. Even if the eyes of
many species have not changed in millions of years, their maintenance in the reproducing
population still requires explanation. Random mutations keep occurring and traits that are not
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continuously favored by natural selection tend to turn into vestigial traits and disappear over
time. This means that the maintenance over time and the current existence of a complex
functional trait in a population requires an explanation in terms of natural selection even if that
particular trait originally was the result of a non-gradual change.
Darwin lacked an adequate theory of inheritance. But his contemporary Gregor Mendel
discovered a crucial piece of the puzzle: there are units—now called “genes”—that are discretely
transmitted from parent organisms to their offspring and which play a crucial role in the
inheritance of phenotypical characteristics. Almost a century later, Francis Crick and James
Watson discovered the structure of the DNA molecules stored in cell’s chromosomes. This
helped to establish that genes are strings of DNA—instead of some kind of protein molecule, as
many expected at the time (Watson 1968: 12). The synthesis of evolutionary theory with
Mendelian genetics and eventually with molecular genetics has proven to be extremely fruitful.
Genetics not only contributes to the explanation of the underlying mechanisms involved in the
inheritance of phenotypical traits. It also contributes to the explanation of the phenotypical
variations required for evolution to take place. At least some of such variations result from
random mutations in strings of DNA. Molecular genetics also provides crucial evidence of the
common descent of existing organisms and their links in the tree of life. It must be mentioned,
however, that relatively recent research shows that genes are not the only factors involved in
heredity, so treating them as the single “unit of inheritance” is an oversimplification. Organisms
also inherit plenty of traits in non-genetic ways, ranging from the epigenetic inheritance of
cellular structures and molecular machinery (other than DNA) to the “cultural” inheritance of
behaviors that occurs even in simple organisms that are able to learn from their parents.67
67 See Sterelny and Griffiths (1999: Ch. 5) for a discussion of non-genetic forms of inheritance.
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A controversy in the field of evolutionary biology that is particularly relevant to the
philosophy of biology involves the “units of selection”. Classical Darwinism regards natural
selection as operating mainly at the level of individual organisms, regarded as the entities that
inherit traits and may succeed or fail to survive and reproduce. But some theorists—such as
George Williams (1966) and Richard Dawkins (1976)—propose that genes are the real units of
selection in biology. According to this view, the evolutionary process selects those genes that
have favorable phenotypical “expressions”—instead of those organisms that have favorable
traits. Genes are regarded as the main beneficiaries of the process. Other theorists propose that
natural selection operates at multiple levels. Richard Lewontin (1970), for example, suggests that
natural selection acts on any entities that display heredity, variation and differential fitness—
whether they happen to be genes, organisms, populations or even species. The etiological
account of functions discussed below works regardless of which of these views on the units of
selection turns out to be correct. While the way some versions are formulated does seem to make
assumptions about the units of selection, such assumptions can be easily avoided. As long as a
biological trait is the result of a selection process, the trait can have an etiological function. The
idea that selection processes also operate at the level of learning processes (discussed in Chapter
6) does assume a sort of multi-level view. However, it is worth noticing that even Dawkins—the
most vehement advocate of the gene-centered view—is open about natural selection operating on
more than one level. Indeed, he is known for proposing that there are units of cultural
inheritance, that he baptized as “memes”, which are also units of selection.
The idea behind the contemporary teleological account is that the process of natural
selection not only explains why biological items exist, but also what are their functions. An

165
influential philosophical defense of the account was offered by Larry Wright (1973). I will
briefly discuss his proposal before presenting the main current formulations of the view.

4.4 Wright’s Defense of Teleology
Wright suggested that the questions “What is the function of X?” and “Why do C’s have X?” are
both requests for “functional explanations” and that the answers to them are the same (Wright
1973: 155). For example, the basic common answer to “What is the function of the heart?” and
“Why do humans have a heart?” is “To pump blood” (Wright 1973: 155). Of course, a more
complete answer to the second question requires an evolutionary explanation: hearts have been
naturally selected in order to pump blood. This is precisely what Wright proposed (Wright 1973:
162-164). According to this account, a function depends on causal history or etiology:
“functional explanations... concern how the thing with the function got there... they are
etiological, which is to say «causal»...” (Wright 1973: 156). More specifically, what matters are
the effects of having X’s for ancestors—which Wright called “consequences”. We have hearts
because the hearts of our ancestors pumped blood, which contributed to their survival and
reproduction: “the consequences... must be invoked to explain why X is there” (Wright 1973:
162). Notice that this account does not rely on an Aristotelian view of teleology in terms of “final
causes”. There is nothing that may raise questions about “backward” causation in it. There is
only the “forward” or “efficient” causation involved in selective history. The effects of X can turn
into causes for X existing now precisely because they are past effects. This non-vicious circle is
made possible by the reproduction of traits. Nonetheless, the etiological account may be said to
make legitimate the teleological characterization of functions. According to Wright, his analysis
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“shows what it is about functions that is teleological... [it] provides an etiological rationale for
the functional «in order to»...” (Wright 1973: 162). So talk of hearts existing in order to pump
blood turns out to be correct if ‘in order to’ is understood etiologically.
Contemporary advocates of the etiological account often follow Wright in making use of
explicitly teleological language to characterize functions: the function of an item is said to be its
“purpose” or what it is “supposed” to do, which is a result of evolutionary “design”. The account
of functions itself is called “teleological”. However, the intended meanings of these words is
strictly etiological:
A thin form of teleological description can be grounded in a Darwinian view. For
example, the Darwinian can say that the function of a body part is the thing it
does that has led to its being favored by natural selection. In that thin sense, the
function is what that structure is ‘‘supposed’’ to do. This is a very deflationary
sense of ‘‘supposed to.’’ (Godfrey-Smith 2009: 13)
In fact, since the etiological account of functions is at odds with traditional teleological views,
some biologists prefer to use the word ‘teleonomy’ instead of ‘teleology’ in order to talk about
“those parts of traditional teleological thinking that can be given a foundation in the operation of
natural selection” (Godfrey-Smith 1996: 16). While the etiological account of functions is
sometimes called “teleonomic” in philosophical contexts, it is more often called “teleological”.
But the difference is merely terminological. I will here use ‘teleology’ and ‘teleonomy’ as
equivalent terms and I will use words like ‘purpose’, ‘supposed’, ‘in order to’ and ‘design’ in
their “thin”, strictly teleonomic or etiological, sense.
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Let me make another brief terminological remark. Current teleologists often call
functions “proper functions”. This is a technical term.68 The qualifier ‘proper’ is often intended to
distinguish the teleological notion of function from other ones, such as the causal-role or
dispositional one. While this usage is widespread, it also invites misinterpretation, since ‘proper’
contrasts with ‘improper’, yet it is unclear what an “improper function” would be. I will simply
use the word ‘function’ or the longer ‘etiological function’ or ‘historical function’ when context
may require disambiguation. The qualifiers ‘etiological’ and ‘historical’ contrast with ‘nonetiological’ and ‘ahistorical’, which properly apply to alternative notions of function. The word
‘proper’ is best used to qualify performances of a function. An item may be said to perform
properly or improperly its function. Notice how odd it would sound to say that an item performs
properly its proper function.
While some aspects of Wright’s analysis have been rejected by later teleologists, the core
etiological point of the proposal as I described it above remains the same. But Wright actually
did more than define functions etiologically. He suggested that the two conditions for Z to be the
function of X are: “(a) X is there because it does Z” and “(b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X’s
being there” (Wright 1973: 161). While the first condition is clearly intended to be historical—
although it should be rephrased as ‘X is there because past X’s did Z’—the second condition
requires X to presently do Z. However, suppose that an organism has a kidney that does not work.
The kidney is there because the kidneys of ancestors of the organism filtered blood. It is there in
order to filter blood. Yet this particular kidney does not filter blood. Wright argued, correctly,
that in such a case there is still a functional explanation of X being there, so X does have the
function of doing Z; but he also claimed that this “departs from the paradigms in a systematic but
68 The term was coined originally by Millikan (1984). But has since been used by many other authors.
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intelligible way” and that the word ‘function’ should be italicized “to make its use plausible and
appropriate” in cases where an X fails to do Z (Wright 1973: 167). This is because in such cases
the second condition he proposed for having a function is not met.
Current teleological accounts of functions draw a very different conclusion than Wright
did: biological items that fail to perform their functions have these functions in the exact same
way as those that succeed in performing them. Current versions rely merely on an etiological
condition. The two main formulations of the current teleological account are those offered by
Karen Neander (1991 & 1995) and Ruth Millikan (1984 & 1993). I will present their accounts
and discuss along the way some qualifications proposed by Paul Griffiths (1993) and Peter
Godfrey-Smith (1994).

4.5 Neander’s Proposal
According to Neander, biological functions are “effects for which traits were selected by natural
selection” (Neander 1991: 174). She offers the following more detailed definition:
It is the/a proper function of an item (X) of an organism (0) to do that which items
of X’s type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of 0’s ancestors, and which
caused the genotype, of which X is the phenotypic expression, to be selected by
natural selection. (Neander 1991: 174)
Neander is interested specifically in the biological notion of function. But she suggests that the
broader definition of function that applies also to non-biological items such as artifacts also relies
on selection (Neander 1991: 175). This matches Wright’s claim that the functions of artifacts
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result from “conscious consequence-selection”, while those of biology result from natural
selection (Wright 1973: 163-164). Neander follows Wright in arguing that what is peculiar to
biological functions is that they are determined by natural selection. But notice that her
definition—unlike Wright’s—does not even mention what items presently do. In fact, Neander
explicitly denies that the functions of biological traits are defined by anything other than their
evolutionary history:
[For] a trait to have a proper function is not for it presently to have any actual
causal role... or disposition. Instead, a trait has a proper function if there is
something that it is supposed to do. According to my etiological theory, a trait is
supposed to do whatever it was selected for by natural selection... Functional
norms seem to be determined by a history of selection... (Neander 1991: 183)
The basic idea is that biological functions are not what items do, but what they are supposed to
do given their selective history. The main advantage of this view—which accounts for its
popularity in the philosophy of biology—is that it is able to account for malfunctioning: “It is the
function of kidneys... to filter wastes from blood because that is what kidneys did in ancestral
organisms that caused them to be favored by natural selection... and this fact remains true even if
renal failure becomes universal” (Neander 1991: 183).
A failing kidney is malfunctioning or failing to perform its function. But this requires it to
have the function of filtering blood. Otherwise, it would not be failing to perform it. If X’s having
the function to do Z requires in any way that X actually does Z, then there is no room for
characterizing X as malfunctioning when it does not do Z. What this shows, Neander points out,

170
is that the notion of a biological function is a “normative notion” and that “a normative notion is
not ahistorical” (Neander 1991: 168). The sense in which functions are “normative” obviously is
not the strong prescriptive sense: kidneys do not have an “obligation” or “duty” to filter blood.
Rather, it is a weaker teleonomic sense: kidneys are “supposed” to filter blood because kidneys
were naturally selected for filtering blood—so if they fail to filter blood, they fail to do what
explains what they were selected for. But having a biological function must be “normative” in
this “thin” sense, since otherwise malfunctioning would not be even possible. Neander’s main
argument for the etiological account of biological functions is that only a historical account can
be “normative” in the required sense and properly characterize malfunctioning.
Neander sometimes characterizes natural selection as proportionally increasing the
distribution of genes and their phenotypic expressions in a population (Neander 1991: 174). But
Griffiths warns that proportional increase should not be a requirement. Populations often have
various competing traits, some of which have a reduced number in the population, which anyway
are there due to natural selection; so Griffiths argues that the function of a trait is simply what it
has been selected for, independently of any proportional increase (Griffiths 1993: 414). Of
course, many traits do proportionally increase due to natural selection. Griffiths qualification is
simply that this should not be built into the etiological account of functions. Griffiths proposes
the following definition of biological function:
Where i is a trait of systems of type S, a proper function of i in S’s is F iff a
selective explanation of the current non-zero proportion of S’s with i must cite F
as a component in the fitness conferred by i. (Griffiths 1993: 415)
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Notice that this definition explicitly requires selection to account only for the current existence of
a trait, regardless of how many members of a population have the trait. Another difference with
Neander’s definition is that Griffiths’ “leaves implicit various points about the gene/phenotype
relation” (Griffiths 1993: 415). This is an advantage given that there is debate in biology about
the precise details of such relation (Griffiths 1993: 416). Neander’s formulation seems to assume
the controversial view that genes are the single units of selection. But this unnecessary
commitment is easily avoided. In any case, Griffiths intends his definition to apply exclusively to
biological functions. The only kind of selection he has in mind is natural selection.

4.6 Millikan’s Proposal
Millikan offers a more ambitious etiological account of functions that is even more general than
Griffiths’ variant and is intended to apply not only to innately determined functions, but also to
the functions of any items that result from the interaction between the innate mechanisms of an
organism and its environment, as well as functions of items such as cultural artifacts and words
of human natural languages which, Millikan argues, have selective histories even though they are
not histories of natural selection operating over innate traits. In this section, I will focus on how
her account applies to biological functions.
Millikan distinguishes between what she calls “direct proper functions” and “derived
proper functions” (Millikan 1984: Ch. 1 & 2)—which I will simply call “direct” and “derived”
functions. Her account of direct functions basically matches Neander’s and Griffiths’ accounts
when applied to biological items. Although she introduces some interesting qualifications, the
idea roughly is that an item’s function is determined by its selective history. Her account of
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derived functions, in contrast, goes beyond: it allows for the ascription of functions to the
products of selected mechanisms—products that have not been selected themselves, although
they are the result of selected items which have the direct function of producing them.
I will first present Millikan’s account of direct functions and then elaborate on her
account of derived functions. An item A has a direct function to perform F, Millikan suggests, if
and only if:
A originated as a “reproduction” (to give one example, as a copy, or a copy of a
copy) of some prior item or items that, due in part to possession of the properties
reproduced, have actually performed F in the past, and A exists because (causally
historically because) of this or these performances. (Millikan 1993: 13)
Notice that Millikan does not explicitly mention natural selection or even selection of any kind
here. Nonetheless, her definition of function clearly captures the basic features of the etiological
account and is intended to rely precisely on selective processes. First, the direct function of an
item depends on the causal history that explains why the item exists. As Millikan points out, her
account “looks to the history of an item to determine its function rather than to the item’s present
properties or dispositions.” (Millikan 1993: 13). This is intended to provide an account of
functions that allows for things being able to have them even when they fail to perform them.
Second, the relevant causal history is one that involves the reproduction of items—where
reproduction is understood as a physical process that generates similar copies of the items.
Consider a series of similar items, I1, I2, I3,... In, were each successive item is a reproduction or
copy of the previous one. According to Millikan, the members of this series form a
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“reproductively established family” (Millikan 1984: 18-25). The links between the members of
such a family are causal, so two items do not belong to the same family merely because of
resembling each other. Of course, two items can be members of the same family because they
have a common ancestor: the causal links of reproduction typically produce family trees.
Millikan’s proposal is that an item A has performing F as a direct function when (1) A is a
member of a reproductively established family, (2) some ancestors of A in the family actually
performed F and (3) A exists because of this. If A is a biological trait, the causal-historical
explanation of why it exists in virtue of its ancestors performing F is provided by natural
selection: performing F contributed to the ancestors’ survival and reproduction, so the trait that
allowed the ancestors to perform F was passed on to their descendants in the family.
What kinds of items are members of a reproductively established family? Genes are a
clear example. Each token gene is literally a copy or reproduction of ancestor genes of the same
type. The function of a token gene is to do whatever the ancestors in its lineage did that explains
why the lineage has survived and, consequently, why the token gene exists. But what about
phenotypic traits such as organs and innate behaviors? Neither of them are direct copies of
previous organs or innate behaviors. Millikan draws a distinction between “first-order” and
“higher-order” reproductively established families to clarify this issue (Millikan 1984: 23-25).
Genes belong to first-order families, while organs and innate behaviors belong to higher-order
families, since they are only reproduced via the reproduction of genes. For example: “although
my heart is not a copy of my parents’ hearts, it was produced... in accordance with the proper
functions of certain of my genes which were directly copied from my parents’ genes” (Millikan
1984: 25). This means that hearts do belong to reproductively established families—they are
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reproduced items—and that their function is to do what their (higher-order) ancestors did which
explains why they exist (the full explanation, of course, has to include the selection of genes).
The same considerations apply to innate behaviors such as sneezing. The functions of organs and
innate behaviors are direct functions: “the sorts of purposes that we ordinarily attribute to
biological devices such as hearts and inherited behaviors are direct proper functions, granted that
our guesses about the evolutionary histories of these devices are correct—our guesses about their
«reasons for survival»” (Millikan 1984: 28).69
As formulated, the account attributes functions to reproduced items that exist because
they have been historically selected to perform certain tasks. But without some further
qualification, this account seems to have a problem with vestigial items. The same may be said
of Neander’s account. Consider the vestigial eyes of mole rats. Mole rats live underground and
are blind. But they still have vestigial eyes, although completely covered by a layer of skin. Now
consider the malformed eyes of an individual blind rabbit. The explanation of why the eyes of a
mole rat and the blind rabbit exist involves the evolutionary history of their ancestors, whose
eyes were selected for seeing. In the case of the blind rabbit, the etiological account explains why
the eyes are failing to do what they are supposed to. That is the main virtue of the account over
non-historical ones. But the account seems to wrongly imply that the eyes of the mole rat are also
failing to do what they are supposed to. The solution to this problem relies on the fact that natural
selection is not only responsible for the formation of a trait, but also for its maintenance.
Millikan does point out that “the main business of natural selection is steady maintenance of
69 Millikan’s account of higher-order reproductively established families does seem to be effective in including
phenotypical traits. But notice that her discussion seems to assume a gene-centered view of natural selection.
Why not treat hearts as reproduced or inherited items on their own right? Why should genes be regarded as the
first-order reproduced items?
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useful traits against new intruders in the gene pool” (Millikan 1989: 173). However, this feature
is not part of her definition of direct functions. Godfrey-Smith argues that the historically recent
maintenance of a trait by natural selection is “important enough to make this a constitutive part
of the concept of function” (Godfrey-Smith 1994: 356). He proposes a “modern history” account
according to which biological functions are “dispositions or effects a trait has which explain the
recent maintenance of the trait under natural selection” (Godfrey-Smith 1994: 356). This
qualification allows the etiological account to distinguish vestigial from non-vestigial traits. The
eyes of the mole rat—unlike those of the blind rabbit—have not been recently maintained by
natural selection for seeing, so they do no have a function that they are failing to perform.
Millikan argues that items can have functions even if they have not been selected: these
are not direct functions but derived functions. An item A has a derived function to perform F,
Millikan suggests, if and only if:
A originated as the product of some prior device that, given its circumstances, had
performance of F as a proper function and that, under those circumstances,
normally causes F to be performed by means of producing an item like A.
(Millikan 1993: 13-14)
Millikan’s account of derived functions is intended to illuminate how things that are “new under
the sun”, which do not have a selective history of their own, can nonetheless sometimes have
biological functions (Millikan 1984: 45). The functions of these items are derived from the direct
functions of mechanisms that have been selected precisely for producing them. The account of
derived functions is also etiological, since it is firmly grounded on selective history.
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Millikan uses the example of chameleons’ camouflage to illustrate the need for an
etiological account of derived functions (Millikan 1984: Ch. 2). Chameleons have mechanisms
that allow them to rearrange the pigment patterns of their skin. Some species—such as Smith’s
dwarf chameleon—use their ability to change color as camouflage: they change their color so
that it matches the color of their background, making them less visible to predators. Now
suppose that a chameleon sits on a surface with a color pattern that none of its ancestors has ever
encountered before. Presumably, the resulting color pattern of the chameleon is supposed to
match the color of the surface it is sitting on, thereby making it less vulnerable to predators. But
an orthodox etiological account apparently cannot account for this. This particular background
pattern has not been encountered before, so there cannot be any selective history determining
specifically that the pigment pattern of the chameleon’s skin is supposed to match it. GodfreySmith explains the problem by distinguishing between innate mechanisms or structures and the
states that they produce:
It is one thing to say that a mechanism has a biological function, and another to
say that a particular state of this mechanism has a function... Structural features...
are products of an evolutionary history, a history of heritable variation in fitness.
But states... are not the right sort of things to have such a history... A state may or
may not profit an organism, but its nature is not the product of the success of
previous states of the same type, and has no propensity to lead to the future
survival and proliferation of the type. (Godfrey-Smith 1989: 542)
It seems that the states produced by innate mechanisms cannot have etiological functions.
However, some states produced by some innate mechanisms prima facie seem to have purposes.
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Presumably, the entirely new pigment pattern of the chameleon has the purpose of making the
chameleon less visible to predators by making it blend with its surroundings. The phenomenon
of camouflage is widespread in the animal kingdom. Animals often have color patterns that make
them less visible to predators or prey. When such a color pattern is fixed—as it is in most cases—
the orthodox etiological account has no problem explaining why the pattern has a function: it is a
phenotypical trait that has been naturally selected for camouflage purposes. Yet, the non-fixed
and variable color patterns of some species of chameleon, octopus and cuttlefish also have
camouflage purposes, which must be somehow the result of the evolutionary history of these
species.
Millikan’s account of derived functions expands the etiological account to explain how
the products of innate mechanisms can indeed have functions. Even if the entirely new color
pattern of a chameleon cannot itself have been specifically selected, the mechanisms responsible
for the pigment rearrangement have been naturally selected for producing variable color patterns
to match variable backgrounds. Protecting the chameleon from predators by making it blend with
its current background is a direct function of the mechanisms. This function is performed by
means of producing states of a certain general type: skin color patterns that match the color
patterns of the background. The state of the chameleon sitting on a background not encountered
before by its ancestors is precisely of this general type. The evolutionary explanation of why the
mechanisms exist explains why the new pattern of skin color exists. It also explains its function:
the purpose of the pattern is to make the chameleon less visible. While the state has not been
selected for performing this function, it nonetheless has a function that is derived from the
selected or direct function of the mechanism that produces it (Millikan 1984: 39-45).
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Millikan’s account of derived functions has a crucial application in the explanation of the
functions of non-innate states and behaviors that are the combined result of the innate
mechanisms of an individual organism and its interaction with its environment. Consider the
following case: “If a rat becomes ill within a few hours after eating a specific food, it will later
shun all foods that taste the same. For example, if the rat eats soap and soon becomes ill,
thereafter it will refuse to eat soap.” (Millikan 1993: 224). The mechanism responsible for this
behavior is innate. It was selected because it sometimes made ancestor rats avoid poisonous
foods. The mechanism has the direct function of preventing poisoning. However, the specific
flavors avoided by an individual rat will depend on the rats’ experience: the rat learns to avoid
them after becoming ill. This learning is the result of the interaction between a specific innate
mechanism and the rat’s experience. The rat cannot learn, for example, to avoid foods that
“merely look the same or that are found in the same place as the food eaten prior to illness”
(Millikan 1993: 224-225). The learned behavior has not been itself naturally selected, yet it is the
product of a naturally selected innate mechanism “designed” to enable the rat to learn to avoid
eating certain foods. The learned or acquired behavior and the inner states in the rat’s nervous
system responsible for it have a function or purpose. When a rat has learned to avoid eating soaptasting substances, its behavior and the inner states that cause this behavior have the function of
preventing poisoning. Yet neither the behavior nor the inner state has a history of selection of its
own. Millikan’s account of derived functions provides a compelling explanation how such
learned or acquired states and behaviors can have etiologically grounded functions. They have
functions derived from the direct functions of the learning mechanisms that exist in order to
produce them in response to variable environmental circumstances (Millikan 1993: 225-228).
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4.7 Biological Functions and Causal Roles
The claim that functions are determined by history may be initially counterintuitive. Let us
consider two cases presented by Neander as alleged counterexamples to the etiological account
of functions. The first is the case of William Harvey’s discovery of the function of the heart two
centuries before Darwin’s discovery of the process of natural selection. Since Harvey had no
historical notion of the origins of hearts, it may be argued that the function he discovered cannot
be etiological (Neander 1991: 189). The second is a thought experiment: suppose that lions came
to exist instantly a few minutes ago by a purely accidental arrangement of molecules. The organs
of “instant lions” cannot have etiological functions, since they do not have any selective history,
but it looks like they have functions nonetheless (Neander 1991: 189). The advocate of the
etiological analysis has compelling replies to these alleged counterexamples. But let us explore
for a moment the alternative view. What could be the ahistorical functions of the organs of
instant lions and the function discovered by Harvey if it were not a historical function?
The main ahistorical naturalistic alternative to the etiological account is the view that
functions are defined by the causal roles that items play within larger systems. The chief
proponent of the view is Robert Cummins, who argues that the function of an item is its causal
contribution to some overall capacity of the system of which it is a part. He proposes the
following definition:
x functions as a ф in s (or: the function of x in s is to ф) relative to an analytical
account A of s’s capacity to ψ just in case x is capable of ф-ing in s and A
appropriately and adequately accounts for s’s capacity to ψ by, in part, appealing
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to the capacity of x to ф in s. (Cummins 1975: 762)
Cummins idea is that an overall capacity of a complex system is explained by decomposing the
system into its various parts, showing what each of these parts does and how the combination of
the contributions of each of the parts accounts for how the system as a whole is able to have the
analyzed capacity. Cummins calls this kind of explanation “functional analysis”. A clear
illustration of functional analysis, he suggests, is provided by the schematic diagrams used in
electronics: “Since each symbol represents any physical object whatever having a certain
capacity, a schematic diagram of a complex device constitutes an analysis of the electronic
capacities of the device as a whole into the capacities of its components.” (Cummins 1975: 760).
Here is a simple example: the function of each of the diodes in a circuit that turns alternate
current (AC) into direct current (DC) is to allow the flow of electricity in only one direction,
while the function of the capacitor is to smooth the peeks of voltage that result from the
rectification performed by the diodes (the diodes only make one of the outputs always positive
and the other always negative, but they do not remove the cyclical variations in voltage); the
overall capacity of the circuit is explained by the causal contributions made by each of these
components and how they are arranged.
According to Cummins, the explanation of the functions of biological organs is also
provided by a functional analysis: “It is appropriate to say that the heart functions as a pump
against the background of an analysis of the circulatory system’s capacity to transport food,
oxygen, wastes, and so on, which appeals to the fact that the heart is capable of pumping.”
(Cummins 1975: 762). In this example, the overall capacity to be analyzed is the circulatory
system’s capacity to circulate blood and thereby transport nutrients, oxygen, waste, hormones,
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etc., to and from cells throughout the body. It is simply undeniable that this capacity of the
circulatory system is the result of the interlocking capacities of its parts and that the specific
contribution of the heart is that it works as a pump in the system. An analysis of how the
circulatory system works (when it works properly) must surely have the basic features of a
Cummins-style functional analysis. Consequently, it has to be acknowledged that the idea that
functions are causal roles played within a system has some initial plausibility.
Let us consider the two alleged counterexamples to the etiological account presented by
Neander: Harvey’s discovery of the function of the heart and “instant lions”. It may be argued
that the function discovered by Harvey was merely a causal-role function—since he knew
nothing of evolutionary history—and that this illustrates what kind of functional explanation is
really employed in physiology. This is a rather weak argument. But many philosophers who are
skeptical about the etiological account seem to share the intuitions that support it. Similarly, it
may be argued that the organs of instant lions have causal-role functions. A functional analysis
will reveal that their kidneys have the function of filtering blood, their hearts have the function of
pumping blood, and so forth. The etiological account cannot attribute functions to instant lions,
but the causal-role account does not have this limitation. Indeed, the functions ascribed by the
causal-role account to instant lions are the same it ascribes to real lions. These points give
reasons to favor the causal-role account over the etiological account to those who have the
intuitions that Harvey discovered all about the function of the heart and that the organs of instant
lions really would have the same biological functions as those of real lions. What can the
advocate of the etiological account reply?
The first point to notice is that the advocate of the etiological account can and should
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accept that Harvey did discover the contributions of the heart (when it is functioning properly) to
the circulatory system and that the causal-roles of the organs of instant lions would indeed be
those ascribed by a Cummins-style functional analysis if such creatures suddenly came to exist.
The second point to notice is that the causal-roles of organs do play a crucial explanatory role in
the etiological account as well, although with an important qualification. The causal-roles of
properly working hearts within the circulatory systems of ancestors, for example, are what
explain why their descendants have hearts. The hearts of present day creatures are there only
because the hearts of past creatures pumped blood and contributed to the circulation of nutrients,
oxygen and waste, which thereby contributed to their survival and reproduction, leading to the
genes for hearts being passed on to their descendants. The etiological account does not require a
heart to presently pump blood in order to have the function of pumping blood. This is the main
disagreement between etiological and purely causal-role accounts. But a causal-role analysis is
anyway already part of the etiological account of what has been selected by natural selection.
The crucial debate is not whether causal-roles matter, but whether the purely causal-role
account is the proper account of biological functions. Cummins explicitly denies that the
evolutionary history of an organ defines its function and argues that the function of an organ
depends on its current dispositions:
[If] the function of something in a system s is to pump, then it must be capable of
pumping in s. Thus... to attribute a function to something is, in part, to attribute a
disposition to it. If the function of x in s to ф, then x has a disposition to ф in s.
(Cummins 1975: 757-758).
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If the kidneys of an instant lion have the disposition to filter blood and thereby contribute to the
capacities of its circulatory and urinary systems, this is their biological function according to
Cummins. This would be an advantage over the etiological account if the intuition that the
kidneys of instant lions have the biological function of filtering blood were correct. However,
that intuition is highly suspicious and, more importantly, the causal-role account has a major
drawback that outstrips any advantages it may seem to have over the etiological account.
By requiring an item to actually have a causal role or disposition in order to have a
function, the causal-role account cannot explain what would it be for the item to malfunction or
fail to perform its function. Consider a real lion—i.e., not an “instant lion”—with a non-working
kidney that does not have a disposition to filter blood. Surely the kidney is malfunctioning. But
according to the causal-role analysis this kidney does not have the function to filter blood to
begin with, since it has no such disposition. I take it that most advocates of the causal-role
analysis of functions accept that evolutionary history explains why real lions have kidneys. What
they deny is that this is what defines the function of kidneys. Regarding Harvey’s discovery, they
may want to say that what Harvey discovered is the function of the heart, while Darwin merely
discovered the historical origins of the heart. However, by denying that evolutionary history
defines the functions of organs and other biological traits, the causal-role account is simply
unable to characterize them as malfunctioning or failing to perform their functions, as Neander
(1991 & 1995), Millikan (1993 & 1999) and others have emphasized.
How can the etiological account handle the alleged counterexamples? Regarding “instant
lions”, the etiological account must claim that their organs do not have functions of the sort that
allow for ascriptions of malfunctioning. When a real lion’s kidneys do not filter blood properly
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or at all, they are failing or malfunctioning because they have been selected for filtering blood.
When an instant lion’s kidneys do not filter blood, they are not malfunctioning, since they are not
supposed to filter blood to begin with. Surely we should say, when they do filter blood, that they
have this causal-role. This is true of both real and instant lions. But the purely causal-role
account is wrong to characterize the functions of the organs of real lions in the same way as
those of the organs of instant lions. As Neander points out, “theories which imply that instant
lions... would have proper [biological] functions do not capture the distinction between what an
item does and what it is supposed to do...” (Neander 1991: 180). Consequently, “wayward
intuitions about instant lions might have to be revised in the light of the fact that biology has and
needs a notion of a «proper function» that is normative” (Neander 1991: 180). There is the
intuition some people have that the organs of instant lions would have the same functions as
those of real lions. But there is also the strong intuition that things that have functions in some
sense have “purposes”: that they are “supposed” to perform their functions but may “fail” to do
so. The dilemma is that an account of the nature of functions cannot be consistent with both
intuitions. The only way out of the dilemma that preserves the second intuition is to revise the
first one. While the traditional teleological intuition was associated with notions that are
incompatible with naturalism, the etiological account is not. So a firm commitment to naturalism
does not provide any reason to favor a causal-role account over an etiological one.
Regarding Harvey’s discovery, what the etiologist must say is that he indeed discovered
what hearts do when they function properly—which, unknown to him, turned out to be also what
hearts have been naturally selected for doing. That Harvey did not know about natural selection
is irrelevant to the issue of the nature of biological functions (Neander 1991: 175-176; Millikan
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1993: 15). Just like Mendel discovered genes without having a clue about their underlying nature
as strings of DNA, Harvey discovered the function of the heart without having a clue about its
underlying etiological nature. The intuition that what he discovered was merely a causal-role
function is simply wrong. The etiological functions of items are first identified by the causalroles of normal well-functioning samples. As Neander points out, this is how physiology works:
“The

primary

physiological

analysis

necessarily

abstracts

away

from

maladaptive

environments... and the infinite possible pathways of pathology... by describing what the
components do when they are functioning properly.” (Neander 1995: 117-118). Harvey
abstracted away from failing hearts and thereby described how hearts work when functioning
properly. That hearts are supposed to pump blood, however, can only follow from some
teleological or teleonomic account of biological functions. Harvey himself was a teleologist,
likely of the theological kind (Neander 1991: 176). So he likely thought he had discovered what
hearts are supposed to do given their intelligent design. If this is the case, then we have to say
that he was wrong about the source of natural teleology. The heart is indeed supposed to pump
blood, but this is because it has been naturally selected to do so.

4.8 Conclusion
The etiological account relies on the selective history that accounts for the existence of trait in
order to explain its function. The crucial advantage of this account over dispositionalist
alternatives is that it offers a fully naturalistic account of what an item is supposed to do and
what counts as malfunctioning or failing to perform its function. It is this feature that is of
interest to semantics. Teleosemantic theories promise to explain the nature of meanings in a way
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that offers a naturalistic solution to problems of misrepresentation. I will discuss the main
available teleosemantic approaches in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5:
Standard Teleosemantics

5.1 Introduction
The etiological account of functions discussed in Chapter 4 has the crucial advantage over
dispositionalist alternatives of offering a fully naturalistic account of malfunctioning.
Teleosemantic theories exploit this feature to offer a fully naturalistic account of the “normative”
character of meanings. If symbols or representations have etiological functions that determine
how they are supposed to be used, then they can be said to have meanings that are independent
of their current uses. When a representation or symbol is not deployed the way that accounts for
its existence, such deployment can be characterized as a misuse. In this chapter I will discuss in
depth the main teleosemantic approaches, including those that focus on the effects of
representations to explain their meanings, and those that focus on their causes. I will argue that
each of these approaches has insights but also drawbacks and that a hybrid account that explains
meanings in terms of both the inputs and outputs of representations is needed. I will start with a
discussion of indicator or informational theories of meaning and the problem of
misrepresentation they face—which is a major motivation for favoring a teleosemantic account.

5.2 Indicator or Informational Semantics
According to indicator or informational semantics, the meanings of symbols or representations
are basically their referential properties, which are determined by their direct causal links to
reality. More specifically, the relevant links are alleged to involve reliable causation. A symbol
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or representation is claimed to refer to what reliably causes tokens of it. Consider the reliable
causal correlation between smoke and fire or between the rings of a tree and its age. Smoke and
tree rings can be said to “carry natural information about” or “indicate” the presence of fire and
the age of trees, respectively, because of the law-like correlations involved. Similarly, a token
representation is said to indicate or carry natural information about the presence of those things
which its type is lawfully or nomically linked to. This is a very demanding requirement for
indicating or carrying information. Dretske, for example, proposes: “A signal r carries the
information that s is F = The conditional probability of s’s being F, given r... is 1” (Dretske
1981: 65). Suppose that r is a perceptually induced mental state that represents that something is
a horse—say, the word ‘horse’ in an agent’s language of thought. Dretske’s requirement entails
that an actual horse must always be present when ‘horse’ is tokened for ‘horse’ to carry
information about or indicate specifically horses.
An obvious problem is that the indicator theory, even if it worked, would only apply to
perceptually induced representations: what about the stimulus-independent tokens of ‘horse’?
The indicator theory is at best incomplete and needs to be complemented with an account of how
the meanings of stimulus-independent tokens derive from the meanings of stimulus-dependent
tokens (Devitt and Sterelny 1999: 157). Another problem is that the indicator theory only applies
to symbol or representation types that have direct links to reality: what about words like the
‘bachelor’—and their mental counterparts—whose meanings depend on those of other words?
This is a problem of scope: the theory does not have the generality required to provide us with a
theory of meaning that covers all kinds of word (Devitt and Sterelny 1999: 156). These problems
may be solved by restricting the indicator theory to a theory of stimulus-dependent meaning and
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combining it with other theories that provide the missing explanations. However, the indicator
theory faces a serious problem that undermines its account of stimulus-dependent meanings. As
Godfrey-Smith points out: “informational semantics has been hounded by a problem with error...
and no other problem has hounded the theory so persistently” (Godfrey-Smith 1989: 533-534).
Stimulus-dependent tokens of ‘horse’ are not only caused by horses, but also by a number of
horse-looking things, such as distant cows or muddy zebras. A token of ‘horse’ caused by a
muddy zebra is being misused: this is a clear case of misrepresentation. But the word ‘horse’ is
causally linked to all of these things, so the indicator theory wrongly entails that it must mean
“horse or distant cow or muddy zebra or...”. The indicator theory cannot characterize misuses as
misuses: it must characterize tokens of ‘horse’ caused by muddy zebras as correct uses of the
word. As Godfrey-Smith points out, the problem is the following:
[Any] environmental state that can cause a representation token is included in the
class of environmental states informationally linked to that representation type.
Anything that can cause you to think ‘Horse!’ contributes to the content of that
representation type, and as a result error is impossible. (Godfrey-Smith 1989:
537)
Fodor attempts to overcome the problem by invoking an alleged “asymmetric dependence” of
incorrect uses on correct uses: “the fact that cows cause one to say ‘horse’ depends on the fact
that horses do; but the fact that horses cause one to say ‘horse’ does not depend on the fact that
[cows] do” (Fodor 1987: 108). The basic idea is that the meaning fixing law-like regularity
underlying the use of a symbol is exclusively the one that is not asymmetrically dependent on
other regularities. Fodor thinks that this simple proposal shows why ‘horse’ applies correctly to

190
horses and not muddy zebras. While ingenious, however, this suggestion does not truly avoid the
problem. Why should we suppose that the most basic regularity is precisely the one linking
‘horse’ with horses? It seems rather that the most basic regularity is the one linking ‘horse’ with
horse-looking things, of which actual horses, distant cows and muddy zebras are all instances
(Godfrey-Smith 1989: 539-540; Devitt and Sterelny 1999: 159-160).
The indicator theory, while initially attractive, does not have the resources to make room
for misrepresentation. The problem arises due to the dispositionalist character of the theory: x
being reliably caused by y is an actual disposition governing occurrences of x. As Saul Kripke
argues, dispositionalist theories of meaning constitution cannot properly account for
misrepresentation, since the users of representations often have dispositions to make mistakes
while using them and often lack the dispositions to correctly deploy them (Kripke 1982: 28-35).
A theory that reduces meanings to the actual regularities or dispositions underlying the uses of
representations cannot avoid the problem of error. As I argued in Chapter 3, this is the case for
Horwich’s account of the meanings of words in terms of law-like regularities involving the
acceptance of basic sentences containing them. This is also the case for the indicator account of
the meanings of representations in terms of their reliable causes.
Notice the affinity between the indicator theory and the causal-role account of functions
discussed above. They are both dispositionalist and have analogous problems: one cannot
account for misrepresenting and the other cannot account for malfunctioning. Indeed, the
indicator theory may be regarded as adopting the causal-role account of functions and identifying
meanings with a part of those functions. The causal-role of a representation in a cognitive system
includes not only its causes, but also its effects—which are crucial in the explanation of the
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contribution of the representation to the systems’ overall capacities. Clearly, the indicator theory
does not identify meanings with the complete causal-roles of representations. However, the
indicator theory does identify meanings with the (distally characterized) causes of
representations, which are part of their causal-roles: the part that allegedly fixes their meanings
or contents. When seen this way, the indicator theory’s problem of error turns out to be an
instance of the broader problem of malfunctioning that undermines causal-role accounts of
functions. On the other hand, the etiological account of functions is tailored to make room for
malfunctioning and it is precisely an alternative to dispositionalism. This suggests that the
problem of error that undermines the indicator theory may be overcome by adopting an
etiological account of functions.

5.3 Teleosemantics and Indication
The simplest teleosemantic proposal is to combine indication with an etiological account of
functions. Dretske (1988), for example, modifies his previous indicator theory precisely in this
way. According to his amended version, “the meaning or representational content of an element
is what it has the function of indicating rather than what it actually succeeds in indicating”
(Dretske 1988: 151). The idea is that the meaning of an item depends on what it is supposed to
indicate—in the teleological sense of “supposed”. This combination of teleology an indication is
meant to allow for indication relations fixing the meanings of representations while making room
for representations sometimes failing to indicate. I will discuss this form of teleosemantics and
the problems it faces before exploring other versions of teleosemantics that depart further from
the indicator theory.
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Dretske offers a historical explanation of why the function of a representation is to
indicate something. His explanation takes into account both the causes and the effects of
representations. The crucial effects of representations, he reasonably argues, are their behavioral
effects. Representations allow organisms to behave in ways that are appropriate responses to
their surroundings. According to Dretske, representations are able to do this because they are
able to carry information about those surroundings. The causal relation between a representation
C and the behavior M it elicits, Dretske argues, must be explained by the meaning of C which in
turn, he argues, “will have to be explained by the fact that C indicates, or has the function of
indicating, how things stand elsewhere in the world” (Dretske 1988: 84). But why is the function
of C to indicate something? Dretske argues that C has this function because of what it has been
recruited to do: “Once C is recruited as a cause of M—and recruited as a cause of M because of
what it indicates about F—C acquires, thereby, the function of indicating F.” (Dretske 1988: 84).
Whether “indicating”—in Dretske’s sense—can indeed be a function is something I will discuss
after presenting the view in more detail.
Dretske’s account of recruitment is historical. A simple example is provided by artifacts.
Consider a thermostat that turns on the heating in a room when the temperature drops. Here M is
the heating turning on, C is the state of the thermostat that causes M, and F is the drop in
temperature that causes C. The function of C is to indicate F, Dretske suggests, because it has
been recruited for this job: the system has been intentionally designed for F to reliably cause C
and C to reliably cause M (Dretske 1988: 86-89). But how can we extend this kind of account
beyond the case of intentional design?
Consider the hair triggers used by the Venus flytrap (a carnivorous plant) to detect that an
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insect has landed on it. When an insect touches twice any of the hair triggers in a leaf within a
short time interval, the plant snaps together the two halves of the leaf, trapping the insect
between them (when successful). Dretske comments on this example:
[Here] leaf movement (M) is caused by an internal state (C) that signals the
occurrence of a particular kind of movement, the kind of movement that is
normally produced by some digestible prey. And there is every reason to think
that this internal trigger was selected for its job because of what it indicated...
(Dretske 1988: 90; emphasis added)
Dretske suggests that the same kind of the explanation applies whenever a representation is
innately linked to an instinctive behavior. For example, when noctuid moths detect the highfrequency sounds normally produced by echolocating bats approaching to prey on them, they
swerve away. Moths’ bat-detectors (C) were selected for triggering the avoidance behavior (M),
Dretske argues, because they normally indicated that bats were approaching (F) (Dretske 1988:
91). Dretske’s suggestion is that whenever the instinctive behaviors of an organism are innately
triggered by perceptual mechanisms or states, natural selection is responsible for recruiting such
mechanisms or states as indicators: “What the theory of evolution has to tell us about these
cases... is that... M is produced by an indicator of F because such an arrangement confers a
competitive advantage on its possessor.” (Dretske 1988: 92). 70 Once an item has been recruited
for this job by natural selection, Dretske argues, it has the biological function of indicating:
If we suppose that, through selection, an internal indicator acquired (over many

70 Dretske does not discuss the distinction between mechanisms and states. So it is not entirely clear what is his
precise account of what is selected. See Godfrey-Smith (1989) for a critical discussion of this issue.
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generations) a biological function, the function to indicate something about the
animal’s surroundings, then we can say that this internal structure represents (or
misrepresents, as the case may be) external affairs. (Dretske 1988: 94)
If indicating is a teleonomic function, then items that have this function can fail to perform it. As
Dretske points out, an indicator may represent or misrepresent. However, Dretske’s account does
not make enough room for misrepresentation in spite of its reliance on teleology. I will get back
to this in a moment.
What about acquired representations? When a representation is acquired rather than
innate, Dretske argues, its recruitment as an indicator is done instead by the learning process. In
operant conditioning, he proposes, reinforcement recruits indicators as causes of behavior: “By
the timely reinforcement of certain output—by rewarding this output when, and generally only
when, it occurs in certain conditions—internal indicators of these conditions are recruited as
causes of this output.” (Dretske 1988: 98). Consider a pigeon that learns in a lab to get food by
pecking on a screen if and only if pictures of trucks are displayed (Dretske 1988: 153). Here the
learned behavior would be pecking on truck pictures and the indicator recruited would be a
detector of truck pictures. Or consider the following example: when a blue jay becomes ill after
eating a monarch butterfly, it avoids eating monarch butterflies again (Dretske 1988: 111). Here
the learned behavior would be refusing to eat monarch butterflies and the indicator recruited
would be a detector of monarch butterflies.71 Notice the analogy between such a learning process
71 Operant conditioning is a general kind of learning: it does not have a specific target, which makes it particularly
plastic. The case of the pigeon is paradigmatic. But perhaps the blue jay learns not to eat monarch butterflies
because it has instead a specialized innate mechanism. In that case, the function of the learned behavior and the
representation that causes it would be best characterized as a derived function. In any case, there are various
forms of learning and surely something along the lines of operant conditioning has a place among them. Also,
notice that the complex mechanisms responsible for operant conditioning must themselves be the result of the
evolutionary history of organisms that have them. So the functions of responses to stimuli learned in this way
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and the natural selection of innate perceptual representations. In both cases, some perceptual
representation C is recruited to detect some F in the surroundings and cause some behavior M. In
both cases, the recruitment happens because of the benefits of the effects of responding in certain
ways to certain stimuli. Dretske indeed suggests that the learning process may itself be regarded
as selection process: “Learning... is a way of shaping a structure’s causal properties in
accordance with its indicator properties. C is, so to speak, selected as a cause of M because of
what it indicates about F.” (Dretske 1988: 101).
The three kinds of historical process discussed by Dretske (artificial design, natural
selection and learning) are alleged to recruit items to have the function of indicating conditions in
the world—a function that items may fail to perform. What kind of account of misrepresentation
is available to this approach? If the thermostat breaks and gets stuck in C even though the
temperature has not dropped, we can say that C is supposed to indicate F—if this is what it was
recruited for—but that it is failing to do so. Consider the Venus flytrap. If its hair triggers have
been naturally selected for indicating that an insect has landed, they would be failing to indicate
what they are supposed to when they are triggered by a botanist touching them twice with a stick.
The same may be said of indicators selected by learning processes. The blue jay’s detector of
monarch butterflies would be failing to indicate what it is supposed to when triggered by a fake
monarch placed by a researcher.
Unlike the standard indicator theory, the combination of indication and teleology does
make room for misrepresentation. The idea is that if item C was selected for indicating F because
it did indicate F during its recruitment, then it is failing to do what it is supposed to when it does
can also be characterized as at least being partly derived from the direct functions of innate mechanisms.
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not indicate F after its recruitment. Sometimes misrepresentation may happen because the
mechanism itself is or becomes internally defective, like in the case of the thermostat stuck in C
or a moth that is born unable to detect bats. But the interesting cases are those where the internal
mechanisms are not defective and the misrepresentation occurs because “the world is deceptive”
(Godfrey-Smith 1989: 546). In such cases, the teleological version of the indicator theory can
claim that the conditions in the world that cause the misrepresentation are abnormal, since they
differ from the conditions under which the indicator was recruited. The teleological component is
intended to offer a naturalistically respectable characterization of the distinction between
“normally and abnormally caused representation tokens” (Godfrey-Smith 1989: 546). When the
Venus flytrap’s detectors are triggered by insects or the blue jay’s detectors are triggered by
monarch butterflies, we may say that the detectors are operating under normal conditions. When
the same detectors are triggered instead by researchers, the detectors are still supposed to
indicate insects and monarch butterflies, respectively, but they fail to do so because they are
operating under abnormal conditions.
What does the teleological version of the indicator theory regard specifically as a normal
condition? An etiologically characterized normal condition must be a condition that obtains
during selection. But this leaves room for more than one teleonomic account of normal
conditions. As we will see in the next section, Millikan offers a very different account than
Dretske’s. According to Godfrey-Smith’s interpretation, the teleological version of the indicator
theory relies on the “ecologically normal” environment were the indicator evolved or was
selected (Godfrey-Smith 1989: 546). And this is indeed what Dretske proposes. His idea
becomes clear in his discussion of cases where misrepresentation occurs because of the
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abnormality of the circumstances. Here is a revealing (albeit long) passage:
In many cases of biological interest, a sign—some internal indicator on which an
animal relies to locate and identify, say, food—will... be a reliable indicator only
in the animal’s natural habitat or in conditions that approximate that habitat. Flies,
for instance, when given a choice between nutritionally worthless sugar fructose
and some nutritive substance like sorbitrol, will invariably choose the
nutritionally worthless substance and starve to death. Surprising? Not really.
Under natural conditions... the substances that stimulate the receptors are
nutritional. Under natural conditions, in a fly’s normal habitat, then, receptor
activity indicates a nutritional substance. Furthermore, the correlation between
receptor activity and nutritional value of its activator is no accident... Flies would
not have developed (or maintained without modification) such a receptor system
in environments where such a correlation did not exist. (Dretske 1988: 57-58)
According to Dretske, what a detector is supposed to indicate is what it actually indicates in the
natural habitat or environment where the detector was recruited. The fly’s detector is supposed to
indicate a nutritional substance because this is what it has been naturally selected for indicating
and still indicates in ecologically normal conditions. When the detector misrepresents, Dretske
suggests, it is because the conditions are ecologically abnormal. Notice also that Dretske is still
thinking of indication in terms of reliable causation or correlation: a detector has the function of
indicating X because it is (or at least was) a reliable indicator of X in the environment where it
was recruited or selected.72 Recall that the inability of the original indicator theory to make room
72 Here is another passage where Dretske clearly makes these points:
Put a frog in a laboratory where carefully produced shadows simulate edible bugs. In these
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for misrepresentation resulted from its requirement of reliable correlation. Dretske’s teleological
modification no longer requires that a representation is reliably correlated to what it represents
under all conditions. Nevertheless, the modification still requires reliable correlation in
ecologically normal conditions.
Dretske’s teleological version of the indicator theory does make some room for
misrepresentation, but it is not enough. The problem is that misrepresentation can occur more
frequently than correct representation even in ecologically normal conditions, as Godfrey-Smith
(1989 & 1992) points out. Consider the following example: “many birds have a hair-trigger flight
response to dark fluttering shapes that could be predators” (Godfrey-Smith 1989: 547). The
benefit of the flight response comes from helping birds to escape predators. This is why the
predator-detectors have been favored by natural selection. Ancestor birds managed to escape
predators by responding in this way and the trait was inherited by their descendants. The
perception that triggers this response is clearly supposed to represent predators, even when it
fails to do so. But we should distinguish two kinds of misrepresentation. On one hand, a bird’s
predator-detector may fail to be activated when a predator is actually present. On the other hand,
a bird’s predator-detector may be activated when no predator is actually present. The first case is
a “false negative”, while the second one is a “false positive” (Godfrey-Smith 1992: 299). It is
safer for birds to have predator-detectors that generate many false alarms than detectors that
unnatural circumstances the frog’s neural detectors—those that have, for good reason, been called
«bug detectors»—will no longer indicate the presence or the location of bugs... If we suppose...
that it is the function of the frog’s neural detectors to indicate the presence of edible bugs, then, in
the laboratory, shadows are misrepresented as edible bugs... Occasionally, when an edible bug
flies by, the frog will correctly represent it as an edible bug, but this is dumb luck... The frog has...
no reliable representation. (Dretske 1988: 68-69)
Again, what a detector is supposed to detect is determined by what it indicates in ecologically normal conditions
—and misrepresentation can occur in abnormal conditions. But here Dretske clarifies that correct representation
can also occur in abnormal conditions—even though it is not reliable in such conditions. The assumption again
is that representation would be reliable in ecologically normal conditions.
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sometimes fail to be triggered when a predator is actually menacing. As Godfrey-Smith points
out, whenever the benefit of avoiding false negatives outweighs the cost of avoiding false
positives, natural selection will favor detecting mechanisms that produce representations that are
not reliably correlated to what they are supposed to represent—namely, mechanisms that produce
many false positives (Godfrey-Smith 1992: 302-303 & 1989: 547-548). Dretske’s account
ascribes the wrong meanings to the representations produced by such mechanisms. The activated
state of a bird’s predator-detector is reliably correlated to dark fluttering things in ecologically
normal circumstances, but presumably it represents predators.
The same problem arises in the case of representations selected by learning processes.
Consider the case of the blue jay that learns to avoid eating monarch butterflies again after
becoming ill. When the blue jay avoids eating a fake monarch placed by a researcher, this can be
reasonably characterized as an ecologically abnormal situation. However, there are naturally
occurring butterflies, such as viceroy butterflies, that mimic the appearance of monarchs. Viceroy
butterflies are part of the normal ecosystem of blue jays. As Dretske himself points out, blue jays
actually avoid eating viceroys after learning that monarchs are poisonous (Dretske 1988: 111).
What the blue jay’s detector is reliably correlated to—what it indicates—in ecologically normal
circumstances is monarchs or viceroys. Indeed, Dretske claims that, in this case, the detector
represents “monarch-like butterflies” (Dretske 1988: 111). However, the purpose of the detector
is specifically to help the blue jay to avoid indigestion by not eating monarchs. The avoidance of
viceroys results from blue jays mistaking them for monarchs—i.e., false positives. But Dretske’s
theory cannot characterize such false positives as misrepresentations. The problem arises even
for detection systems that are produced by intelligent design. A house alarm system may be
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triggered not only by burglars but also by insects or rodents. But it may be better to have an
alarm system that produces false positives than one that may fail to detect burglars. The system
may be purposefully chosen despite its known unreliability: perhaps it is less expensive than a
more reliable one. The detectors are reliably correlated in normal conditions to the presence of
moving objects in the house. What they are supposed to represent is the presence of burglars.
Another objection that has been raised against Dretske’s combination of indication and
teleology is that indicating cannot be an etiological function. Talking about the combination of
teleonomy with informational semantics, Godfrey-Smith warns: “A thing cannot have the
function to have come from somewhere, to have certain normal antecedents. A thing’s function is
always something that it does; a function is always something like a power.” (Godfrey-Smith
1989: 542). Similarly, Millikan claims that “it cannot be the function of a state to have been
produced in response to something” (Millikan 1993: 85). If we think of indication in terms of
reliable causation, the objection then can be simply expressed as follows: R cannot have the
function of indicating X because R indicating X involves R being caused reliably by X, while a
function is a selected effect. If we are talking about the mechanism that produces R, the same
consideration applies: the mechanism can indeed have the function of producing R, but it cannot
have the function of being caused by X to produce R. This objection works against Dretske’s way
of combining indication with teleology—where indication is simply identified as the function of
a representation. Neander (2013) proposes an updated combination of causal or informational
semantics with teleonomy—which I discuss in Section 4.5. In reply to the objection that
functions are selected effects, she suggests that functions can sometimes include causes in
addition to effects. A causal version of teleosemantics, however, does not need to identify what is
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supposed to cause a representation with its function. I will propose in Section 4.6 a causal variant
of teleosemantics that is compatible with the standard account of functions as selected effects.
Let me recapitulate. According to Dretske’s teleological version of the indicator theory,
the activated state of a detector represents what it is supposed to indicate. This means—given his
account of “normal” conditions—that the state represents whatever it indicates or is reliably
correlated to in ecologically normal circumstances. The problem is that this does not make
enough room for misrepresentation. In particular, the account cannot characterize false positives
as misrepresentations when they occur frequently in a creature’s natural habitat. Additionally,
Dretske’s way of combining indication with teleology has the problem of being at odds with the
etiological account of functions as selected effects. Despite these problems, I think that the idea
of appealing to teleonomy in order to draw a distinction between normally and abnormally
caused representation tokens is a crucial insight which is on the right track.
Other teleosemantic theories—even those that are causal or informational—differ
considerably from Dretske’s. The orthodox teleosemantic approach—originally proposed by
Millikan (1984) and Papineau (1984)—does not only reject the requirement of reliable causation
under ecologically normal conditions, but also the requirement that tokens of representations
must be caused by what they represent. An alternative approach—proposed by Neander (1995)—
rejects only the requirement of reliable causation under ecologically normal conditions, but still
attempts to explain the meanings of representations in terms of teleonomically characterized
causal links to reality. The orthodox approach relates the meanings or contents of representations
instead to the effects they are supposed to have. The general motivation for this is that, under an
etiological account, functions are selected effects. Papineau (1984) proposes a teleosemantics
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that focuses primarily on the contents of the complex mental representations involved in human
belief-desire psychology. Millikan (1984) proposes a teleosemantics that starts with an account
of the most basic forms of non-human representation, which she extends to cover the mental and
linguistic representations used by human beings. I will discuss these applications of
teleosemantics to sophisticated human representations in Chapter 6—where I borrow ideas from
Papineau and Millikan, but I argue that a proper teleosemantics for human representations should
be articulated in terms of basic sentence acceptance. In the following sections of this chapter, I
will examine Millikan’s account of the content of basic representations (Section 5.4) and
Neander’s alternative (Section 5.5). Afterwards, I will propose a hybrid account that combines
some insights from these two approaches (Section 5.6). The hybrid account is intended to apply
to basic perceptual representations, not the complex human representations covered by the
acceptance-based teleosemantics proposed in Chapter 6.

5.4 Consumer-Based Teleosemantics
Millikan draws a distinction between the mechanisms that produce representations and the
mechanisms that consume or use representations, and suggests that the latter are responsible for
something being a representation and having a specific meaning or content: “What we need to
look at is the consumer part, at what it is to use a thing as a representation. Indeed, a good look at
the consumer part... ought to be all that is needed to determine not only representational status
but representational content.” (Millikan 1993: 88). In this section I will examine the core features
of Millikan’s consumer-based teleosemantics, focusing on basic non-human representations. I
will argue that her account has the advantage of making ample room for misrepresentation but is
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susceptible to a serious objection because it disregards the causes of representations as irrelevant
to their content.
Let me illustrate Millikan’s distinction between producers and consumers of
representations with a couple of simple examples. In the case of inner representations, the
producers and consumers are located within a single organism. For example, the moth’s
perceptual mechanisms responsible for tokening a representation when a bat is approaching are
the producers, while the mechanisms responsible for triggering the bat-avoidance behavior when
the representation is tokened are the consumers. In the case of outer representations used for
communication, the producers and consumers are located in different organisms. When a beaver
perceives danger, for example, it makes a loud sound by slapping the water with its tail as it
dives for safety. The splashing sound causes other beavers in the colony to also dive under water
for safety. Here the producers of the alarm signal are the mechanisms that cause the original
beaver to slap its tail, while the consumers are the mechanisms that cause the other beavers to
hide when hearing the sound. The consumers are the mechanisms responsible for representations
having the behavioral effects they are supposed to have.
Why should we focus on the consumer mechanisms in order to explain representational
status and representational content? The explanatory role of consumers in determining
representational status becomes clear when we consider cases like the following:
The devices in me that produce calluses are supposed to vary their placement
according to where the friction is, but calluses are not representations. The
pigment arrangers in the skin of a chameleon, the function of which is to vary the
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chameleon’s color with what it sits on, are not representation producers. (Millikan
1993: 85)
As Millikan points out, “not every device whose job description includes producing items that
vary with the world is a representation producer” (Millikan 1993: 85). The mechanisms
responsible for calluses and chameleons’ camouflage colors, just like the mechanisms
responsible for moths detecting bats and beavers slapping their tails, produce items that covary
with conditions in the external world. Yet calluses and chameleons’ camouflage colors are not
representations. What sets apart the inner states produced by moths’ bat-detectors and the tail
splashes of beavers from calluses and chameleons’ camouflage colors is that they are used as
representations by consumer mechanisms: such mechanisms modulate behavior in accordance
with the conditions in the world that representations are supposed to covary with. Notice that the
benefit of having representations comes precisely from their behavioral effects. While the
producer and consuming mechanisms must have evolved to work in coordination with each other
—i.e., they must be co-adapted—the function of the producers must be to provide what
consumers need to perform their functions (Millikan 1993: 88).
What the consumers need is representations to be tokened whenever certain conditions in
the world obtain. The function of the consumer mechanisms that trigger the moth’s batavoidance behavior, for example, is to prevent moths from being captured by bats. That is what
these mechanisms have been selected for. What they need to perform this function is that the
representations they consume are tokened specifically when bats are approaching. Millikan calls
this the “normal condition” for the performance of the consumers’ function. Her consumer-based
teleosemantics does not identify meanings with the teleonomic functions of representations or
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their consumers, but with the relations between representations and the world that obtain in
“normal conditions”—namely, the relations that the consumers need to obtain in order to
successfully perform their teleonomic functions:
Note that the proposal is not that the content of the representation rests on the
function of the representation or of the consumer, on what these do... The content
hangs only on there being a certain condition that would be normal for
performance of the consumer’s functions, namely, that a certain correspondence
relation hold between sign and world, whatever those functions may happen to be.
(Millikan 1993: 89)
Millikan’s talk of “normal conditions” differs from common usage. She does not mean the
conditions that obtain on average or that are ecologically normal. Instead, Millikan clarifies, her
term ‘normal’ should be understood “normatively, historically, and relative to specific function”
(Millikan 1993: 86). What is “normal” in this sense is what has historically happened during the
proper performance of a function. Whatever happened when an item failed to perform its
function is not “normal” in this sense, even if the item failed to perform its function more often
than it succeeded. Millikan uses the term ‘normal’ in this normative-historical sense to
characterize the etiological explanation of the performance of a function, as well as the
conditions that must be invoked in such an explanation:
A “normal explanation” explains the performance of a particular function, telling
how it was (typically) historically performed on those (perhaps rare) occasions
when it was properly performed. Normal explanations do not tell, say, why it has
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been common for a function to be performed; they are not statistical explanations.
They cover only past times of actual performance... A “normal condition for
performance of a function” is a condition, the presence of which must be
mentioned in giving a full normal explanation for performance of that function...
It follows that “normal conditions” must not be read as having anything to do with
what is typical or average... (Millikan 1993: 86-87)
In order to avoid confusion with the common usage of the word ‘normal’, I will use instead the
uppercased word ‘Normal’ to talk about this normative-historical notion, as Millikan does herself
in some of her writings (e.g., Millikan 1984). Consider again beavers’ alarm signals. The
function of the consumers of these representations is to protect beavers from danger. The Normal
explanation of how this function was historically performed, when it was performed properly,
must mention that perception of the signal made beavers instinctively dive under water (a
complete explanation of this will include an account of how the relevant mechanisms worked).
The Normal explanation must also mention that a crucial Normal condition for the consumers
performing properly their function was that the representations were tokened when there was
actual danger, since only on those occasions diving under water was a beneficial behavioral
response to the representation. In evolutionary terms, the cooperating producer and consumer
mechanisms of beaver tail-splashes were favored by natural selection because occasionally they
actually helped to protect beavers from danger. Since the crucial condition that must obtain in the
world for the consumers of beaver tail-splashes to perform their function is that there is danger, it
follows—according to Millikan—that tail-splashes mean danger:
The splash means danger, because only when it corresponds to danger does the
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instinctive response to the splash on the part of the interpreter beavers, the
consumers, serve a purpose. If there is no danger present, the interpreter beavers
interrupt their activities uselessly. Hence, that the splash corresponds to danger is
a normal condition for proper functioning of the interpreter beavers' instinctive
reaction to the splash. (Millikan 1993: 90)
Like the standard indicator theory, Millikan’s teleosemantics explains the meaning of a
representation in terms of its direct links to what it represents. Like Dretske’s teleological version
of the indicator theory, it explains more specifically what a representation is supposed—but may
fail—to represent in terms of an etiological account of what it is supposed to covary with, be
correlated to, or correspond to in the world. But Millikan’s consumer-based teleosemantics does
not place any requirement of reliability under ecologically normal conditions on the production
of a representation. Consequently, it can make ample room for misrepresentation. Suppose, as it
is likely, that the majority of beaver tail-splashes turn out to be false positives—produced when
there is no real danger around. This does not impact at all what the tail-splashes are supposed to
represent according to Millikan’s account. As long as the trait has been selected and maintained
in the population because it aided the survival of beavers by making them dive under water for
safety when there was danger—and even if this happened only on rare occasions—the splashes
will mean danger. When there is no real danger around, a tail-splash is a misrepresentation.
Millikan’s teleosemantics can account for most tail-splashes in ecologically normal conditions
being misrepresentations. Notice that, for many biological devices, successful performance of
their functions is something that rarely occurs but explains why the devices exist. Most sperm
cells, for example, do not succeed in fertilizing egg cells. Nonetheless, this is precisely what they
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have been selected for doing (Millikan 1984: 4). That an item may fail to perform its function
more often than succeeding is not peculiar to representations.
Another advantage of Millikan’s consumer-based teleosemantics is that it offers a
plausible account of how representations can represent distal affairs rather than the proximal
stimuli involved in their deployment. Consider male hoverflies, which wait for females to mate
with by hovering in a single place for long periods of time. When they perceive a female, they
instantly dart towards it. This behavior conforms to a very precise rule that specifies the angle of
the chasing flight in relation to the vector angular velocity of the target’s image moving across
the hoverfly’s retina (Collett and Land 1978). Since this rule specifies how the hoverfly is
supposed to react to a proximal stimulus, rather than a distal object, Millikan calls it the
“proximal hoverfly rule” (Millikan 1993: 218-219). As Millikan points out, while it is unlikely
that the hoverfly “calculates over any inner representation of this rule in order to follow it”, it
still has a “genetically determined mechanism of a kind that has historically proliferated in part
because it was responsible for producing conformity to the proximal hoverfly rule, hence for
getting male and female hoverflies together” (Millikan 1993: 219). 73 Given the selective history
of these mechanisms, they are supposed to conform to the proximal hoverfly rule. Why not
regard the representations consumed by these mechanisms then as representations of the
proximal stimuli—i.e., images—rather than of distal female hoverflies? Images produced by all
sorts of distal objects, such as midges or distant birds, trigger the chasing behavior in conformity

73 Following Devitt, we can say that this is a structure rule “governing the outputs of a competence”, rather than a
processing rule “governing the exercise of the competence” (Devitt 2006: 18). Whether a rule is a structure rule
or a processing rule depends on whether the rule governs the exercise of the competence: whether “following
the rule” involves “calculating over its representation”. This distinction should not be conflated with the one
between proximal and distal rules. As I point out below, the crucial rule governing the hoverfly’s behavior is one
that relates the hoverfly to distal affairs. This is a distal structure rule.
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to the rule more often than actual female hoverflies (Collett and Land 1978). Yet the mechanisms
seem to be working in accordance with their evolutionary “design”, rather than malfunctioning,
whenever they follow the proximal rule. Millikan argues that the representations consumed by
these mechanisms are nevertheless representations of distal female hoverflies, because the
mechanisms are also supposed to make the male hoverfly follow the crucial rule: “If you see a
female, catch it.”—which she calls the “distal hoverfly rule” (Millikan 1993: 222). The
etiological explanation of why the mechanisms exist relies on the occasional past conformity of
the behavior they produce to the distal rule, since “it was only when ancestor hoverflies
conformed to the distal hoverfly rule that they became ancestors” (Millikan 1993: 223). The
proximal rule alone cannot explain why the mechanisms exist. What the mechanisms needed to
perform the function that explains why they were selected is that the representations they
consumed covaried with actual female hoverflies. That is why the representations are
representations of distal female hoverflies rather than of proximal images. But what is the role of
conformity to the proximal rule which, Millikan acknowledges, the mechanisms are also
supposed to follow? Millikan suggests that “conformity to the proximal rule is a means to
conformity to the distal rule” or, in other words, “the mechanism that has historically accounted
for... ancestor hoverflies’ successes at conformity to the distal hoverfly rule begins with
conformity to the proximal rule” (Millikan 1993: 222-223). The idea is that the function of
conforming to a proximal rule is part of the Normal explanation of how the mechanism that
consumes an inner representation properly performs a function that involves conformity to a
distal rule. Whenever an inner representation is supposed to be used in conformity with certain
proximal rule in order to—or as a means to—be used in conformity with certain distal rule, what
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it represents is what it must be related to in the external world for its use to succeed in
conforming to the distal rule.
Millikan’s teleosemantics defines representational content in terms of the historically
Normal conditions for the proper performance of the functions of representation consumers. This
allows the approach to make ample room for error by not imposing any reliability requirement
on the production of representations—not even under ecologically normal circumstances.
Millikan goes a step further, arguing that her account does not even require representations to be
caused by what they represent. She offers the following example—originally discussed by
Dretske (1984)—to clarify this point. There is “a certain species of Northern Hemisphere
[anaerobic] bacteria which orient themselves away from toxic oxygen-rich surface water by
attending to their magnetosomes, tiny inner magnets, which pull toward the magnetic north pole,
hence pull down” (Millikan 1993: 92-93). The function of the consumers of the representation
produced by the magnetosomes is to guide the bacteria towards safe oxygen-free water—this is
the beneficial effect that they were selected for. While the Normal explanation of how the
function is performed will mention magnetosomes pulling towards the magnetic north pole and
bacteria swimming in that direction, the crucial Normal condition for the consumers to perform
properly their function is that the magnetosomes pull towards oxygen-free water. According to
Millikan, then, what the magnetosomes represent is “the direction of oxygen-free water”, even
though this “is not... a factor in causing the direction of pull of the magnetosome” (Millikan
1993: 92-93). The “Normal mechanisms” (Millikan 2004a: 76-79) by which producers perform
their functions—i.e., the mechanisms invoked in a Normal explanation of these performances—
may often rely on causal links between representations and what they represent. But, according
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to Millikan, this is not a requirement and anyway does not determine the meanings of
representations: what matters is that the producers Normally token representations that are
correlated to what they represent, not how they manage to do so. This is a strong and
controversial claim that can be reasonably contested.
An influential objection against Millikan’s teleosemantics shows that her view that the
causes of representations are irrelevant to their content is problematic. Paul Pietroski (1992)
proposes a thought experiment involving two imaginary animal species: kimus and snorfs.
Kimus live in a valley where snorfs, their main predators, hunt during the day. Kimus are utterly
unable to recognize snorfs, but they have evolved both a mechanism that detects red things and
the instinctive behavior of moving towards them, which makes kimus climb a nearby hill every
morning, attracted by “something red on the hilltop”—a trait that has been favored by natural
selection because climbing the hill has helped kimus to avoid being hunted by snorfs (Pietroski
1992: 273). According to Millikan’s theory, the activated state of the detectors represents snorffree areas, since the behavior produced by its consumers was beneficial only because it led kimus
to such areas. But Pietroski argues that this content ascription is unacceptable. He points out that
we ascribe “intentionality” (i.e., aboutness) or representational content to mental states in order
to explain behavior: “For what are intentional states, if not those states that figure in (correct)
intentional explanations?” (Pietroski 1992: 276). While a relation to snorfs is a crucial part of the
evolutionary or selection explanation of why kimus have the trait, Pietroski argues, it is not part
of a plausible intentional explanation of kimu-behavior (Pietroski 1992: 274-276).
It does seem counter-intuitive to claim that kimus climb the hill because they represent it
as snorf-free. The content ascribed by Millikan’s theory seems to conflict in this case with the
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one we would ordinarily ascribe—based on the perceptual causes and behavioral effects of the
representation (see Chapter 2)—and likely also with what a scientific intentional psychology
would ascribe. This is because, as Pietroski points out, kimus cannot “discriminate snorfs from
non-snorfs” (Pietroski 1992: 276) and their representations are tokened “in the absence of any
causal interaction” with snorfs (Pietroski 1992: 277). Pietroski acknowledges that the correct
theory of content may turn out to be “somewhat revisionary of our common-sense practice of
providing intentional explanations”, but he warns that Millikan’s theory is “radically revisionary”
and that she does not provide any “independent motivation”—apart from her own theory—to
support such revision and to regard the evolutionary relation between kimus’ states and snorfs as
constitutive of the states’ content (Pietroski 1992: 277). Notice that this last concern of Pietroski
is in tune with the methodological point I made in Chapter 2—following Devitt (1996)—about
the task of semantics: we need an independent and uncontroversial identification of the meanings
that need explanation. Otherwise, it is unclear what would count as a successful explanation and
whether allegedly competing semantic theories are actually attempting to explain the same
phenomena. I will get back to this methodological issue in Section 4.6.
Millikan agrees that her theory implies that kimus represent snorf-free areas, but rejects
the intuition that this is problematic. She points out that certain desert tortoises find their food
(edible vegetation) by its green color, which is merely correlated to, and not caused by, the
nutritional characteristics that make it food—characteristics that tortoises are unable to
discriminate (Millikan 2000: 236). Millikan’s reply is that, according to Pietroski’s criteria, the
representations that tortoises use as guides to find food cannot be representations of where there
is food. If we accept that tortoises have representations of where there is food, Millikan argues,
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we should revise the intuition that supports Pietroski’s objection.
It is not clear that the tortoises case can settle the issue in favor of Millikan’s view, since
these representations can be beneficial because they direct tortoises to take in nutrients without
being representations about the nutritious characteristics of what tortoises eat. Perhaps they are
representations of “tortoise food”—in the sense of “what tortoises eat” rather than of “what is
nutritious for tortoises”—or perhaps they are simply representations of green stuff. I prefer the
former option because it fits well with the eating behavior guided by the states and because the
latter option would imply that a tortoise eating a green plastic bag—left behind in the desert by a
hiker—would not be misguided by a false positive. There is nothing peculiar about a
representation of “food” in the proposed sense. To put it metaphorically, the representation can
tell the tortoise something like “this is what you can eat” rather than “this is nutritious”. It is
doubtful that animal representations of food represent it qua nutritious stuff.
Another important point is that there would be no causal interaction between tortoises’
representations and what they represent only under Millikan’s assumption that they represent
food qua nutritious stuff. If we take the tortoises’ states to represent green stuff, the causal
connection is clear. But there is also a causal connection if we take the states to represent
“tortoise food”. In the sense suggested above, “tortoise food” is green (even though its nutrients
are not green and are not responsible for its color). So, the presence of “tortoise food” causes the
tokening of tortoises’ representations—because it is green. In contrast, neither snorfs nor their
absence are causally involved in the tokening of kimus’ representations.74 Millikan is counting on
74 There is considerable philosophical debate about what is the nature and what are the relata of causal relations.
Perhaps under some views it is conceivable that snorf-free areas cause kimus’ states. But the view of causation
that Millikan relies on in her reply to Pietroski is not one of them. Millikan relies on the notion that A can cause
B because A is F rather than because A is G—even if A is both F and G. My reply simply points out that in such
a case A still causes B.

214
her readers agreeing that tortoises have perceptual states that represent food but are not caused
by food. But the sense of ‘food’ in which we can correctly say that tortoises represent food is not
necessarily the same as that in which we can correctly say that tortoises’ representational states
are not caused by food.
Another reply to Pietroski offered by Millikan relies on rejecting altogether the
assumption that creatures can only have representations of what they are able to discriminate.
Millikan complains that “a creature can perfectly well have a representation of Xs without being
able to discriminate Xs from Ys” (Millikan 2000: 237). This reply has an important kernel of
truth, but I do not think that it suffices to undermine Pietroski’s objection. What is true in
Millikan’s claim is that the strong discrimination view it opposes is very problematic. The
problematic view is that a creature cannot have a perceptual representation of Xs if it is not able
to discriminate Xs from some (perhaps many) non-Xs. Such a view does not make enough room
for misrepresentation. False positives occur precisely because of the limited discriminatory
capacities of the perceptual mechanisms involved. However, the problematic view should not be
confused with the reasonable view that a creature cannot have a perceptual representation of Xs
if it is not able to discriminate Xs from any non-Xs whatsoever. Now consider Pietroski’s claim
that kimus cannot represent snorfs because they cannot discriminate snorfs from non-snorfs. If
the claim is based on kimus not being able to discriminate snorfs from some non-snorfs, then the
view is implausible because it does not make room for false positives. Pietroski does talk about
kimus not being able to “reliably discriminate” snorfs from non-snorfs (Pietroski 1992: 276), but
his argument does not depend on this. Much more relevant is the fact that kimus cannot
discriminate snorfs from any non-snorfs whatsoever. So Millikan’s fair point against an
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unreasonably strong discrimination view does not defend her theory from Pietroski’s objection.
The content ascription of Millikan’s theory in the kimus case violates even a minimal and
seemingly reasonable discrimination requirement.
Millikan’s focus on the role of representation consumers allows her to offer an account
that makes plenty of room for misrepresentation. But her account is susceptible to Pietroski’s
objection because it disregards the role of representation producers as irrelevant to content. It
should be noticed that Millikan (1984) originally emphasized equally the functions of consumers
and producers and that she has later returned to a more balanced focus, insisting that consumers
and producers have been “designed” or selected for cooperating with each other: “What the
consumer does helps the producer, and what the producer does helps the consumer... The
presence of each is part of the normal mechanism by which the other fulfills its functions.”
(Millikan 2004a: 79). Beyond these matters of emphasis, Millikan has not changed her mind
about the irrelevance of the causes of representations. Her motivation seems to rely on her view
that functions are a matter of effects: “Taking the... example of the firing of a fly detector in a
frog’s eye, it couldn’t be a function of that firing to have been caused by a fly.” (Millikan 2004a:
68). In contrast, Neander has proposed that perceptual states represent what the mechanisms that
produce them have the function of detecting or responding to, when analyzed at the lowest or
most “mechanical” teleo-functional level (Neander 1995: 129-136). Neander’s view is that the
mechanism involved in a representation’s production—in how the representation is caused—is
what is relevant to the representation’s content. Unlike Dretske’s teleological version of the
indicator theory, Neander’s teleosemantics does not depend on what typically causes
representations in ecologically normal conditions. Unlike Millikan’s teleosemantics, it does
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explain meaning in terms of causation.

5.5 Producer-Based Teleosemantics
Neander points out that biological traits have a hierarchical array of functions and argues that, in
the case of systems that produce representations, the lowest-level functions—involving causal
links between representations and what they represent—are the ones that determine
representational content. In this section, I will examine the core features of Neander’s producerbased teleosemantics and argue that it has the advantage not being susceptible to Pietroski’s
objection, due to the role it assigns to the causes of representations, but also that it has the
disadvantage of not making enough room for misrepresentation, due to its treatment of the
effects of representations as irrelevant to their content.
Biological traits typically have various effects. Let us start with a non-representational
example: “Suppose a trait in an antelope population altered the structure of the hemoglobin,
which caused higher oxygen uptake, which allowed the antelope to survive at higher ground to
which they were forced to retreat. Suppose also that, as a result, this trait was selected.” (Neander
1995: 114-115). Which among all of these effects of the trait is its etiological function?
According to Neander they all are, because the explanation of why the trait exists must mention
them all. As Neander points out, however, the various functions are not independent of each
other, since the trait (1) contributed to gene replication by (2) allowing the antelope to survive at
higher ground by (3) increasing oxygen uptake by (4) altering the structure of the hemoglobin
(Neander 1995: 114-115). The various functions are hierarchically related, each of them being
performed by means of the performance of the function in the following “lower” level—where
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the lower level specifies the underlying mechanism responsible for how the higher-level function
is performed and the higher level specifies the purpose for which the lower-level function is
performed (Neander 1995: 116). While all the levels describe functions of the trait, Neander
argues that the lowest level describes the function that is specific to the trait, since the trait itself
is malfunctioning only if it fails to perform this function (Neander 1995: 119-120). A failure in
the increase of oxygen uptake may occur in a certain antelope because its lungs are
malfunctioning, even if the structure of hemoglobin has been properly altered (Papineau 1998:
4). But the trait in question is itself malfunctioning if it fails to properly alter the structure of
hemoglobin. So, according to Neander’s account, altering the structure of hemoglobin is the
specific function of the trait.
Neander applies these considerations to the functions of traits involved in the production
of representations. Consider the magnetosomes which are part of the phenotypes of the anaerobic
bacteria discussed above. What are their functions? What did the magnetosomes of ancestral
bacteria did that explains why they exist today? The magnetosomes (1) contributed to gene
replication by (2) helping bacteria to survive by (3) guiding bacteria towards oxygen-free water
by (4) aligning themselves with the magnetic north pole. According to Neander, all of these are
functions of the magnetosomes, but only the last one is their specific function, since the
performance of higher-level functions—e.g., guiding bacteria towards oxygen-free water—
depends on the magnetosomes’ “collaboration with other components” (Neander 1995: 118). The
other components would include, most crucially, the consumers of the representation.
Now consider the case of frogs, which respond to the visual perception of their prey by
darting their sticky tongues to capture and eat it. Their prey includes insects, spiders, worms and
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all sorts of living animals small enough to fit into their mouths. Frogs respond in this way not
only to their prey, but also to any small and dark thing moving in front of them. According to
Millikan’s teleosemantics, the frog’s perceptions represent frog food, since it was only when the
representations of ancestor frogs corresponded to edible things that their consumers performed
the functions that explain why both the consumers and their cooperating producers where
favored by natural selection. But according to Neander’s teleosemantics, the frog’s perceptions
represent instead small and dark moving things, because detecting such things is the lowest-level
and specific function of the perceptual mechanism involved: “it is by detecting small dark
moving things that the frog detects frog-food” (Neander 1995: 130). Suppose that a frog snaps at
a small and dark leaf carried by the wind. According to Neander, the detectors are not themselves
malfunctioning in this case, even though they are failing to perform the higher-level function of
detecting frog food. The detectors have not been “designed” to tell apart prey from small and
dark moving leaves. In this case there is no misrepresentation according to Neander’s
teleosemantics (Neander 1995: 129). This is a potentially problematic feature of the account. I
will I get back to this later in this section.
A crucial virtue of Neander’s theory, she argues, is that it ascribes contents which are
related to the cognitive capacities of the representation-producing mechanisms—to how they
work when they function properly: “Low Teleology [i.e., Neander’s theory] has something to say
about the criteria by which a cognitive system identifies that which it represents, and how it
represents it, whereas High Teleology [e.g., Millikan’s theory] has nothing to say about this”
(Neander 1995: 134). Recall that in Millikan’s theory what matters regarding the producer
mechanisms is merely that they token representations when the Normal conditions for the
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performance of the consumers’ functions obtain—and not how the producer mechanisms are
supposed and able to do it. Because of this, Millikan’s theory regards the causes of
representations and the discriminatory capacities of perceptual mechanisms as irrelevant to
representational content. But this is precisely why her theory can sometimes ascribe implausible
contents. As Pietroski’s kimus’ case illustrates, it can ascribe perceptual representations about
things that the perceptual mechanisms are causally insensitive to and unable to discriminate from
anything else. Pietroski suggests that his objection undermines teleosemantics in general
(Pietroski 1992: 278). But Neander points out that this is not the case, since the objection applies
only to the “High Church” variety (Neander 1995: 127). Indeed, Neander’s teleosemantics does
not ascribe counter-intuitive contents in the kimus case. The kimus’ trait did evolve because it
helped kimus to survive by avoiding snorfs. While this is a crucial biological function of the
kimus’ trait, it is not the function that determines the content of kimus’ representation, according
to Neander’s theory. What the perceptual mechanism is designed to causally respond to or detect
is specifically red stimuli. So the resulting perceptual states represent red things, not snorf-free
areas. This indeed is an advantage of Neander’s account over Millikan’s.
Neander’s analysis of the relation between the higher-level and lower-level functions of
traits is illuminating. Her teleosemantic account—which focuses on the functions of the
mechanisms that produce representations—has the advantage of ascribing contents that are
related to the capacities of such mechanisms. But there are some important questions or concerns
that may be raised about her account. Does it truly respect the requirement that etiological
functions must be selected effects? Does it actually allow for the representation of distal affairs?
And does it make enough room for misrepresentation? I will address each of these questions,

220
starting with the first one. Regarding this issue, Papineau objects:
Neander has taken insufficient note of Millikan’s point that representational
content hinges on how the representation is used, not on what causes it. In her
general discussion of teleology, Neander focuses, quite rightly, on the effects of
biological traits. But as soon as she turns to representation she shifts to the
question of what is supposed to cause the frog’s state (what it is supposed to
detect). (Papineau 1998: 7)
Neander’s account is committed to the view that the content of a representation is whatever is
supposed to cause it—which, in Papineau’s view, is at odds with the etiological account of
functions as selected effects. This is similar to the objection raised by Godfrey-Smith (1989) and
Millikan (1993) against earlier attempts to articulate an indicator or informational version of
teleosemantics, including Dretske’s: an item cannot have the function of being caused by—or
being produced in response to—something (see Section 4.3). Neander replies that while it is true
that functions must involve effects—since this is what is required for natural selection to occur—
they can also involve causes: “Biological mechanisms are selected for their causal roles, which
can include dispositions to respond to specific types of causes.” (Neander 2013: 24). Going
against teleosemantic orthodoxy, Neander suggests that sensory systems have response functions:
functions to produce states in response to certain input conditions—where ‘response’ is
understood in “purely causal” terms (Neander 2013: 23). Her proposal is that a sensory state
indeed represents what its producer mechanism has the function of causally responding to, given
its evolutionary “design”.
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Neander’s proposal that sensory systems have response functions has some intuitive
appeal. Nonetheless, the proposal is indeed at odds with the standard etiological account of
functions as selected effects—which Neander (1991) herself helped to articulate (see Section
3.5). It is no surprise that Millikan disagrees. She objects that a sensory system cannot be
selected for producing states in response to certain causal inputs—since this cannot be a selected
effect—and proposes that the causal relations that Neander has in mind are instead part of the
Normal explanation of how sensory systems often are supposed to work to perform their
functions (Millikan 2013a: 37-40). The idea here is that a sensory system may be selected
because it produced states that were caused by certain causal inputs, but this is not what it has
been selected for doing: it is not its purpose or function. Millikan’s suggestion is that we can
account for the explanatory role of the relevant causal relations—when a sensory system relies
on them to perform its function—without abandoning the standard etiological account of
functions as selected effects. But let us consider an example that Neander provides to support her
view that items can have response functions:
Now think about those biological functions that depend on natural selection. One
type of mechanism might secrete melatonin in response to the dimming of light,
while another type of mechanism might secrete melatonin in response to light
brightening and a third more or less randomly. Since melatonin makes us sleepy,
the first mechanism might be more adaptive in creatures like us who have poor
night vision. So the first type of mechanism might be selected in preference to the
second and third because the first differs in its input cause, in what triggers its
production of melatonin. (Neander 2013: 24)
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It sounds initially reasonable to claim that the selected mechanism in this example was selected
for secreting melatonin in response to the dimming of light. Such a function would be a selected
disposition or causal role, rather than merely a selected effect. There is no doubt that there is an
important difference between the three mechanisms in this example and that the difference is
responsible for one of them being favored by natural selection. The way Neander describes it, the
difference is merely about input causes, since the three mechanisms have the same effect:
secreting melatonin. However, the standard account of functions as selected effects can handle
this case without problems. The effects of the three mechanisms can be described differently:
secreting melatonin at night, during the day or randomly. So there is no problem omitting the
cause in the characterization of the function of the selected mechanism. The cause can be
accommodated instead as part of the Normal explanation of how the selected mechanism
manages to secret melatonin at night: the mechanism performs this function by causally
responding to the dimming of light.
It looks like the selected effects view can account for the phenomena that may intuitively
seem to have response functions. We should remain open-minded, but the selected effects view is
the standard etiological account of functions—the status quo—so we would need compelling
reasons to abandon it and adopt Neander’s revisionary proposal. Furthermore, the selected
effects view presumably has an advantage in those cases that may seem to involve response
functions. Suppose that the mechanism discussed by Neander happens to secret melatonin certain
night by accident—i.e., not in response to the dimming of light. There is a sense in which the
mechanism did perform its function, albeit accidentally. As Millikan points out: “functions are
sometimes performed yet performed abNormally” (Millikan 2013a: 40). The selected effects
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view has no problem characterizing this situation as I did. The function of secreting melatonin at
night was performed, but abNormally because the dimming of light is what Normally causes the
secretion—i.e., what is supposed to cause it. The response function view, however, is unable to
characterize the situation this way: the function of secreting melatonin in response to the
dimming of light was simply not performed. So this view has a problem allowing for alleged
response functions to be performed accidentally. While I am skeptical about the need for
response functions, I am not skeptical about Neander’s view that the content of a representation
depends on what is supposed to cause it. I will get back to this in the next section.
Moving on to another issue, Millikan has also objected that Neander’s teleosemantics
treats all representations as representations of proximal stimuli (Millikan 2000: 231). But
Neander has recently offered her own solution to the distality problem. Her proposal is that a
representation R refers to something distal D rather than something proximal P (when P is an
intermediary link in the causal chain between D and R) if and only if the sensory system has the
etiological function of producing tokens of R in response to D by means of producing tokens of
R in response to P (Neander 2013: 34). Notice that this suggestion is analogous to Millikan’s
solution to the distality problem, but articulated in terms of response functions. In both cases, a
relation between a representation and proximal stimuli is regarded merely as a means to perform
a function involving a relation between the representation and something distal. However,
Neander’s solution seems to be incompatible with her own claim that the content of a
representation is determined by the lowest-level mechanical function of the system that produces
it. Consider Neander’s claim that the frog’s perceptual states represent small and dark moving
things, rather than prey or frog food. With her new solution to the distality problem, she is able to
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argue that the frog’s states represent distal things, since they are the products of sensory systems
that have (1) the function of responding to distal small and dark moving things, which is
performed by means of performing (2) the function of responding to proximal small and dark
moving images. But if we must accept that a higher-level function determines content in order to
solve the problem of distality, why not regard this higher-level function as the one performed
when the frog darts its tongue towards its prey or food? Neander’s solution to the distality
problem requires abandoning her “lowest level of analysis” account of representational content.
So that analysis can no longer provide a reason for favoring her claim that frogs’ perceptions
represent small and dark moving things rather prey or food.
In fairness, Neander can still appeal to the fact that the frog does not have the capacity to
distinguish its prey from other small and dark moving things, even when its visual systems are
working properly: the perceptual systems are not themselves malfunctioning when the frog darts
its tongue towards a moving leaf. But this brings us to the remaining question I raised about
Neander’s teleosemantics: can it make enough room for misrepresentation? Neander’s causal or
informational teleosemantics, unlike Dretske’s combination of indication and teleology, does not
depend on reliable causation or correlation under ecologically normal circumstances. Yet her
account faces similar problems. Presumably the representation that causes the frog to dart its
tongue towards a moving leaf is a false positive—just like the beaver’s tail splash produced in
the absence of danger or the bird’s representation of predators tokened in the absence of
predators. For frogs, the benefit of not missing actual prey outweighs the cost of darting their
tongues towards non-edible targets, so natural selection has favored a perceptual mechanism that
cannot discriminate between actual prey and a number of other things, but is quite effective at
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allowing frogs to catch their prey, which is its purpose. According to Neander’s teleosemantics,
however, the frog’s representation triggered by a small and dark moving leaf is a true
representation instead of a false positive: “I suggest that the frog doesn’t misrepresent as long as
its representation... is caused by something appropriately small, dark and moving” (Neander
1995: 129). The leaf example is mine, but Neander remarks that according to her theory a frog
responding to a “bee bee” (a small metallic projectile shot by an air gun) is not misrepresenting
(Neander 1995: 131).
I should clarify that Neander’s teleosemantics does make some room for
misrepresentation. The frog does misrepresent when it responds to “anything which reflects onto
its retina a pattern that falls outside of the specified parameters” of size, shade and movement—
which can happen, she points out, if the frog is sick, neurologically damaged or has a congenital
defect (Neander 1995: 131). Neander’s account makes room for misrepresentation in cases where
the perceptual mechanism fails to perform its function because it malfunctions. The problem,
however, is that misrepresentation often occurs when the mechanism fails because “the world is
deceptive”—to use Godfrey-Smith’s expression. As Millikan reasonably argues against Neander
(2013), there can be misrepresentation without malfunctioning: this occurs when the Normal
condition in the external world required for the representation producer to perform its function
does not obtain (Millikan 2013a: 40). Neander’s teleosemantics does not make room for this kind
of misrepresentation and this is a serious drawback. Given the limited discriminatory capacities
of male hoverfly mate-detectors, of beaver danger-detectors, of bird and moth predator-detectors
—just to mention some other examples discussed above—it turns out that the states produced by
these devices do not represent mates, danger or predators, according to Neander’s
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teleosemantics, despite their guiding mating, hiding and avoidance behavior.
Dretske’s original attempt to combine informational semantics with teleology was
intended to make room for misrepresentation. It was a nice try. But it did not make enough room.
Neander’s updated attempt has virtues that I have pointed out. However, it shares with Dretske’s
attempt the problem of not making enough room for misrepresentation. Perhaps it makes even
less room, since Dretske does not take such a restrictive approach regarding the discriminatory
capacities of creatures. Frogs, he says, represent bugs (Dretske 1988: 68). And I already quoted
him claiming that flies represent nutritional substances by means of detecting their sweet flavor
—because in their natural habitat “the [sweet tasting] substances that stimulate the receptors are
nutritional” (Dretske 1988: 58). Under Neander’s account, these receptors would only represent
sweet substances—and Millikan seems to agree that a causal theory would be forced to adopt
such a restrictive view of causal connections. Perhaps Dretske is mistaken to claim that flies
represent nutritional substances as such. Still, the representations do tell flies to eat these
substances—not just that they are sweet. So a more plausible content ascription may be that they
represent edible stuff or “food”—in the sense of something to get a hold of and eat, rather than
something nutritious. In the analogous case of carnivorous hunters or predators, we have a better
word for this: ‘prey’.
Back to Dretske, it is worth mentioning that—even in his early version of the indicator
theory—he allows for more complex informational groundings than Neander. Notice that
Neander does not limit herself to simple causal links: R can represent X even when they are not
directly connected by a single causal link, but rather by a chain of causal links: this is what her
solution to the distality problem is meant to allow for. But Dretske allows for other variants of
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what we may call “causal groundings”. Suppose, for example, that something X causes both Y
and Z, but Y and Z are not causally linked otherwise. In this case, Dretske proposes, Y and Z
carry information about each other due to their common cause (Dretske 1981: 38-39). It follows
that a perceptual system can manage to indicate Z by detecting Y even if it is not causally
sensitive to Z itself. If these more complex forms of causal grounding do work, then it may be
the case that flies do have representations of nutritious stuff. The presence of nutrients and of
sweet tasting molecules in a fruit, for example, surely are connected by a common and complex
causal process. The same would apply to the green color and nutrients of the edible vegetation
that tortoises eat—recall Millikan’s reply to Pietroski. These are complicated matters, but it
certainly looks like adopting a restrictive view of causal connections is not the only reasonable
option for a naturalized semantics. It should be noticed, however, that Dretske goes beyond
“causally grounded” informational relations. His definition of indication relies on the conditional
probability of X happening if a representation R is tokened (Dretske 1981: 65). Such correlations
may often be the result of causal connections, which can be found in most of Dretske’s examples,
just like in most of Millikan’s. But they are not strictly required. That is why Dretske suggests
that the magnetosomes of northern anaerobic bacteria may represent oxygen-free water, even
though there is no causal connection between the magnetic north they detect and oxygen-free
water (Dretske 1986: 26).75 On this issue Dretske and Millikan coincide. But this sort of view
leads to the problem highlighted by Pietroski’s though experiment.

75 Dretske argues that it is indeterminate whether the magnetosomes represent the magnetic north or oxygen-free
water (Dretske 1986: 28-32). The lack of a causal connection in one of the two alternatives does not motivate
him to prefer the other.
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5.6 A Hybrid Account
Neander’s producer-based teleosemantics avoids Pietroski’s objection because it does relate
content to the cognitive capacities of the mechanisms that produce representations, but cannot
characterize many false positives as genuine misrepresentations: those that occur because “the
world is deceptive” rather than because of internal malfunctioning. Millikan’s consumer-based
teleosemantics can properly characterize such false positives as misrepresentations because it
relates content to the Normal conditions for the performance of the functions of the mechanisms
that consume representations—i.e., that guide behavior based on them—but cannot avoid
Pietroski’s objection. In this section I will propose a hybrid account that relates content to the
roles of both producers and consumers of representations. The hybrid account promises to make
ample room for misrepresentation while making plausible ascriptions of content that take into
account what the perceptual mechanisms of a creature do causally interact with—thereby
avoiding Pietroski’s objection.76 While the hybrid account makes ascriptions that are in tune with
Pietroski’s plausible intuitions, it should be noticed that my case for the approach rests mainly on
methodological considerations about what phenomena it is the task of semantics to explain.
The hybrid account is meant to apply primarily to “basic representations” that are caused
by perceptual mechanisms and directly guide behavior: representations of the kind that have
been the focus of this chapter. The approach also has an application for the simplest perceptual
representations of cognitively complex creatures such as human beings. But those
76 My hybrid account may look similar at first sight to Nicholas Shea’s suggestion that Millikan’s teleosemantics
should be supplemented with an input condition (Shea 2007). Shea adds an input condition to Millikan’s outputbased account. I agree that we need a teleosemantics that takes into account both inputs and outputs. But the
hybrid account I am proposing differs in a crucial respect from Shea’s: while his input condition involves mere
informational correlations between representations and what they represent, my hybrid account relies on causal
links—like Neander’s. Since Shea’s input condition is not causal (Shea 2007: 16), his proposal shares problems
with Millikan’s. In the kimus’ case, it also entails that their states represent snorf-free areas.
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representations differ in crucial ways from what I am treating here as basic representations, since
they typically do not directly govern behavior and their consumers are likely to include a variety
of mechanisms, including those that token more complex representations such as thoughts and
concepts. I will focus here on “basic representations”. My proposal in a nutshell is the following:
Hybrid Producer-Consumer Teleosemantics: The content of a basic representation
is determined by what is supposed to cause tokens of it—what its producer
mechanisms are supposed to respond to—in order for its consumer mechanisms to
perform their function in accordance with a Normal explanation.
Like Neander’s account, the hybrid account relates the content of a basic representation to what
is supposed to cause it: the links involve connections to things that the perceptual system of a
creature does causally interact with. Like Millikan’s account, the hybrid account relates the
content of a basic representation only to those links to reality that the representation tokens have
on those occasions when the consumers succeed performing the functions that they have been
selected for. These functions are selected effects, as conceived by the standard etiological
account of functions. In the case of basic representations, the functions are to produce behaviors
that are appropriate to—and vary accordingly with—the creatures’ circumstances.
I pointed out in the last section that I agree with Neander’s view that the content of a
basic representation depends on what is supposed to cause it, but I explained why I am skeptical
about the need for response functions. How can we get the “normative” notion of being
“supposed to be caused” by something without identifying this as a function of a mechanism?
Millikan’s distinction between what is part of a function and what is part of the Normal
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explanation of how the function is performed provides the answer. It allows us to extend the
“normativity” conferred by the teleonomic account of functions to the mechanisms and
conditions involved in their performance. Kidneys are supposed to filter blood because this is
their function. They are also supposed to be connected in certain ways to the circulatory and
renal systems. But this is not something they do, not an effect that they have been selected for.
Instead, it is a Normal condition for their managing to filter blood in the way that historically
accounts for their existence. The same applies to the causes of perceptual representations under
Millikan’s analysis: such representations are supposed to be caused by certain distal events in
order for their producers and consumers to perform their functions. Millikan, of course, thinks
that such causal relations are not relevant to the representations’ contents. But notice that what
Millikan does identify as the contents of representations—namely, certain crucial Normal
conditions for the performance of the consumer’s functions—are not part of a function either, but
of a Normal explanation. The fact that causes are not a part of the functions of the producers or
consumers of representations does not rule them out as candidates for content determination in a
teleosemantic theory.
What kinds of content ascriptions are provided by the hybrid account? I will discuss the
cases of frogs and kimus below. Let me start with other two examples. According to the hybrid
account, the states produced by male hoverfly mate-detectors and by moth predator-detectors
represent mates (i.e., female hoverflies) and predators (i.e., bats), respectively, since the
consumers of the representations perform Normally their behavior-governing function of guiding
these creatures to mate or avoid predators when the representations are caused by mates or
predators. The states are supposed to be caused by mates and predators, respectively, so they
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misrepresent when triggered by things that are not mates or predators. Notice that the content
ascriptions are plausible given the roles of these representations in the lives of hoverflies and
moths. Also, the approach makes plenty of room for misrepresentation. In these examples, the
content ascriptions are similar to those provided by Millikan’s theory, but the hybrid account
relies on causal connections between representations and reality rather than on mere correlations.
An interesting point made by Pietroski is that Millikan’s teleosemantics looks appealing
because there are cases where the contents it ascribes coincide with those ascribed by a plausible
intentional explanation of behavior: “selection explanations and intentional explanations
sometimes make reference to the same properties; and this is probably what makes teleological
accounts of content like Millikan’s look so plausible” (Pietroski 1992: 278). For example, he
points out, the plausible intentional explanation of frogs’ tongue-darting behavior and the
evolutionary explanation of why frogs have such a trait both make reference to bugs (Pietroski
1992: 278). Pietroski’s kimus case is meant to show that intentional and evolutionary
explanations do not always coincide. This happens when the crucial Normal condition that
Millikan would regard as determining the content of a representation does not coincide with what
causes the representation: “The kimu example is designed to be just like that of the frog, with
one exception: Whereas bugs at least sometimes cause neural firings in frogs, snorfs never cause
[neural firings] in kimus.” (Pietroski 1992: 274). As Pietroski figured out, when the causes and
the crucial Normal conditions associated with a representation come apart, Millikan’s ascriptions
of content look considerably less plausible. While Pietroski takes his objection to apply to any
teleosemantic theory, the situation is different for causal versions of teleosemantics. Presumably,
a causal version can ascribe contents that are plausible by Pietroski’s standards. As discussed
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above, Neander’s teleosemantics does ascribe to kimus the content that Pietroski argues to be the
plausible one. However, the ascriptions of Neander’s teleosemantics do not always coincide with
what Pietroski regards as plausible ascriptions. In the frog’s case, for example, Pietroski thinks
that the ascription that best explains the tongue-darting behavior is that the frog represents bugs.
This is closer to Millikan’s ascription than Neander’s. So neither Millikan’s theory nor Neander’s
delivers content ascriptions that consistently match the ascriptions which, according to Pietroski,
would be part of a plausible intentional explanation of behavior. The hybrid teleosemantic
approach I am proposing, in contrast, does deliver ascriptions that are more consistently in tune
with Pietroski’s plausible ascriptions and, I dare say, with the ordinary and scientific ascriptions
made to successfully explain animal behavior that is governed by representational states.
In the imaginary kimus case, the hybrid account entails that kimus represent red things,
since red things are the cause of the representations in those occasions where the consumers
managed to perform their function—mainly guiding the kimus up the hill, which was indeed
beneficial because kimus avoided snorfs by going to the hilltop. The causal part of the hybrid
account ensures that—unlike what happens with Millikan’s theory—the contents ascribed are
properly related to creatures’ perceptual capacities. In the frog’s case, the hybrid account entails
that the representations are about prey or frog food, since the presence of prey or frog food was
causally responsible for the tokening of the representation in those occasions where the
consumers succeeded in performing their function of making frogs catch and eat their prey. The
consumer part of the approach ensures that—unlike what happens with Neander’s theory—the
contents ascribed are properly related to creatures’ behavioral repertoires. Unlike Millikan’s
consumer-based and Neander’s producer-based account, the hybrid account ascribes contents
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that are in tune in both cases with what Pietroski argues to be plausible ascriptions, based on
ordinary non-teleosemantic standards. I do think that this is an advantage of the hybrid account,
because the contents suggested as plausible by Pietroski are indeed the ones we would ascribe
based on the causal roles of representations—that is, on their causes and behavioral effects.
While these ascriptions are in principle subject to revision, the identifications of meanings they
provide are overall likely to be correct because—as I argued in Chapter 2—we are largely
successful explaining behavior based on them.
While I agree with Pietroski’s take on what would count as plausible ascriptions, my case
for the hybrid account does not rely merely on Pietroski’s intuitions. Instead, it is based on
methodological considerations about what phenomena it is the task of semantics to explain. As I
pointed out in Chapter 2, following Devitt (1996), we need a relatively uncontroversial
identification of meanings in order to define a common explanatory goal for semantic theories. It
is troubling that the disagreements between semantic theories are not just about what is the best
explanation of the nature of meanings, but also about what counts as a meaning that needs
explanation (Devitt 2012: 62). Given this situation, it is hard to establish that different theories
are genuinely competing with each other to explain the same phenomena. Consider the
disagreement between Millikan and Neander regarding frog’s representations. Their theories
disagree about what non-semantic phenomena are responsible for the content of these
representations; but they also disagree about what is the content to be explained: whether frogs
represent frog food or small and dark moving things. Why should we regard their theories as
competing with each other? We need a common and theory-neutral identification of what needs
explanation to regard them as rivals. 77 Furthermore, it is problematic that the identification of the
77 Otherwise, it may look like Millikan and Neander are simply interested in different aspects of frogs’
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putative content (the explanandum) seems to depend exclusively on the very theories that offer
the explanation of its nature (the explanans).
Perhaps the main point made by Pietroski in his objection to Millikan is that we need a
theory-independent identification of contents in order to be able to judge whether Millikan’s
theory succeeds or fails at explaining them (Pietroski 1992: 277). I argued in Chapter 2,
following Devitt (1996), that folk and scientific content ascriptions based on representations’
causal roles provide the needed independent identifications. This happens to be also the sort of
theory-independent ascription that Pietroski has in mind. As his discussion makes clear, he takes
proper content ascriptions to be those that contribute to the explanation of behavior and take into
consideration the causes of representations. He also regards discriminatory capacities as relevant
to (perceptual) content. I made a distinction above (see Section 5.4) between a reasonable and a
problematic discrimination requirement: the problematic one is that a creature cannot have a
perceptual representation of Xs if it is not able to discriminate Xs from some non-Xs—which
does not make room for false positives—while the reasonable one is that a creature cannot have a
perceptual representation of Xs if it is not able to discriminate Xs from any non-Xs.
Consider the kimus case. It is reasonable to conjecture that this case looks prima facie
like a counter-example to Millikan’s theory precisely because our ordinary standards for content
ascriptions would rule against kimus having representations of snorfs or snorf-free areas. Based
on the behavior of kimus and the stimuli that causes it we would likely ascribe to them instead
representations of—and an attraction towards—red things. Cognitive ethologists or comparative
representational activity, which they are honoring with the label of “meaning”. Recall Lycan’s humorous
“Double Indexical” theory of meaning—“MEANING =def Whatever aspect of linguistic activity happens to
interest me now” (Lycan 1984: 272)—which we could paraphrase more broadly here as follows: “MEANING
=def Whatever aspect of representational activity happens to interest me now”.
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psychologists studying kimus’ behavior would do the same. The discovery that kimus’ fondness
for red things evolved because the nearby red-looking hilltop happened to be snorf-free is not
likely to prompt a revision of this ascription. Since kimus’ cannot discriminate a snorf from
anything else and their perceptual systems are not causally sensitive to snorfs or their absence,
the best explanation of kimus’ behavior remains the one in terms of perception of—and fondness
for—red things.
Now let us consider the frog’s case. Neander complains that it has been an assumption in
the philosophical debate that the frog’s state represents “frog food or fly or some such thing” and
that it misrepresents when triggered by a bee bee (Neander 1995: 131). But this hypothesis is
based on ascriptions made after witnessing frogs’ hunting/feeding behavior and the stimuli that
causes it—ascriptions that provide a very plausible explanation of frogs’ behavior. Our ordinary
ascriptions are not perfect. People tend to ascribe more complex and fine-grained contents than
animals’ representations are likely to have. Some people may think that frogs can represent flies
qua flies, crickets qua crickets, etc. Also, some people may ascribe beliefs and desires to frogs:
“It thinks there is a fly passing by and wants to eat it”. But even such anthropomorphizing
ascriptions often seem to contain a grain of truth. In any case, misconceptions can be easily
corrected by studying further frogs’ behavior: we can go scientific. Consider the revolutionary
research on frogs’ vision by Jerry Lettvin and his colleagues. Lettvin et al. (1959) start the
presentation of their discoveries with some crucial observations about frogs’ behavior:
A frog hunts on land by vision. He escapes enemies mainly by seeing them... The
frog does not seem to see… the detail of stationary parts of the world around him.
He will starve to death surrounded by food if it is not moving. He will leap to
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capture any object the size of an insect or worm, providing it moves like one. He
can be fooled easily… by any moving small object. (Lettvin et al. 1959: 1940)
After exposing frogs to various stimuli—fooling them in various ways—and measuring with
electrodes the responses in their nervous systems, they discovered that frogs have different
feature detectors—i.e., neurons that respond to specific stimuli such as moving edges or the net
dimming of light. The most interesting ones were “convexity detectors”:
We have been tempted... to call the convexity detectors “bug perceivers.” Such a
fiber... responds best when a dark object, smaller than a receptive field, enters that
field, stops, and moves about intermittently thereafter... Could one better describe
a system for detecting an accessible bug? (Lettvin et al. 1959: 1951)
Lettvin et al. realize that these neurons play the role of bug detectors, even though they cannot
discriminate bugs from some other things—i.e., small and dark moving things. 78 This is because
of the role of the detectors in the explanation of frogs’ behavior: “the purpose of a frog’s vision is
to get him food and allow him to evade predators” (Lettvin et al. 1959: 1950). Regarding them
merely as detectors of small and dark moving things would not make room for characterizing the
frog as being “fooled” in the lab when engaging in hunting behavior towards a metal pellet.
The fact that the ascriptions entailed by the hybrid account are in tune with ordinary and
scientific ascriptions provides evidence in favor of the approach: independent evidence that the
phenomena explained are indeed meanings. I have focused on the role of ascriptions in the
explanation of behavior, which is one of their main purposes (Devitt 1996). But ascriptions also
78 Notice that this is consistent with the reasonable discrimination requirement, but not with the problematic one,
which would not allow for a characterization of the neurons as bug detectors.
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serve the purpose of informing us about reality (Devitt 1996). In the case of scientific ascriptions
of meaning to the representations used in non-human languages, the main purpose is that of
explaining how animal utterances serve as guides to reality to their intraspecific audiences
(Devitt 2013: Sec. 3). Consider the cases I discussed of vervet monkeys and domestic chickens
(see Chapter 2). Vervets use three distinct vocalizations to warn of the presence of leopards,
eagles and snakes (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). Chickens use two distinct vocalizations to warn
of the presence of aerial predators and land predators (Evans and Marler 1995). Each vocalization
triggers an avoidance behavior in the audience that is appropriate to the particular kind of
predator being announced. What these alarm calls represent, according to the hybrid account, are
the specific kind of predators that cause their utterance when the consumers in the audience
manage to perform Normally their avoidance behavior functions. When a chicken or a young
vervet makes an aerial or eagle call in response to a non-predatory bird—as they often do—this
is a misrepresentation because the running-for-cover behavior it triggers does not perform the
function of protecting from an aerial predator, at least not Normally (it may on occasion do it
abNormally, when the alarm is triggered by a non-predator but a yet unseen aerial predator is
also approaching). In cases of animal communication, the hybrid account also makes ascriptions
that are in tune with those made by scientists studying what “information” animals communicate
to their conspecifics.
The hybrid account looks at what the consumers of representations need to perform their
functions in order to determine which among all the causes that the producers respond to are the
ones that they are supposed to respond to. By relying on the actual causal interactions of
perceptual mechanisms, the approach avoids ascribing implausible contents. By relying on the

238
functions of the consumers to separate Normal from abNormal causes, the approach is able to
make plenty of room for misrepresentation.

5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored the core motivation for teleosemantics and the main teleosemantic
approaches. On one hand, I argued that a consumer- or output-based approach makes ample
room for misrepresentation but can ascribe implausible contents given the cognitive capacities of
the perceptual mechanisms involved. On the other hand, I argued that a producer- or input-based
approach has the advantage of explaining content in terms of what perceptual mechanisms can
causally interact with, but has the drawback of not making enough room for misrepresentation. I
proposed a hybrid producer-consumer approach that promises to make ascriptions that take into
account the capacities of perceptual mechanisms while also making enough room for
misrepresentation. The focus of this chapter has been mainly on basic representations. In the next
chapter I discuss how teleosemantics has been extended to complex human representations and I
argue that a proper teleosemantics for such representations should be articulated in terms of basic
sentence acceptance. The resulting account combines insights from Horwich’s use-theory of
meaning and available teleosemantic theories.
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Chapter 6:
Basic-Acceptance Teleosemantics

6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, I argued that a hybrid producer-consumer teleosemantics ascribes the right contents
to representations—taking into account the capacities of the (perceptual) mechanisms that
produce them, while also making enough room for misrepresentation. The proposal is that the
content of a representation is determined by its Normal cause: what is supposed to cause tokens
in order for them to produce the effects they have the function of bringing about. The focus in
Chapter 5 was on the contents of the most basic representations, which are the least controversial
candidates for a teleosemantic account, since the existence of the mechanisms that produce and
consume them is surely explained by natural selection operating over innate traits. But how can a
teleosemantic approach be extended to cover also the meanings of the sophisticated mental and
linguistic representations used by human beings? I suggested in Chapter 3 that a combination of
basic-acceptance semantics with a teleonomic account of the functions of words and concepts
can overcome the problems of ignorance and error that undermine Horwich’s dispositionalist
version. In this chapter, I will elaborate on what sets apart human representations and what are
the challenges for a teleosemantic account of their contents, I will then discuss available attempts
by Papineau and Millikan to offer a teleosemantics for human representations and critically
assess them. Finally, I will discuss how a basic-acceptance teleosemantics can be articulated and
what advantages does it have over standard teleosemantic accounts and over Horwich’s theory.
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6.2 Etiological Functions and Human Representations
The sophisticated mental and linguistic representations that humans use for thinking and for
communicating with each other differ in a number of ways from the basic representations I
discussed in Chapter 5. Notice that plenty of non-human representations also differ from such
basic representations in at least some of these ways and it is likely that some human
representations are basic. But let us focus on the stark contrast between sophisticated human
representations—which I will simply call “human representations”—and basic representations:
i. Many human representations are acquired rather than innate. Unlike beaver tail-splashes
and the inner states produced by moth’s bat-detectors, which are directly the result of
genetic selection, all the linguistic symbols that humans use to communicate with each
other are the result of linguistic conventions and many—perhaps most—of the mental
symbols that humans use for thinking are the result of learning. Humans coin new
concepts as a result of their interactions with the environment and thought processes, as
well as new words to communicate thoughts involving these new concepts, but they also
acquire concepts from learning the conventional meanings of words in their linguistic
communities. So there is a complex interrelation between human language and thought.
ii. Human representations are compositional. Beaver tail-splashes and the states produced
by moth’s bat-detectors are not combinations of simpler representations and do not
combine into more complex ones. Human sentences and thoughts, in contrast, are
combinations of words and concepts, respectively, and their meanings depend on the
meanings of these parts and the ways they are combined. The recursively applicable rules
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of syntax explain the productivity and systematicity of human language: how a finite
stock of words can be combined into innumerable sentences and how the words of some
sentences can be recombined into other sentences. The hypothesis that thoughts are
syntactically structured combinations of concepts offers a very plausible explanation of
the analogous productivity and systematicity of human thought (Fodor 1987: 147-154).
iii. Most inner human representations only have behavioral effects when combined with
other representations. The activated inner states of moth’s bat-detectors automatically
make moths engage in bat-avoidance behavior without the mediation or collaboration of
other inner representations. Human concepts can only have behavioral effects when
combined into thoughts. But most human thoughts do not have behavioral effects on their
own either: beliefs and desires only cause behaviors when suitably combined with each
other to produce decisions to act—e.g., neither the belief that there is food in the fridge
nor the desire to get food will independently make someone open the fridge to get food.
iv. Human thoughts—as well as the sentences used to express them—are inferentially
linked. The inferential processes involved in theoretical and practical reasoning connect
beliefs and desires to produce new beliefs and desires and, eventually, to produce
decisions to act. The inferential links between thoughts parallel those between sentences.
Just like ‘Dolphins are warm blooded’ can be inferred from ‘Dolphins are mammals’ and
‘All mammals are warm blooded’, someone can come to believe that Dolphins are warm
blooded because of believing that they are mammals and that all mammals are warm
blooded. Since our best explanation of inferential links relies on syntactic structure, the
account of inferential processes as computational operations performed over syntactically
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structured inner representations arguably offers the best explanation of thinking (Fodor
1987: 143-147). While some non-syntactic structures—such as map-like structures—
could in principle account for the productivity and systematicity of thought, it is unclear
how could they account for thinking processes (Devitt 1996: 154-156).
v. Human words as well as concepts have different kinds of meanings. Beaver tail-splashes
and the activated states of month’s bat-detectors have meanings determined by direct
links to reality. While many human words and, more fundamentally, the concepts they
express also have meanings determined by direct links to reality (e.g., ‘tiger’), it is very
plausibly the case that others have meanings determined by links to other words/concepts
(e.g., ‘bachelor’) and yet others have meanings determined by their links to rules of
inference (e.g., ‘and’).
vi. The overall deployment of concepts—and, consequently, of the words used to express
them—is partly a function of inferential processes. While the activated states of moth’s
bat-detectors are directly produced by perceptual mechanisms, many tokens of human
concepts are produced instead by inferential mechanisms that token thoughts containing
them as a result of other thoughts containing them—even when the causal-inferential
chain may begin, for concepts linked to reality, with tokens produced by perception.
Teleosemantics can offer a plausible account of the meanings of basic representations which are
innate, non-compositional, directly connected to perceptual causes and behavioral effects and,
consequently, directly linked to what they represent. But an ambitious teleosemantic theory that
expects to explain the nature of the meanings of mental and linguistic human representations
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must: (1) offer an account of how acquired representations which do not have a history of genetic
selection can have etiological functions, (2) offer an account of the meanings of
thoughts/sentences based on an account of the meanings of concepts/words and how they are
combined, (3) offer and account of the different functions of beliefs and desires and (4) offer an
account of the explanatory role of inference in the performance of the functions of beliefs and
desires. Additionally, as I argued in Chapter 3, a proper theory of meaning must (5) offer an
account of how the meanings of various concepts and words are related either to their links to
reality, their links to other concepts and words or their links to rules of inference, and also (6)
explain how the meanings of linguistic and mental words (i.e., concepts) govern their overall use
in inference. I will argue that none of the available versions of teleosemantics properly satisfies
requirements (5) and (6), but that a teleosemantic theory articulated in terms of basic sentence
acceptance—a “basic-acceptance teleosemantics”—can do so. Recall that I argued in Chapter 3
that we need a basic-acceptance semantics precisely in order to account for the variety of kinds
of meaning and, more importantly, for how meanings govern the uses of words. But I also argued
that Horwich’s dispositionalist version is undermined by problems of ignorance and error. Basicacceptance teleosemantics is meant to overcome this problem by virtue of being based on a
teleonomic account of how words are supposed to be used—instead of a dispositionalist account
of how they are regularly used.
Before elaborating on my proposal, I will discuss the teleosemantic theories that
Papineau and Millikan offer to explain the meanings of human representations. Their accounts
attempt to satisfy requirements (1) to (4). Among these, (1) is the crucial requirement. An
ambitious teleosemantic theory can borrow available (non-teleonomic) accounts of belief-desire
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psychology, inference and compositionality—giving a teleonomic twist to them—as long as
human representations and/or the mechanisms responsible for their deployment have etiological
functions. The most pressing question is how acquired human representations and/or the
mechanisms responsible for their use can have etiological functions. The version of
teleosemantics I will propose is new in regarding basic acceptance as crucial to meaning
determination. But it will borrow plenty from the work of Papineau and Millikan, particularly
regarding how acquired representations can have etiological functions.
How can acquired representations have etiological functions? One option, proposed by
Papineau, is to regard the learning processes responsible for the acquisition of new mental
representations as selective processes (Papineau 1984: 557). Another option, proposed by
Millikan, is to regard acquired mental representations as having functions derived from the
functions of the innate mechanisms responsible for their acquisition and deployment (Millikan
1984: 41-43). Regarding linguistic representations, Millikan suggests that they have etiological
functions because they are socio-culturally reproduced items with their own histories of
selection. I will start discussing mental representations. If Papineau is right, acquired
representations have direct functions. This allows for a fairly straightforward application of
teleosemantics to human mental representations. I will first elaborate on Papineau’s account of
mental content. Afterwards I will contrast it with Millikan’s alternative—and elaborate on her
teleosemantic account of linguistic meaning. It is worth pointing out that despite differences in
their earlier work, the views of Millikan and Papineau have to a large extent converged over the
years. This includes their views of what are the sources of teleonomy for acquired
representations, which happen to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
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6.3 Papineau on Human Mental Representations
Papineau offers accounts of the contents of human beliefs, desires and the concepts that compose
them, which are based on the functions these representations have been allegedly selected for
performing—whether they are innate or acquired. In this section, I will elaborate on his proposal.
Papineau expects his teleosemantic account to cover both innate and acquired
representations, since he conceives the acquisition of new representations as a selective process
that is analogous to the intergenerational selection of innate traits: “Natural selection takes place
in learning as well as in intergenerational evolution (though then it is natural selection of
cognitive components rather than genes).” (Papineau 1984: 557). Dretske’s (1988) suggestion
that the recruitment of representations by operant conditioning may be regarded as a form of
selection is a variant of the same general idea (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3). The idea that learning
processes are selective has an important precedent in twentieth-century psychology. The
influential psychologist B. F. Skinner insisted on the similarity between operant conditioning and
natural selection:
In both operant conditioning and the evolutionary selection of behavioral
characteristics, consequences alter future probability. Reflexes and other innate
patterns of behavior evolve because they increase the chances of survival of the
species. Operants grow strong because they are followed by important
consequences in the life of the individual. (Skinner 1953: 90)
Skinner’s claim is that both innate and learned behaviors are shaped by their effects. While the
phylogenetic shaping of behavior takes long periods of time, working only across multiple
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generations, the ontogenetic shaping of behavior due to operant conditioning takes place in short
periods of time, during the life of individuals. Skinner suggested that both processes “change the
organism so that it adjusts to its environment in the sense of behaving in it more effectively...
Successful responses are selected in both cases, and the result is adaptation” (Skinner 1966:
1211-1212; emphasis added). The idea is that learning is a fast-paced selective process that, just
like its slower phylogenetic counterpart, produces adaptive behaviors. Furthermore, Skinner
pointed out that both the phylogeny and the ontogeny of behavior “seem to «build purpose into»
an organism” so that “an ongoing system acts as if it had a purpose” (Skinner 1966: 1211;
emphasis added). Notice that Skinner here is getting very close to suggesting that the products of
operant conditioning, just like those of natural selection, have teleonomic functions or purposes.
He seems to be warning—just like those biologists that cautiously distinguish teleonomy from
classical teleology—that the sense in which the products of selection can be said to have
“purposes” is not the robust sense of in which intentionally designed items have purposes.
Skinner’s selectionist view of operant conditioning is very plausible—since the analogies
between operant conditioning and natural selection are striking—and it constitutes an important
precedent of the selectionist views of learning proposed by Papineau and Dretske. 79 But
Skinner’s selectionist view is entangled with two problematic features of his thought. First,
Skinner was a radical behaviorist who disregarded inner or mental phenomena as irrelevant to
the explanation of behavior. Second, he expected conditioning to explain the ontogeny of all
acquired behaviors, from the simplest to the most sophisticated ones. This model turned out to be
inadequate and has been largely replaced by a cognitivist model in which inner structures,
79 See Hull, Langman and Glenn (2001) for a detailed discussion of the analogies between operant conditioning
and natural selection—as well as a general characterization of selection that applies to biological evolution,
operant behavior and the workings of the immune system.
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processes and representations play crucial explanatory roles. One of the triggers of this cognitive
revolution was, incidentally, the criticism by Noam Chomsky (1959) of Skinner’s attempt to
explain the acquisition of human verbal behavior in terms of reinforcement (Skinner 1957).
Operant conditioning is now considered just one among many forms of learning—not well suited
to explain verbal or other sophisticated behaviors—and it is often itself taken to involve
cognitive components. Dretske’s suggestion that learning may be regarded as selecting inner
representations, for example, resurrects Skinner’s selective account while disregarding his
behaviorism. However, Dretske only presents the idea as a tentative suggestion, when talking
specifically about representations acquired by means of operant learning (Dretske 1988: 101),
and refrains from fully endorsing a selective account of the functions of all acquired
representations.80 Papineau, in contrast, is confident that the kinds of learning involved in the
acquisition of all inner representations—including human beliefs, desires and concepts—are
function-conferring selective processes. He offers the following hypothetical illustration of how
this may come about in the case of beliefs:
Suppose our individual psychological developments throw up new possible belief
types, new ways of responding mentally to circumstances, at random, analogously
to the way that our genetic history throws up mutations at random. Then we
would expect such new dispositions to become ‘fixed’ just in case belief tokens
give rise to advantageous (that is psychologically rewarding) actions, analogously
to the way that genetic mutations become fixed just in case they have
80 Dretske prefers to talk about the “recruitment” of innate and acquired representations. He is only committed to
the recruitment of innate representations being a selective process. But he does not elaborate much on how the
recruitment of both innate and acquired representations is a function-conferring process. Godfrey-Smith argues
that this “leaves a gap in [Dretske’s] theory” that should be filled in by a selective account which “can apply
equally to genetic and learning-theoretic cases” (Godfrey-Smith 1992: 291).
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advantageous (offspring-producing) results. (Papineau 1987: 66)
Papineau does not articulate a detailed account of how human beings actually acquire
representations—which is something better left for scientific psychology to figure out. But he
warns that the link between sophisticated representations and behaviors in human belief-desire
psychology is not fixed merely by conditioning which, he points out, is a “relatively primitive
method of generating actions” (Papineau 1993: 79-80). Nonetheless, he expects the acquisition
of the relevant representations to have—just like operant conditioning—crucial features in
common with genetic selection. This is a very interesting idea. It is very plausible that some
inner representations are acquired by means of some selective process. It is doubtful, however,
that the analogy with genetic selection can be properly extended from operant conditioning to the
kinds of learning involved in the acquisition of all novel representations. But the account can be
combined with the account Millikan offers (see Section 6.4) in order to provide a solid
teleonomic account of the acquisition of human mental representations. I will elaborate on how
Papineau makes use of this idea to offer a teleosemantic account that applies equally to the
meanings of innate and acquired human representations.
Papineau offers teleonomic accounts of the contents of beliefs, desires and the concepts
that compose them. Regarding beliefs, his suggestion is the following:
The disposition to form a given type of belief is explained by the fact that that
belief has typically arisen in certain circumstances, and in those circumstances the
actions that it has directed have been selectively advantageous. The typical
circumstances in question are the belief’s truth conditions. (Papineau 1984: 557)
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Since Papineau regards learning as a selective process, this account is supposed to cover all
beliefs. The idea is that a belief (whether acquired or innate) has been selected because it has had
beneficial behavioral effects (either for the individual or for its ancestors) when tokened under
specific conditions. Given its selective history, the belief is supposed to be tokened in such
conditions, which are what it represents—its truth-conditional content. This account has the
virtue of making room for misrepresentation: belief tokens are false when they occur in
“untypical” circumstances that differ from those under which those types of tokens where
selected (Papineau 1984: 558). Suppose that I have acquired a disposition to token certain belief
because past tokens of this belief had beneficial behavioral effects specifically when it was
raining—such as helping me stay dry by making me seek cover or pick up an umbrella. My
belief is consequently supposed to be co-present with the occurrence of rain and it is false when
tokened in the absence of rain.
Notice that Papineau’s account is somewhat similar to Millikan’s account of the content
of basic innate representations—although extended to cover acquired representations: in both
cases the content is the condition that the representation, given its selective history, is supposed
to covary with. (A crucial difference is that Papineau relies on “typical” conditions, while
Millikan relies on “Normal” conditions—and the difference is not merely terminological, since
he does regard such conditions as those that were average during the selection period. This leads
to a problem that I will point out in the next section.)
Beliefs, however, differ from basic representations not only because they are often not
innate, but also because they only cause actions when combined with desires. My belief that it is
raining will only make me pick up an umbrella or seek cover if I want to stay dry. Also, the
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contents of beliefs and desires depend on the contents of concepts that compose them and the
way they are combined. The content of the belief that elephants swim depends on the content of
the concepts expressed by ‘elephants’ and ‘swim’—and presumably on its predicational
structure. Papineau attempts to accommodate these complexities by offering teleonomic accounts
of the content desires, of the content concepts and of how the different pieces of the puzzle fit
together.
The “biological purpose” of desires, Papineau proposes, is to cause behaviors that bring
about conditions which meet the varying needs of the organism. He offers the following account
of their content:
[The] satisfaction condition for a given desire is that characteristic result of the
actions it directs which has been selectively advantageous, and the production of
which therefore explains the disposition to form that desire. (Papineau 1984: 562)
The idea is that a desire has been selected because the behaviors prompted by its tokens
produced certain beneficial effects. Given its selective history, the desire is supposed to produce
such effects, to bring about certain conditions in the world, which are what it represents—its
satisfaction conditions. Again, Papineau intends this account to cover innately determined and
acquired states. The explanation of why I have an innate disposition to desire to eat (whenever I
need nutrition) involves intergenerational natural selection: my ancestors benefited from having
inner states that made them get food into their stomachs. According to Papineau, the acquisition
of novel desires is also a selective process (Papineau 1984: 563). The explanation of why I have
a desire to drink coffee in the morning, for example, may be that drinking coffee in the morning
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has been psychologically rewarding in the past, so a disposition to token the desire has been
selected for producing this behavior.
In Papineau’s account, desires and beliefs are both selected because of their behavioral
effects, but their contents depend on different aspects of their roles. The contents of desires are
the conditions they are supposed to produce, while the contents of beliefs are the conditions they
are supposed to be co-present with. Notice that desires “fluctuate… in response to environmental
circumstances”—e.g., the desire to eat is supposed to be triggered when the level of blood sugar
is low—yet they do not represent such circumstances (Papineau 1984: 564). Conversely, beliefs
are supposed to direct behavior, but they do not represent their behavioral effects. How are the
contents of desires and beliefs related to their etiological functions or purposes in Papineau’s
account? In the case of desires, the answer is simple: their contents are the conditions they have
the purpose of bringing about. Regarding beliefs, Papineau’s initial suggestion is that their
purpose is “to be present when certain states of affairs obtain” (Papineau 1984: 559). So their
contents would be the conditions they have the purpose of being co-present with. But this
characterization of the purpose of beliefs is problematic. Etiological functions are selected
effects. Being co-present with certain states of affairs is not even an effect of beliefs. A later
suggestion of Papineau is that the purpose of beliefs is “to produce whichever results will fulfil
the purposes of the desires they are acting in concert with… to generate actions which will
produce desired results in such-and-such conditions” (Papineau 1998: 8). This second suggestion
is preferable. Directing behavior to satisfy the desires they are combined with is an effect that
beliefs could be selected for producing (including acquired beliefs, if Papineau’s selective
account of learning were right). In order to explain their contents in terms of co-presence, then,
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we should not say that beliefs have the purpose of being co-present with certain states of affairs,
but rather that beliefs perform their function of contributing to the satisfaction of desires by
being co-present with certain states of affairs, which are what they represent.
Papineau refines his characterization of the contents of beliefs, taking into account their
collaboration with desires: “we should count as the truth conditions of beliefs not simply
circumstances in which the resulting actions have advantageous effects, but rather circumstances
in which those actions lead to the satisfaction of desires” (Papineau 1984: 564-65). Consider, for
example, my disposition to form the belief that the artifact I am perceiving is my television’s
remote control. According to Papineau’s account, the explanation of why this belief has been
selected is that its tokens have led in “typical circumstances” to the satisfaction of the desires
they were combined with. The “typical circumstances” were specifically those in which I was
perceiving my television’s remote control, so those circumstances are the belief’s truth
conditions. Once the truth conditions of the belief have been fixed by its selective history, tokens
will still cause similar behaviors when combined with similar desires, but they may be false and,
consequently, fail to perform their function. When combined with the desire to turn on the
television, the belief will make me press the artifact’s power button. When combined with the
desire to turn off the sound of the television, it will make me press the artifact’s mute button.
Such behaviors may succeed or fail to satisfy the relevant desires depending on whether the
belief is tokened in “typical” or “untypical” circumstances—e.g., when I mistake my stereo’s
remote control for my television’s, I fail to turn on the television when pressing the artifact’s
power button. Basically, Papineau explains the current success or failure of an already selected
belief in performing its function in terms of its truth or falsity and the truth conditions of the
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belief in terms of its past success in contributing to the satisfaction of desires. (Papineau further
characterizes truth conditions of a belief as those that guarantee the success of actions based on
them. This is another problematic feature that I will briefly discuss in the next section.)
A belief will produce different behaviors in combination with different desires. Beliefs do
not have specific behavioral effects of their own—however, they do have specific circumstances
under which they are supposed to be tokened. Similarly, a desire will produce different behaviors
in combination with different beliefs. My desire to eat may make me open my fridge or go to the
grocery store, depending on what beliefs it is combined with. But Papineau’s account does
require some specific effect of all successful behaviors directed by a desire to be its satisfaction
condition, since this is the condition the desire has the purpose of bringing about. So he suggests
that the content of the desire is the effect it is always supposed to produce, regardless of what
beliefs it is combined with (Papineau 1998: 12). Whether it makes me open my fridge or go the
grocery store, my desire to eat has the purpose of getting food into my stomach. Still, in order to
direct behaviors that fulfill their purposes, desires must be combined with appropriate beliefs:
beliefs that are true and relevant to their satisfaction. Papineau suggests that part of the purpose
of the “inferential mechanism” in the “human decision-making system” is to generate true beliefs
about means to satisfy desires—out of true background beliefs—and that, consequently, there is
an interdependence between the purposes of beliefs, desires and the inferential mechanism
(Papineau 1993: 76-77). The inferential mechanism, he proposes, has been selected for making
valid inferences: “Habits of thought which correspond to... deductively valid steps will tend to be
preserved by natural selection” (Papineau 1987: 77). The advantage of this etiological account is
that it is able to explain why the mechanism is supposed to produce certain conclusions rather
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than others. While “humans often draw invalid conclusions”, Papineau points out, this “doesn’t
show that validity isn’t the inferential mechanism’s purpose, any more than heart failures show
that blood circulation isn’t the heart’s purpose” (Papineau 1993: 77). Notice that a non-historical
account of the function of the inferential mechanism in terms of its current dispositions—of the
sort that a Cummins-style functional analysis would provide—cannot explain inferential error for
the same reason that it cannot explain why a failing heart is malfunctioning (see Chapter 4,
Section 4.7).
Papineau’s discussion of the inferential mechanism focuses on deductive inferences,
including those that have beliefs about means to satisfy desires as conclusions. But a full account
should be extended in two ways. First, it should cover inductive and abductive theoretical
inferences—which also play important roles in how human beings form new beliefs out of old
ones. Second, it should cover practical inferences that have beliefs and desires as premises and
intentions or decisions to act as conclusions—which are crucial to explain how beliefs and
desires are combined to direct behavior. Consider my belief that drinking the liquid in my glass
will quench my thirst. This seems to be the kind of belief about means that Papineau has in mind.
I may have inferred it from my beliefs that lemonade quenches thirst and that the liquid in my
glass is lemonade. But the belief will not make me drink the liquid unless it is combined with my
desire to quench my thirst to produce a decision to act. This form of practical inference provides
a clear example of the interdependence between the purposes of beliefs, desires and the
inferential mechanism. Also, it is in tune with Papineau’s claims that beliefs and desires cannot
have behavioral effects on their own and that the inferential mechanism is part of the decisionmaking system. Once the etiological account has been extended to cover these other forms of
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inference, however, the claim that validity is the purpose of the inferential mechanism must also
be revised. Good inductive and abductive inferences are not valid. Intentions or decisions to act
have satisfaction-conditions rather than truth-conditions, so a good practical inference cannot be
characterized as truth-preserving. What the etiological account must say is that the purpose of the
inferential mechanism (or mechanisms) is to produce conclusions that are well-supported by the
premises—thereby producing (1) beliefs that are guaranteed or likely to be true when the
premises of theoretical inferences are true and (2) decisions to act in ways that satisfy desires
when the beliefs about means in the premises of practical inferences are true.
A crucial piece of the puzzle is still missing. Human beliefs and desires are structured
combinations of meaningful parts. The structures of thoughts are crucial to their participation in
inferential processes. If the purposes of beliefs and desires are interdependent with the purpose
of the inferential mechanism in the decision-making system, then beliefs and desires must have
appropriate structures in order to perform their functions. Additionally, the meanings of thoughts
depend on their structures and the meanings of their parts. A teleonomic account of the functions
and contents of thoughts must explain how they are related to the functions and contents of the
concepts that compose them. Papineau proposes that the function of a concept depends on its
selective history:
A concept will get selected because in combination with other concepts it forms
beliefs which, in ‘typical’ circumstances, lead to advantageous behavior. At
bottom it is the concepts that get selected... And so we can think of concepts
themselves as having purposes – namely, to ‘refer’ to certain objects – which then
contribute to the purposes of beliefs. (Papineau 1987: 76-77)
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Papineau intends a full account to include desires: concepts get selected because they form
beliefs and desires which, in concert with each other, lead to advantageous behavior. Like him, I
will set aside desires for the sake of simplicity. Papineau expects the truth-conditions of beliefs to
be explained by their structure and the referential values of the concepts they contain: “we need
to start with the components of beliefs, such as singular concepts, predicate concepts, ways of
combining concepts and so on, and to focus on the referential values of such components”
(Papineau 1993: 82). His account of truth-conditions in terms of what states of affairs beliefs are
supposed to be co-present with is reductive: it explains truth-conditions non-semantically, in
terms of teleonomic links between beliefs and states of affairs. But he intends the complete
explanation to be compositional: what state of affairs a belief is supposed to be co-present with,
he says, “will depend in turn on the concepts and structure making up the causal role of the
belief” (Papineau 1987: 76). His basic idea is clear: what a concept contributes to the truthcondition of a belief is its referential value, which is reductively explained by its teleonomic
links to certain objects.
Papineau insists that a concept can only get selected because it contributes to beliefs
performing their functions (Papineau 1987: 77). So the teleonomic links between a concept and
certain objects are those links that it had when it was selected because the beliefs it was tokened
in directed advantageous behavior. While Papineau says that the purpose of concepts is to “refer”
to certain objects, this semantic description is a place-holder for a non-semantic one in terms of
teleonomic links. But notice that this characterization of the function of concepts is problematic.
Referring to certain objects—even if this is spelled out in non-semantic terms—is not an effect of
a concept. The effects that concepts could be selected for producing (if Papineau’s selective
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account were right) would rather have to be the effects on behavior they have had when tokened
in beliefs—effects that may then be explained by links to objects. The content of a concept
should not be identified with its function, but with the links it is supposed to have in order to
perform its function of contributing to the production of advantageous behavior.
Suppose that beliefs are mental sentences. According to Papineau’s theory, then, the name
‘Harry’ (i.e., a singular concept) in my mental lexicon was selected because it was tokened in
mental sentences that were co-present with states of affairs involving Harry. The link between
‘Harry’ and Harry was what the word contributed in those occasions to the link between the full
sentences and the complete states of affairs. Similarly, my mental predicate ‘is talking’ (i.e., a
predicate concept) was selected when tokened in mental sentences that were co-present with
talking things. Given their selective history, ‘Harry’ and ‘is talking’ are supposed to be tokened in
sentences that are co-present with states of affairs involving Harry and talking things,
respectively. Now suppose that I combine the name and the predicate, forming a mental token of
‘Harry is talking’. Given its structure and the teleonomic links of its parts, this sentence is
supposed to be co-present with the state of affairs that Harry is talking. If I made a mistake and
the one who is talking is instead Harry’s twin brother, my belief is false because ‘Harry’ has a
teleonomic link to Harry and not to his brother. If I made a mistake and Harry is babbling rather
than talking, my belief is false because ‘is talking’ has a teleonomic link to talking things and not
to things that are making meaningless vocal sounds. Reference is not determined by the current
causal links to reality of tokens of a mental word. So the account makes room for
misrepresentation, for errors in the deployment of mental words.
As we have seen, Papineau adopts the common characterization of the contents of beliefs
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and desires in terms of truth and satisfaction conditions, as well as a compositional
characterization of such conditions in terms of the structures of thoughts and the referential
values of the concepts that compose them. Additionally, he adopts the standard characterization
of the roles of beliefs, desires and inference in the production of behavior. But Papineau explains
each of these elements in terms of etiological functions—specifically, of functions that beliefs,
desires, concepts and even inference patterns have been selected for performing. The main
advantage of this etiological twist is that it promises to make room for representational error. I
have tried to offer a sympathetic summary of Papineau’s views. But the way he articulates his
teleosemantic account does face some difficulties—the most serious of which stems from his
bold suggestion that the learning processes responsible for all acquired mental representations
are selective processes. These problems are avoided by combining his account with Millikan’s
alternative one. In the next section, I will explain how Millikan’s account of the functions and
contents of mental representations differs from Papineau’s, discuss how it avoids some problems
faced by Papineau’s account and elaborate on how Millikan extends teleosemantics to cover
linguistic representations. Afterwards, I will discuss the problems shared by both accounts and
argue that a basic-acceptance teleosemantics can overcome them.

6.4 Millikan on Human Mental Representations
Millikan’s teleosemantic account of the contents of human mental representations has many
features in common with Papineau’s. Like Papineau, she proposes that the main etiological
function of desires is to bring about certain conditions in the world, which constitute their
contents or satisfaction conditions, and that beliefs—given their etiological functions—are
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supposed to be correlated with certain conditions in the world, which constitute their contents or
truth conditions. Millikan also offers a teleonomic account of the inferential mechanisms
involved in the decision-making system and a compositional explanation of the contents of
thoughts in terms of their structure and the teleonomic links to reality of the concepts they
contain. So described, Millikan’s proposal seems identical to Papineau’s. But this general
description glosses over some differences between the proposals, which I will discuss in this
section. I will first discuss the similarities and some minor differences between the proposals.
Afterwards I will focus on the most significant difference: that Millikan’s account of the
functions of acquired mental representations does not rely on their own selective history, but on
the selective history of the innate mechanisms responsible for their acquisition and use: novel
mental representations have derived rather that direct functions. I shall argue that this feature of
Millikan’s account is a crucial contribution to the project of extending teleosemantics to cover
acquired mental representations. While it is indeed very plausible that some acquired
representations have selective histories of their own, as Papineau suggests, there are reasonable
doubts about all of them having such histories. However, there are good reasons for expecting
that the underlying innate mechanisms that enable human beings to coin and deploy novel
representations been selected for doing so. So a combination of both accounts of the source of
teleonomy for human mental representations is preferable. After discussing Millikan’s account of
acquired mental representations, I will present her proposal for how to extend teleosemantics to
cover acquired linguistic representations.
Let us start with desires. Like Papineau, Millikan proposes that the contents of desires are
individuated by their purposes: “the descriptions that we give of desires are descriptions of their
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most obvious proper functions” (Millikan 1993: 67). The content we ascribe to a desire,
according to Millikan, is the condition it has the purpose of bringing about if the ascription is
correct. Millikan suggests that desires have an additional purpose related to their role in the
decision-making system: “desires have as a subsidiary proper function to participate in practical
inferences along with beliefs” (Millikan 1993: 71). The idea is that desires perform their main
function—bringing about their satisfaction conditions—by means of performing the function of
participating in inferences that combine them with relevant beliefs to produce decisions to act.
Like Papineau, Millikan suggests that the inferential mechanisms themselves have etiological
functions. One such function is “to produce true beliefs from prior beliefs... by conforming to
logical principles... that move us to true beliefs reliably, or relatively reliably (inductive
inference), from other truths” (Millikan 1993: 245-46).81 She also stresses that the inferential
mechanisms have the function of combining beliefs and desires to produce decisions to act
(Millikan 1993: 99).
In contrast with her view on desires, Millikan argues that the contents of beliefs are not
individuated by their purposes. One function of a belief, she proposes, is “to participate in
inferences in such a manner as to help produce fulfillment of desires”, while another function is
“to participate in inferences to yield other beliefs, true ones” (Millikan 1993: 71). Millikan’s
account of the functions and contents of beliefs differs in some respects from Papineau’s. She
does identify, like Papineau, the truth-conditional content of a belief with the state of affairs it is
supposed to be correlated with—or, as she prefers to put it, “correspond” or “map onto”.
However, she does not regard mapping onto a state of affairs as the function of a belief. So why
81 The inferential mechanisms can also function properly when producing true beliefs from prior false beliefs—as
it is the case when they perform correct reductio inferences (Millikan 1993: 246n).
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is the belief supposed to map onto a specific state of affairs? Millikan’s general answer is the
same as the one she gives in the case of basic representations: mapping onto a specific state of
affairs is the crucial Normal condition for the performance of the belief’s function (Millikan
1993: 71-74). When I presented Millikan’s account of the content of basic representations
(Chapter 5, Section 5.4), I pointed out that the notion of a “Normal condition” is a normative and
historical notion: it is a condition that must obtain for an item to perform its function in
accordance with a Normal explanation—which in turn is an explanation of what has historically
happened during the proper performance of the function. This simple model must be adjusted in
order to apply to the performance of the derived functions that novel human beliefs have
according to Millikan. I will set this aside to simplify matters, but I will get back to it shortly. For
the moment, I will simply assume that Millikan has a way to account for the functions of novel
representations and the Normal conditions for their performance. Another complexity is that the
mapping in the case of human beliefs is not between a simple representation and a state of
affairs, but involves instead some sort of compositional principles according to which a belief is
supposed to map onto a certain portion of reality based on its structure and the referential links to
reality of the concepts it contains—just like in Papineau’s full account. I will also set these issues
aside for a moment.
Millikan’s account of the functions of beliefs, as well as her notion of a “Normal
condition”, differs from Papineau’s account of the functions of beliefs and his notion of a
“typical circumstance”. As I pointed out above, Papineau’s proposal that the function of a belief
is “to be present when certain states of affairs obtain” (Papineau 1984: 559) does not fit well with
the view that functions involve effects.82 Millikan, in contrast, characterizes the functions of a
82 Here is another passage where Papineau expresses this view: “the biological purpose of beliefs [is] to occur in
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belief clearly in terms of the effects it is supposed to have: one function of a belief is “to
participate in inferences in such a manner as to help produce fulfillment of desires”, while
another function is “to participate in inferences to yield other beliefs, true ones” (Millikan 1993:
71). In fairness, Papineau’s later proposal—i.e., that the function of a belief is “to produce
whichever results will fulfil the purposes of the desires they are acting in concert with”
(Papineau 1998: 8)—is equivalent to Millikan’s and does not have the problem of his initial one,
as I pointed out in the last section. The views of Millikan and Papineau have converged on this
matter. Still, there are a couple of other significant differences on which the accounts differ.
Recall that, for Papineau, a belief represents those “typical circumstances” under which it
has lead to advantageous behavior. For Papineau, the “typical” circumstances under which a
belief is supposed to be tokened are the average or ecologically normal conditions that obtained
during the period when it was selected. This allows for beliefs being misrepresentations when
tokened in “untypical” circumstances after selection has taken place: “it is only the past
predominance of true belief over false that is required” (Papineau 1984: 558). But this does not
make enough room for misrepresentation happening during the selection period. As Devitt
objects in his review of Papineau (1987):
The insistence that a belief must have had a history of usually being true runs into
the problem that was so disastrous for the... hybrid theory consisting of
informationalism with a dash of teleology… This is the problem of false
the presence of certain states of affairs, which states of affairs therefore [count] as their truth conditions”
(Papineau 1987: xvi). Papineau (1993) still makes a similar claim: “we can pick out the real truth condition of a
belief as that condition which it is the biological purpose of the belief to be co-present with” (Papineau 1993:
58). But he clarifies in a footnote: “biological purposes are always a matter of results… the purposes of beliefs
are to get the organism to behave in a way appropriate to certain circumstances” (Papineau 1993: 59n). This
latter claim avoids the mentioned problem.

263
positives. Many species have survived only by mostly misrepresenting the world.
What got selected, from the beginning, were beliefs whose tokens were true when
it mattered for survival, even though they may have been mostly false. In this
crucial respect, Papineau’s full-blown teleological theory is no advance over the
partly teleological hybrid theory. (Devitt 1991: 439)
The hybrid theory that Devitt is alluding to here is the combination of indicator semantics with
an etiological account of functions offered by Dretske (1988). Papineau’s account based on
“typical conditions” suffers from the same problem with false positives (see Chapter 5, Section
5.3). Additionally, Papineau characterizes typical circumstances as guaranteeing the success of
behaviors: “truth conditions are circumstances which ensure the success of action” (Papineau
1984: 565). As Devitt remarks, this is simply wrong: “Truth does not guarantee success. The
satisfaction of many desires depends on things that are quite outside the control of the desirer: on
the natural order; on the socio-economic situation; on the personal foibles of others; and so on.”
(Devitt 1991: 439). Based on my true belief that it is raining I may carry an umbrella and
succeed in staying dry. But there may be no umbrella around. My true belief obviously does not
guarantee that I will succeed.
Millikan’s characterization of content-fixing circumstances avoids the two problems just
mentioned: her Normal conditions are neither typical conditions nor success-guaranteeing
conditions. Instead, they are the conditions that obtained on those special historical
circumstances under which the representation successfully performed its function. Such
conditions may have rarely obtained when the representation was tokened. As I showed in
Chapter 5, Section 5.4, Millikan’s account in terms of Normal conditions makes room for
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frequent false positives. Additionally, the conditions may obtain on plenty of occasions when the
representation fails to perform its function. That a frog darts its tongue in the presence of a fly
does not guarantee that the fly will not manage to escape. Millikan’s account has no problem
with this because her “Normal conditions” are not sufficient conditions for the performance of a
function.83 An output-oriented teleosemantic theory like Papineau’s, which attempts to explain
the truth-conditions of beliefs in terms of circumstances that they are supposed to be co-present
or covary with in order to bring about beneficial effects, is better off relying on a Millikanian
notion of Normal conditions. I take it that this is a small but helpful amendment for a theory like
Papineau’s. As I argued in Chapter 5, however, while an output-oriented teleosemantics based on
Normal conditions makes plenty of room for misrepresentation (including false positives), it also
faces problems that stem from not assigning any role whatsoever to the causes of representations
in the determination of their meaning. This is a shared—and in my opinion serious—concern
about Millikan’s and Papineau’s accounts. I will get back to it in the next section.
It is time to discuss the main difference between the proposals of Millikan and Papineau
—at least as originally articulated—which concerns their accounts of the source of teleology for
acquired mental representations. While Papineau proposes that learning processes are selective,
Millikan suggests that acquired representations have functions derived from the functions of the
innate mechanisms that are ultimately responsible for their acquisition and deployment. I
discussed Millikan’s account of derived functions in Chapter 4, Section 4.6. Recall that,

83 As Justine Kingsbury points out, Millikan’s Normal conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions
for a representation performing its function (Kingsbury 2006). The reason they are not necessary is that the
token of a representation may perform its function abNormally in situations when the Normal condition does not
obtain. For example, a beaver may mistakenly token an alarm call, causing all the family to dive for safety, after
hearing a branch fall from a tree, but by pure accident save the family from an undetected predator that was
lurking around. It is easy to imagine analogous situations involving human beliefs.

265
according to Millikan, an item A has a derived function to do F if and only if A is the product of a
device M that has the direct function of producing items like A in order to do F (Millikan 1993:
13-14). (Strictly speaking, the device M may also have a derived function to produce items like
A, but then such a function will have to be derived from another device that has the function of
producing devices like M… Derived functions must be ultimately anchored on the direct
functions of mechanisms that have been historically built and maintained by a selective process.)
For example, the color pattern of the skin of a Smith’s dwarf chameleon has the function of
protecting the chameleon from predators by making it blend with its surroundings. But the
pattern has not itself been selected for doing this. It is not itself a reproduction of earlier patterns
and, in fact, it may be a pattern that has never occurred before in the evolutionary history Smith’s
dwarf chameleons. However, the pattern is the product of innate mechanisms that have the
function of producing such color patterns in order to protect chameleons from predators. The
mechanisms have been built and maintained by natural selection precisely for doing this.
Consequently, the color pattern has the derived function of protecting the chameleon from
predators. According to Millikan, the relationship between the functions of novel representations
and the functions of the innate mechanisms responsible for producing them is of the same kind
(Millikan 1984: Ch. 2 & 1993: Ch. 4).
Consider the functions ascribed by Millikan’s theory to human desires and beliefs: the
function of desires being to bring about their satisfaction conditions by participating in
inferences that combine them with relevant beliefs to produce decisions to act; and the function
of beliefs being to participate in inferences to produce other beliefs and to help produce the
fulfillment of desires. As far as acquired beliefs and desires are concerned, these are, according
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to Millikan, derived functions that these states have because the mechanisms that produce them
have the function of producing such states as means to perform their ultimate functions—which
we may characterize, very roughly, as modulating behavior in ways that are appropriate, given
varying conditions in the world, to satisfy our varying needs. The machinery involved in the
deployment of human mental representations is orders of magnitude more complicated than the
machinery involved in the deployment of the basic internal representations discussed in Chapter
5—such as the frog’s “bug detector”. It involves a whole system of beliefs and desires composed
out of concepts and interlinked with each other in inferential processes. This complexity makes
the system considerably more flexible. But at bottom it works, just like the most basic systems,
by mediating between inputs from perception and outputs to behavior, according to certain
principles of operation:
The human’s mainframe takes, roughly, stimulations of the afferent nerves as
input… It responds, in part, by developing concepts, by acquiring beliefs and
desires in accordance with these concepts, by engaging in practical inference
leading ultimately to action… When conditions are optimal, all this aids survival
and proliferation in accordance with a historically normal explanation, one of high
generality, of course. (Millikan 1993: 95)
Millikan’s very reasonable contention is that the innate human mechanisms responsible for our
development of concepts and our acquisition of beliefs and desires have been built and
maintained by natural selection—i.e., “designed”—precisely for doing this, so that producing
novel concepts, beliefs and desires are among their direct functions. After all, the extremely
complex “design” of the human brain responsible for our acquisition of concepts, beliefs and
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desires calls for an explanation. And the only viable explanation is the Darwinian one.
As I said above, the account of belief content in terms of Normal conditions needs to be
adjusted in the case of acquired beliefs. Since an acquired belief has no selective history of its
own on Millikan’s model, the crucial Normal condition for the performance of its derived
functions cannot be one that figures in a Normal explanation of how token beliefs of the same
type historically managed to perform their functions. How can there be Normal conditions for a
device performing a derived function? Millikan’s answer relies on the Normal explanation of
how the mechanisms that produce the device are supposed to work. In the case of the chameleon,
for example, the pigment rearrangement mechanisms are supposed to perform their function—of
protecting it from predator detection—by means of producing patterns of skin color that bear the
relation of having the same-pattern-of-color-as the surface the chameleon is sitting on—
whatever it may be. The Normal condition for a particular and novel pattern of skin color
performing its derived function is, consequently, that is does bear that relation to the surface the
chameleon is sitting on (Millikan 1984: 42-44). For example, if the chameleon’s skin is currently
yellow with black dots, then its Normal condition for performing its derived function—of
protecting the chameleon from predators—is simply that the chameleon is sitting on a surface
that actually is yellow with black dots.
Even though the chameleon’s skin is not a representation, the situation of acquired beliefs
is analogous in Millikan’s account: the crucial Normal condition to perform their derived
functions—of participating in inferences to produce other beliefs and to help in the fulfillment of
desires—is that they bear a certain general type of relation to the world. Millikan proposes that
the relevant relation in the case of beliefs is that of “corresponding to” or “mapping onto”
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portions of reality—because the Normal explanation of how mechanisms that produce beliefs
historically managed to perform their functions is that they produced states that bore such
relations to reality. Millikan’s account of the relation between true beliefs and reality is along the
same lines as Papineau’s. I will say a bit more about it in a moment.
While Millikan relies on functions derived from innate biological mechanisms to extend
her teleosemantics to cover acquired mental representations, she is by no means against
postulating selective processes that work outside the bounds of biological intergenerational
natural selection. Actually, Millikan relies on non-biological selection to offer a teleosemantic
account of the meanings of linguistic representations. Her basic idea is that the elements that
compose a language, including words and syntactic forms, are themselves reproduced items that
spread across linguistic communities by being copied from user to user—and from generation to
generation—forming causal chains of use that constitute lineages or, as Millikan calls them,
“reproductively established families” (Millikan 1984: 19):
The selection of language forms takes place on the social level. Language
survives when it serves cooperative functions often enough, functions that reward
at once both speakers and hearers… Language forms proliferate when aiding
speaker and hearer cooperation on common projects—typically, the sharing of
information… or the coordinating of projects and activities… (Millikan 2005: 85)
Basically, language forms proliferate in this historical process because they are socially selected
to serve “cooperative functions” involving communication. As reproduced items that get
historically selected in order to serve certain purposes, linguistic representations have direct
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functions. Recall that Millikan’s account of a direct function is formulated in general enough
terms to cover the functions of any reproduced items that exist because of being favored by one
or another selective process: an item A has a direct function to perform F if and only if A is a
reproduction of prior items that performed F in the past and A exists because such prior items
performed F (Millikan 1993: 13).
Millikan suggests that the main function of “descriptive” language forms—i.e., the
utterance of indicative sentences—is to produce true beliefs in hearers, while that of “directive”
language forms—i.e., the utterance of imperative sentences—is to produce compliance by
hearers (to make them behave in particular ways). I will focus on indicative sentences. Millikan
relates their function and meaning as follows. Their truth-conditional meaning is determined by
the crucial Normal condition for such sentences to perform their function—of inducing true
beliefs in hearers—in accordance with a Normal explanation: namely, that they bear a relation of
correspondence to reality in accordance with certain “mapping rules” (Millikan 2005: 63).
Even though the functions of beliefs and indicative sentences are different, their truthconditional meanings are alleged by Millikan to be determined in both cases by the Normal
conditions that are supposed to obtain for these representations to perform their functions. In
both cases, the relevant Normal conditions are determined by “mapping rules” that relate the
complete representation to specific portions of reality based on its structure and the referential
properties of its parts—referential properties that are reductively explained in terms of the
teleonomic links between concepts or words and portions of reality such as individuals, stuffs,
kinds and properties (Millikan 2000: 1 & 2005: 66). One of the features that sets apart mental
and linguistic human representations, Millikan suggests, is their logico-syntactic structure: they
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have subject-predicate form and can be negated (Millikan 1984: 308-309 & 1993: 100-101).
Notice that, while expanded to cover also linguistic representations, this is roughly along the
same lines as Papineau’s account of the truth-referential contents of thoughts. Both theories can
be regarded as contributing to the project of reductively explaining reference and truthconditions along the lines of a contemporary version of the correspondence theory of truth—
which combines a Tarskian characterization of truth-conditions based on logico-syntactic
structure and referential properties with a reductive account of reference (see Chapter 2, Section
2.2). Surprisingly, however, Millikan often characterizes her theory of truth-conditions more
ambitiously: as one that involves isomorphisms or picturing relations. I will critically assess such
characterization of her theory in Appendix 1—where I will argue that, despite her rhetoric,
Millikan’s theory does not actually rely on picturing relations.
Millikan’s account of the meanings of linguistic representations, based on their direct
functions qua reproduced devices, is intended to explain the literal meanings of linguistic
representations. It is worth comparing briefly Millikan’s teleonomic account with what may
deserve to be called the “standard” account of the source of literal meanings. The standard
account is that the literal meanings of utterances depend on conventions that link them to the
meanings of speakers’ thoughts. There is a lot to say in favor of this view. On one hand, prima
facie it looks like we use language to communicate what we think: to express our thoughts. On
the other hand, the arbitrary linguistic signs we use to achieve this goal are obviously a matter of
social convention. As David Lewis put it: “It is a platitude that language is ruled by convention”
(Lewis 2002: 1). In English, for example, we use sentences containing the word ‘dog’ to
communicate thoughts about dogs. Other languages use different words with this same purpose.
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And in English any other arbitrary sign could have been used for this purpose. To explain how
this comes about, we need explanations of how we can use utterances to communicate thoughts
and of how linguistic conventions can emerge from our communicative practices. The work of
Paul Grice (1989) is often regarded as helping to solve at least the first part of the puzzle and the
work of Lewis (2002) as helping to solve the second part.
Grice proposed an influential account of what speakers mean by their utterances, based
on complex communicative intentions. The basic idea is that a speaker A means that p by an
utterance x on if “A uttered x with the intention of inducing [in the hearer/s] a belief [that p] by
means of the recognition [by the hearer/s] of this intention.” (Grice 1989: 219). Grice proposed
that the literal meanings of expressions could be explained as regularities that emerge from what
speakers mean based on their communicative intentions: “[to] say what a word means in a
language is to say what it is in general optimal for speakers of that language to do with that
word… what particular intentions on particular occasions it is… optimal for them to have”
(Grice 1989: 299). But this does not seem like a plausible mechanism for literal meanings to
emerge from speakers’ meanings: it seems to over-intellectualize linguistic competence (Millikan
1984: Ch. 3; Horwich 2005: 57-62).
Lewis work on linguistic conventions offers an interesting alternative to Grice. Lewis
suggests that conventions are arbitrary regularities of behavior that are perpetuated because they
solve recurring coordination problems among people. For example, the convention of driving on
the right side of the road arises from the coordination problem faced by drivers wanting to avoid
colliding with each other, and it is arbitrary because driving on the left would have worked
equally well. Once a solution to the coordination problem arises, it serves as a precedent that
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people continue relying on when the problem recurs, so a behavioral regularity emerges. The
particular coordination problems that language conventions solve are related to communication.
People want to share thoughts with each other, so certain regularities in the use of words emerge
to facilitate this task. Lewis idea is that speakers conform to certain regularities in their use of
words because they have managed to truthfully communicate what they think by conforming to
those regularities in the past (Lewis 2002: 179). Just like in the case of driving on the right side
of the road, other regularities would have worked equally well—e.g., the word ‘dog’ could have
been used in English to share thoughts about cats. But once a solution arises—e.g., using the
word ‘dog’ to share thoughts about dogs—, it will serve as a precedent that people will continue
to rely on to solve the same coordination problem when it arises again—e.g., sharing thoughts
about dogs—; so a linguistic convention will emerge. The crucial advantage of Lewis’ account
over Grice’s is that it relies on precedent—so that speakers and hearers do not need to keep
relying on complex nested intentions on every communicative interaction. Once a convention
has emerged, speakers and hearers can simply rely on the available recipe.
Millikan’s account of the linguistic conventions responsible for the literal meanings of
words is similar in some respects to Lewis’. First, she also proposes that linguistic conventions
emerge as solutions to coordination problems related to communication. Second, she also
regards linguistic conventions as patterns emerging due to the weight of precedent—e.g., the
word ‘dog’ is used to share information about dogs because it has been successfully used in the
past with that purpose. But the crucial difference with Lewis’s account is that Millikan does not
characterize linguistic conventions as mere regularities, but as reproduced patterns that
proliferate because they perform coordinating functions. Lewis initially proposed that a pattern
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of behavior is conventional if everyone conforms to it (Lewis 2002: 42). This is too strong. He
later relaxed this requirement, suggesting that a behavior is conventional if almost everyone
conforms to it (Lewis 2002: 78). But even this relaxed requirement turns out to be too
demanding. Speakers may often fail to conform to the conventional pattern, because they
misspeak, they misuse words due ignorance or error, they commit grammatical mistakes, and so
forth. Surely the literal meanings of words are a matter of conventions governing their use. But
an account of such conventions as regularities cannot make enough room for misuses of words.
One alternative is to treat linguistic conventions as involving norms instead of
regularities. A clear example is Robert Brandom’s account, according to which meanings are
engendered by norms governing the use of words. This approach has the advantage of making
room for misuses of words: the existence of norms, after all, does not require almost everyone to
conform to them. But the approach also has a serious drawback: while Brandom offers a
“reductive story about norms as instituted by social practices”, he insists on “the irreducibly
normative character of the metalanguage in which norm-instituting social practices are specified”
(Brandom 1994: 626)—which entails that meanings cannot be reduced to natural facts. As
Brandom acknowledges, his theory is “opposed to naturalism” (Brandom 2000: 26).
In Millikan’s account, like in Brandom’s, the conventions governing the use of words
transcend mere regularities and provide a basis for distinguishing correct uses from misuses. But
Millikan’s account, unlike in Brandom’s, is fully consistent with naturalism. Instead of relying on
prescriptive norms that are irreducible to natural facts, it relies on what we might call
“teleonomic norms”. As Millikan puts it:
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[The] central norms applying to language are… like those norms of function and
behavior that account for the survival and proliferation of biological species…
Specific linguistic forms survive and are reproduced together with cooperative
hearer responses because often enough these patterns of production and response
benefit both speakers and hearers. Like conformity to… biological norms,
conformity to these patterns need not be uniform or even average. In some cases
conformity may not even be particularly common. Conformity is needed only in a
critical mass of cases, enough to insure [sic] that the cooperative use constituting
the norm—the convention—continues to be copied… (Millikan 2005: vi)
If the conventions that govern the use of words are teleonomic norms, then they establish how
words are supposed to be used. This has the advantage of making plenty if room for misuse
while anchoring the literal meanings of words on natural facts. Notice that Millikan’s account of
the literal meanings of words in human languages is at its core analogous to her account of the
meaning of simple animal languages. The main differences are that in the case of human
languages the reproduction is cultural rather than biological and the teleonomic links are
complex: the teleonomic links between sentences and states of affairs are determined by the
logico-syntactic structure of sentences and the reference-determining teleonomic links between
their words and the individuals, stuffs, kinds or properties that (allegedly) make up those states of
affairs. The same compositional “mapping rules” apply to her account for the contents of
thoughts. Millikan tends to present her theory as a teleosemantic version of a “picture” theory of
truth-conditions. This is a problematic aspect of her work that I will leave to discuss in Appendix
1. Setting that issue aside, the main point is that on Millikan’s account the meanings of concepts

275
and words are basically their referential properties, which Millikan explains in terms of their
direct teleonomic links to entities in the world.

6.5 Assessing Papineau’s and Millikan’s Teleosemantics
In the previous two sections I elaborated on the attempts by Papineau and Millikan to offer
teleosemantic accounts of the meanings of sophisticated human representations. In this section, I
will briefly assess their proposals regarding how to extend the etiological account of functions to
human representations and discuss some problems with—and limitations of—their theories of
meaning. I will argue that there is good reason to expect a teleonomic account of human
cognition and communication to succeed. But I will argue that the specific accounts of meaning
that Millikan and Papineau offer are inadequate because (1) they rely on reference-determining
teleonomic links that abstract away from the causes of representations, (2) they do not offer
adequate accounts of the meanings of non-primitive symbols and (3) they do not ascribe
meanings that could plausibly govern the overall use of symbols in inference. The first problem
is related to the concerns of Pietroski (1992) and Neander (1995) about output-based
teleosemantics that I discussed in Chapter 5. The second and third problems are specific to
human symbols: they are related to the generality and explanatory power considerations that
favor—as I argued in Chapter 3—a basic-acceptance approach over other approaches.
Papineau and Millikan make interesting proposals regarding the source of teleonomic
functions for acquired mental representations. Millikan even suggests a bold account of the
source of teleonomic functions for linguistic representations. Are their proposals plausible?
Let us begin with Papineau’s suggestion that learning processes are selective in nature. As
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I pointed out in Section 6.3, learning by operant conditioning exhibits striking similarities to
natural selection. As Skinner observed, it is able to “select” behaviors based on their effects, just
like it happens in the natural selection of hereditary traits, but during the life of individual
creatures (Skinner 1953 & 1966). But does the similarity between operant conditioning and
natural selection extend to other forms of learning and, in particular, those involved in the
development of human concepts and the acquisition of human beliefs and desires? It is very
plausible that processes involved in the acquisition of some mental representations are selective.
Recall Dretske’s example of a pigeon that learns to get food by pecking on a screen if and only if
pictures of trucks are displayed (Dretske 1988: 153). If conditioning can achieve such results in a
humble pigeon, it is not hard to imagine that humans could develop perceptual and perhaps
conceptual skills through conditioning in similar ways. Another form of learning that is shaped
by effects and can plausibly be seen as a selective process is trial and error learning. Perhaps
some acquired human beliefs are fixed by some form of trial and error. Nevertheless, the
processes involved in the acquisition of some representations do not seem to be selective.
Suppose that someone learns that elephants can swim after a single encounter with a swimming
elephant. This example illustrates a standard way in which we form many of our beliefs: we
combine concepts we already possess in novel ways as a result of our interactions with the
world. Yet, there is nothing here that resembles natural selection. The belief does not seem to be
selected from competing variations and no beneficial effect is responsible for its fixation.
Acquiring a true belief is, of course, something that is potentially beneficial. But the benefit may
come after the belief has been fixed or never. Another example of a belief that is not acquired
through a selective process comes from Papineau himself, who proposes that a function of the
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inferential mechanisms is to generate new beliefs about means to satisfy desires out of
background beliefs. Clearly, such inferential processes are not selective.
Because some acquired representations are not selected by a learning process, they
cannot have direct functions. Papineau’s proposal has the advantage of being simpler that
Millikan’s, but it cannot account for all acquired representations. That is why Millikan’s proposal
that acquired representations have functions derived from the mechanisms responsible for their
acquisition is crucial to extend teleosemantics to human mental representations. And there are
compelling reasons to support Millikan’s proposal. Human beings are only able to develop new
concepts and acquire new beliefs and desires during their lifetimes because they are born with
complex brains that come equipped with innate mechanisms that make this possible. This is
beyond dispute. But once we acknowledge this, it becomes clear that there must be some
explanation of why we have such mechanisms. Pure chance is not a good explanation. But even
if some complex trait happened to be built by pure chance, that would not account for why it was
maintained. But there is the reasonable concern that what look like complex traits that constitute
adaptations—that have been selected for—may instead be byproducts of the selection for other
traits (Gould & Lewontin 1979; Gould & Vrba 1982). To assess this concern, it is crucial to
distinguish between two very different kinds of byproducts: (1) those that originated as
byproducts of other traits but have been subsequently maintained by natural selection because
they turned out to be adaptive or beneficial for survival, and (2) those that continue to exist
without any selection for them—so-called “spandrels”—because they continue to be mere
byproducts of other beneficial traits. If the complex mechanisms responsible for the acquisition
of new human representations were of the former kind, then their maintenance by natural
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selection would be enough to confer teleonomic functions to them—and derived functions to
their products. If instead they were of the latter kind, then they would not have teleonomic
functions.
A point that often goes unnoticed is that the claim that a complex trait is merely a
“spandrel” is a very bold hypothesis—as bold and in as much need of evidence as the hypothesis
that the trait is an adaptation. The mere abstract possibility of some traits being “spandrels” does
not seriously undermine teleosemantics, because it is prima facie implausible that having
acquired concepts, beliefs and desires in our cognitive repertoires does not confer an advantage
for survival: “To suspect that the brain has not been preserved for thinking with—… in the
absence of any alternative hypothesis—would be totally irresponsible” (Millikan 1993: 96). The
best available hypothesis we have by far—about why our brain comes equipped with the innate
mechanisms it does—is that such mechanisms have been selected for producing concepts, beliefs
and desires that help us to meet our needs in varying circumstances.
Analogous considerations apply to acquired linguistic representations, because having
words and ways of combining them into sentences to communicate with each other surely
confers as much of an advantage for survival as the simpler innate languages of other animals do.
Additionally, even if linguistic representations are themselves culturally reproduced items, it is
important to also take into account that our capacity to learn a language is innate. As much as
linguistic representations may be said to have direct functions that stem from their own selective
history, they can also be said to have derived functions from our innate language faculty. I
consider the view that there are non-biological selective processes—such as some selective
learning processes (Papineau) and the socio-cultural reproduction of linguistic symbols
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(Millikan)—as largely compatible and complementary with the view that acquired
representations have functions derived from the direct functions of innate mechanisms.
Granting that innate and acquired human representations have teleonomic functions, it
remains to be seen what is the proper account of their meanings. While Papineau and Millikan
have made an extremely valuable contribution to semantics, I think that their theories face some
very serious problems that show that a different kind of teleosemantics for human representations
is needed. The first problem stems from the purely output-based character of their accounts. In
Chapter 5, I argued that Millikan’s “consumer-based” teleosemantics for basic representations
has the problem of ascribing implausible contents that are detached from the cognitive capacities
of the mechanisms that produce them. As Pietroski (1992) showed, the ascriptions of content
made by Millikan’s theory can be implausible, because they are unrelated to the capacities of the
mechanisms that produce them. In his example, the kimus’ state that is caused by red surfaces is
adaptive because it led kimus to snorf-free areas, so the states mean “snorf-free area”, even
though kimus are utterly unable to tell apart a snorf from anything else. I argued that the
ascriptions of Millikan’s theory—based exclusively on the “Normal conditions” for the
performance of the representation’s evolutionary function—are indeed implausible because the
causes of perceptual representations do not play any role in them. I proposed in its place a hybrid
input-output theory according to which the content of a basic representation is determined by its
Normal cause—namely, what causes tokens when they manage to produce the effects the
representation has the function of producing. These are also teleonomic links, but they are causal.
As it turns out, Papineau’s and Millikan’s output-based teleosemantics for human
representations face the same problem with causes playing no role in meaning determination.
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Millikan’s “Normal conditions” link words/concepts to their referents abstracting away from any
causal connection. Papineau’s theory has the same problem. While discussing what his theory
and Millikan’s have in common, Papineau (writing with Graham Macdonald) says:
[The] approach… dissociates the determination of content from input
conditions… content depends on how consumer mechanisms interpret
representations… on the behavioural output, not the informational input. The
content is that condition under which the resulting behaviour would be
appropriate, whether or not the actual circumstances that caused the
representation are of that type. (Macdonald & Papineau 2006: 6) 84
What Millikan and Papineau tell us is that the teleonomic links that determine meanings are links
to what concepts are supposed to be correlated to in order to perform their functions, regardless
of whether those correlations are causally based or not. But this is precisely the kind of view that
leads to the problem pointed out by Pietroski and Neander: ascribing meanings that are
implausible because they are detached from the cognitive capacities of the mechanisms
responsible for producing the representations. In the case of human representations linked to
inputs from perception, the problem is clear: the theory detaches their meanings from what the
perceptual mechanisms causally interact with. Consider the concept of darkness. Suppose, as it is
likely to be the case, that many human infants have an innate tendency to fear being alone in
84 As far as I can tell, the views of Millikan and Papineau were output-oriented from the beginning—unlike, say,
the clearly input-oriented view of Neander. However, Millikan seems to have been the one that originally
rejected most adamantly the idea that causes may play a role in determining content. Interestingly, at the same
time that Papineau (1987) explained truth-conditional content in terms of co-presence rather than causation, we
can find remarks where he seems to assign a crucial role to causation. In a passage he remarks, for example, that
the explanation in terms of natural selection “gives us a substantial distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’
causes” which are related to circumstances when a belief “had advantageous behavioral effects” (Papineau
1987: 65). This is very much in tune with the core idea of my hybrid input-output approach! However, these
passing remarks did not seem to be articulated into his official doctrine.
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open dark places. Suppose that such tendency is meant to protect us from night predators, by
making us avoid staying in places where we would be vulnerable to them. Now, such tendency
will play a role in the development of the concept of a dark place and of thoughts such as the
belief that I am in a dark place and the desire to leave such a place as soon as possible—which
combined in inferential processes will on various occasions make us leave dark places. Perhaps
this sort of effect saved the lives of many of our ancestors. (We may assume that the learned
concepts and acquired beliefs have derived functions or direct ones—following Millikan or
Papineau.) But according to the output-based theory it looks like the concept of darkness, or of a
dark place, led to beneficial behaviors because it was correlated with night predators. So it looks
like the meaning-determining teleonomic link is with night predators. But this is an extremely
implausible ascription. Our pre-theoretical ascriptions relate the concept to darkness. We can
perfectly explain the behavior in terms of the fear of dark places. Of course, we can also explain
the evolution of such behavior based on the avoidance of night predators. But what we explain
then is not that the concept of darkness refers to predators, but rather that the evolutionary
explanation for our desire to avoid darkness is that it prompted behaviors that were adaptive
because they helped us to avoid night predators. An output-based teleosemantics cannot
distinguish cognitively relevant links from other evolutionarily relevant ones. Consider another
example: the desire for soda, derived from an innate desire for sweetness together with a belief
that soda is sweet. Surely the contents of the thoughts that make us drink soda are not about
nutritiousness—even if the evolutionary explanation of why we have those desires is one where
the goal of getting nutrients plays a crucial role. Papineau is willing to go along with Millikan
and bite the bullet in the case of basic representations, but he argues (together with Graham
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Macdonald) that Pietroski’s objection does not apply to representations that belong to
sophisticated systems of representation: if kimus had a color-perception system serving various
functions, then their states would mean “red” anyway (Macdonald & Papineau 2006: 9). But this
reply does not suffice to explain why the kimus’ states do not also mean “snorf-free area”. If
there is a history of selection related to the absence of snorfs, the states presumably acquire that
meaning regardless of also having other contents and functions.
The problem I just discussed already affected output-based teleosemantics for basic
representations. The following two problems I will point out are specifically about human
representations. In Chapter 3, I argued that a theory of meaning articulated in terms of basic
sentence acceptance has two advantages over other theories. First, it is able to account for
different kinds of words/concepts having meanings that relate them either to the external world,
to other words/concepts or to rules of inference. Second, it is able to explain how the meanings
of words/concepts govern their overall uses in inferential processes. As it turns, the teleosemantic
theories of Papineau and Millikan are at a disadvantage: they do not offer plausible accounts of
non-primitive symbols and the meanings they ascribe even to primitives do not govern their use
in inference.
The views of Papineau and Millikan are very different regarding the issue of nonprimitives. Millikan seems to defend an extreme form of semantic externalism according to
which content is just reference and all referring terms are primitives. (It will become clear below
why I say “seems”.) Millikan (2000), for instance, argues that “substance” concepts—i.e.,
concepts of individuals, stuffs and natural kinds—have the purpose of enabling us to re-identify
things, and that this purpose is independent of the various ways in which we may achieve it. It is
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independent of any particular causal links through perception and from any associated beliefs or
concepts. She argues that reference is not determined by any modes of presentation. All the
causal and conceptual links of a substance concept, she claims, are part of a non-reference
determining conception. (See Millikan 2000: Ch. 11 & 12.) When talking about the literal
meanings of words, she candidly claims: “[The] public meaning of a referential term… is
essentially just reference. I intend this sweeping assertion to include terms for properties, kinds,
stuffs, and so forth…” (Millikan 2005: 66). These views seem extremely radical. What about the
word ‘bachelor’ and the concept it expresses? Is Millikan willing to say that ‘unmarried man’ is
merely part of a non-reference determining associated conception? And what about the terms of
logic such as ‘and’? As I argued in Chapter 3, a general theory of meaning must cover all of
these sorts of words/concepts. Surprisingly, Millikan herself comments on an endnote: “We
should also note that there are some terms—‘bachelor’ is the favorite example—that do seem
simply to be shorthand for their standard public intensions.” and speculates that “terms of this
kind are not very common” (Millikan 1984: 340n). Regardless of how common they may be or
not, we need a theory of meaning to accommodate them. But Millikan does not comment on how
to do so within her theory. Given her views, there should be a teleosemantic story to be told here.
After all, the word ‘bachelor’ is a reproduced device presumably with a literal meaning governed
by a teleonomic norm, while the concept it expresses is tokened by mechanisms with teleonomic
functions. But the story cannot be the same story that Millikan offers for primitives.
Papineau, in contrast, offers a different theory for “non-observational concepts”, based on
their inferential links to other concepts (Papineau 1987: 78-80). What he proposes is in fact a
kind of description theory. Interestingly, he suggests it is a teleosemantic theory. The purpose of
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non-observational concepts, he suggests, is to “enable us to respond to features of the world to
which we only have indirect inferential access” (Papineau 1987: 80). This sounds promising,
surely there is such a thing as the misapplication of concepts covered by a description theory. An
explanation of their meanings based on what inferential links they are supposed to have would be
interesting. But, unfortunately, the version of the description theory that Papineau adopts is
hopeless. He surprisingly claims that “a non-observational concept refers to that entity whose
role in the causal structure of the world mirrors the role of the concept itself in the cognitive
structure” (Papineau 1987: 93). Why not go instead with something closer to a classical
description theory? Papineau’s version does not seem to work for many non-observational
concepts. As Devitt objects, ‘bachelor’ “probably depends for its reference on its causal links to
‘unmarried’ and yet that causal link is not ‘mirrored’ by one between bachelors and unmarried
objects” (Devitt 1991: 432). Additionally, Papineau’s version of the description theory is holistic
(see Papineau 1987: 97-98). As Devitt complains: “Papineau… is committed to an extremely
individualistic version of holism: if the functional role of a concept in your head, or in my head
last week, differs in the slightest degree from one in my head now, then the concepts must differ”
(Devitt 1991: 432). These problems, however, stem from the version of the description theory
adopted by Papineau, rather than the teleosemantic twist he suggests for it.
Setting aside non-primitives, the final problem with the theories of Papineau and Millikan
is that the meanings they ascribe are not causally responsible for governing the use of concepts in
inference. That this is the case is already clear given the fact that Papineau and Millikan regard
the teleonomic links that determine meaning as causally detached from tokens, as I discussed
above. But even if their direct links were causally anchored, we would still have a problem.
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Imagine, for example, that we modified Millikan’s theory replacing her teleonomic links with the
teleonomic causal links of my hybrid account. These would still be links between isolated tokens
of the concept and its perceptual causes—e.g., between tokens of ‘dog’ in the belief-box and
dogs. But the overall use of a word/concept in inferential processes—as I argued following
Horwich in Chapter 3—can only be governed or shaped by certain sentences containing it. For
example, the use of ‘dog’ in inference may be governed by tokens of ‘This is a dog’ in the belief
box—tokens that may in turn be caused by the perception of dogs.

6.6 Basic-Acceptance Teleosemantics
This has been a long journey, in which I have assessed the virtues and problems of Horwich’s
use-theory and available versions of teleosemantics. It is time to tie up loose ends. I will start
with a review of the preliminary conclusions of the previous analyses, articulate the combination
of basic-acceptance semantics and teleosemantics, and point out some advantages of the view
over Horwich’s theory and existing teleosemantic theories. I will end with some reflections on
the roles of reference and truth in the resulting account.
In Chapter 1, I argued that meanings are natural worldly phenomena because they play
causal roles in the explanation of behavior. In Chapter 2, I argued that the task of semantics is to
explain the underlying natures of the meanings identified pre-theoretically by the causal roles of
mental and linguistic representations. As folk semanticists, we identify samples of meanings in
attitude ascriptions that have the purpose of explaining other people’s behaviors and using their
thoughts and utterances as guides to reality. I argued that an explanation of the underlying nature
of these meanings should account for the causal roles used to identify them. In the particular case
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of words and concepts, I argued that we identify their meanings by the way they are used and as
what is causally responsible for their uses. This sets a clear target for an explanation of the
underlying nature of their meanings: it must account for what non-semantic phenomena explain
the overall uses of words and concepts and, consequently, constitute their meanings. Notice that
all of these considerations regarding the identification of meanings and the task of semantics do
not assume any views about the nature of truth and reference. While the mainstream view in
semantics is truth-referentialism, which requires truth and reference to play substantial
explanatory roles, the identification of the task of semantics should not presuppose any such
view, which would beg the question against deflationists, who argue that truth and reference are
not properties that could play such roles and usually advocate for “use” theories of meaning
where truth and reference allegedly do not play any substantial roles. I argued that we are likely
to find out about the nature of truth and reference precisely by finding out if we need to appeal to
them in the explanation of meanings.
In Chapter 3, I argued that Horwich’s version of the “use” theory of meaning has crucial
advantages over other available accounts. Horwich proposes that the meanings of words are
constituted by their roles in certain basic or core sentences containing them, which are causally
responsible for the rest of their uses—or, as Horwich likes to put it, they govern the overall use
of words. Horwich’s theory is meant to apply to words in natural languages and also to words in
the language of thought. He largely treats language and thought as a “seamless whole” which is
appropriate as a simplification for some explanatory purposes, because language and thought are
indeed closely interlinked. But I agree with Devitt’s point that in an ultimate analysis an
acceptance-based theory should treat thought as more fundamental (Devitt 2002: 109-111). I will
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set this aside for now.
Horwich’s main reason for suggesting that the meanings of words must be constituted by
the acceptance of some fundamental sentences containing them is that most uses of words are a
result of their participation in inferential processes, so that what constitutes their meanings must
be something capable of shaping such use in inference. The crucial point is that only sentences
can participate in inferences. Horwich’s insight is that a few sentences containing a word can
play the role of something like axioms or premises in inferential processes, thereby governing
the overall use of the word. How this works is rather clear in the case of words traditionally
regarded as covered by a description theory, such as ‘bachelor’. The sentence ‘The bachelors are
the unmarried men’ can serve as a premise in inferential processes if it is accepted by the user:
tokened in his or her belief-box. Other uses of the word ‘bachelor’ can subsequently be explained
in terms of this fundamental use, together with other factors. But what makes Horwich’s proposal
interesting is that it can account for a variety of words. As he suggests, the meaning of words can
be shaped by links to the external world. For example, the acceptance of ‘This is red’ when
perceiving a red surface is plausibly what explains the overall use of ‘red’. A connection between
‘red’ and red surfaces, by itself, cannot play a role in inference. So it cannot govern the use of the
word. Finally, Horwich suggests that the overall use of logical words can also be explained in
terms of basic acceptance. For example, the use of ‘and’ may be governed by the acceptance of
the two-way schema “p, q // p and q”.
What I just described is the core insight underlying Horwich’s use-theory: that the
acceptance of some basic or fundamental sentences containing a word constitutes its meaning. I
call this view “basic-acceptance semantics”. The view is recommended by its promise to account
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for the overall uses of words—to explain how meanings govern use—and because of its
generality—it can account for meanings of words that depend variously on their links to other
words, to the external world and to rules of inference.
Horwich’s use-theory has extra commitments. First, it is proposed as a companion to
Horwich’s deflationism about truth and reference. So Horwich expects the acceptance of basic
sentences containing a word not to determine its reference. Second, it is articulated in terms of
dispositions and regularities of use. Horwich claims that our disposition to accept basic sentences
containing a word is the fundamental law-like regularity governing its use. In Chapter 3, I argued
that these two commitments are problematic. Regarding deflationism, Devitt points out that the
theory seems to provide the same links that a moderate truth-referentialism would count as
reference-determining. So the theory risks collapsing into truth-referentialism. I happen to
believe that a collapse is likely, but I argued that it does not undermine basic-acceptance
semantics. I also argued that Horwich’s articulation of the theory is undermined by serious
problems of ignorance and error that stem from its dispositionalism. People often have
dispositions to make mistakes (error) or lack the relevant dispositions to use a word (ignorance),
so a theory that reduces meanings to use-dispositions cannot make enough room for
misrepresentation. For instance, if someone confuses wolfs and coyotes with dogs, the law-like
regularity underlying his use of ‘dog’ will be his disposition to accept ‘This is a dog’ when
perceiving dogs, wolfs or coyotes—with the unwelcome consequence that he is not
misrepresenting when he applies ‘dog’ to a coyote. Horwich proposes a version of the division of
linguistic labor that may be thought to help with this problem. But his account is dispositionalist
as well: a speaker’s use of a word can be characterized as a misuse provided that he or she is
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disposed to defer to experts. But as Devitt replies, people may make mistakes about when or
whom to defer to, and may not be disposed to defer at all.
I suggested in Chapter 3 that a combination of basic-acceptance semantics with
explanatory frameworks other than “dispositionalism/regularism” could avoid the problems of
ignorance and error. One option would be to adopt a “normativism” according to which
meanings do not depend on regularities, but on prescriptive norms governing the uses of words.
If the meaning of ‘dog’ is constituted by the norm that we ought to accept ‘This is a dog’ in the
presence of dogs, then basic-acceptance semantics could draw the line between correct uses and
misuses. But this alternative is unattractive because it involves abandoning the project of
naturalized meanings—and meanings play causal roles in the world, so they cannot be
irreducibly normative. Another alternative that promises to overcome the problem of
misrepresentation, but within the confines of naturalism, I suggested, is to combine basicacceptance semantics with a teleonomic or teleological account of the functions of symbols.
The suggestion to combine these views led me to explore the teleonomic account of
functions and available theories that rely on it to explain meanings. The teleonomic notion of
function discussed in Chapter 4 has its home in biology, where it is explained in terms of what
traits have been naturally selected for doing. Hearts have the function of pumping blood because
that is what the hearts of ancestors did that explains why there are creatures with hearts today.
What is of interest to semantics is that this notion of function allows for “quasi-normative”
ascriptions of failure to perform a function. If a heart does not pump blood, it is not doing what it
is supposed to, given its evolutionary history. Applying this notion to offer a theory of meaning
promises to makes room for misrepresentation. The simplest cases are those of basic innate
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representations in animals.
There are two main kinds of teleosemantic approaches that I explored in Chapter 5. On
one end of the spectrum, there is Millikan’s account, according to which meanings are
determined by the conditions in the world that must obtain for the consumers of a representation
to perform their function. For example, the frog’s so-called “bug detectors” represent frog food
because it was when frogs captured nutritious bugs by darting their tongue that the consumers
performed the function for which the trait was selected. While very attractive at first sight, it
turns out that causal links to reality through perception play no role in this account, which can
lead to implausible content ascriptions and, more fundamentally, the account fails to achieve a
fundamental goal of semantics, which is to account for the causes of representations being
tokened. On the other end of the spectrum, there is Neander’s producer-based teleosemantics,
which has the advantage of tying meanings to the causal links responsible for the tokening of
representations, but which does not make enough room for misrepresentation because it
disregards the consumption of representations as irrelevant to their meanings. So the frog’s state,
according to Neander, means “small, black, moving thing”, since the frog’s perceptual
mechanisms cannot tell apart a flying bug from any other small black thing—even though what
the consumers need is to catch bugs. To overcome this dilemma, I proposed a hybrid account
according to which basic representations represent what I called their “Normal causes”: namely,
what is supposed to cause their tokens in order for their consumers to perform their functions.
The hybrid account makes plenty of room for misrepresentation, like a consumer-based one, but
ascribes meanings that do play a causal role in the tokening of representations.
The remaining challenge was to explore how teleosemantics can be extended to the
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sophisticated mental and linguistic representations of human beings. In this chapter, I presented
the proposals of Papineau and Millikan, who agree that desires have the function of producing
behaviors that satisfy them and that beliefs have the function of collaborating with desires to
produce such behaviors—and are supposed to covary with conditions in the world. But they both
ultimately offer compositional accounts according to which the truth-conditions of beliefs (and
the satisfaction conditions of desires) are determined by their structure and the referential
properties of their parts. At bottom, their theories are about teleonomic links between concepts
and their referents. The main difference is that Papineau proposes that the source of teleonomic
functions for acquired representations is that learning processes are selective, while Millikan
proposes that the functions of acquired representations are derived from the functions of the
mechanisms responsible for their acquisition and deployment—like the varying colors of the skin
of a chameleon, which have not been selected themselves, but are the product of innate
mechanisms that have been selected to protect the chameleon by producing patterns of color that
make it less visible to predators. Millikan also offers a teleonomic account of the functions of
words, based on the fact that they are culturally reproduced items with a history of social
selection. Millikan plausibly argues that the conventions that determine the literal meanings of
words are teleonomic norms. I argued that some but not all learning processes are selective, so
we need to rely on Millikan’s account of derived functions, although it can be combined with
Papineau’s account. There is very good reason to expect the innate mechanisms responsible for
the acquisition of concepts, beliefs and desires have the function of producing such states, since
human cognition is obviously adaptive. So the most plausible hypothesis is that there are
function-conferring selective processes underlying the maintenance of such mechanisms.
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Similarly, reproduced patterns of linguistic behavior are at least as adaptive as simpler innate
systems of animal communication. So the most plausible hypothesis is that they have teleonomic
functions.
On a critical assessment of Papineau’s and Millikan’s accounts of concept and word
meanings, I pointed out three serious problems. First, that the reference-determining teleonomic
links they rely on are not causal in nature, so their theories have the same problem as Millikan’s
consumer-based theory of basic representations. Indeed, those links are not causally responsible
for the tokening of concepts/words, and they are detached from the cognitive capacities of the
mechanisms that produce them. So, based on the methodological considerations proposed in
Chapter 2 and deployed against Millikan’s consumer-based teleosemantics in Chapter 5, I
objected that such links cannot plausibly be regarded as meanings. Second, relying on one of the
arguments in support of basic-acceptance semantics deployed in Chapter 3, I objected that the
theories of Millikan and Papineau fail to be general enough because they do not offer plausible
accounts of non-primitives. In Millikan’s case, the theory does not even attempt to offer an
account of anything other that primitives. Papineau’s case is different. To his credit, he tries to
offer an account for non-observational concepts that is a teleosemantic version of the description
theory. Unfortunately, the version of the description theory he adopts fails because it relies on
implausible mirroring relations and it is hopelessly holistic. Neither Papineau nor Millikan offer
accounts of logical terms. Finally, the theories of Millikan and Papineau do not ascribe meanings
that can govern the use of concepts in inferential processes. Most of the uses of concepts are in
inference, so direct links to reality—even setting aside the issues mentioned above—are not
enough to explain what governs stimulus independent uses.
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In summary, the situation is the following. On one hand, a basic-acceptance semantics
promises to explain meanings in terms of underlying properties that are causally responsible for
the overall uses of words/concepts, which can explain how the meanings of words/concepts
govern their overall uses in inference and in a way which is general enough, allowing for
meanings to involve links to the world, to other words/concepts or to rules of inference. But the
regularist version articulated by Horwich cannot make room for misuses or misrepresentation.
On the other hand, teleosemantics promises to offer a naturalist solution to the problem of
misrepresentation, but available proposals for human words/concepts are implausible because the
links they regard as meaning constitutive are causally detached from the production/tokening of
words/concepts, they cannot govern use in inferential processes, and they do not account for the
variety of links that a general theory of word/concept meaning should account for.
The solution, I suggest, is to articulate a teleosemantic theory in terms of basic
acceptance or—what is equivalent—to articulate a basic-acceptance semantics in terms of
teleonomic functions. It is worth mentioning that the idea that a “use” theory of meaning can be
coupled with a teleonomic account of the functions of symbols has been suggested before by
teleosemanticists, although not by use-theorists. For example, Neander suggests:
[Teleosemantic] theories tend to be versions of causal or informational theories,
but teleonomy could also be used to add normativity to a conceptual role theory of
mental content. (Neander 1999: 3)
The “normativity” that Neander refers to is, of course, not of the prescriptive kind that normative
versions of the “use” theory rely on. It is rather the teleonomic normativity involved in there
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being, as a matter of fact, a distinction between correct and incorrect deployments of concepts.
Similarly, Millikan suggests that a functional-role theory of mental content can be coupled with
teleology to make room for misrepresentation:
Suppose, for example, that you think of mental representations as items defined in
a classical functionalist way, in accordance with patterns of causal/inferential
dispositions… Then the teleological theorist, call her Tilly, will come along and
point out that surely some of the causal roles of actual representations in actual
people’s heads correspond to bad inferences. What you must say, says Tilly, is that
what the representation represents is determined by what its causal role would be
if the head were operating correctly, that is, in the way it was designed, by
evolution or learning, to operate. (Millikan 2000: 229)
Neither Neander nor Millikan are interested in developing themselves a teleonomic version of
functional-role semantics: what we may call a “functional-role teleosemantics”. But they realize
that dispositionalist versions of functional-role semantics have problems of misrepresentation. In
contrast, theorists that defend naturalistic versions of the “use” theory tend to ignore the problem
—or even to dismiss it as a pseudo-problem, like Horwich (see Chapter 3, Section 3.6.2). The
only “use” theorists that take this problem seriously seem to be those that defend non-naturalist
versions that rely on prescriptive normativity, like Brandom (1994 & 2000). It is surprising that
“use” theorists themselves have not seriously contemplated the possibility of articulating
teleonomic versions of their theories. Some of them even explicitly claim that teleology is
incompatible with functional-role semantics. Greenberg and Harman (2006), for example,
propose what they consider a broad and inclusive understanding of functional- or conceptual-role
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semantics (CRS), which encompasses any theory that regards the content of concepts as
determined “by any part of their role or use in thought”, rather than being restricted to those
theories according to which content is determined merely by “the role of the mental states or
symbols in inference or in other purely internal mental processes” (Greenberg & Harman 2006:
295-296). Under their broad understanding, they point out, indicator or informational theories
“count as special versions of CRS” (Greenberg & Harman 2006: 296). However, they go through
the trouble of specifically excluding teleological theories from even their broad understanding of
functional- or conceptual-role semantics:
Just how inclusive our broad understanding of CRS is depends on how broadly
conceptual role or use is understood. For example, teleological theories of content
give an important role to the evolutionarily determined “function” of symbols or
symbol structures, where some such theories understand the notion of the function
of a symbol or structure in a way that goes beyond the symbol’s use or role as
ordinarily understood… We do not count such theories as versions of CRS.
(Greenberg & Harman 2006: 296.)
Greenberg and Harman display a notorious resistance to regard the teleological notion of
function as compatible with the kind of naturalist “use” theory they favor. I suspect that their
resistance stems from the close relationship between their naturalist “use” theory and classical
functionalism, since teleological functions are not merely uses or roles as understood by classical
functionalism. According to classical functionalism, mental states are characterized by their
functional roles, which consist in their patterns of actual and potential causal relations with other
mental states, perception and behavior. Naturalist use theories that regard meaning as determined
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by functional roles constitute an application of the general functionalist framework to the
explanation of meaning, and they draw much of their plausibility from functionalism. Moreover,
“use” theories have traditionally regarded the meanings of expressions as closely related to their
inferential roles, and functionalism promises to naturalize inferential roles by reducing them to
causal roles. By characterizing functional roles as patterns of actual and potential casual
relations, however, classical functionalism and the “use” theories based on it are committed to
dispositionalism. It is true that the teleological notion of function goes beyond the one deployed
by traditional functional-role theories: the one that has its origin in classical functionalism. But
going beyond the dispositionalist notion of function may be a changed that is needed—and not
only for the purposes of semantics. As Elliott Sober points out, functionalism about the mind
would also benefit from a teleological twist (Sober 1985).
In principle any dispositionalist version of functional-role semantics could benefit from a
teleological twist. But as I pointed out in Chapter 3, most of these theories are hopelessly
holistic. A teleological twist can only help with problems of misuse and misrepresentation. Any
other problems faced by a functional-role theory will presumably be inherited by its
teleosemantic counterpart. As I argued in Chapter 3, the best available theory is the non-holistic
one offered by Horwich, which relies on the acceptance of basic sentences. It is this version of
the “use” theory that I propose to combine with a teleonomic account of functions. Of the many
possible forms of “functional-role teleosemantics”, a “basic-acceptance teleosemantics” seems to
be the most promising one.
The core feature of a basic-acceptance teleosemantics is that it regards the basic
sentences involved in the meanings of words not as what regularly governs their uses, but as
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what is supposed to govern their uses. A general statement of the main idea is the following:
The meaning of a word, w, is constituted by the fact that the acceptance of certain
basic sentences containing w is supposed to govern w’s overall use.
The sense in which some core sentences are supposed to govern the overall use of a word is the
same sense in which the heart is supposed to pump blood or the blink reflex is supposed to be
triggered by foreign objects touching the cornea. It is a sense in which an item may be supposed
do something even if it fails to do it. This is the feature that allows basic-acceptance
teleosemantics to make room for misuses of words. Instead of claiming that the meaning of
‘bachelor’ is constituted by the fact that its use is regularly governed by the acceptance of ‘The
bachelors are the unmarried men’, basic-acceptance teleosemantics claims that the meaning of
‘bachelor’ is constituted by the fact that its use is supposed to be governed by the acceptance of
‘The bachelors are the unmarried men’. Similarly, basic-acceptance teleosemantics claims that
the meaning of ‘horse’ is engendered by the fact that its use is supposed to be governed by the
acceptance of ‘This is a horse’ in response to the perception of horses. If someone tends to apply
the word also to muddy zebras and odd cows, such uses can be characterized as misuses, because
they are not governed by the acceptance property that is supposed to govern them. This account
of word meaning promises to maintain the advantages of Horwich’s theory, regarding generality
and explanatory power, while overcoming its problems of ignorance and error.
The general statement of the main idea of basic-acceptance teleosemantics I provided
above has the advantage of being simple. It provides a convenient way to introduce the idea. But
it ignores crucial details, since it does not even use the word ‘function’. As I argued above, there
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is very good reason to believe that words do have teleonomic functions based on one or another
of the sources of teleonomy for acquired representations proposed by Papineau and Millikan—
or, even better, a combination of them. Even our most basic conceptual and linguistic abilities
exhibit all the signs of “design” and the only plausible explanation is one that ultimately relies on
natural selection and/or other selective processes. But even if we grant that words do have
teleonomic functions, this leaves open the question of how such functions are related to the
acceptance of some basic sentences containing them. The answer to this question I favor regards
the acceptance of basic sentences as the Normal cause of uses of words: as what causes such
uses when words perform their functions in accordance with a Normal explanation. Notice that
this idea of a “Normal cause” is the same one I deployed in my hybrid account of the meanings
of basic representations. The difference is that the Normal causes of basic representations are
perceptual causes, while the Normal causes of words deployed in inference are certain sentences
in the “belief-box” (although for some words the basic sentences themselves have Normal
perceptual causes). I think that reliance on Normal causes provides a good basis to articulate a
teleonomic version of basic-acceptance semantics, since basic-acceptance semantics is a theory
that is tailored to explain meanings in terms of what causes tokens of words/concepts. Notice that
if the acceptance of a basic sentence constitutes the Normal cause of the use of a word, then such
sentence indeed is supposed to govern the use of the word. So the general statement I provided
above is indeed an accurate, while simplified, representation of the view.
How does a basic-acceptance teleosemantics articulated in terms of Normal causes look
like? To simplify exposition, I will first follow Horwich assuming that language and thought
form a seamless whole. The appearance that language and thought form a seamless whole may
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come from the fact that, on one hand, we use language to express what we think but, on the other
hand, we have acquired many of our concepts—or “mental words”— from their linguistic
counterparts. But this is not an explanatory circle. It is a “spiral”, since the ultimate origin of
newly coined words must be on some thinker that coined the correlated concept and a word to
express it (Devitt 1996: 157-158). But the fact that our language and thought are so intimately
interconnected means that for certain explanatory purposes we can more or less safely take them
as a seamless whole. So in order to articulate a simple version of “basic-acceptance
teleosemantics” I will simply talk of sentences, words, and assume that we use the same words to
communicate and think with. I will also simply assume that there is a teleonomic story to tell
about acquired representations. Let me start with a statement of the account:
The meaning of a word w is constituted by its use in certain core sentences (that
link it to the world, other words or rules of inference), because this use is the
Normal cause underlying the overall use of the word in virtue of which it
performs the functions determined by the history of its use and/or of the
underlying cognitive mechanisms responsible for it.
The idea is that certain core sentences are supposed to govern the use of the word because those
are the sentences that govern the use of the word when it successfully performs its function in
accordance with a Normal explanation. So the quasi-normative teleonomic sense of “supposed”
in my previous general statement is explained by how words Normally manage to perform their
functions. Notice the difference between the following three statements:
(R) The acceptance of certain basic sentences containing the word w is the
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regularity governing the use of w.
(P) The acceptance of certain basic sentences containing the word w is the
prescriptive norm governing the use of w.
(T) The acceptance of certain basic sentences containing the word w is the
teleonomic norm governing the use of w.
(R) states the view adopted by Horwich. But a basic-acceptance semantics can be articulated
instead in terms of prescriptive norms, such as (P) or in terms of teleonomic norms, such as (T).
A basic-acceptance semantics articulated as (R) is naturalist, but does not make enough room for
misrepresentation. A basic-acceptance semantics articulated as (P) makes room for
misrepresentation, but abandons naturalism. While a basic-acceptance semantics articulated as
(T) is simultaneously naturalist and makes enough room for misrepresentation.
Let us consider the treatment of a likely primitive, such as the word ‘dog’ by different
semantic theories. For a word like this, an indicator theory based on reliable causes would say:
The word ‘dog’ means what it does because its tokens are regularly caused by the
perception of dogs.
This theory has, on one hand, a serious problem of error. If someone has a tendency to token
‘dog’ as a result of the perception of dogs, coyotes and wolfs, the result is that, according to the
theory, the word means “dog, coyote or wolf”. Additionally, the theory cannot explain stimulus
independent uses of the word. Now, this indicator theory can be modified initially in one of two
ways. On one hand, we can follow Horwich’s dispositionalist use-theory and articulate the link
as one between a basic sentence containing the word and reality:
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The word ‘dog’ means what it does because its use is governed by a disposition to
token ‘This is a dog’ in the presence of dogs.
This version can explain the stimulus-independent uses of the word, because the meaning
ascribed is a property that can causally explain the uses of the word in inferential processes—i.e.,
in thinking. This is an important advantage of the theory. But Horwich’s articulation does not
make room for misrepresentation. Just like with the original indicator theory, if the speaker is
unable to distinguish dogs from coyotes and wolves, then the application of the word to coyotes
or wolves turns out, implausibly, not to be a misapplication. This is a serious drawback of the
theory. On the other hand, we can modify instead the original indicator theory using a version of
my hybrid account. I proposed it merely as an account for basic representations. But we could
apply it to words assuming, for example, that they have a history of social selection:
The word ‘dog’ means what it does because its tokens are Normally caused by the
perception of dogs—i.e., this is the cause of tokens that perform the function that
accounts for the proliferation of the word.
This sort of theory promises to make room for misrepresentation, since it states what is supposed
to cause tokens of the word. But it has nothing to say about stimulus-independent uses, which is
a very serious drawback that makes the theory a non-starter as it is—which is a problem shared
with the original indicator theory. Finally, according to basic-acceptance teleosemantics we
would get the following:
The word ‘dog’ means what it does because its uses are supposed to be governed
by the acceptance of ‘This is a dog’ in response to the presence of dogs—i.e., the
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acceptance of ‘This is a dog’ caused by the perception of dogs is the Normal
cause governing the use of ‘dog’ in thinking.
This view combines the advantages of Horwich’s account and the hybrid teleosemantic account
over the simple indicator theory. Like Horwich’s account, it can explain how the stimulusdependent use governs the stimulus-independent uses in thinking. Like the hybrid teleosemantic
account, it makes room for misrepresentation. Surely this articulation of the theory is sketchy.
But it is a first attempt in a promising and entirely new direction. When we recount the serious
problems faced by available theories, it really looks like exploring further the possibility of
combining a basic-acceptance account of meaning with a teleosemantic one is worth it.
Let us assume that words are reproduced items that are culturally transmitted from user to
user—and from generation to generation—and that they proliferate because of the benefits they
confer to their users as tools for thinking and as tools for communicating with each other. We
may then offer the following accounts of the meanings of different kinds of words:
The word ‘dog’ means what it does because the uses in which it performs the
functions that account for its proliferation are Normally governed by the
acceptance of ‘This is a dog’ in response to the perception of dogs.
The word ‘elm’ means what it does because the uses in which it performs the
functions that account for its proliferation are Normally governed by the
acceptance of ‘This is an elm’ in response to the perception of elms.
The word ‘bachelor’ means what it does because the uses in which it performs the
functions that account for its proliferation are Normally governed by the
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acceptance of ‘The bachelors are the unmarried men’.
The word ‘arthritis’ means what it does because the uses in which it performs the
functions that account for its proliferation are Normally governed by the
acceptance of ‘Arthritis is an inflammation of the joints’.
The word ‘and’ means what it does because the uses in which it performs the
functions that account for its proliferation are Normally governed by the
acceptance of the two-way inference schema “p, q // p and q”.
This articulation is in some regards overly simplistic. It treats the words used for communication
and the words used for thinking as the same. And it treats them as reproduced items with their
own socio-cultural selective history. The real story is very likely much more complicated than
this. However, this simplified story serves the purpose of illustrating how a basic-acceptance
teleosemantics promises to explain the uses of words in thinking processes, and the uses of
words for communication, all while making plenty of room for misuses of the words and,
furthermore, while accounting for a variety of words with meanings involving either links to the
world, links to other words or links to rules of inference.
Consider the meaning ascribed to ‘elm’ above. If speakers/thinkers are too ignorant to
distinguish elms from beeches—like in Hilary Putnam’s (1975) example—then their application
of the word to beeches counts as a misuse because the word has proliferated due to uses that
were caused by the perception of elms. Now consider the meaning ascribed to ‘arthritis’ above.
Suppose ‘arthritis’ is a term covered by a description theory. This does not prevent users from
making mistakes. Yet versions of the description theory that make room for error are difficult to
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find.85 Remember Papineau’s failed attempt at a teleosemantic version of a description theory.
While it had problems, the idea of offering a teleosemantic description theory was not itself bad.
So, if Bert uses ‘arthritis’ to say something like ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’—like in Tyler
Burge’s (1979) example—then he is misusing the word, since the uses that explain the
proliferation of the word are Normally governed by the acceptance of ‘Arthritis is an
inflammation of the joints’. And it is indeed plausible, I venture to say, that the English word
‘and’ has proliferated because of uses were it was governed by the acceptance of the inferential
rule for conjunction. A speaker that mistakenly uses it in some other way—say, as governed by
the acceptance of the inferential rule for disjunction—surely is misusing the word.
I have assumed for the sake of simplicity that language and though form a seamless
whole and that words simply proliferate as reproduced items. But a better account will have to
explain public words as tools for communication and mental words or concepts as tools for
thinking. Additionally, while public words are indeed likely candidates for having direct
functions, this is not the case for all concepts. These are difficult matters. But I will give an idea
of how this may be managed by basic-acceptance teleosemantics.
In the case of acquired concepts, I suggest that basic-acceptance semantics should follow
mainly Millikan, proposing that they have particular functions that derive from the general
functions of the innate mechanisms responsible for concept acquisition when coupled with
experience. Additionally, some concepts may be acquired through selective learning processes, as
Papineau suggests—in which case they will have direct functions resulting from their own
selective history. But this does not prevent these same concepts from also having functions
85 Devitt and Sterelny point out that the traditional description theory may have problems of ignorance and error
even in the case of terms that seem to properly fall under it (Devitt & Sterelny 1999: 94-96).
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derived from the very same selective learning mechanisms.
In the case of the arbitrary symbols of natural languages, I suggest that their meanings
depend on public conventions that establish them as shared means or tools to express certain
concepts, where the linguistic conventions are characterized in terms of the history of the use of
words instead of regarded as current regularities in their use—following roughly Millikan’s
teleonomic account of linguistic conventions. Words spread across linguistic communities by
being copied from user to user, thus forming lineages or reproduced items. Words proliferate in
this historical process because they are socially selected to facilitate communication—the
expression of thoughts. Consequently, the process through which a certain use gets standardized
as a conventional or public use for a word—e.g., the use to express certain concept—is a process
in which the word acquires a historically selected function. Just like with the “learning selection”
of some concepts, it is plausible that the “social selection” of words is ultimately possible
because people have certain innate mechanisms; in this case, mechanisms that allow people to
acquire languages and expand their lexicon, so that words may also plausibly have derived
functions from these mechanisms.
The resulting view is, then, that the meanings of words in public languages are
determined by historical conventions that link them to words in the language of thought—i.e.,
concepts—and that the later, in turn, have meanings determined mainly by derived teleonomic
functions performed when their deployment in thinking—i.e., inferential—processes is governed
by their use in some core sentences that serve as the most fundamental premises in these
processes: core sentences that constitute the Normal causes of the overall uses of concepts. These
core sentences are not themselves the result of inferential processes—in this sense they are non-

306
inferential aspects of the uses of words—but they are anyway part of the “inferential roles” of
words, because they serve as premises in the inferential machinery of thought.
The functions of different words in the language of thought varies considerably. The
common function to all words is, I suggest, a very general function—namely, to play certain
roles in inference in order to ultimately contribute to the modulation of intentional behavior;
since the ultimate effects of inferential processes are decisions to act that lead to the external
outputs of the cognitive system: actual behavior. After all, functions are “effects” according to
the teleonomic model of functions adopted by basic-acceptance teleosemantics. But my proposal
is not to identify the meaning of a word with its function. Nor is it to identify it with a
Millikanian “Normal condition” that is detached from the causal-roles of symbols. Instead, I
follow roughly the idea I developed in my hybrid account for basic representations, identifying
meaning with the Normal causes responsible for words performing their functions—when they
do. Borrowing from Horwich’s use-theory of meaning, I propose that the Normal causes
responsible for words performing their functions—when they do—involve core sentences
governing their use. A word can play a causal role in intentional behavior—and thereby perform
its ultimate function—because it is deployed in certain characteristic ways in inference that
follow from its use in certain basic sentences that are not themselves the result of any inferences.
I conclude with a provisional consideration about the roles of reference and truthconditions in basic-acceptance teleosemantics. I pointed out, following Devitt, that Horwich’s
version of basic-acceptance semantics risks collapsing into truth-referentialism. I have not
articulated basic-acceptance teleosemantics explicitly in truth-referential terms. I am of the
opinion that we can continue making plenty of progress in semantics before settling the issue of
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deflationism. I very strongly suspect that the direct and indirect links to reality postulated by
basic-acceptance teleosemantics will turn out to be reference-determining ones. But I suggest
that use-theorists who favor deflationism should explore teleosemantic versions of the use-theory
(i.e., versions of “functional-role teleosemantics”), since they promise to overcome the problems
of ignorance and error that plague all naturalistic use-theories. I suggest also exploring the
possibility of non-reference-determining meanings within the framework of basic-acceptance
teleosemantics. But as far as I can see, however, the most reasonable hypotheses about meaning
constitutive links seem to be the ones we would expect if truth-conditions and referential
relations played substantial explanatory roles in semantics.
A proper truth-referentialist version of basic-acceptance teleosemantics should be
moderately truth-referentialist, in order to accommodate words with meanings that link them
either to reality, to other words or to rules of inference. It will have the following general shape:
i. The meanings of primitive words are constituted by the acceptance of basic sentences
containing them with links to reality that are supposed to govern their use and that
determine their references.
ii. The meanings of non-primitives are constituted by the acceptance of basic sentences with
links to other words that are supposed to govern their use and that determine their
references.
iii. The meanings of logical words are constituted by the acceptance of basic sentences with
links to inference rules that are supposed to govern their use and that determine their
contribution to the truth-conditions of the sentences they are used in.
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Not surprisingly, this is very similar to the shape of a truth-referential basic-acceptance semantics
that I offered as an illustration in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.3, but now with a teleonomic twist. The
idea is that the very same properties that are responsible for governing the use of a word are what
determine its reference. I want to suggest that in a truth-referentialist version of basic-acceptance
teleosemantics, the basic sentences that constitute meanings (because they function as the
Normal causes of the overall uses of words) should be seen as playing the role of modes of
reference. Consider the meaning ascribed to ‘bachelor’ above. The teleonomic link between
‘bachelor’ and the acceptance of ‘The bachelors are the unmarried men’ can be regarded as a
descriptive mode of presentation in Fregean style. More interestingly, consider the meaning
ascribed to ‘elm’. In this case, the teleonomic link between ‘elm’ and the acceptance of ‘This is
an elm’ in response to the perception of elms provides what Devitt (2001b) calls a “causal” mode
of reference. Frege regarded the associated description that determines the reference of a word as
part of the word’s meaning. So he could explain how co-referential words can differ in meaning:
different associated descriptions can determine the same reference. But this only works for nonprimitives. Devitt’s idea is that the direct causal link to reality that determines the reference of a
primitive can also be regarded as part of the word’s meaning. So we can explain how coreferential primitives can differ in meaning: different causal links can determine the same
reference. What I am suggesting is that a truth-referential basic-acceptance teleosemantics as a
matter of fact treats the meanings of both primitives and non-primitives as modes of reference.
Basic-acceptance teleosemantics treats words with different basic sentences playing the
role of Normal causes as having different meanings, even if they happen to be co-referential.
Suppose that the Normal cause of uses of ‘renate’ is the acceptance of ‘A renate is a creature
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with a kidney’, while the Normal cause of uses of ‘cordate’ is the acceptance of ‘A cordate is a
creature with a heart’. The two words have different meanings but, as it turns out, they have the
same reference, since all renates are cordates and vice versa. The old description theory already
was able to treat terms such as these as having different meanings or senses, and consequently to
explain why the identity statement ‘All renates are cordates and vice versa’ has a different
meaning than the trivial statement ‘All renates are renates’. Basic-acceptance teleosemantics
offers roughly the same explanation as the description theory in these cases. But now let us focus
on primitives: words with meanings involving direct links to reality, which are not covered by a
description theory. Suppose the Normal cause of uses of ‘Hesperus’ is the acceptance of ‘This is
Hesperus’ in response to the perception of the shiniest star-looking celestial body during the
evening, while the Normal cause of uses of ‘Phosphorus’ is the acceptance of ‘This is
Phosphorus’ in response to the perception of the shiniest star-looking celestial body during the
morning. Since these two words have different Normal causes, they have different meanings
according to basic-acceptance teleosemantics, even if it turns out that they both refer to the
planet Venus. So basic-acceptance teleosemantics explains why ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ has a
different meaning than the trivial ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’. A problem faced by “direct reference”
theories is that they cannot explain why ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ has a different meaning than
‘Hesperus is Hesperus’, since ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ have the same reference and such
theories claim that meaning is exhausted by reference.86 But even a truth-referentialist version of
basic-acceptance teleosemantics identifies meanings with the Normal causes of the uses of
words, which it takes to be certain basic sentences containing them. If these meanings turn out to
86 Theorists that defend “direct reference” views usually propose that the difference between ‘Hesperus is
Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ is not semantic, but merely pragmatic (e.g., Salmon 1986 & Soames
2002). Devitt (2012: Sec. 3.4 & 3.5) offers compelling arguments against this “pragmatic defense” of the direct
reference view.
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strongly determine the referential properties of words, they will constitute modes of reference.

6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed how teleosemantics can be extended from the basic
representations discussed in Chapter 5 to the sophisticated mental and linguistic representations
of human beings. I assessed the valuable attempts by Papineau and Millikan to extend
teleosemantics to human representations. While I defended and borrowed their proposals
regarding the sources of teleonomic functions in human cognition—as well as the functions of
beliefs and desires—I found serious problems with their accounts of concept and word meanings.
In their place, I offered a new version of teleosemantics for concept and word meanings that is
articulated in terms of basic sentence acceptance. I argued that the resulting view, “basicacceptance teleosemantics”, overcomes problems of Horwich’s basic-acceptance theory and of
the teleosemantic theories of Papineau and Millikan.
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Appendix 1:
Millikan’s Pictorial Account
The canonical version of the correspondence theory of truth has been largely abandoned for good
reasons. This version relied on alleged relations of resemblance between truth-bearers and facts.
One of the boldest attempts to clarify what such relations involved was perhaps Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)—were the correspondence relation was portrayed as
involving (1) a relation of structural resemblance between as true sentence and a fact, and (2)
referential relations between the words of the sentences and the components of the fact. In
Chapter 2, Section 2.2, I discussed the serious difficulties faced by this view—which account for
why it has been largely abandoned. However, Tractarian themes have resurfaced in the literature.
Wilfrid Sellars, for example, endorsed a picture theory according to which “the manner in which
the names occur in the picture is a projection, in accordance with a fantastically complex system
of rules of projection, of the manner in which the objects occur in the world” (Sellars 1963: 215).
More recently, Ruth Millikan has pursued, as she puts it, “the picturing themes from the
Tractatus that were carried through in Sellars’ discussions” (Millikan 2005: 77). According to
Millikan, “what makes a sentence true is that there is something in the world onto which it maps
in accordance with certain mapping functions” (Millikan 1984: 9). She clarifies that what she
means by ‘mapping’ is, basically, “as Wittgenstein put it, ‘picturing’.” (Millikan 2005: 63). “The
value of a system of representation”, she claims, “depends... on there being some kind of
isomorphism... between the domain of the signs and the domain of their signifieds” (Millikan
2004a: 84). Given the insurmountable problems faced by the pictorial account of truth, these
confident claims are puzzling. I will argue in this appendix that Millikan wrongly presents her
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view as a pictorial one in the tradition of the Tractatus and that the relations between true
representations and reality that her “mapping functions” actually require are better understood
within the framework of a contemporary correlation-based account of truth, of the sort that
follows from a Tarski-based characterization of the truth of a sentence in terms of its syntactic
structure and the referential properties of its words, combined with a reductive account of
reference in terms of substantive relations between words and parts of reality. In this appendix I
will abstract away from the other objections I raised against Millikan’s theory in Chapters 5 and
6. The topic of this appendix is merely her claim that her theory involves picturing relations.
Millikan combines what she claims to be a pictorial account of truth with a teleological
account of the functions performed by representations, which includes a teleological account of
the referential properties of their parts. Her naturalist account of reference is among the main
contemporary candidates for reducing referential properties to substantial non-semantic relations.
So her “pictorial” view does not suffer from lacking such an account. Millikan’s view is complex
and the role of picturing in her account is often overlooked, because most of the interest has been
on her theory of reference. Notable exceptions are Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996) and Nicholas
Shea (2013), who are sympathetic to some aspects of Millikan’s program but skeptical about the
role of isomorphism in her account. Godfrey-Smith and Shea see the teleological part as doing
all the explanatory work in Millikan’s theory, in such a way that truth-conditions are determined
merely by the selective history underlying the mechanisms responsible for producing
representations. While their assessments are different, they agree that isomorphism does not play
a genuine explanatory role in Millikan’s theory (Godfrey-Smith 1996: 184-187; Shea 2013: 6380). Their main concern is about the interplay between the teleological and the allegedly pictorial
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aspects of her theory. But in this appendix I am mainly concerned with the allegedly nonteleological part of Millikan’s theory.
Millikan regards mapping relations or isomorphisms between representations and reality
as the core features that make representations true, and she intends her teleological account to
explain merely why representations are supposed but may fail to map or be isomorphic to reality:
the teleological part of her theory is only intended to explain misrepresentation (Godfrey-Smith
1996: 184-185; Shea 2013: 63). While Godfrey-Smith and Shea are skeptical about this, I will
here simply grant for the sake of argument that Millikan’s theory does contain a non-teleological
account of truth in terms of the relation that she calls “mapping” or “isomorphism”. My question
is what is precisely this relation. If it really is the Tractarian relation of picturing, as she
explicitly claims, then this part of her theory is undermined by the problems discussed in Chapter
2, Section 2.2. Millikan intends her theory to apply to all sorts of representations, from human
representations to the most basic cases of non-human representation. I will focus here on
sentences of natural human languages.
According to Millikan, sentences “correspond to states of affairs in accordance with
semantic-mapping functions” (Millikan 2005: 63). The notion of “function” here is the
mathematical one (Millikan 2005: 53), rather than the teleological notion that she deploys in
other parts of her theory. Semantic-mapping functions, she argues, are rules that determine the
truth-conditions of sentences:
The semantic-mapping function is given by rules according to which significant
transformations of the sentence that conserve its syntactic form yield different
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truth- or satisfaction-conditions... ‘It’s raining’ contrasts with ‘It’s snowing’, ‘It’s
hailing’, ‘It’s sleeting’, and so forth. All display the same syntactic form, the
transformations that substitute ‘snow’, ‘hail’, and ‘sleet’ for ‘rain’ determining
different satisfaction-conditions in a systematic way. (Millikan 2005: 63-64)
Substitutions of component parts of a sentence of a specific syntactic form, she claims, change
its truth-conditions in a systematic way. So, for example, ‘Fa’, can be transformed into ‘Fb’,
‘Ga’, ‘Gb’, etc., which have the same syntactic structure but represent different states of affairs.
The difference regarding what portions of reality each of these sentences “maps” onto is
determined exclusively by the different referential properties of their components. To the extent
that mapping rules determine what states of affairs are represented by transformations of
sentences of the same form—which is what Millikan suggests in the quoted passage—the
“mapping” determined by these rules has nothing to do with the traditional notion of structural
resemblance between sentences and facts. Of course the mapping rules that determine the truth
conditions of ‘Rab’ and its transformations—‘Rba’, ‘Scd’, ‘Sdc’, etc.—will be different. It is
clear that Millikan thinks that mapping functions relate each sentence to a state of affairs that
would make it true, and that this relation depends on (1) the syntactic structure of the sentence
and (2) the referential properties of its words. These two features are part of pictorial theories,
but also of the contemporary non-pictorial account of correspondence that I discussed in Chapter
2 (although this theory does not explicitly posit fact or states of affairs, a variant of it may do so
without relying on picturing relations). The questions are whether Millikan’s “mapping” rules are
intended to relate sentences to states of affairs which have the very same structures as the
sentences and whether this is actually required by her account of truth-conditions in terms of
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“mapping” rules.
Consider the following rule for the simplest form of subject-predicate sentence. SP: The
sentence ⌜Φx⌝ is true if and only the state of affairs in which the object referred to by ⌜x⌝ has
the property referred to by ⌜Φ⌝ obtains. The rule SP is compatible with Millikan’s claim that the
relata of sentences are states of affairs and her professed Aristotelian realism about properties
(Millikan 1984: Ch. 15 & 16). Also, SP covers all the substitution instances of ⌜Φx⌝—i.e., ‘Fa’,
‘Fb’, ‘Ga’, etc.—assigning a specific state of affairs as the truth-maker for each instance. It
yields in a systematic way the truth-conditions for of all the transformations of ‘Fa’. Assuming
that these corresponding states of affairs have the same ontological structure—that of an object
having a monadic property—SP pairs or correlates sentences that have a specific syntactic
structure with states of affairs that have a specific ontological structure. SP delivers what
Millikan calls “a correspondence by a given rule or function between form and some structure in
the world” (Millikan 2005: 98). Everything that Millikan seems to require of a “semanticmapping rule” is met by SP. The crucial point is that SP does not require the combination of a
name with a monadic predicate to structurally resemble the combination of an object with a
monadic property. If SP is the kind of “semantic-mapping rule” that Millikan has in mind, then
hers is a correlation-based rather than a resemblance-based form correspondence view. What is
puzzling is Millikan’s talk of “mapping” as a form of “picturing” involving an “isomorphism”
between representations and reality. A correlation account should only talk of “representing”.
Millikan’s favorite example of representation is the figure-eight waggle dance made by
honey bees to communicate to each other the location of nectar—which she often compares to
human sentences. The ethologist Karl von Frisch discovered that waggle dances communicate
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the location of nectar and that they do this by representing its direction and distance from the
hive: the angle of the waggle dance with respect to the vertical axis of the hive represents the
angle from the line between the hive and the Sun where nectar is located, while the duration of
the dance represents how far away from the hive the nectar is (von Frisch 1953: Ch. 11).
According to Millikan, the bee dance “is a tiny map” that “maps the location of nectar by a
certain rule of projection” (Millikan 2005: 83). “Variations in possible bee dances”, she points
out, “correspond one-to-one to variations in possible locations of nectar” and “the principle
involved”, she claims, “is mathematical isomorphism” (Millikan 2005: 97). The way she
describes how the “bee language”—as von Frisch called it—represents the location of nectar has
a distinctly Tractarian flavor. It is striking that bee dances do represent the location of nectar by
means of mathematical rules of projection. A waggle dance x represents the presence of nectar in
direction y at distance z from the hive. There is a direct mathematical projection between the
angle of x and the direction y, and another one between the duration of x and the distance z.
Mathematical rules of projection determine the values of y and z. Whether this makes the whole
dance “isomorphic” to the location of nectar is not so clear and I will not discuss it. But what is
this supposed to tell us about representations in general and about human sentences in particular?
Bee dances are Millikan’s favorite example because she thinks that they illustrate basic
features of representations in general. Here is how she explains what “mapping functions” do in
any system of representation: “Semantic mapping functions define isomorphisms between the set
of possible signs in a certain sign domain and the set of their possible signifieds.” (Millikan
2004a: 49). This is meant to apply also to the linguistic and mental representations of human
beings, although she warns that we should “expect the... mapping functions to be much more
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abstract” in the case of human representations (Millikan 2005: 102). Furthermore, she insists that
she uses the term ‘isomorphism’ in “the abstract mathematical sense” (Millikan 2004a: 84). In
their pictorial period, Wittgenstein and Russell also intended true sentences to be isomorphic to
facts only in an abstract sense. They intended only the underlying logical form of a true sentence
to resemble the structure of what it represents, independently of its superficial structure which
may be different. If this were the kind of abstract isomorphism that Millikan expects to obtain
between true sentences and what they “map” onto, her theory would be undermined by the
problem discovered by Russell: that a sentence ‘Rab’ would represent a fact containing two
objects united by a dyadic relation, while the sentence contains three words united by a triadic
logico-syntactic relation (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2). However, despite her talk of “picturing”,
“mapping”, “rules of projection” and “isomorphisms”, she never claims explicitly that a true
representation has the same structure as what it represents.
Recall Millikan’s claim that, in human languages, the mapping rules systematically
determine for different sentences different states of affairs as truth-makers (Millikan 2005: 6364). This is compatible with a correlation-based view of correspondence. Recall her claim that
mapping rules determine a correspondence between the form of a true sentence and some
structure in the world (Millikan 2005: 98). This claim also falls short of being genuinely
pictorial. As I argued above, the rule SP would determine a correspondence between a sentence
of the form ⌜Φx⌝ and a state of affairs with a specific structure—that of an object having a
monadic property—regardless of whether the sentence’s form matches that structure or not
(which is good because it does not, as Russell showed). Now consider the following passage:
We can think of beliefs as... mental sentences... and think of... their truth makers...
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as determined by some sort of Tarskian mapping... Certain substitutions of
sentence parts correspond to substitutions in aspects of world affairs mapped...
That is, there is a functional isomorphism between the whole set of possible
mental sentences... and the set of world affairs to which these sentences would
correspond... (Millikan 2004b: 231-232)
This passage is very revealing of what kind of “mapping” Millikan expects to obtain between
true sentences and reality. The rule SP I proposed is precisely the “sort of Tarskian mapping” for
simple predicative sentences that a realist about properties and structured states of affairs (or
facts) like Millikan would need. Analogous “sort of Tarskian” rules would be required to cover
other syntactic structures. What those rules would determine is a systematic one-to-one pairing
of all possible sentences with all of their possible truth-makers, which is what Millikan in the
passage calls—rather confusingly, in my opinion—a “functional isomorphism”. This pairing is
clearly what a fact-based view of correspondence as correlation requires, which is less than what
a genuinely pictorial theory requires. Incidentally, notice that the set of all instances of the
equivalence schema also seems to provide a systematic pairing between sentences and what they
represent (‘p’ is true ↔ p, ‘q’ is true ↔ q, ‘r’ is true ↔ r, etc.). But this “pairing” is not a
relation. A correlation-based correspondence theory requires the systematic pairing to be
determined by substantial relations between sentences and truth-makers.
All of this, however, leaves open the possibility that Millikan’s talk of relations of
“picturing” between sentences and their truth-makers may additionally require actual structural
resemblance. The fact that she does not explicitly require structural resemblance is not enough to
sort this out, since her pictorial talk and her comparison between sentences and bee dances
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suggests otherwise. However, Millikan has recently made a distinction between “projected
correspondence” and “substitutional correspondence” (Millikan 2013b: 84-86) that helps to
clarify this issue. This distinction is intended as a response to an objection by Shea. So I will
provide some context before explaining the distinction and discussing how it settles the issue of
whether Millikan requires true sentences to structurally resemble states of affairs.
In his objection to Millikan’s isomorphism requirement, Shea suggests an interesting
hypothetical scenario. Suppose that the bee rules for representing distance were as follows: 1
waggle = 75 m, 2 waggles = 300 m, 3 waggles = 60 m, 4 waggles = 150 m, etc. (Shea 2013: 74).
Of course, these are very different from the actual rules, discovered by von Frisch, relating bee
dances to the distance of nectar. But in principle—while very unlikely—some species or
subspecies of bee could have evolved to have dances which represent by Shea’s rules, provided
their foraging range was limited, so that a finite list of rules could be used to represent all the
required distances. I will call these creatures “bees*”. One of the features of Shea’s bee* rules is
that they are list-like: there is a different rule for each distance represented. Another feature is
that the list is arbitrary: there is no general principle involved, such as more waggles representing
more distance. The only principle is that each number of waggles represents a particular distance.
Bee* dances are not “isomorphic” in any minimally strict sense of the word to the distance of
nectar they represent. Yet, as Shea points out, his arbitrary rules seem to determine what qualifies
as a “functional isomorphism” in Millikan’s sense (Shea 2013: 75). As I indicated above, a
systematic one-to-one pairing of representations with states of affairs seems indeed to be what
she calls a “functional isomorphism”. Shea’s hypothetical bee* rules deliver such a pairing. The
example echoes and supports Godfrey-Smith’s objection that Millikan’s notion of isomorphism
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is too liberal—that “nearly any relation can constitute a «mapping» in Millikan’s theory”
(Godfrey-Smith 1996: 185). Shea and Godfrey-Smith make these points in the context of
discussing the relation between Millikan’s isomorphism requirement and her teleological theory
of content. As far as Shea is concerned, Millikan’s teleosemantic theory has the resources to
explain his hypothetical bee* rules in terms of evolutionary grounded substantive relations. 87 He
is not objecting to Millikan’s teleosemantics. What Shea intends the example to show is that the
isomorphism requirement does not play a genuine role in the theory.
Millikan draws the distinction between projected and substitutional correspondence in her
response to Shea. The language of actual bees, she suggests, is a clear example of mapping by
means of projected correspondence. There are mathematical functions or projection rules relating
features of different bee dances to different locations of nectar. She offers the following
illustration of what the rule for representing distance may look like: “For example: add one
waggle to the dance = add 1,000 yards to the distance of nectar. If this equation applies to every
possible bee dance, it describes a projected correspondence between dances and distances”
(Millikan 2013b: 84). While also imaginary, this rule does capture the basic principle involved in
actual bee dances: a longer dance represents a longer distance of nectar from the hive. About
Shea’s bee* rules Millikan says: “Shea suggests for bee dances a list giving arbitrary
correspondences between numbers of waggles and distances. This would be a list of correlated
substitution transformations...” (Millikan 2013b: 84). Her point is that there is no mathematical
equation or projection rule relating the number of waggles to the distance of nectar. Instead, she
87 The list-like nature of bee* rules may raise concerns about whether they determine substantive correspondences,
since deflationists offer precisely list-like characterizations which, they claim, involve no substantive relation.
Presumably the reply to this concern is that the bee* dances are substantially related to locations of nectar by
evolutionary history.
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claims, there are substitutional rules that arbitrarily relate changes in the number of waggles to
changes in the distance of nectar from the hive represented—e.g., replacing a 2 waggles dance
with a 3 waggles dance transforms the distance represented from 300 m to 60 m (Millikan
2013b: 84-85). Even though they are arbitrary, she acknowledges, bee* rules do determine a
systematic one-to-one pairing of representations and what they represent (Millikan 2013b: 85).
Setting aside the representation of direction, her claim is that a bee dance is true when it has a
projected correspondence to the distance of nectar, while a bee* dance is true when it has a
substitutional correspondence to the distance of nectar.88
Millikan further illustrates the distinction with another example where, she says, both
kinds of correspondence are at play: a human-made map of a county where lines represent “the
shape and placement of roads” and “different colors... represent different road surfaces, such as
dirt, gravel, paved, and so forth” (Millikan 2013b: 86). This is basically a hybrid case where, if
the map is accurate, the shape and placement of the lines has a projected correspondence to the
actual shape and placement of the roads, while the colors of the lines have a substitutional
correspondence to the actual surfaces of the roads.
A way of clarifying Millikan’s point is that what she calls a “projected correspondence”
involves a relation of isomorphism between representation and reality, while what she calls a
“substitutional correspondence” involves merely a correlation determined by some substantial
relation other than isomorphism. Millikan does not make the point explicitly in these terms.
Perhaps she still wants to regard substitutional correspondences as involving some form of
“abstract isomorphism”. While this is a terminological issue, I see no point in applying the term
88 Millikan now claims that the teleological part of her theory is what grounds any such correspondences on real
relations (Millikan 2013b: 82-83).
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‘isomorphism’ to non-projective correspondences. This would be misleading, since it would
obscure the standard distinction made in the literature on the nature of truth between
correspondence as congruence, structural resemblance or isomorphism, on one hand, and
correspondence as mere correlation, on the other. Once a theory admits both non-projective and
projective correspondences, it is better characterized as a correlation theory, since what it claims
to be the common feature of all true representations is that they are paired to their truth makers
by one or another substantive relation—projective relations being merely one such kind of
relation that some representational systems (e.g., bee dances) may rely on.
Now we can address Millikan’s position regarding sentences in human languages.
Drawing on her distinction between projective and substitutional correspondence, she says that
“almost all of the correspondences found in natural language are substitutional” (Millikan 2013b:
84) and claims that “this is the main difference between simpler representations and the
representations of human language” (Millikan 2013b: 86). I am skeptical about the second claim.
But let me start by commenting on the first one. Millikan has always argued that what sets apart
sentences from other representations is their syntactic structure: they have subject-predicate form
and can be negated (Millikan 1984: 308-309). She has pointed out, for example, that “bee dances
are not sentences, for they have no subject terms, and a rabbit’s danger thumps are not sentences,
for they never predicate of a time and place anything other than danger... [while] the alarm calls
of vervet monkeys are not sentences because... [they] are never negated” (Millikan 1993: 118).
Also, she has always characterized the “mapping” rules of sentences as mainly substitutional, as
shown by some passages I have already quoted. Here is an earlier example: “In the case of
sentences that map, the significant transformations... are mostly substitution transformations...”
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(Millikan 1984: 108). However, only now she has made the explicit claim that substitutional
rules are not projective rules. This makes it clear that she does not regard now the kind of
“substitutional” correspondence of true sentences to be like the “projective” correspondence of
accurate bee dances. In the clearer terms I prefer to use, her conception of sentential truth is one
of correspondence as correlation, rather than one of correspondence as congruence, structural
resemblance or isomorphism. I argued before that Millikan’s theory does not really require true
sentences to structurally resemble states of affairs. Whatever she intended in her previous work
—which is not entirely clear—she now clearly does not think that true sentences structurally
resemble what they represent.
I close this appendix with couple of critical remarks. The first one is substantive and the
second one terminological. My first remark is against Millikan’s claim that the distinction
between substitutional and projective truth-conditions is what sets apart human sentences from
simpler representations. (I think that her syntax-based distinction is more appropriate, although
we may find syntax also in non-human languages of thought: whether syntax is uniquely human
is an empirical question.) Notice that some very sophisticated representations (e.g., computer
generated models) may rely at least partly on projective rules. More importantly, many simple
non-human representations seem to have “substitutional” truth-conditions. Vervet monkey alarm
calls are an obvious example: they are merely correlated to the presence of the appropriate
predators when accurate. Indeed, plenty of extremely simple “detection” systems represent
reality without relying on any projective rules or mathematical isomorphisms. The hair detectors
used by the Venus flytrap to detect that an insect has landed are a clear example. (By the way, the
triggers only represent—when successful—that an insect has landed, so there are neither
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projective nor substitutional “transformations” involved. The distinction does not apply across
the board.) It is likely that the perceptual representations of more sophisticated creatures do rely
on some forms of isomorphism (Millikan 2005: 102). But correspondence as correlation seems to
be ubiquitous and not merely a sophisticated human phenomenon.
My second point is that once correspondence by means of mathematical isomorphism has
been discarded as a necessary condition for representational truth, there is no motivation for
regarding true representations in general as either picturing or mapping what they represent. It is
obvious that any further talk of picturing would be merely metaphorical. Perhaps bee dances and
many other representations literally are maps of what they represent. But consider simple human
sentences like ‘Socrates is wise’ or ‘Snow is white’. Saying that these sentences map something
seems clearly metaphoric. What could that possibly mean other than that they represent
something? Talk of mapping does not convey anything that cannot be as easily conveyed by
explicit talk of representing.
In Chapter 2, Section 2.2, I argued that the pictorial account of sentential truth as
structural resemblance to facts is hopeless. In this Appendix I have argued that the “pictorial”
account promoted by Millikan, despite her claims, does not require genuinely pictorial relations.
If she originally intended correspondence relations in general to involve structural resemblances,
that feature of her theory should be replaced by a correlation-based account. It seems that
Millikan herself has now reached this conclusion, at least for the case of sentential truth. The
only viable alternative for a correspondence theory of sentential truth is to offer a correlation
account based on substantial relations between sentences and reality.
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Appendix 2:
More on Attitude Ascriptions
In Chapter 1, I argued against the view that attitude ascriptions of the form ‘S believes that p’ or
‘S said that p’ assert relations between people and abstract objects called “propositions”. I
defended a non-propositionalist alternative, proposed by Devitt (1996), according to which the
‘that’-clauses in attitude ascriptions function as indefinite singular terms. I showed how this
account has crucial advantages over the propositionalist analysis. In this appendix, I will discuss
yet another analysis of attitude ascriptions that constitutes an important non-propositionalist
alternative to the one I defended in Chapter 1: the multiple-relation analysis offered by
Friederike Moltmann (2003 & 2013). Moltmann’s analysis is based on Russell’s multiplerelation theory of beliefs. Russell himself abandoned this view due to a serious problem he
encountered while trying to develop it—and the view was not taken seriously afterwards.
Moltmann, however, has resurrected the view an attempted to articulate it in a way that
overcomes the difficulties faced by Russell’s version. In what follows, I will first present
Russell’s original proposal and the problems it faces. Afterwards, I will present Moltmann’s
contemporary version and argue that it also faces serious difficulties. Finally, I will argue that the
analysis I proposed following Devitt has crucial advantages that favor it over any multiplerelation analysis of belief ascriptions.
To understand Russell’s multiple-relations theory, it will be convenient to briefly review
the view he was trying to avoid: his earlier view that the primary truth-bearers are what today are
called “Russellian propositions”. (I discussed this in Chapter 1. Here I provide a brief summary.)
Let me use a simple example: the proposition that Rab—i.e., that the object a has the relation R
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with the object b. The early Russell (1903) held that the constituents of propositions were entities
in the world. The constituents of the proposition that Rab would be the objects a and b, as well as
the relation R. But what glues these parts into a unity? Russell suggested that in the proposition
that Rab, the fact that R actually relates a and b is what provides the unity of the proposition
(Russell 1903: 48-53). As I pointed out in Chapter 1, on this view true propositions collapse into
the facts that make them true. Russell embraced this, proposing that a proposition is true if and
only if it is identical to a fact (Russell 1904). But a serious problem is that on Russell’s view
there cannot be false propositions (King 2007: 23). If it is not a fact that Rab—if R does not
relate a and b— there is no unity that we can call the “false proposition” that Rab.
Eventually Russell attempted to avoid the problem of falsehood by rejecting propositions
and replacing them with beliefs as the primary truth-bearers. Treating a belief as a relation to a
“Russellian” proposition would defeat the purpose. Russell proposed instead that a belief is
complex unity involving multiple relations between entities in the world and the believer: that
S’s act of believing that Rab contains R, a and b bound to S by the believing relation (Russell
1912: 124-29). Notice that there was an important continuity with Russell’s earlier account: the
constituents of his truth-bearers still were mind- and language-independent entities, rather than
representations standing for them. But on Russell’s new account the unity of the truth-bearer was
provided by the believing relation: “The relation [R... when S believes that Rab]... occurs in the
act of believing... [as] one of the objects—it is a brick in the structure, not the cement. The
cement is the relation ‘believing’.” (Russell 1912: 128). Russell’s analysis of the structure of S’s
act of believing that Rab can be logically symbolized by ‘BsRab’—where ‘B’ is a polyadic
predicate standing for the believing relation but ‘R’ is a name for a relation rather than a dyadic
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predicate. Similarly, the analysis of S’s act of believing that Fa can be symbolized by ‘BsFa’—
where ‘F’ is a name for a property instead of a predicate. The constituents united by the believing
relation are all treated as objects.
The multiple relation account allowed Russell to make some room for falsehood and led
him to define truth as correspondence. On this account, whether BSRab is independent of whether
it is a fact that Rab—the believing relation can bind R, a and b one by one with S even if R does
not bind a and b: “it is easier to account for falsehood if we take judgment to be a relation in
which the mind and the various objects concerned all occur severally” (Russell 1912: 125). This
independence of truth-bearers from facts is what originally led Russell to regard truth as a
correspondence rather than an identity relation. He proposed that S’s belief that Rab is true if and
only if there is a corresponding fact where R binds a and b in the “same order” as R, a and b are
bound to S by the believing relation (Russell 1912: 128-29). As Kirkham points out, this is “the
(original modern) correspondence-as-congruence theory of truth” (Kirkham 1992: 132).89
Russell’s multiple relation theory was an ingenious attempt to avoid propositions, but it is
undermined by two insurmountable problems which show that the theory ascribes the wrong
constituents and the wrong structures to truth-bearers. The solution to these problems requires a
shift to structured representations as truth-bearers.
One problem faced by Russell’s theory is that it does not truly make room for all kinds of
falsehood: it fails to achieve its main goal. Suppose that S falsely believes that Rab, not merely
89 The account relies on a supposed resemblance or congruence between the structures facts and true beliefs. But it
also relies on an alleged identity of the constituents of facts and true beliefs. While this is the first contemporary
attempt to explain truth as resemblance-to-facts, the truly influential one is the second attempt by Wittgenstein
and Russell himself, which treats representations as truth-bearers and relies on referential rather than identity
relations between their constituents and reality.
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because R does not relate a and b, but because b does not exist. As Kirkham points out, on
Russell’s analysis S cannot have such a false belief: one of the constituents is missing, since the
theory requires R, a and b—rather than ideas or concepts purporting to stand for them—to be the
constituents of the belief (Kirkham 1992: 122-123). I will call this the “missing constituents”
problem. The upshot of this problem is that the constituents of a truth-bearer must be symbols or
representations that purport—but may fail—to refer to entities in the world. In fact, the early
Russell’s account of propositions is also undermined by the problem: if a does not exist, there
cannot be a false proposition that Fa, not because it lacks unity, but because it lacks a
constituent. The early Russell had a reply: ‘a’ is not a genuine name, but an abbreviation for a
uniquely identifying description (Russell: 1905), so the proposition expressed by ‘Fa’ does not
contain a to begin with: there is no missing constituent. An analogous attempt may be made to
rescue his multiple relation theory: the belief expressed by ‘Fa’ does not contain a, so it is not
missing a constituent (see Kirkham 1992: 123). But Saul Kripke has shown that Russell’s
treatment of ordinary names as disguised descriptions utterly fails (Kripke 1980). Additionally,
Russell acknowledged that there are genuine names. The missing constituents problem would
anyway arise for Russellian propositions or beliefs expressed by sentences containing empty
genuine names. While Russell assumed that genuine names cannot be empty, Kripke has also
debunked this assumption (Kripke 2011).
The missing constituents problem may be avoided by a modification of the multiple
relation theory that replaces the relevant entities with concepts purporting to stand for them. The
truth of a belief would then depend on whether there is a corresponding fact where the referents
of the concepts are bound together in the same order as the concepts are bound to the believer by
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the believing relation—which would make room for beliefs that are false due to reference failure.
If we use underlining to symbolize concepts, so that the concepts purporting to stand for R, a and
b are R, a and b, we can symbolize the resulting analysis of S’s act of believing that Rab by
‘BsRab’—where ‘R’ is a name for a predicational concept, rather than a dyadic predication. This
is still a multiple relation account: the concepts are related one by one to the believer by the
believing relation. If the missing constituents problem were the only problem faced by Russell’s
multiple relation theory, this variant may work. In any case, Russell did not realize that his
theory was undermined by this problem (perhaps he thought that he could deploy his theory of
disguised descriptions to avoid it). What led him to abandon the multiple relation theory was
another problem, which happens to affect any variant.
The other problem faced by the multiple relation theory was discovered by Wittgenstein.
In a letter from June 1913, Wittgenstein pointed out to Russell that ‘Rab ∨ ~Rab’ must “follow
directly” from the correct analysis of ‘S believes that Rab’ and that this “condition is not
fulfilled” by his theory (Wittgenstein 2008: 40). Notice that ‘Rab ∨ ~Rab’ is a tautology and that
any arbitrary tautology can be validly deduced from any statement. So what is the problem?
Wittgenstein was hinting that there must be a non-arbitrary connection between S’s belief that
Rab and specifically ‘Rab ∨ ~Rab’ which—unlike other tautologies—expresses that this
particular belief is either true or false. On his Notes on Logic from September 1913, Wittgenstein
elaborated on why the multiple relation theory fails to establish this connection:
When we say A judges that, etc., then we have to mention a whole proposition
which A judges. It will not do... to mention only its constituents... [A] right theory
of judgment must make it impossible for me to judge that “this table penholders
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the book”... (Wittgenstein 1969: 96)
In the ordinary ascription ‘S believes that Rab’, S’s belief is specified by ‘Rab’, which by itself
constitutes meaningful unit that can be true or false—‘Rab ∨ ~Rab’—because the syntactic
arrangement of ‘R’, ‘a’ and ‘b’ forms a sentence. Such a sentence is the “whole proposition” that,
according to Wittgenstein, must be mentioned to specify S’s belief. (I discuss below
Wittgenstein’s treatment of sentences as propositions). The belief ascriptions made by Russell’s
theory were very different, since they replaced ‘S believes that Rab’ with ‘BsRab’, which does
not contain ‘Rab’. This was an intended feature of Russell’s analysis. But Wittgenstein objected
that in ‘BsRab’, the string ‘Rab’ is not by itself a meaningful unit that can be true of false, so it
cannot specify S’s belief. The concatenation of ‘R’, ‘a’ and ‘b’ does not form a sentence because
‘R’ does not play the role of a dyadic predicate: ‘ Rab’ is merely a string of names analogous to
the nonsensical string of ‘table’, ‘penholder’ and ‘book’ mentioned by Wittgenstein. As Russell
explained the problem some years later, he was “putting the subordinate verb on a level with its
terms as an object term in the belief” (Russell 1918: 59). Russell’s account of S’s act of believing
that Rab did not have the right form: it did not relate S to a structured unity that can be true or
false. I will call this the “structure problem” of the multiple relation theory.90
Notice that the structure problem also affects the concept-based variant of the multiple
relation theory that may overcome the missing constituents problem. In ‘BsRab’ the string ‘Rab’
is merely a concatenation of names for concepts, rather than a meaningful unit that can be true or
90 Nicholas Griffin (1985) argues that Wittgenstein’s main concern was that the multiple relation theory did not
provide the necessary type restrictions on the constituents of the belief: it did not treat R as a relation in S’s
belief that Rab. Peter Hanks (2007) argues that Russell could have provided the required type restrictions, but
Wittgenstein’s main concern was the unity of the truth-bearer: even if R were specified to be a relation, it would
not relate a and b, since R, a and b would still be severally related to the believer. Of course, if R is not treated
as a relation to begin with, its unity with a and b is also broken. On either interpretation of Wittgenstein’s
objection, Russell’s truth-bearer does not have the right structure.
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false such as the mental sentence symbolized by ‘Rab’. Regarding beliefs as structured mental
representations containing concepts or ideas purporting to refer to entities in the world avoids
both the structure and the missing constituents problems.
Russell unsuccessfully tried to amend his theory by adding a form as yet another object of
the multiple relation—instead of ‘BsRab’, the ascription would be ‘BsRabδ’, were ‘δ’ names the
form Φxy—but it was unclear how this separate form could structure the other constituents
(Griffin 1985: 242; Hanks 2007: 127). Russell eventually abandoned the theory and accepted
Wittgenstein’s proposal that truth-bearers are linguistic and mental representations. The shift to
representations was exclusively motivated by the structure problem. The missing constituents
problem played no role. Even in Russell (1918) and Wittgenstein (1922) empty genuine names
are wrongly assumed to be an impossibility (Kripke 2011: 60-61).
After Russell himself abandoned it, the multiple relation theory was relegated during the
remainder of the twentieth century to a “historical curiosity, rather than a serious philosophical
position” (Griffin 1985: 213). But Michael Jubien (2001) and Friederike Moltmann (2003) have
recently resurrected it in an attempt to avoid treating beliefs and other attitudes as relations to
mind- and language-independent propositions. Peter Hanks argues that these attempts face the
very same problem that led Russell to abandon the theory (Hanks 2009: 471-72 & 484n).
Moltmann (2013), however, maintains that her analysis of attitude ascriptions overcomes the
problem. Her version of the multiple relation theory is the most developed one and provides an
alternative to the non-propositionalist analysis of attitude ascriptions I proposed in Chapter 1.
But I will argue that it is unclear whether her ingenious proposal succeeds and that my proposal
avoids altogether the problems faced by any multiple relational analysis of attitude ascriptions.
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Moltmann (2013) treats attitude verbs as multigrade predicates, following a proposal by
Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley (2004). A multigrade predicate is alleged to be one that can take
a variable number of arguments. Consider (1) ‘Tom cooked dinner’ and (2) ‘Tom, Dick and
Harry cooked dinner’. The logical form of (1) is ‘Ct’, but Oliver and Smiley contend that
‘cooked dinner’ is multigrade, so the form (2) is ‘Ctdh’ rather than ‘Ct & Cd & Ch’ (Oliver and
Smiley 2004: 609-612). Oliver and Smiley also draw a distinction between argument places and
positions. Consider (3) ‘Adam fought with Yuri’ and (4) ‘Adam and Bill fought with Yuri and
Zero’. Each of the two places of ‘x fought with y’, they propose, can take a variable number of
internal positions; so the form of (3) is ‘Fa;y’ and the form of (4) is ‘Fab;yz’—where the nonstandard ‘;’ is used to separate places (Oliver and Smiley 2004: 615-618).
Moltmann suggests that ‘believes’ and other attitude verbs are multigrade predicates with
a first place reserved for the agent and a second place with a variable number of positions
reserved for the constituents of the “attitudinal object” (which she claims is not a proposition); so
that the logical form of ‘John thinks that Mary likes Bill’ is: ‘THINK(John; LIKE, Mary, Bill)’
(Moltmann 2013: 132-149). Like Russell, she regards the constituents as severally related
arguments of the attitude verb. Unlike Russell, she treats the attitude verb as dyadic: ‘LIKE,
Mary, Bill’ occupies a single place, within which ‘LIKE’, ‘Mary’ and ‘Bill’ occupy different
positions. The attitude verb, she proposes, establishes relations of “intentional predication”: the
attitudes are “ways of predicating a property of its arguments” (Moltmann 2013: 147). Her
suggestion is that the attitude verb assigns “different roles” to the “different positions” within its
second place: “one distinguished argument position for a property, meant to be predicated of the
other arguments, as well as further argument positions matching the argument positions of the
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property” (Moltmann 2013: 149). What ‘S believes that Rab’ states, she argues, is that S
predicates the property R of a and b (Moltmann 2013: 146). This analysis, she claims, overcomes
the problem that undermined Russell’s account: “the fact that the constituents are arguments of a
multigrade attitudinal relation will ensure that the sequence forms the content of an attitudinal
object that... has the right truth conditions.” (Moltmann 2013: 153).
Does Moltmann’s theory overcome the problems of Russell’s theory? Let us start with the
missing constituents problem—which she does not discuss. Moltmann says: “An agent is
successful in predicating an n-place property of n objects just in case the property holds of the
objects” (Moltmann 2013: 146). If it is not the case that Rab, then S is not successful in
predicating R of a and b. This makes room for some falsehoods. But Moltmann’s analysis, like
Russell’s, relates S to R, a and b themselves. If b does not exist, then it seems that S is not only
unsuccessful in predicating R of a and b, but the predication cannot take place. In fact, if ‘b’ is an
empty term, ‘S believes that Rab’ seems to be a false ascription under her analysis instead of the
ascription of a false belief. Moltmann makes a tentative suggestion that may provide a solution to
this problem: “[the] constituents may be concepts, occupying a position in the multigrade place
of the attitude verb specifically marked for such concepts” (Moltmann 2013: 159). Moltmann
here is not committing herself to this suggestion, and she is focusing only on the predicate
embedded in the ‘that’-clause (which is why she mentions only a single position that may be
occupied by concepts). But by adopting this suggestion and extending it to cover the arguments
of the embedded predicate, her theory may overcome the missing constituents problem. This
would be a concept-based modification of her analysis.
Moltmann’s analysis also faces a dilemma regarding the structure of the ascription. The
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quasi-unity provided by treating the attitude verb as dyadic is not enough to overcome the
structure problem: what unifies the different positions in its second place into a structure that can
be true or false? Moltmann claims that the attitude verb assigns “different roles” to the different
positions. This could either mean that in ‘S believes that Rab’ the ascription contains a name ‘R’
referring to a property R—which S is “meant” to predicate of a and b—or that the ascription
itself contains a relational predicate ‘R’. The dilemma is that both options are problematic: the
first one is undermined by the structure problem, while the second one seems to collapse into
propositionalism. According to the first option, the form of the ascription is ‘Bs;Rab’.91 The
string ‘Rab’, just like in Russell’s version, is a concatenation of names. Even if one of these
names has the specially assigned role of referring to a relational property, this does not turn the
string into a unity that can be true or false. Clearly this is not what Moltmann has in mind: recall
her analysis of ‘John thinks that Mary likes Bill’ as ‘THINK(John; LIKE, Mary, Bill)’. What she
has in mind is the second option, according to which the form of the ascription is ‘Bs;Rab’.92 In
the string ‘Rab’, the predicate ‘R’ does appear to take ‘a’ and ‘b’ as its arguments: we do seem to
have a structure with “the right truth conditions” (setting aside the missing constituents problem:
can S have this belief if b does not exist?). But this analysis seems to collapse into the very kind
of propositionalism she wants to avoid. In the traditional propositionalist view, the ascription ‘S
91 Oliver and Smiley suggest this option. They argue that this solves the problem of the multiple relation theory
using “predicates with variably many arguments”, but they do not claim that it solves the problem—which they
do notice—of “the conversion of verbs into nouns (‘loves’ into ‘loving’) which the multiple relation theory
demands” (Oliver and Smiley 2004: 628). Moltmann departs from Oliver and Smiley on this matter.
92 This is not a well-formed formula of first-order logic, even when extended to include multigrade predicates. But
suppose that ‘B’ is treated instead as a multigrade higher-order predicate that takes both names and predicates as
arguments. In this case, the ontological commitments of the ascription may seem as problematic as the
commitment to propositions that Moltmann wants to avoid. However, Moltmann (2013) interprets ordinary
language expressions—including second-order predications—as having less ontological commitments than
usually supposed. Roughly, she interprets expressions usually understood as referring to a property qua
universal or abstract object as merely plurally referring to the various particular instances of the property
(Moltmann 2013: Ch. 1-3). I will grant that Moltmann can account for ‘Bs;Rab’ being well-formed and not
having problematic ontological commitments related to the seemingly higher-order predication it contains.
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believes that Rab’ is analyzed as having the form as ‘Bs<Rab>’—where ‘<Rab>’ functions as a
name for the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Rab’. How different is ‘Bs;Rab’ from
‘Bs<Rab>’? Instead of angled brackets, Moltmann uses multigrade positions. Nonetheless, her
analysis seems to plug the same unity—by other means—into the second argument place of the
attitude verb. She actually acknowledges that in her analysis “the structure of the multigrade
position matches a structured proposition”, but she insists that there is a difference: that there is
no propositional object in her analysis, but merely “an ordered plurality of propositional
constituents” (Moltmann 2013: 150). Moltmann wants the constituents to be separated enough so
that there is no unity left that may be regarded as a “propositional object”, but she also wants
them to be united enough so that the “attitudinal object” they compose can be true or false. It is
unclear whether she succeeds balancing these two conflicting desiderata.
Things get even less clear when we consider ascriptions containing logically complex
embedded sentences. Moltmann tentatively suggests that ‘John believes that either Mary or Bill
will win’ may have the form ‘believe(John; OR, f[WIN, Mary], f[WIN, Bill])’—where the
connective ‘OR’ works as a multigrade predicate “taking attitudinal objects of entertaining as
arguments in any of their places” (Moltmann 2013: 152). This suggestion seems outright
implausible. Are quantifiers and negations embedded within ‘that’-clauses also multigrade
predicates? Consider ‘John believes that God does not exist’. Its multiple relation analysis will
have to be some variant of ‘BELIEVE(John; NOT, EXIST, God)’. Placing logical operators and
quantifiers in predicate argument positions is not only logically problematic, but ontologically
opens Pandora’s box. Of course, the Russellian view of propositions has difficulties handling
complex truth-bearers as well: what are the constituents of, and what provides the structure for,
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propositions like <Mary or Bill will win> and <God does not exist>? Moltmann acknowledges
that her theory “shares a number of issues concerning complex sentences with structured
propositions approaches” (Moltmann 2013: 152). What she has in mind is mainly Russellian
approaches. But these shared issues are serious enough to undermine both kinds of approach.
The analysis I propose in Chapter 1, drawing on Devitt’s (1996) suggestion that the
‘that’-clauses in attitude ascriptions function as indefinite singular terms, completely avoids
commitment to mind- and language-independent propositions, while also avoiding the problems
faced by multiple relation analyses. According to this analysis, ‘S believes that p’ states that S
has a belief and specifies that the content of this belief is the same as that of the embedded
sentence ‘p’. The form of the attribution in the analysis is ‘ ∃x(Bxs & Sx‘p’)’: some belief of S has
the same content as ‘p’. In Chapter 1, I showed that this analysis has crucial advantages over the
propositionalist analysis. First, it avoids the Substitution Problem that, as Moltmann (2003)
shows, undermines the propositionalist analysis.93 Second, it does not treat the attributed content
as a mind- and language-independent entity, which could not possibly play a causal role in the
explanation of people’s behavior. Additionally, I showed that the analysis is able to account for
the validity of inferences like ‘S believes that p, so S believes something’ without quantifying
over propositional objects.
93 The issue is that the clause ‘that p’ cannot be replaced with ‘the proposition that p’ for all attitude verbs without
changing the meaning of the ascription. ‘Mary believes that it will rain’ can be rephrased as ‘Mary believes the
proposition that it will rain’, but ‘Mary fears that it will rain’ cannot be rephrased as ‘Mary fears the proposition
that it will rain’. Strictly speaking, the substitution problem only undermines the traditional version of the
propositional analysis, where ‘S believes that p’ is analyzed as having the form ‘Bs<p>’. As I pointed out in
Chapter 1, a propositionalist can go along with Devitt’s proposal to treat the ‘that’-clause as an indefinite
singular term, but give a propositionalist twist to the analysis. On this sophisticated propositionalism, ‘S believes
that p’ is analyzed as having the form ‘∃x(Bxs & Cx<p>)’: Some belief of S has the proposition that p as its
content. As I showed in Chapter 1, this analysis avoids the substitution problem. However, the resulting view is
undermined by the main problem with propositionalism: the ascribed contents cannot play causal roles in the
explanation of behavior.
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Now I want to point out that this analysis also does better than multiple relation analyses.
Consider (1) ‘S believes that Fa’, (2) ‘S believes that Rab’ and (3) ‘S believes that Fa or Gb’. On
the analysis I propose, the forms of these attributions are simply (1') ‘ ∃x(Bxs & Sx‘Fa’)’, (2')
‘∃x(Bxs & Sx‘Rab’)’ and (3') ‘∃x(Bxs & Sx‘Fa or Gb’)’—where names for the sentences
embedded in the ‘that’-clauses (formed by enclosing them within quotation marks) are placed in
the second argument place of the relational predicate ‘Sxy’ (‘x has the same content as y’).
Suppose that ‘Gb’ is true—so ‘Fa or Gb’ is true—but ‘Fa’ and ‘Rab’ are false because a does not
exist. Then the beliefs attributed to S in (1') and (2') are false, while the belief attributed in (3') is
true. The analysis avoids the missing constituents problem: if the embedded sentence is false due
to reference failure, the ascribed belief will be also false. Since any two representations (whether
mental of linguistic) have the same truth-value if they have the same content, the analysis entails
that the belief has the same truth-value as the sentence embedded in the ascription’s ‘that’-clause.
Consequently, the analysis also avoids the structure problem: by mentioning the complete
embedded sentences, it specifies the right truth-conditions for the ascribed beliefs. (Notice that
this is precisely what Wittgenstein recommended in his criticism of Russell’s theory, although he
did not articulate an analysis of ascriptions.) For example, the analysis of (1) as (1') entails that
S’s belief is true if and only if Fa. The full inference is the following:
(P1) Some belief of S has the same content as ‘Fa’. (P2) ‘Fa’ is true if and only if
Fa. (P3) Any two representations have the same truth-value if they have the same
content. (C) Therefore, some belief of S is true if and only if Fa.
Here (P1) is the analysis’ paraphrase of ‘S believes that Fa’, (P2) is an uncontroversial instance
of the equivalence schema and (P3) is an equally uncontroversial principle. The conclusion (C)
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shows that the analysis ascribes a belief with the right truth-conditions. The logical form of this
inference is as follows:
∃x(Bxs & Sx‘Fa’)
T ‘Fa’ ↔ Fa
∀x∀y[Sxy → (Tx ↔ Ty)]
∴ ∃x[Bxs & (Tx ↔ Fa)]
Where ‘Tx’ = ‘x is true’. (Recall that ‘Bxs’ = ‘x is a belief of S’ and ‘Sxy’ = ‘x has the same
content as y’). This is a valid argument form and it remains valid when replacing the all
mentioned and used instances of ‘Fa’ with instances of any other sentence. This shows that any
belief ascription under the proposed analysis has the right truth-conditions.
Finally, the analysis I propose can handle attitude ascriptions with logically complex
embedded sentences as easily as it can handle simpler ones, just with the resources of standard
first-order logic. This is already shown by the analysis of (3) as (3'). But consider (4) ‘ S believes
that ~∃y(Fy)’. The analysis of (4) as (4') ‘ ∃x(Bxs & Sx‘~∃y(Fy)’)’ does not use ‘~’ or ‘∃y’ in a
predicate argument position: they are merely parts of the name for the sentence that specifies the
content of S’s belief. (3') and (4') are well-formed and ontologically unproblematic. They are as
plausible and harmless as the statement that the Spanish sentence ‘Dios no existe’ has the same
meaning as the English sentence ‘God does not exist’.
Even if a sophisticated multiple relation analysis like Moltmann’s were able to avoid the
problems of Russell’s version without collapsing into propositionalism—which is unclear—its
treatment of logically complex ‘that’-clauses would nevertheless be implausible. Consequently, I
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doubt that the multiple relation theory can be successfully resurrected. Russell did well to
abandon it following Wittgenstein’s advice.
Neither the early Russell’s account of propositions nor his subsequent account of beliefs
solved the problem of the unity or structure of the truth-bearer. On his Notes on Logic from 1913,
Wittgenstein proposed a simple solution: “Propositions... are symbols” (Wittgenstein 1969: 98).
The sentential symbol ‘Rab’, for example, has the symbols ‘Rxy’, ‘a’ and ‘b’ as constituents
(Wittgenstein 1969: 98). There is no problem accounting for the unity of the sentence, which is
provided by its syntactic structure. As Wittgenstein wrote in his Notebooks on 1914: “Does the
subject-predicate form exist? Does the relational form exist? ...everything that needs to be shewn
is shewn by the existence of subject-predicate SENTENCES” (Wittgenstein 1969: 2-3). Of
course, the structure of sentential symbols was never a problem for Russell. In fact, he used
symbolic logic to uncover the hidden structures of sentences that traditional logic mistakenly
analyzed as having simple subject-predicate forms—such as ‘The present King of France is bald’
which, Russell (1905) showed, has the complex form ‘∃x{[Kx & ∀y(Ky → x=y)] & Bx}’: i.e.,
‘there is unique thing which is King of France and this thing is bald’). But Russell was convinced
that the primary truth-bearers themselves contained no symbols—whether in his early account of
propositions or in his multiple relation theory of beliefs—and regarded the symbols used in logic
as a “theoretically irrelevant convenience”. This conviction made syntactic structures unavailable
as candidates for the structure of truth-bearers. Wittgenstein’s suggestion that “propositions” are
symbols places not only symbols, but also syntactic structures, in the truth-bearers themselves.
By 1918, Russell finally accepted sentences as truth-bearers: a “proposition is just a...
complex symbol... that... has parts which are also symbols: ...a sentence containing several
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words... is therefore a complex symbol” (Russell 1918: 10). By 1919, he extends the view to
cover mental representations, whether they are made out of mental words and mental images
(Russell 1919: 29). Russell’s truth-bearers are finally concrete linguistic and mental
representations. Similarly, Wittgenstein (1922) uses the word ‘proposition’, as Horwich points
out, to refer to “a sentence with its meaning, and not, as is more common these days, to refer
merely to the meaning itself that a sentence might have” (Horwich 2012: 76n). Wittgenstein’s
“propositions” are structured combinations of meaningful symbols or representations. Like
Russell, he intends the view to cover mental representations: “The applied, thought,
propositional sign is the thought.” (Wittgenstein 1922: 3.5). While Russell (1919) and
Wittgenstein (1922) do not offer an account of attitude ascriptions, notice that neither the
analysis of ascriptions as stating single relations between agents and mind- and languageindependent propositions, nor Russell’s multiple relation analysis, is compatible with their view
that beliefs are concrete structured representations that are truth-bearers in their own right—i.e.,
primary truth-bearers. But the analysis of ascriptions as proposed by Devitt, which I have
defended in Chapter 1 and in this appendix, does offer a compatible alternative.
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